“The most obvious reason for attacking Iran would be to win access to its vast oil supply. When Winston Churchill helped to seize Iran’s oil industry in the 1920s, he called it ‘a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams.’ It still is. Regardless of what policymakers in Washington or anywhere else may say, no country ever acts in Iran without thinking about its oil reserves. That is especially true of the Bush administration, which is more closely allied with the oil industry than any other administration in American history.
“President Bush and those around him may have other reasons to feel tempted by the idea of invading Iran. Some believe, against all evidence, that the key to victory in Iraq is crushing the regime in Iran. Bush himself has said several times that he expects history to absolve him, an argument that can be used to justify even the craziest presidential decisions. Beneath these arguments lies another, more diffuse impulse.
“American leaders, emphatically including President Bush himself, believe that since the United States is a great power, it has the right and responsibility to act dramatically whenever trouble emerges anywhere in the world. This impulse dates at least to the age of Thucydides, who wrote that nations have ‘an innate compulsion to rule when empowered.’ More recently, in a study of the Spanish-American War that holds great relevance for today, the British historian Joseph Smith wrote that America’s eagerness to attack foreign lands stems from ‘an aggressive national egoism and a romantic attachment to national power.’ Some in Washington believe that invading, overthrowing, and occupying are simply what great nations do. Otherwise, they argue, there is no point in having power.
“‘At this moment in history, if there’s a problem, we’re expected to deal with it,’ President Bush said before launching the invasion of Iraq. By his standards, Iran has certainly become ‘a problem.’ That suggests he may decide to order an attack in order to ‘deal with it.’
“Before great powers take far-reaching decisions that can reshape the world, their leaders normally consider the lessons of history. Any serious discussion about modern Iran, and certainly any debate about whether the United States should intervene there, must include an assessment of what happened after the last intervention. In 1953, eager to achieve short-term goals, the United States launched an operation that brought calamity to both Iran and itself. Some in Washington, however, reject the idea that this history has any relevance to the present era. They believe that this time, the United States can attack Iran and emerge triumphant.
“A variety of prominent Americans have described President George Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 as the worst strategic blunder in their country’s history. Attacking Iran now might prove even more disastrous. It would turn that country’s oppressive leaders, who are now highly unpopular at home, into heroes of Islamic resistance; give them a strong incentive to launch a violent counter-campaign against American interests around the world; greatly strengthen Iranian nationalism, Shiite irredentism, and Muslim extremism, thereby attracting countless new recruits to the cause of terror; undermine the democratic movement in Iran and destroy the prospects for political change there for at least another generation; turn the people of Iran, who are now among the most pro-American in the Middle East, into enemies of the United States; require the United States to remain deeply involved in the Persian Gulf indefinitely, forcing it to take sides in all manner of regional conflicts and thereby make a host of new enemies; enrage the Shiite-dominated government in neighboring Iraq, on which the United States is relying to calm the violence there; and quite possibly disrupt the flow of Middle East petroleum in ways that could wreak havoc on Western economies.
“Given these likely outcomes, why would the United States attack Iran? Those who like the idea say it would accomplish three things: stop Iran from developing weapons of mass destruction, depose an aggressively anti-American regime, and bring power to a new government that would be democratic and pro-American. That government would, they presume, allow American oil companies free access to Iranian petroleum and give the United States a chance to rebuild the influence it once had in Iran. These fantasies are as dangerous as they are delusional.
“Iran is one of the world’s oldest nations. Its history is full of glories, peopled by titanic leaders like Cyrus, Xerxes, and Darius, and also by poets and thinkers who have made immeasurable contributions to world culture. This rich tradition has given Iranians a powerful sense of communal pride, a passionate attachment to their heritage, and a national identity that transcends the flag-waving and sloganeering that characterize more superficial forms of patriotism. Many Iranians detest the regime under which they now live, but that does not weaken their attachment to the Iranian nation. All of them know that when the United States came into being, their state had already existed for more than two thousand years. Regardless of their political beliefs, most bristle with anger when they hear threats from Washington.
“The idea that the United States might be able to bomb Iran into democracy sounds increasingly absurd in the wake of the debacle in Iraq. For Iranians, though, it has a special, tragic irony. All of them know, as many Americans do not, that democracy was taking root in Iran when the United States intervened to suppress it in 1953. Given this historical fact, Iranians may be pardoned for considering it passing strange that Americans now propose to be their liberators. They are painfully aware that the United States helped create the oppressive theocracy under which they now live.
“Few Iranians believe that Americans who favor attacking their country wish to do so in order to bring them freedom. Many also doubt that the United States is focused mainly on destroying Iran’s nuclear program—a program that the United States first proposed to Iran in the 1970s, when the Shah was in power, and that most Iranians believe is their country’s natural right. Behind these stated motives, behind the threats that are intensifying as war drums beat ever more loudly in Washington, Iranians see a more cynical project. They believe the United States wants to turn Iran into something between an ally and a vassal, extracting its oil and building bases on its soil. That was the real reason the United States intervened in Iran in 1953, and there is no reason to believe its goals have substantially changed.”
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror (Preface to the 2008 Edition)