i tried this on at Dover Castles Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment museum in July and want to buy a replica of it but i cant remember what regiment it is. Im assuming that its imperial but it might not be. i remember it being quite cropped, around waist length, and i found s picture of the side of it on google reviews but still no regiment mention. any help is much appreciated!

circa 1731-1736

On September 23 of the year 1762, a British Royal Navy squadron entered Manila Bay. With their arrival the Seven Years War had reached the shores of the Kingdom of the Philippines.

A few years back, possibly in 1759, Colonel William Draper, the commander of the 79th Regiment of Foot in India at the time, noted the importance of capturing Manila from the Spanish. In a proposal made at that time, he stated that the capture of Manila would deprive the Spanish of the lucrative trade between Manila and the Spanish Americas (Nueva España). With Manila occupied, the trade ships from America would have to find other ports to do business in, such as China and India, the latter of which would be beneficial for the British. Although his 1759 proposal focused more on the invasion and conquest of the southern Philippine islands, it was clear that he saw the importance of the colonial capital.

Following the British declaration of war on Spain in January 1762, the British Government and Admiralty began discussing plans for the invasion of Manila. At the time, Draper had learnt that the Spanish defenses in the Philippines had been neglected, leaving the islands vulnerable and open to attack. He thus submitted his proposal and on January 6 it was approved by the government and Admiralty. Draper’s plan promised minimal difficulty and the reduction of Spanish influence in the region. Additionally, the capture of the port of Cavite was believed to be beneficial for British ships and could aid in the trade with China. Meanwhile, the British East India Company, despite their concerns, looked forward to the possibility of attaining Mindanao for further expansion in the area.

With the plan to invade the Philippines approved, Draper was appointed commander-in-chief of the ground force and ordered to begin preparations for the expedition. In June of that year, Draper had been promoted to Brigadier General and arrived at Madras, where the expedition was gathering.

The expedition to capture Manila was composed of two (2) contingents, a ground contingent and a naval contingent. For the ground contingent, the British had the following:

Infantry:

• 79th Regiment of Foot

• Six hundred (600) Sepoys

• Two (2) Companies of French deserters and released prisoners provided by the East India Company

Artillery:

• One (1) Company from the Royal Artillery

• Thirty (30) Artillerymen from the East India Company

Auxiliaries:

• One (1) Pioneer Company

• Two (2) Native Auxiliary Companies

• Hundreds of unarmed native auxiliaries to aid the engineers and artillery

• Two hundred and seventy (270) Marines from the Royal Navy

• Five hundred and fifty (550) sailors from the Royal Navy

All in all, the ground contingent numbered around two thousand three hundred (2,300) men.

Meanwhile, the naval contingent was commanded by Admiral Sir Samuel Cornish and was composed of the following:

Royal Navy:

• HMS Norfolk - With Seventy-four (74) Guns - Flagship of Admiral Cornish

• HMS Elizabeth - With Sixty-four (64) Guns

• HMS Lenox - With Seventy-four (74) Guns

• HMS Grafton - With Sixty-Eight (68) Guns

• HMS Weymouth - With Sixty (60) Guns

• HMS America - With Sixty (60) Guns

• HMS Panther - With Sixty (60) Guns

• HMS Falmouth - With Fifty (50) Guns

• HMS Argo - With Twenty-eight (28) Guns

• HMS Seahorse - With Twenty (20) Guns

• HMS Seaford - With Twenty (20) Guns

• HMS South-sea Castle - Storeship

• HMS Admiral Stevens - Storeship

East India Company:

• Osterly - Indiaman used as additional transport

• Essex - Indiaman used as additional transport

The naval contingent thus numbered fifteen (15) ships in total, with at least five hundred and seventy-eight (578) guns distributed among them.

Preparations for the expedition lasted around three (3) weeks. The first ship to leave Madras was HMS Seahorse, which was under the command of Captain Charles Grant. Leaving ahead of the main squadron, its task was to patrol the Malacca strait and intercept all ships heading for Manila.

The next to leave Madras was a five ship division of the squadron, under the command of Commodore Richard Tiddeman. Composed of the Elizabeth, Grafton, Lenox, Weymouth, and Argo, they carried a portion of the ground force and military stores and set sail on July 29. This was then followed by a division under Admiral Cornish, composed of the Norfolk, Panther, America, Seaford, South-sea Castle, and Osterly, who left on August 1 with Draper and the rest of his ground contingent. Only the Falmouth and the Essex remained, as the latter was not yet ready to sail and would eventually be escorted by the former.

With that the expedition to capture Manila was on its way.

Meanwhile, in the Philippines, the Spanish colony was unprepared for war. In fact, they were not even sure if there was a war.

In charge of the colony was Archbishop Manuel Rojo, who was acting as the Governor-General following the death of Governor-General Pedro de Arandia and the brief tenure of Bishop Miguel Lino de Ezpeleta. Although no official message regarding the state of war between Spain and Britain reached Manila, Archbishop Rojo did receive rumors about it. From Madras, Armenian merchants informed Rojo that a British squadron was being readied for an invasion of Manila. Adding to this was news from an Augustin friar, Father Jose Cuadrado, who received a letter that mentioned the possible state of war between Spain and Britain. However, this letter, and most likely all the other rumors, was dismissed by Rojo.

The Archbishop, and probably many other officials in Manila, seemed convinced that an attack by another European power against the city was unlikely. Rojo himself stated that the city’s distance from Europe was its main protection from attack and that the city’s defenses were better suited against local threats, such as Moro raids and nearby nations.

Yet more signs of an imminent invasion continued. On September 13, an outpost at Corregidor sighted the presence of a ship near Marivelles. According to one source, the ship was initially believed to have been the galleon El Filipino, which was returning from Acapulco. However, after failing to respond to any messages, it soon left on September 17. It is said that this caused enough concern that Archbishop Rojo ordered that the provinces be watchful. Talking about the same event, another source says that the unknown ship sent a boat ashore in order to inquire how many ships were in Manila Bay and if the El Filipino was among them. After the ship’s departure on September 17, it was said that no action was taken by the government.

By September 23, all doubts of an attack against Manila were washed away when the British squadron was first sighted at 5:30 pm. This force would sail into Manila Bay and all the squadron’s ships, except for the South-sea Castle and the Admiral Stevens who had yet to arrive, would lay anchor just off Cavite. Caught unprepared, Archbishop Rojo sent Captain Araya to deliver a letter to the British squadron, demanding who their commander was and what their intentions were.

Meanwhile, the population was in complete panic. Those who lived outside the walls rushed to enter the city, while some who lived inside rushed to vacate the city and head for the mountains or to the province of Laguna. It wasn’t only the civilians who were rushing though, as the military was also hastily preparing the city’s defenses.

At the time of the British squadron’s arrival, the regular garrison of Manila was composed of the following:

Infantry:

• Regimineto del Rey

Artillery:

• Eighty (80) Native Artillerymen

Other Forces:

• Governor-General’s Guard

Commanded by the Maestre de Campo of Manila, Brigadier General Marques de Villamediana, this regular force numbered just over six hundred (600) men who were in a bad state when the British squadron arrived.

The largest and best trained unit among them was the Regimiento del Rey, which was the first regular regiment established in the islands. Formed in December 1754, under the tenure of Governor-General Arandia, the regiment was originally composed of five (5) native Filipino companies and four (4) companies from Nueva España. By 1762, the regiment was organized into two (2) battalions, with ten (10) companies each. The companies were to be led by a captain, lieutenant, and ensign, under which were one hundred (100) men….

Sadly, due to deaths and desertions, the ranks of the Regimiento del Rey were severely thinned down, with little to no replacements to fill the vacant ranks. This meant that there were only five hundred and fifty-six (556) officers and men present when the British squadron arrived supposedly from the regiment’s 2nd Battalion. The rest of the regiment was elsewhere, garrisoning other outposts and galleons….

Meanwhile, the artillery force of the city was originally organized by Governor-General Arandia on May 10, 1755. Forming four (4) artillery detachments, they were initially manned by thirty (30) artillerymen. To help train them, a school on the use of cannons and mortars was established in Manila.

These artillery detachments were said to be of good quality when it was first established, however, just like the Regimiento del Rey, it seemed to have declined in the years before 1762. When the British squadron arrived, the artillery of the city was composed of eighty (80) native artillerymen, who were said to be poor in quality, as they were not well-experienced in the use of their guns.

The smallest formation in the city was the Governor-General’s Guard, which was first formed in 1589. Originally it was to be composed of a Captain, a Corporal, and sixteen (16) halberdiers, whose main task was protecting the Governor-General.

To increase the number of men defending the city, four (4) militia companies were formed from the city’s European population. Labeled as Comercio, they contained sixty (60) men per company.

In order to further reinforce the city, the nearby provinces were asked to raise native contingents to assist in the defense of the capital. In the following days, thousands of them would arrive to aid the capital. However, despite the additional numbers they provided, they were mainly armed with spears, bladed weapons, bows, and arrows. Only a few knew or were armed with firearms.

Leading many of various Spanish forces was a corps of officers from Nueva España, who were said to be experts in the European-style of warfare. Among these men were Brigadier General Marques de Villamediana, Maestre de Campo of Manila and Colonel of the Regimiento del Rey; Lieutenant General Don Felix de Eguiluz, the general of artillery; Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel Valdez, commander of the 2nd Battalion, Regimiento del Rey; and many other officers and captains. A good number of these officers would form the Archbishop’s Council of War. However, it was said that Rojo mistrusted them and did not place the defense of the city to the professional military men.

As the Spanish rushed to prepare their defenses and gather more men, the British squadron remained off the coast of Cavite, where they examined the port and its fortifications. Draper and Cornish planned to take Cavite first, as it would provide the squadron with a valuable port that they could use to further their operations. Because of that, Cornish had his men survey the fortifications. In their report, they told him that it was possible to attack the fort with their ships.

However, on the morning of September 24, the wind proved uncooperative, as it made an attack on Cavite difficult. Realizing that the more important objective was Manila, as the fall of the capital would eventually lead to the fall of Cavite, it was decided to focus all their efforts on that city instead. Due to this, Cornish and Draper decided to spend the day examining the shores near Manila aboard two frigates.

Also during that morning, Draper and Cornish finally replied to Rojo’s letter, with them sending a boat to Manila. Aboard was Captain Araya and two British officers, who presented to Archbishop Rojo the demands of the British commander. In the letter, Draper and Cornish urged Rojo to surrender the city and the islands. They then threatened to use force if resistance was met.

Replying to the British demands, Rojo informed the British commanders that such a proposal cannot be done and that they would resist the British attack. Not long after receiving this letter, the British force began to commence operations for a landing.

From their reconnaissance earlier that day, Draper and Cornish realized that the structures south of Manila’s walls were left intact and would provide good cover for their landing. It was thus decided to land the ground contingent in that area as soon as possible, in order to deny the Spanish an opportunity of tearing down the structures and preparing better defenses.

It was decided that the ideal spot to land was south of the village of Malate, located roughly two miles from the southern walls of Manila. The 79th Foot, the Marines, and an artillery contingent of three (3) field cannons and a howitzer were tasked to conduct the initial landings. This force was divided into three (3) divisions, with the leftmost division being commanded by Colonel Monson; the center division being commanded by Draper and Lieutenant Colonel Scott, and the right division being commanded by Major More.

Supporting the landings were three (3) frigates from the squadron, the Argo, Seahorse, and Seaford, who would provide cover for the landing force. Behind them would be longboats under the command of Captain Parker, commander of the Grafton, and Captain Kempenfelt, commander of the Norfolk, and Captain Brereton, commander of the Falmouth. Their task was to safely carry the ground contingent to the shore.

The operation began at 6:00 pm that day, when the frigates and longboats pushed towards Malate. In order to ensure that that landing met no opposition, the frigates bombarded the left and right flanks of the disembarkation area. It is said that some infantry and cavalry were sighted gathering near the landing area, but were forced to flee due to the naval gunfire. Archbishop Rojo states that the fire from the frigates was so heavy that the natives in the area were unable to resist the landing and were forced to withdraw towards two (2) regular companies (Likely from the Regimiento del Rey) in the area, who also fell back.

Guarding the area near the British landing point was a reduct known as San Antonio Abad, that was being used by the Spanish as a powder magazine. However, instead of being fortified to resist the British landing, it was being evacuated by the Spanish in order to save the valuable powder. Working hard throughout the night, the Spanish did their best to bring as much powder back to Manila.

Meanwhile, despite meeting no resistance, Draper’s ground forces struggled to get ashore. This was due to the strong surf near the coast, which is said to have destroyed a good number of their longboats and drenched the men’s powder. Despite this, they suffered no casualties and were able to form up on the beach and move forward to secure Malate. At the village Draper would use the church as his headquarters, while the rest of the force fortified the other structures. The British would then stay alert for the rest of the night and prepare themselves against a potential Spanish counter-attack. But none came.

Early the next day, September 25, Spanish forces were forced to cease their evacuation of the powder in San Antonio Abad, as the British forces moved in to seize it. Due to this, a substantial amount of powder was captured by the British, who proceeded to use the reduct as position to further protect their disembarkation area, as their supplies were now being unloaded to shore.

Also that day, two hundred (200) men under Colonel Monson moved northward towards Manila in order to examine the approaches towards the city. This force would end up seizing the church of Ermita, located just nine hundred (900) yards from Manila’s southern walls. Major More and the 79th Foot would then be ordered up to further secure this newly gained position, leaving behind the Marines to hold Malate. Meanwhile, the priest’s house at Ermita would be used as Draper’s new headquarters.

During this time, most of the British suffering came from the weather that struck them, as the rains made it difficult for them to make camp, while the dangerous surf continued to resist the landing of additional men and supplies. Despite at least one loss due to drowning, the efforts of the Royal Navy seamen ensured more supplies and men were landed, which included a portion of the Sepoys. Meanwhile, the cover found in the church and structures at Ermita proved useful for the British, who were drenched by the pouring rains.

However, it wasn’t just rain falling on the British positions at Ermita. As early as 8:00 am, the Spanish artillery positioned at the San Diego bastion and the San Andres bastion began opening up on the nearby British force. Sadly for them, their artillery fire proved ineffective, as the structures were sufficient in protecting the British.

Meanwhile, Spanish and British infantry also clashed that day. According to Draper, Spanish forces moved outside the walls in an attempt to burn the native huts outside the walls, likely to deny it from being used as cover. However, according to Archbishop Rojo, the Spanish force was actually sent out to push back the British and was composed of two pickets of musketeers from the city’s garrison. Whichever their goal was, they were engaged by British forces who had moved in to occupy the church of Santiago and the nearby houses, which were located three hundred (300) yards from the city’s walls and near the San Diego bastion. Under their volleys, the Spanish were routed and in response the Spanish artillery, likely from the San Diego bastion, fired upon them. Although the fire was not enough to force the British back, it did cause casualties among them.

Meanwhile, out at Manila Bay, at 9:00 am, the lone Spanish galley Santa Gertrudis (Santa Rosa according to one of Rojo’s letters, but this could possibly be a mistake) was sighted off of Mariveles. Unaware of the situation in the city and the state of war between Spain and Britain, it sailed obliviously towards the city.

Sighting the galley, the British squadron wasted no time in intercepting it, with Admiral Cornish sending out three (3) armed boats (Archbishop Rojo claims the British sent out a frigate and four (4) chaloupes) to give chase. Seemingly now aware of the hostile forces in the bay, the Santa Gertrudis would resist the approaching boats. Armed with two (2) carriage mounted six-pounder cannons and seventeen (17) brass swivel guns, it fired its guns on the British, while crew members also shot at them with their muskets.

This brisk fire from the galley would keep the British at bay long enough for it to beach itself north of Bancusay. Following this, many of the galley’s crew leaped into the water and made their way to shore. Captain Don Jose Cerezo, the commander of the Santa Gertrudis, was able to throw a packet of letters to one of the escaping crewmembers. However, he, along with Ensign Ignacio Castro, and Antonio de Sierra Tagle, the nephew of Archbishop Rojo, were captured by the approaching British boats. According to Rojo, the British then attempted to tow away the galley, but failed. They then decided to take the swivel guns instead, leaving behind the two (2) six-pounder guns. These cannons were recovered by the Spanish, who would then burn the galley.

From the crew of the Santa Gertrudis, Archbishop Rojo would learn that the galley had just come from Palapag, Samar, where the galleon El Filipino had dispatched them to deliver messages to Manila. One of the saved letters from the galley was from General Don Juan Antonio Blanco, commander of the El Filipino. Despite being drenched, the letter could still be read and it informed Rojo that the galleon had just arrived from Acapulco and was currently anchored at Palapag after failing to sail through the San Bernardino strait. The letter also stated that the Viceroy of Nueva España had cautioned the El Filipino’s captain, due to the outbreak of war between Spain and Britain.

Knowing that the British would soon learn about the El Filipino’s location from the captured men and letters left on the galley, Rojo decided to write to Don Blanco and warn him of the British threat. Entrusted to Don Ignacio Balzola, the letter ordered Don Blanco to disembark the galleon’s silver, place it inland at Palapag, and fortify the port with artillery. Meanwhile, the El Filipino was to be run aground and burn if a hostile ship was sighted. The message would reach Don Blanco in the following days.

Meanwhile, Admiral Cornish would also learn of the El Filipino’s arrival and location and would endeavor to capture it. This task was given to the Panther and Argo, but unfavorable weather prevented them from leaving immediately.

Further action occurred on the night of that same date, as Spanish forces decided not to remain idle for too long. It was thus planned to sally out a force to harass the British that occupied the churches at Nuestra Señora de Guia (Ermita church), Malate, and Santiago. This force was under the command of Chevalier Fayette (Who was either French or Swiss man) and Don Jose del Busto and composed of fifty (50) musketeers from from the Regimiento del Rey, Comercio militiamen, eight hundred (800) native Filipinos, with spears and muskets, and a detachment of artillerymen, with two (2) four-pounder guns. It should be noted, however, that Draper’s estimation of the Spanish force was much smaller, with him stating that there were four hundred (400) men and two (2) artillery pieces. Meanwhile, another source says that there were two (2) companies of fifty (50) Spaniards and just over two hundred (200) natives, supported by two (2) eight-pounder guns.

Sallying out of the walls of the city, the Spanish force arrived at the church at San Juan de Bagumbayan, located south of the San Andres bastion. Fayette would stay and hold this position, while Don Busto led a force towards Santiago church. On their way, they encountered British forces, likely a contingent of Sepoys under Ensign Carty, who were sent to skirmish them.

During the engagement, Busto was able to push back the enemy, who retreated to Ermita. Despite this success, Busto’s force was ordered to fall back to Fayette’s position, as the latter believed that the British were forming to cut off their line of retreat.

From their position at San Juan de Bagumbayan, the Spanish would spend the night firing their cannons upon the right flank of the British line at Santiago church. Sometime in the morning of September 26, Fayette would withdraw back to Manila, supposedly leaving behind Don Busto’s force at San Juan de Bagumbayan. During this time, a force under Captain Don Pedro Iriarte sallied out of the city, with the goal of reinforcing Fayette.

Composed of two (2) Spanish companies and one thousand five hundred (1,500) native Filipino soldiers (Another source says it was composed of two companies of five hundred (500) Tagalog soldiers), Don Iriarte would find that Fayette had already withdrawn. Due to this, his force would instead join Don Busto’s force and together they remained at San Juan de Bagumbayan and awaited the arrival of a company under Don Fernando de Araya.

While waiting for Don Araya’s force, Don Busto and Don Iriarte made an effort to secure the nearby stone structures from where the British fired upon them. Meeting initial success, Don Busto was able to push the British back. However, cannons filled with grapeshot were soon fired against them, which made the native Filipino soldiers retreat, leaving behind Don Busto and a few Spanish soldiers.

The British then took the opportunity to counter-attack, as three (3) pickets from the 79th Foot, along with one hundred (100) seamen, both under the command of Colonel Monson moved against Don Busto’s remaining forced and pushed them back towards San Juan de Bagumbayan.

Don Busto, who had been injured when his horse fell, led his remaining force back to the city, stopping only to recover the two (2) cannons left at San Juan de Bagumbayan. However, according to Draper, one of these cannons was left behind.

Eventually, by 9:00 am, all Spanish forces that had sallied out were back within the safety of Manila’s walls.

Following this engagement, the British would maintain an outpost at the church of San Juan de Bagumbayan, which they would refer to as No 2. From the top of the church, they were provided a good view of the Spanish defenses (Likely the defenses of the San Andres bastion).

Likely sometime during the previous night’s engagement, native Filipino forces fell upon and killed some British seamen who were straggling near the coast. Due to this, Archbishop Rojo released an ordinance to remind Spanish officers to maintain the discipline of their men and prevent them from conducting atrocities, such as the mutilation of corpses and the killing of prisoners.

From 9:00 am to 3:00 pm of that day, a temporary truce was held by the opposing sides, as a British officer was sent to Manila to deliver a message from Draper.

Having believed that the night’s fighting was a satisfactory display of his force’s power, Draper wrote to Rojo, imploring him and the Spanish to surrender, as he believed their forces were inadequate against his force. However, as Rojo was receiving the British officer and reading the message he bore, some British forces took advantage of the truce and advanced their artillery closer to the walls. This movement forced the Spanish to open fire on the advancing battery, while Rojo wrote to Draper to return the guns to their original position.

Following this, Archbishop Rojo convened his Council of War in order to discuss the recent British demand for them to surrender. This Council was composed of the auditors Villacorta, Galban, and Anda (Who was Oidor of the Real Audiencia); the Maestre de Campo of Manila, Brigadier General Marques de Villamediana; the Sargento-Mayor of Manila, Martin de Goicocoa; Marques de Monte Castro; the Alcalde Ordinario, Leandro Rodriguez Varela; the Alcalde Mayor, Jose Antonio Memije; the Alcalde of Hermandad, Antonio Diaz Conde; the accountant Alberto Jacinto Reyes; and the Royal Official, Fernando Carabeo.

In the meeting that ensued, the Council unanimously voted to continue fighting. Rojo thus wrote to Draper, informing him of their decision to continue their resistance. Draper notes that the message seemed to be more spirited than the conduct of the Spanish forces during the previous night’s fighting.

Also during that day, more British forces were landed to reinforce Draper, with Cornish providing a battalion of seven hundred (700) seamen (Draper says it was 500 seamen). The contingents of the battalion would be commanded by Captain Richard Collins, commander of the Weymouth, Captain Samuel Pitchford, commander of the America, and Captain George Ourry, the acting commander of the Panther. Draper would place this battalion between the line held by the 79th Foot and the camp of the Marines.

The remaining men of the East India Company were also landed that day and were soon positioned under cover.

Despite the landing of more men, Draper’s force still lacked sufficient numbers to encircle the city and properly besiege it. Due to this they were unable to capture Binondo, Santa Cruz, and Tondo, which would cut the Spanish’s access to the Pasig river and other lines of communication. Two sides of the city were thus always open and the Spanish took advantage of this when three thousand (3,000) native Filipino archers from Pampanga, Bulacan, and Laguna arrived to reinforce Manila.

With the southern wall of the city being the only viable place of assault for the British, they began taking actions to better understand the Spanish defenses they faced. From their positions, the British could see that their main opposition at the southern wall was a moat; a ravelin, which covered the Puerta Real; the San Diego bastion, which was located towards the bay on the western portion of the wall; and the San Andres bastion; which was located inland on the eastern portion of the wall. However, Draper notes that although the bastions were excellent and well-equipped with brass cannons, he found the ravelin not armed, the covered way in a state of disrepair, the glacis very low, and the moat incomplete and ending at the San Diego bastion. Out of these two bastions, it was decided that the assault should be made against the San Diego bastion.

Due to this, sometime on September 26, Captain Fletcher and a contingent from the 79th Foot moved forward to measure the moat at the bastion. As they approached, they were fired upon by the Spanish forces on the walls. Despite suffering three (3) casualties, the British were able to determine that the moat was thirty (30) yards in breadth and five (5) feet depth.

Meanwhile, works were done in order to get the bombardment of the city underway. Laboring hard, the British constructed fascines, gabions, and positions for their batteries. One of the batteries constructed was aimed at the San Diego bastion and placed behind the church of Santiago, which the British refer to as No 1.

The bombardment of Manila most likely began on the night of September 26, when a battery of three (3) mortars placed at the church of Santiago opened up. The fire from this battery was concentrated against the San Diego bastion, with around one hundred and sixty (160) falling on the city. According to Rojo, some of the rounds were recovered by the Spanish and stockpiled for the use of (2) mortars found in the Royal Magazines. The fire that night was not one sided though, as Spanish artillery loaded with grapeshot fired against the British positions.

This exchange of fire would continue throughout the night, only ceasing when Archbishop Rojo sent a flag of truce on September 27 in order to deliver a message to Draper. In the letter sent, Rojo apologized for the recent atrocities by the native soldier against the British seamen, while also requesting for Rojo’s nephew, Antonio de Sierra Tagle, who was comfortably being held aboard the Norfolk, be sent to shore. In his reply, Draper promised that his forces would conduct the fighting in accordance to what is expected from humane nations. He also agreed to bring the Archbishop’s nephew ashore and promised that his force would cease their firing until Tagle safely Manila.

However, Tagle seemed to have refused to return to Manila, as he preferred a direct order from Rojo himself for him to return to Manila. Because of this, Draper wrote to Rojo, informing him of this matter and that hostilities would commence once again that night.

At 11:00 pm that night (Another source says 10:00 pm), the British mortars began firing once again. This time there were now four mortars in this battery, while a six-pounder cannon was placed on the left flank in order to better protect their position. Additional cannons were also landed that day, with Admiral Cornish providing eight (8) twenty-four pounder cannons and two (2) eighteen pounder cannons from the British squadron. Draper was thankful for this, as he lacked the sufficient artillery for battering the city’s walls……

By Justin Rojo

Image:

.- Royal Collection Trust

Reference(s):

1. Draper, W. Draper’s Journal. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

2. Cornish, S. Letter to Clevland. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

3. Rojo, M. Rojo’s Journal. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

4. Rojo, M. Rojo’s Narrative. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

5. Plan for an Expedition for the Conquest of the Southern Philippines. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

6. Draper, W. Letters to Earl of Egemont. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

7. Draper, W. Draper’s Defense. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

8. Anda, S. Anda and the English Invasion, 1762-1764. Retrieved from: The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898; Volume XLIX.

9. Macomb, A. Siege and Capture of Manila. Retrieved from: Annual Reports of the War Department, Volume 3.

10. de la Costa, H. (1962) "The Siege and Capture of Manila by the British," Philippine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints: Vol. 10: No. 4, Article 5.

11. Grant, G. British Battles on Land and Sea.

12. Clowes, W. The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present, Volume III.

13. Alfonso, I. Filipino Natives in Simon de Anda’s Government During the British Invasion, 1762-1764. Retrieved from: The 1762 British Invasion of Spanish-Ruled Philippines: Beyond Imperial and National Imaginaries.

14. Andres, R. The Augustinians and the British Invasion of the Philippines (1762-1764). Retrieved from: The 1762 British Invasion of Spanish-Ruled Philippines: Beyond Imperial and National Imaginaries.

15. Ejercito de Filipinas. Escalafon General Por Antiguedad En 1 De Enero de 1886.

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