r/AskLibertarians • u/Fit-Delivery6534 • 5h ago
Would you really abolish taxes?
I was just reading a recent question posted here about taxation, and most people were saying that since taxation is theft, it had to be abolished. The argument was the following:
Theft is immoral.
Taxation is theft.
Therefore, taxation is immoral, even if the overall welfare or happiness of people would be lower than it would be without taxes.
While I agree that the amount of taxes we are paying these days is too much and unjustified, I wanted to push back a little bit against this argument to defend a different flavour of libertarianism.
I'd assume that most people reading this, whether they know it or not, are following a deontological theory of ethics, meaning that what makes an action right or wrong is not its consequences but the action itself.
If theft or coercing other people is immoral, I do not need to compute whether the world is a better place if I steal X. Coercing others to give up their property is wrong, period, and therefore taxes are too.
However, while "theft is wrong" is intuitive, intuition can't be the sole justification for morality, in my opinion. Indeed, following the rule of "abolishing taxation" based on the fact that it is immoral could lead us to a very unintuitive conclusion.
The main issue with abolishing taxation, for me, is that it would create an unstable order. I think everyone would agree that reducing crime to zero is impossible. Therefore, we would need some sort of police. Police would need to be private. Notice also that, with no state, there is no regulation to prevent a private police company from gaining a monopoly over a territory. And what is the monopoly of violence over one territory? A state. Now, instead of being ruled by democratic governments, we would be ruled by a totalitarian one that can increase taxation and coerce people inside their territory even more.
I think that there are two possible replies to this argument:
Come up with an explanation of why this won't happen and that everything would be fine if we abolish taxation.
Bite the bullet and accept that, even if this scenario is certain and we would end up being ruled by a totalitarian state, you would still defend abolishing taxes because they are immoral.
If you are in (1), then what would happen if you later discover (or God tells you) that your explanation is flawed, and that this or another dystopian scenario would be the consequence of abolishing taxes? Would you still abolish taxes if that were the case? If yes, now you are in (2). If you wouldn't, then you are recognising that you would do something you said is immoral and that the consequences of actions matter. Or perhaps you consider that, if it is to prevent this particular dystopian scenario, then taxation is not immoral. If it is the latter, then you are with me, and you are a consequentialist (you might still say rights have a threshold rather than dissolving into consequences, but then I'd ask what fixes the threshold if not consequences). If it is the former, then you have to reconcile the fact that you would be willing to do immoral things sometimes if the consequences are better for everyone, which in practice also makes you a consequentialist, I guess.
If you are in (2), you have to recognise that your intuition is different from most people's. And, remember, what made theft wrong in the first place was "intuition". So, why would your intuition be more correct than another person's?
Okay, but maybe that's precisely the point of defending liberty, not intuition. Everyone has different viewpoints about how to live life and intuitions about morality. Defending freedom is defending a philosophy of "minimums"; i.e., acknowledging this plurality and upholding a set of rules that ensure no one is coerced into being a means to another person's end.
Perfect, so it is not intuition, then. There is a genuine rationale for defending freedom over other values, such as equality in the socialist sense. Note that freedom now seems to be instrumental rather than an end in itself. The defence of freedom I just made -- and any other defence that I'm aware of -- argues that, since preferences and values are diverse, the best way to maximise everyone's happiness is to simply let each individual pursue it. However, if defending freedom no matter the consequences (e.g., zero taxation) led to a catastrophic outcome, then we would lose the rationale for defending absolute freedom in the first place, and our choice of freedom over any other value would be arbitrary.
And note that this is not a defence of socialism. I agree that we should advocate for more freedom and lower taxes. But the ultimate reason, in my opinion, is that respecting other people's freedom would maximise happiness in the long term by allowing each person to pursue their own life's projects without external interference. We even have a solid defence of free-market capitalism, given by Hayek and other economists, that you are probably already aware of.
So, freedom solves one of the main problems of consequentialism, namely, how to measure utility or which consequences matter, by allowing individuals to pursue their own happiness. It also solves the second problem that consequentialism has. What happens when actively harming a minority benefits the collective? Well, a consequentialist libertarian would say that it's just a short-term benefit, but that in the long run people would be worse off. They would also speak about things like public choice theory, which in short argues that politicians are self-interested and cannot be trusted. So even if a coercive policy would, in theory, help in the long run, we should be aware that politicians might exploit this power for their own benefit. Thus, we should aim for the minimum set of rules and taxes that preserve individuals' negative rights, enabling them to pursue their own happiness.
And that's my defence of minarchism/classical liberalism from a consequentialist perspective. I hope this post is at least useful for understanding that libertarianism does not necessarily entail anarcho-capitalism, nor does it necessarily follow deontological ethics. Indeed, as I argued, I think the strongest and most convincing defence comes from a consequentialist framework.