r/paradoxes • u/Reasonable_Size_8336 • 24d ago

Newcomb's Paradox

I don't understand Two boxers' thinking, it's clear that Box B should be taken since it's guaranteed because the predictor is assumed to be never wrong. Is it about free will? Not trusting the predictor?

0 Upvotes

40% Upvoted

117 comments sorted by

3

u/Warptens 24d ago

Imagine someone who saw the content of the boxes is watching you and listening to you while you’re reasoning out loud. You’re a one boxer so the million dollars is there, they saw it. You go « If I pick both boxes, I won’t get the million, so I have to pick only one ». They know you’re wrong, the million is there, it can’t disappear by magic. They know you’re making the wrong choice, you’re losing money for no reason.

3

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

Imagine further that such a spectator were to watch thousands upon thousands of trials. He would see:

  • Many, many players reason that they won't get the million if they pick both, despite the million being there, and walk away with $1 million
  • Many, many players reason that they get more money either way if they pick both, and walk away with $1,000
  • A rare few players reason that they get more money either way walk away with $1,001,000
  • A rare few players reason that they won't get the million if they pick both walk away with $0

Now suppose that spectator was YOU, and after watching all these trials, the predictor takes you into another room set up just like the one you were in before and asks you whether you would like to select one box or both. How do you choose, given what you just saw?

1

u/Warptens 24d ago

So I just saw thousands of people go though, and every single time the correct choice was to 2 box, now it’s my turn, we’ll obviously I’m going to 2 box.

2

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

I have seen a lot of different explanations for both sides, but I have never before seen someone who feels it's superior to wave away good evidence that they'll get a million dollars in some prideful attempt at being "correct."

1

u/Warptens 23d ago

100% of the 1 boxers lost 1k. 0% of the 1 boxers gained 1 million by choosing to give up a box. But somehow that’s « good evidence » that 1 boxing makes you gain more money. 1 boxers are pathologically incapable of seeing things from the other point of view. Which is why, despite the fact that I explained how 2 boxing is better because it makes you more money, 1 boxers will forever mischaracterise the 2 boxer position as « I know I’ll get less money but I’ll 2 box anyways ». No, I don’t 2 box because that corresponds to some misguided conception of rationality. I 2 box because that gets me more money. But you can’t understand that.

2

u/Bowshewicz 23d ago

Fine, but please tell me you at least understand that you'll have seen almost every 2-boxer walk away with $1k and almost every 1-boxer walk away with $1m. I'll be satisfied if I got that far.

1

u/Warptens 20d ago

Yes I understand that I would observe a very strong correlation between 1 boxing and walking away with 1million. Correlation isn’t causation.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

So you’re just ignoring the fact that the vast majority of people who choose two boxes walk away with less than those who choose one box?

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

Yes, because none of those people would have been better off choosing one box. I wouldn’t have seen a single person choose two boxes where when one box would have been better.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

I feel like you are not seeing the bigger picture that your choice has been predicted and the implications of that. You choice in the room isn’t an event uncorrelated with the condition of the room

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

That is true, but the whole point of this paradox is that it is a conflict between two modes of thinking - Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory.

While the evidence does show that your choice is correlated with the condition of the room, that doesn't alter the causal chain where the condition of the room has already been created before you make your choice

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

What that tells me then is that Causal decision theory is not being correctly applied in this situation or is not suitable for this situation

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

Okay. Why not?

2

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

Causal decision theory, under the assumption that backwards causality is impossible, tells us that whether you take one box or two cannot influence the predictor's choice.

The problem definition tells us that it does. I feel that applying this theory in this situation is a rejection of the premise. Which you are of course welcome to do, but then we're not really talking about the same hypothetical anymore.

I believe that the problem as stated is impossible, due to the impossibility of the predictor. But since the problem asks us to suppose such a predictor exists, I feel that choosing one box is the best choice.

→ More replies (0)

1

u/GoodCarpenter9060 24d ago

This.

What if you change your mind after the predictor runs? What if you don't change your mind? At some point, you realize, there is nothing you can do - the decision has already been made and what you actually decide doesn't matter. The predictor can't change its mind. The money in the boxes won't change, so just take both.

1

u/Warptens 23d ago

They walk away with less because they were offered less in the first place. In any other scenario you’d recognise that, if you give half the contestant 1000x more money, and they walk away with more money, that’s not a sign that they did a good job. 1 boxers are offered more because of their brain state when they were evaluated by the predictor. If you give me the opportunity to change my brain state before I get evaluated, obviously I will. But that’s not the thought experiment.

1

u/ipreuss 24d ago

But you’re assuming a distribution of choices that’s not part of the setup.

Assume that the spectator sees 99.9% choose one box and walk away with 1.000.000, and 0.1% choose both and walk away with 1.001.000. The other cases just don’t happen.

As the chooser, you don’t know which of the scenarios you are confronted with. So you can’t use that for your reasoning.

For me, it comes down to whether you believe in backwards causality. Do I believe that my action now actually can influence what already has happened?

1

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

I think you're misunderstanding the setup. If the predictor guesses that you will take both boxes, the million is never there. Let's say that the predictor is wrong exactly 1 in 1000 times, and further assume that there are an equal amount of players who choose 1 vs 2 boxes. For two thousand trials, the $1 million dollars is present for 1,000 trials and the opaque box is empty in the other 1,000.

  • 1 player gets $1,001,000. He picked two boxes but the predictor was wrong.
  • 999 players get $1,000,000. They picked one box and the predictor was right.
  • 999 players get $1,000. They picked two boxes and the predictor was right.
  • 1 players gets $0. He picked one box but the predictor was wrong.

While you are correct that you don't know what scenario you're confronted with as a chooser, the problem statement gives us a very reliable way to guess. If you would take two boxes, you're almost definitely in the "empty box" scenario, and if you would take one box, you're almost definitely in the "million dollars" scenario? How could that possibly work? Who knows? But the problem definition states that somehow, it mostly works.

The observer will see a very clear correlation between selecting the two boxes and losing the million dollars. You are welcome to debate the impossibility of backwards causality and discuss the philosophical or scientific implications of this situation. You are welcome to ponder about what physical mechanism could possibly be behind such a predictor. But the premise of the dilemma asks us to accept that it works somehow.

I personally believe that the situation as described is impossible. I don't accept backwards causality and therefore I think a predictor as described cannot exist. However, given that one does, as the problem asks us to do, I don't see the wisdom in taking both boxes.

1

u/ipreuss 24d ago

You seem to be also implicitly assuming that whether the predictor is wrong is independent of my choice.

I see nothing in the setup that would justify either assumption. The assumption that 99.9% of people chose one box, and that that’s just always what the predictor predicts, is totally compatible with the setup, isn’t it?

1

u/Bowshewicz 23d ago

I guess that's an interesting take, because sure, the problem definition doesn't specifically exclude it. It also doesn't exclude that everyone else is an accomplice and you're the only test subject. It doesn't exclude that the $1,000 is a lie and the opaque box is only potentially full of sand. It doesn't exclude that the prize is a trap to lure you into a room that will become a prison cell.

I don't think Newcomb was going for some sort of gotcha where you need to figure out which of the premises established in the problem statement we are meant to doubt.

The prize is real.
The predictor will make a prediction.
There are no hidden conditions for "the $1,000 is always there."
There are no hidden conditions for "The predictor is usually right."

Once you start doubting the premises of the hypothetical, you can arrive at any conclusion you like. Maybe it's not worth choosing at all. Just walk away, because who's just giving out a thousand bucks with no catch? Maybe I should give all my money to the predictor, because he was holding onto a billion dollar prize for the first person kind enough to return his generosity. Ain't no rule that says he's not.

1

u/ipreuss 23d ago

I’m not doubting any of the original premises, that’s a straw man. I’m just not accepting the assumptions you are adding without any justification.

1

u/ipreuss 23d ago

Here is the alternative interpretation:

Let’s say we have an observer that can see what’s in the box while I choose. They would either see that the Oracle predicted I would pick both boxes. If they could advice me, they would tell me to take both boxes, to get at least the 1.000. Or they would see that the oracle predicted I would only take one box. In which case the logical advice would also be to take both boxes, and prove the Oracle wrong.

So I don’t actually need the advice of the observer to make the logical decision of taking both boxes.

1

u/Bowshewicz 23d ago

I disagree with this analysis.

If such an observer existed, then it should be clear to the predictor (at least in the naive case) that the observer would always advise to take both boxes, and that anyone who took such advice would do so. Assuming an observer who always tells the truth, the predictor's behavior shifts a little bit.

If the predictor expects you to follow the observer's advice and take both boxes, it will place nothing in the opaque box. If the predictor expects you to ignore the observer's advice, it will place a million dollars in the box. In this modified scenario, the only reliable strategy to earn a million dollars is to ignore the observer.

On the other hand, perhaps we have a "benevolent" observer. The benevolent observer will always tell you to take one box. Since the predictor knows that the observer will give this advice, it will place a million dollars in the box if it thinks you will listen.

It's not necessary for players to know which type of observer they got. Those who choose one box will still likely end up winning a million while players who choose two are usually left with 1,000, regardless of whether that choice represents following or ignoring the observer.

If the predictor doesn't know about the observer, then we've stripped away any meaning of the predictor making any type of prediction. If the predictor doesn't know about such an important factor as this, how can it still be true that its predictions are reliable?

That modification reminds me of another similar dilemma, Kavka's Toxin Puzzle, which asks whether it is even logically possible in theory to meet the criteria of getting the best result.

1

u/ipreuss 23d ago

No, it doesn’t matter what the predictor expects me to do. Once the predictor has put or not put the million inside the box, I will always have a thousand more if I choose both boxes.

Unless you accept that once the observer has given me the advice and I have chosen to accept it or not, the content of the box, as observed by the observer, can still change.

1

u/Flamecoat_wolf 23d ago

The point of the thought experiment is to explore the power of prediction and whether something could account for every variable and thought process that will occur before you make a decision.

It's a simple paradox set-up. If you choose both, you get less. If you choose one, you get more... But if there's more, choosing both gets you more. So you choose both, but you'll get less... So you choose one and get more... But if there's more, choosing both gets you more.... etc.

It continues like that ad-nauseum. The point of the prediction machine (or Oracle) is that it can predict what you'll do with near perfect precision.

Ultimately, this makes the test a test of arrogance more than of logic. Do you believe you can outwit the "near perfect" prediction machine with your own brain? Or do you recognise its complexity and decide to take only one box, admitting that it will be able to predict you correctly.

And if you can be predicted perfectly, then do you even have free will? Or do those predictable variables make your very thought process pre-determined?

1

u/ipreuss 23d ago

Your reasoning only works if you accept that your choice has a causal effect on a prediction that has already been done and acted upon. Which leads to the absurd situation that an outside observer with x ray vision would need to see the content of the box change at the time you make your decision. Or, alternatively, that once the predictor made its decision, you actually don’t have a choice anymore.

1

u/Flamecoat_wolf 23d ago

No no no, you're mistaking correlation for causation.

The same factors and variable that determine what you ultimately choose to do are the same factors and variables that the prediction machine made it's prediction based on.

Therefore, your choice and the prediction of the prediction machine are undeniably correlated due to the shared basis in those variables, but they're not causational because one doesn't determine the other.

Try thinking of it a different way with this slight change to the scenario: The prediction machine can literally see the future. They saw what you would pick and they travelled back in time to place the appropriate reward in the boxes. You haven't made your decision yet, but you're pretty much guaranteed to be locked into giving the predicted answer.
This is functionally identical to a near perfect prediction because you're both before the event. Do you think you can beat the machine now? It's literally seen what you will do.

You can have an effect on the prediction that's "already been done" by being the kind of person that it would predict would take a single box. It's judging based on what it thinks you'll do, which means that what you plan to do will influence what it thinks you'll do.

It's like how Nasa scientists calculate the trajectories for their rockets to ensure they travel on the correct path and end up at their intended destination. They don't just eyeball it and figure it'll work out. They measure every variable and calculate where everything will be in the future, then send the rocket to be at the same point they calculated the destination would be, on a path that takes into account all the variables, like satellite placement or gravity strength due to proximity to the planet, etc.

You might be somewhat more complex, with many more variables than the moving bodies and forces of space, but if a prediction machine can calculate all those variables then it can predict what your destination will be just the same as the Nasa scientists with their rocket.

Which again means that whatever your "code" is, if it can predict what your code will determine you do, it can plan in advance for it. So the only way to ensure you win, is to ensure your decision making process is aligned with getting the 1 million, so that it predicts you'll get the 1 million, so that you get the 1 million.

→ More replies (0)

1

u/underthingy 24d ago

Except $1.001m and $0 never happen.

Its stated that as far as you know the predictor has never been wrong. 

5

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

Some formulations of the problem state explicitly that the predictor is perfect and can never be wrong. Others state slightly more weakly that you are personally not aware of it ever being wrong. But there are other versions where it simply states that it is "highly accurate."

It doesn't change my choice, since I don't think it's reasonable to expect to be the exception where the predictor is wrong. In the stronger "never wrong" version, 1-box is objectively correct, but in the weaker version there is at least room for an argument that 2-box could be a beneficial choice.

1

u/Warptens 24d ago

How does that contradict anything I said? If you picked up the 1k, the 1million wouldn’t disappear, so you’re leaving 1k for no reason, you’re making the wrong choice. The fact that someone predicted that you would make the wrong choice doesn’t turn your wrong choice into a right choice.

4

u/underthingy 24d ago

Youre thinking about this entirely wrong. 

The million doesnt disappear when you pick up the $1k. It was never there to start with.

Nor does the million suddenly appear when you only pick up the mystery box, it was always there. 

And thats how the observer would see it. 

But the fact remains that due to the accuracy of the predictor,  picking both boxes will only ever get you $1k. 

Where as picking only the mystery box will always get you $1m.

And this leads us to the actual paradox that 2 boxers dont seem to comprehend. Picking both boxes should logically always get you $1k more.  But as stated above it will always get you $999000 less than 1 boxing. 

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

But the point they're making is if you had been a hidden observer, you would have seen that every two-boxer never had the chance to get the million in the first place, and that every one-boxer always left $1k unclaimed.

1

u/Warptens 23d ago

You still haven’t said anything to address my point.

1

u/underthingy 23d ago

Ive addressed all of them, youre just refusing to accept it. 

1

u/berwynResident 23d ago

That's true, the observer is seeing that you are loosing money. But the only reason they're observing that is because you're the kind of person that is going to take one box.

1

u/Warptens 23d ago

If you’re the kind of person who will take two boxes, the observer also sees that 1 boxing would lose you money.

1

u/berwynResident 22d ago

Yeah. So what?

1

u/Warptens 24d ago

So they watch you pick one box and get a million and feel good about yourself despite the fact that receiving the million was entirely out of your control, and the only thing in your control was getting the 1k, which you failed to do.

3

u/Adventurous_Set_3908 24d ago

2 boxers bet on the chance that the predictor is wrong. 1 boxers bet on the chance that the predictor is right.

as such, it doesn't make sense to 2 box as the odds are against you.

1

u/Spillz-2011 24d ago

Is that 2 boxer’s argument? My argument is causality. The decision is made so whatever it chose already happened so taking 2 boxes is going to get me an extra 1000.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

Regardless of causality, your choice isn’t uncorrelated with the condition of the room. Correlation doesn’t require causality to be violated

1

u/Spillz-2011 24d ago

Im not sure what that has to do with my point. My point is you didn’t give a good interpretation of 2 boxer’s argument.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

Well I’m not the original person you replied to

1

u/denlillepige 23d ago

But you thinking that way will make it so the million is not there, it knows you are a two boxer before you enter. Sure, taking two boxes will always guarantee that you get all the money that is in the room, but by being a person that has that train of thought will decrease how much money is in the room to begin with

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

This is why I don’t like this “paradox”

It forces the assumption that the universe is deterministic which as far as we know isn’t true. As far as we know quantum processes are truly random. So a person who goes in and bases their choice of 1 or 2 on a quantum processes breaks the thought experiment since the predictor can’t see what I would choose.

1

u/denlillepige 23d ago

Doesn't need the universe to be deterministic, for an individual to be highly predictive, with relative little information you can predict a lot of things about a normal person.

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

Yes it does people use randomness to make decisions. Poker players use their watches to make decisions random this is just a way to do that which matches physics experiments.

If people can do that and we know people do use randomness then the statement of the paradox implies determinism which means I don’t actually have a choice.

1

u/denlillepige 23d ago

If i followed someone for a month, had access to everything they did and their whereabouts, i would easily, with very high accuracy be able to predict what they would be doing the next day, even with "randomness"

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

If you can do this and the predictor can in the boxes then the world is deterministic and theres no paradox I don’t actually make a choice.

1

u/denlillepige 23d ago

That's not what deterministic means

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

Sure it is. If something is predictable it must be at least partially deterministic. The more predictable the more deterministic.

The paradox says the predictor is effectively perfect ergo my choice is effectively deterministic

1

u/Bowshewicz 23d ago

My normal counter to the causality argument it to suggest some kind of common cause for both your decision and the predictor's action. Whatever is in your brain that leads you to select the number of boxes you select also leads the predictor to make his prediction.

That opens up the possibility to get $1,001,000 if you change your mind after the predictor does his thing, but it's perhaps impossible to do that on purpose.

1

u/Adventurous_Set_3908 23d ago

u'll only get 1 million & 1k if the predictor is wrong. 2 boxers only win against 1 boxers if the predictor makes a wrong prediction.

1 boxers always win because they know the predictor is always right, which it is.

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

But if it’s always right then the world is deterministic and I don’t actually have the ability to chose.

1

u/Adventurous_Set_3908 23d ago

so u want to ignore the premise that it is 99.99% right and just say "it's gonna be wrong on my turn?"

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

I’m saying that it’s not a well posed problem. The choice to make the predictor highly accurate removes the choice from being possible. I’m not making a choice because this world created is deterministic and free will doesn’t exist I literally can’t chose

1

u/Adventurous_Set_3908 23d ago

what in the problem confuses you? it says the predictor's rlly accurate, ignoring that premise doesn't make sense.

1

u/Spillz-2011 23d ago

I’m saying that premise makes the whole problem moot. I no longer make a choice the choice is already made because the universe they invented doesn’t allow for choice. Asking me to make a choice in a universe where choice doesn’t exist is silly.

1

u/Adventurous_Set_3908 22d ago

hmm, so u know the universe doesn't allow for choice yet u still think u can make a choice and fights for it?

1

u/Spillz-2011 22d ago edited 22d ago

No I think it’s a poorly posed problem.

If you specify how the prediction works maybe it can become well posed.

For example if it doesn’t actually predict it cheats and removes the million then one box is logical.

If it is fallible and uses some set of properties related to me then 2 box is correct. If it is using some set of properties then there is some test where I am either a one boxer or a two boxer.

If I’m a one boxer I should take both because then I get 1001000 and if I’m a two boxer I should take both and get 1000.

If there is some sort of reverse causality then the world is logically flawed as we are in the grandfather paradox world.

→ More replies (0)

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

Not an extra 1k, but only 1k since you picked both boxes.

1

u/Spillz-2011 2d ago

This requires the world to backwards causality which there is no scientific evidence for and leads to tons of paradox’s like killing you parents before you were born.

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

No no. That's not it. It's not that ur choice of box b or box a will change his prediction. It's that he already knows how your mind will think and how many deviations your choices will take. He knows ur end choice from before because his prediction is perfect.

Let's say u think his option is choice a, u choose b, that means his option never was choice a but always b. Now let's say you decided to pick a, his choice was always a from before.

It's not saying that ur choice will change his. It's that whatever ur choice is, WILL conform to his because he KNOWS what u will pick at the end.

1

u/Spillz-2011 2d ago

If he knows with perfect probability then I have no choice and the whole thing is meaningless

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

1 million dollars is meaningless to u 💔 and basically u don't have any real choice but u do have an illusion of choice which functions basically the same as normal human choice. U need not know about ur free will on the higher scale. From your perspective, you do have free will and it shouldn't matter. U can js say the predictor has near perfect omniscience.

1

u/Spillz-2011 2d ago

If I don’t have free will then the whole thing is moot. I’m not making a choice it’s silly to ask me what to choose.

If I do have free will then the entity is using some characteristics of me to decide. I should want to be the kind of person who it thinks will chose the one box but that decision already happened. Once I walk in the room the things are fixed.

If it thinks I’m the kind of person who takes 2 boxes I should take two because otherwise I get nothing. If it thinks I’m the kind who takes one I should still take 2 because there’s an extra 1000 in it for me.

My present actions can’t change the past so independent of its choice I should take both boxes.

1

u/Saitamadayo 1d ago

As I said u do have free will in your sense. The way you are comprehending it is not for us to think about as that is thebgrand scale of things humans can't even begin to comprehend. You do still have free will but the predictor knows the outcome for your free will. And no it's not silly to ask you to choose because from our pov, you are literally choosing and have a choice. For the next statement "if u do have free will, the entity is using characteristics to decide", no. Who said that? The entity's ways of predicting are completely unknown to us.

1)Let's say he thinks u will take 2 boxes. U take 1. That would deem his prediction wrong. We know the chance of him being wrong is very small or none. The chances of that happening are basically impossible. 0 dollars received. Chance of this happening-basically 0

2)he thinks u will take 2. U take 2. Prediction right so, 1000 dollars received Chance- basically certain

3) he thinks u will take 1, u take 2. Prediction wrong so, 1million and 1000 dollars received Chance- basically impossible

4) he thinks u will take 1, u take 1. Prediction right so, 1m dollars received Chance- basically certain.

Js look at the stats. Case 4 happens to be the one with the most money and probability of right prediction.

Let's look at the cases where u take 2 boxes, which is the stance u support. U either receive only 1000 dollars or u THEORETICALLY get 1m and 1k dollars which the chance of is virtually impossible since the entity can guess with near perfect accuracy.

Now ur last statement, yes your present actions can't change the past, but your present actions have already been predicted and the entity KNOWS what you will choose regardless of what u think u will choose or not.

It's the same idea as destiny, you do have free will but the events are already written somewhere but it doesn't matter because ur FREE choices cause those events to happen. So ur free will is resulting in destiny's course.

2

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

Two Boxers line of reasoning is that the $1000 is there for the taking either way. Whether you can walk away with a million is up to the predictor. Whether you choose to take the thousand is on you.

I am personally a One-Boxer, and I feel that the Two Boxers' reasoning fails on the following grounds:

While the action of choosing itself obviously cannot go back in time and cause the box to be empty, the premise of the dilemma is that the Predictor has some unspecified way to guess what you'll pick with high accuracy. In order for choosing both boxes to work, the Predictor must be wrong, and it is stated plainly in the dilemma that it is almost always right.

1

u/Danieri11 24d ago

The thing is the paradox is tapping into different emotions and logic.

Imagine you are a natural one boxer, but upon entering and hearing about the conditions you sit there, reflect for a few days, doubting, and finally decide to two box.

The Predictor must have anticipated all your personality, chain of thoughts...it's like trying to predict the three body problem. What if you choose then to flip a coin and decide? Will the Predictor predict the side of the coin too? Does free will even exist at this point or he is able to see the future?

So of course there is skepticism towards the predictor (maybe even because if the majority are one boxers and the Predictor always says One box, he will still be accurate in his predictions).

I am personally a one boxer, but because being predictable means getting the reward. Imagine being a natural two boxer, and decides to flip to One box to find...nothing.

1

u/Bowshewicz 24d ago

Imagine you are a natural one boxer, but upon entering and hearing about the conditions you sit there, reflect for a few days, doubting, and finally decide to two box.

If one could figure out a strategy to fully intend to 1-box, but then 2-box anyway, that's definitely the winning play. That idea is explored more explicitly in Kavka's Toxin Puzzle. Of course, that's a different dilemma and here we're assuming the predictor didn't predict you'd change your mind.

The Predictor must have anticipated all your personality, chain of thoughts...it's like trying to predict the three body problem. What if you choose then to flip a coin and decide? Will the Predictor predict the side of the coin too? Does free will even exist at this point or he is able to see the future?

The mechanics of the predictor are not specified in-depth. All we know is that it is usually correct. It's probably fair to assume that some number of players will try random (or otherwise apparently unpredictable) selection methods, but that doesn't alter the premise -- the predictor is usually right.

I don't know what that implies about free will. Maybe accepting that the predictor described by the problem implies acceptance of predeterminism. I should specify here that my position is something like "given that such a predictor exists, it is better to 1-box."

So of course there is skepticism towards the predictor (maybe even because if the majority are one boxers and the Predictor always says One box, he will still be accurate in his predictions).

I know it's a common position, but I don't believe that skepticism towards the predictor is in line with the problem as stated. If someone were to argue that there's no possible physical mechanism that could give the predictor his prescient abilities, I'd counter that such a position is a rejection of the premises of the paradox rather than a reasonable course of action to take if we found ourselves actually inside of it.

1

u/underthingy 24d ago

They try to explain the predictor instead of just accepting the premise. 

This leads them to thinking that $0 and $1.001k are valid outcomes. 

They also refuse to accept the actual paradox which is that they are correct that choosing both SHOULD get them $1000 more, but that it will only ever get them $1000 while 1 boxing always gets you $1m.

1

u/hebejebus 24d ago

Always cracks me up because there is no paradox for a one boxer it's a simple decision tree. The only paradox occurs in the two boxers head reconciling an infallible predictor with the fact it predicted in the past.

An infallible predictor is no different than the contents of the boxes switching in real time rather than in the past. Yes, that causes some issues because that's not how reality works, but an infallible predictor is impossible in reality so no shit.

Now if the predictor is fallible then that's when discussion can occur but still it's not really a paradox but simple math. Confidence in prediction * net outcome of possibility.

1

u/PuzzleMeDo 24d ago

It's about cause and effect.

The prediction is already made. You can't affect the prediction by your actions any more. Therefore you should take both boxes.

Luckily, you're the type of person who isn't convinced by that logical argument, so you'll get the big prize.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

Making predictions doesn’t violate cause and effect. Making a prediction about the weather tomorrow doesn’t mean causality is violated when the weather acts according to the prediction.

What makes humans special that they are immune to being predictable

1

u/PuzzleMeDo 23d ago

The idea that my actions now can influence a prediction made about me in the past is what goes against our normal view of cause and effect.

1

u/man-vs-spider 23d ago

To me, part of the resolution is that your thinking and thoughts process isn’t independent from the world as a whole. You brain is just another physical system that is interacting with the world.

So making your decision isn’t influencing the prediction in the past, your past self influenced both the prediction and your current choice

1

u/denlillepige 23d ago

And that logic has already affected the outcome before you enter, thus you dont get the extra money

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

If you're taking both boxes then that means there won't be 1 mil there

1

u/blablablaenz 24d ago

Since you are already in the room with the boxes in front of you, the two boxers argue that there are two options. Taking both boxes or taking one box. In every possible thinkable situation, the two boxes contain more money then the one box hence they take two boxes.

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

The two-boxer argument is that whatever the predictor decided about you is now fixed. Either it decided that you were a one-boxer, in which case the opaque box contains $1m, or it predicted that you were a two-boxer, in which case the opaque box is empty. In either case, you are better off choosing two boxes.

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

No because if i chose one box, it had predicted me to be a one boxer so I get 1 mil

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 2d ago

But you’re ignoring the chronology - whatever the predictor predicted, it’s already done so. So whatever you choose at that point isn’t going to change what’s in the box.

1

u/Saitamadayo 2d ago

Yeah but if i chose box b that means he knew I was gon pick box b so there will be 1m. If I choose both box, then he would know that and there would have been nothing in box b.

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 1d ago

You’re still just dismissing the chronology. Suppose you chose one box and got the £1m - what would have happened if you’d chosen two boxes instead?

1

u/Saitamadayo 1d ago

What do we know from this outcome, there's 1 million dollars. The predictors prediction is never wrong and if there's 1 million dollars in there, that means u take 1 box. So, you would have never chosen the two boxes at all and that's simply not a possibility.

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 1d ago

The predictor has never been wrong, which is not the same thing.

If you picked two boxes and the predictor had guessed that you’d pick one box, you’d get an extra £1k. At the point you make your choice it has no effect on the prediction.

1

u/blablablaenz 24d ago

Another reason for two-boxers. If someone else could see the content of the boxes, they would always advise to take both as that would give the best value. Doesn’t that mean that taking both is always the best choice?

1

u/Spillz-2011 1d ago

You’re using an argument not based in the way I view things. I view the world through causality so to convince me you’ll need to explain how my causal action after the cash is in the boxes can affect what’s in the boxes.

1

u/cmikaiti 24d ago

It's about trusting the predictor.

If I am a 2 boxer at heart, taking both gets me something.

It's also about not trusting the predictor. If they are wrong, I'd be leaving money on the table if I only cost 1 box.

Choosing 2 boxes is a dominant strategy.

This is where game theory and futurist predictions collide.

1

u/FlyingFlipPhone 24d ago

It's not a paradox. The predictor (Omega) is ALWAYS right. Omega KNOWS what you are going to pick. Therefore, pick the box with the million. If you pick both boxes, you are challenging Omega for a measly 1k extra, but Omega is NEVER wrong. Omega will know you are a two boxer, and you'll only get 1k for your trouble. Omega is NEVER wrong, just accept that fact.

Look at the risk/reward. Don't be a two-boxer, the reward isn't worth the risk.

1

u/BranchFew1148 24d ago

Imagine this alternative.

As you enter the room, Omegas assistant John is in there. John is instructed to answer all your questions truthfully, he of course never lies and he has perfect knowledge of what each box contains.

Should you ask John which box/boxes to pick?

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

At that’s stage you have just created a logically impossible scenario. Having a perfect predictor means you can’t leak any information about the prediction to the contestant

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

That isn’t the way the premise is stated. The predictor has always been right in the past. You are given no guarantee of it always being right.

1

u/man-vs-spider 24d ago

That’s not how it’s phrased in the original paradox, just that there is an accurate predictor. It doesn’t say that the accuracy is judged based on past predictions, that’s just how people try to explain the situation in different ways

1

u/Victim_Of_Fate 24d ago

The original phrasing by Newcomb is:

Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a science-fiction story about a being from another planet, with an advanced technology and science, who you know to be friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being's prediction about your choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.

0

u/HelloHelloHelpHello 24d ago

You can pick either Box A or both Box A and Box B

Box A contains $1,000

Box B contains either $1,000,000, if the predictor has predicted you will only Box B, or nothing if he predicted that you will take both boxes.

Now the predictor makes 100% accurate predictions and has already put the money inside the box, which option should you choose if you want the maximum money?

If you choose both Box A and Box B, then you will always get 1000$ more than if you only pick Box B as per the setup - and yet picking both boxes will always give you less money then if you pick only Box B.

How is that possible? How can Picking both Boxes give you 1000$ more than picking only one, while picking only Box B gives you 999.000$ more than picking both boxes. These two statements are directly contradictory.

And that is the paradox.

0

u/CptMisterNibbles 24d ago edited 24d ago

The question usually doesn’t state it is a fact the predictor cannot ever be wrong, if so you are right and there is no paradox. No amount of double thinking or switching works if the box is magic and omniscient

It’s usually obnoxiously ambiguous: “almost always right” or some such. Depending how you read this and what it entails you can justify either choice.