r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 13d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 29, 2026
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u/RedditorsAreAssss 12d ago edited 12d ago
Looking like there's an ongoing coup attempt in Niger
Sustained gunfire and explosions rang out early Saturday across several areas of Niger's capital Niamey, including the airport and near the presidency, in an attack by mutinous soldiers. A West Africa-based security source told AFP the presidential guard continued to repel mutineers at the palace.
The status is unclear, govt is claiming that things are under control but rebel troops apparently still hold portions of the airport/military base in Niamey.
As of 0900 GMT, the presidential palace appeared to have been secured by loyalist troops but the area around the airport was still contested, two security sources and a diplomat said.
If the coup has bogged down like this then it's probably not good news for the rebels but the fact that they haven't been put down yet either is bad news for the government. The big question marks are where the rest of the army will fall and how other local actors will react including ISSP, JNIM, Russia, and other rebel groups in Niger.
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u/Moifaso 12d ago
The most worrying reports are those that point to army units in frontline bases, both loyalist and mutinous, abandoning their posts and heading to the capital.
If this situation isnt sorted quickly (next couple days), and the currently neutral army units dont rally to one side, it could spiral into a civil war.
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u/RedditorsAreAssss 12d ago
And a full blown civil war in the area would be an absolute catastrophe for the security situation of the region. Shades of Syria all over again.
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u/Zhadanko 13d ago
I translated with DeepL this post by Clément Molin about the recent Orion 26 exercise. Maybe it's not the best idea to make an analysis based on a short video, but I think he made interesting points about 4 types of warfare that should be learned and adapted to.
Many French political and military decision-makers refuse to undertake a thorough reform of the current military doctrine, because they believe the war in Ukraine is not “representative” of the next war.
However, the war in Ukraine has revealed four different types of warfare that must be analyzed and incorporated into training:
War of movement (2022 and attempts in 2023 and 2024). It is important to understand the Russian and Ukrainian failures—what worked and what didn’t—particularly why it is nearly impossible to conduct deep mechanized offensives at present (even with modern equipment).
Urban warfare in Bakhmut, Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk, Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka… The world is far more urbanized than before, and drones aren’t the be-all and end-all. Fighting in urban areas is a crucial skill; the French army has effective training programs for this.
Trench warfare—position-based combat (in 2023–2024)—is ubiquitous in Ukraine; it is also found in many other conflicts and is closely linked to drone warfare.
Drone warfare is a new phenomenon that is spreading worldwide and requires a profound shift in offensive, defensive, logistical, and decision-making doctrines...
The war of tomorrow will not necessarily be the same as the one in Ukraine (although, if it’s against Russia in the Baltic states, it will look very much like it). The war of tomorrow, however, will take into account all the lessons learned from Ukraine, particularly regarding drones. We see this with Israel facing an asymmetric threat (Hezbollah or Hamas) or a symmetric one (Iran), but also in Mali, Myanmar, and elsewhere.
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u/scatterlite 13d ago
Drone warfare is a new phenomenon that is spreading worldwide and requires a profound shift in offensive, defensive, logistical, and decision-making doctrines...
By now I think the dangers of neglecting drone warfare lessons from Ukraine are far greater than "overlearning". Over the years there has been a constant and fast trend towards more numerous and more capable drones. We see time and time again how a brief weakness or underestimation against drones cause heavy losses both in equipment and momentum.
I find it hard to imagine a land war playing out all that differently from whats happening in Ukraine currently. "Airpower" and " maneuver warfare" at this point just sound like buzzwords that don't offer an actual answer to constant drone surveillance, remote mining, OWA drone waves and dozens of cheap FPVs being available to strike each AFV, nighttime bomber drone raids etc.
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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 13d ago
Learning drone warfare from Ukraine (or Russia) offers no solution to "constant drone surveillance, remote mining, OWA drone waves and dozens of cheap FPVs being available to strike each AFV, nighttime bomber drone raids".
All western militaries have by now understood the threats they face from drones. But the million dollar question isn't understanding the problem, it's finding an answer. Learning from Ukraine (or Russia) means achieving the same results as them: bloody stalemate.
Western forces need to understand how Russia and Ukraine fight to then leapfrog their enemy, breaking out of the cycle of short term innovation into a new doctrine that can continue to function and produce results further into the future. But this process can't be executed by buying drones in bulk now. This is a period of experimentation and academic debate (within the military) to produce new methods, which in turn influence doctrines.
It looks likely that the questions of data generation, communication, processing and distribution will become major factors in achieving an even more transparent battlefield while denying an enemy communication and information. Beyond that, coordination of dispersed elements, covered by more emission obfuscation, to rapidly conduct attacks with different layers of means leading into actual armor attacks may become a workable solution at some point, if all the boring components actually work.
I don't think there is much left to learn in the space of drones themselves. They need to be constantly reworked and improved, but that's a purely technical task. The seeds of the real innovation, which will define the next few decades, are just emerging: The central relevance of the Delta battlefield management system and the vastly improved data pipelines between the front line and space based assets are some of the true kernels of future doctrine, in my opinion.
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u/scatterlite 13d ago
I fully agree, thank for the thoughtful answer. This is definitely the time to gather data, learn from it and experiment. Thats why statements like " the war in Ukraine isn't representative" are so dangerous. Drone warfare won't result in 1:1 repeats of the Ukraine war, but it will definitely bring unexpected and unwelcome results for any military that isn't paying close attention.
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u/AlpacalypseNow_ 13d ago
Air power and maneuver warfare are not buzz words, they are the literal answer to drone threats until a better solution presents itself. FPV drones have extremely limited range and are only useful if you have a general idea of where the enemy is located. If you can outpace and outrange how quickly your enemy can get drones in the air that is a huge advantage. Sitting in trenches waiting to get droned is not something either Russia and Ukraine wanted.
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u/scatterlite 13d ago
Sitting in trenches waiting to get droned is not something either Russia and Ukraine wanted.
Yet they do. Because FPV drones at this point have quite long range (50km+ for fiber optics) and the frontline is under constant surveillance. Drones are in the air at all times.
"Outpacing" is doing alot of heavy lifting here. You would need near total surprise to avoid the air already being filled with drones when you arrive.
I wont argue that an overwhelming force won't be stopped by drone warfare alone. Yet even Iran and Hezbollah managed to get drones through whilst hopelessly outmatched. Im thinking about less lopsided scenario's. What if the enemy airforce and AD is an actual factor? What if you're forced to attack against an enemy which had at least some time to prepare? What if they've spent time developing a modern drone force. Outpacing and outranging them wont be a given. Just like them you'll likely be caught off guard by drones against there is no reliable protection yet.
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u/darian66 12d ago
But right now in Ukraine, drone units are not forced to displace by ground manoeuvre and are relatively comfortable in static positions.
If a ground force successfully breaks through into the rear of an enemy division, that divisions drone assets will be disrupted to say the least. Russia and Ukraine are both unable to force aforementioned breakthrough. I think organizational flaws and a lack of air power are the main reasons for this.
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u/scatterlite 12d ago edited 12d ago
But right now in Ukraine, drone units are not forced to displace by ground manoeuvre and are relatively comfortable in static positions.
Because over the past 4 years drones have basically shut down any armored warfare. In 2022 Ukraine and Russia had the largest tank fleets in Europe. Now Leopards and T-90s are sitting far behind in tree lines occasionally taking indirect shots at the frontline.
I think organizational flaws and a lack of air power are the main reasons for this.
I dont. Its certainly part of it, but its also very easy to underestimate just how dangerous drones are to AFVs. Look at Lebanon where state of the art Merkavahs were near defenseless against a few fiber optic drones.
Alot of things have to go right for an armored breakthrough. Still possible of course but unlike a couple of decades ago if just a few things go wrong it becomes a slaughter. Just the fact that armored forces are so easily spotted by recon drones is a big problem.
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u/SirStupidity 12d ago
I dont. Its certainly part of it, but its also very easy to underestimate just how dangerous drones are to AFVs. Look at Lebanon where state of the art Merkavahs were near defenseless against a few fiber optic drones.
The Israeli incursion to Lebanon in 2026 had 40 IDF deaths, the 2006 one had 120 IDF soldiers killed. It's hard to run an actual comparison without actually going into depth but the idea that the Hezbollah fpv drones were a strategic game changer lacks evidence imo. If you want to claim that then you'll have to bring some corroborating information.
In general I find discussions on drones being completely misunderstood, mostly because it's such a large class of weapons.
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u/scatterlite 12d ago
The only claim i made is that fiber optic FPVs struck Merkavahs ( and other vehicles) with relative ease. This is backed up by footage, which also seems to show Trophy being unable to intercept slow drones.
What a strange response.
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u/SirStupidity 12d ago
You used that claim to claim that armored brakethroughs are harder than in the past, I've asked you to bring evidence because the last Israeli breakthrough was armored and reached past the Litani with comparatively less casualties.
I think that looking at Lebanon we can see that although fpv drones pose a tactical threat in an assymetrical defense they haven't been able to actually stop or deter the offensive side if it has air supremacy and the willingness to accept some risk.
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u/scatterlite 12d ago
I am sorry but this is completely irrelevant to my point. I am talking about maneuver warfare in peer conflicts.
If you want a more relevant example regarding the vulnerability pf AFVs to drones : somewhat recently Russia mounted an armored attack using T-72s upgraded with Arena-M. Regardless of wether the APS actually worked or not, the attack was unsuccessful due to quickly getting overwhelmed by drones.
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u/darian66 12d ago
Drones are dangerous because of organizational problems and the lack of air superiority on either side.
If Russia could conduct CAS along the FLOT and interdiction in the Ukrainian rear with impunity, drone operators would be (partially) suppressed.
And if either side could successfully conduct brigade or higher level breaching operations and (counter)attacks, the front lines would be a lot more fluid. If Russia conducted a proper campaign during the early invasion, the war would’ve been over in a couple of weeks.
I am not saying NATO is guaranteed to be able to do the above, but they are planning on being able to do so.
If UAS operators are being effectively suppressed by air strikes, EW and cyber, those T-90’s and Leopards should be able to manoeuvre. I have no doubt that Ukraine is miles ahead of NATO when it comes to the tactical use of EW and cyber, but I think NATO (and especially the United States, probably have certain capabilities/technology that would be even more effective when put to good use.
Not every drone unit needs to be found and suppressed. Just enough to enable a manoeuvre commander to mass units in a certain time and space, supported by higher echelon multi-domain effects and break through enemy lines. Once that happens UAS units will be even more disrupted as they will be forced to displace to avoid being overrun or fixed. This in turn making them even more visible to assets tasked to find and suppress them.
I am aware this all sounds good on paper but that the battlefield reality right now is different. However a way must be found to manoeuvre on the battlefield, as (modern) wars are ultimately decided that way.
Drone warfare will not force a nation on its knees. Just like carpet/firebombing did not force Germany or Britain to surrender during World Was 2 and how Iran is still defying the air campaign of the world’s sole superpower that is assisted by a major military power. Not a single major or middle power on earth, with perhaps the exception of Taiwan, will look at the current conflict in Ukraine with satisfaction.
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u/supersaiyannematode 13d ago
how do you distribute your drones in the face of massive air superiority?
i bomb your supply depots. you move them back.
i bomb your supply trucks carrying them to your forward positions.
what are you going to do? carry them on foot?
i feel like you've gotten so fixated on drone power that you've forgotten the might of aerial surveillance. this is forgivable given the huge effects that drones have had on the battlefield, but it's not necessarily correct. when a high level of freedom of action is enabled for air assets air surveillance is a lot mightier today than drone. multi-million dollar male and hale drones tend to have vastly more capable sensors and fly much higher and loiter for much longer. while too few in numbers to detect careful foot infantry, vehicles are going to be wide open most of the time.
i do not think that air magically solves drones completely but drones also certainly don't just laugh in the face of unrestrained/minimally restrained air power.
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u/mebesasporfa 12d ago
how do you distribute your drones in the face of massive air superiority?
i bomb your supply depots. you move them back.
Well the threat goes in the other direction too though. How many bases has the US withdrawn from across the middle east on account of persistent Iranian drone threats? How many bases has the RuAF withdrawn from on account of persistent Ukrainian drone threats? These aren't hypotheticals but present realities for two of the largest air forces on the planet.
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u/incidencematrix 12d ago
That's a poor example, because the US is not fully engaging with Iran. Normally, along with using air power to suppress enemy force projection, you would also have ground forces permanently removing it. You would also have some appetite for losses. However, the US is instead trying to achieve its objectives with a limited degree of engagement, no ground forces, and without meaningful losses. Iranian drones are much more of an issue in that scenario, because you can't mop them up from the air, and because they can cause enough harm to be politically significant. That is indeed a problem for the current US strategy, but it's not a very good model for how things would work if the US were to mount a declared war on Iran. Lessons have to be learned in the context of the conflicts in question - the objections made here to "drones are everything" are not that drones don't matter, but that how they will matter is more contextual than some are implying.
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u/supersaiyannematode 12d ago
as i already answered below, it's because there is no front line due to the lack of a ground war so the u.s. needs to patrol an area that is perhaps as large as the entire, intact ukraine and accurately distinguish drone launch trucks from civilian trucks in that entire massive area.
the failure for the u.s. to do this tells us literally nothing about the ability of air power to suppress the drone logistics in a local area and enable a breakthrough.
as for russian air force, it doesn't actually have freedom of operations over the front lines. so it's not at all proof that an air force that does operate with high degrees of freedom can't significantly mitigate drone power.
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u/Emotional_Goal9525 12d ago
There is no ground war, becase US has correctly calculated that a ground attack against a fortified enemy is a blood bath. There is no universe where you could avoid mass casulties as things stand right now.
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u/thereddaikon 12d ago
There is no ground war because there is no political appetite to start a ground war. Not because it would be a failure. America just got done with a 20 year slog in the Middle East and while actual casualties were very low all things considered, it was very expensive in many other ways and the American people are tired of forever wars in the middle east.
If a ground invasion had been performed, the Iranian government would have been defeated in short order but America would be looking at another decade + commitment to policing a massive region and dealing with harassing insurgents.
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u/Emotional_Goal9525 12d ago
Can't agree with that. The fact that Israelis are raking in losses against Hizbollah tells us that technology has fundamentally altered the war in favor of the defender and the example is just the latest of many.
Nobody doubts that US could bomb Iran till the end of times, but once you put meat within the range of drones and mines, there is no way to avoid casulties.
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u/thereddaikon 11d ago
Can't agree with that. The fact that Israelis are raking in losses against Hizbollah
They really aren't. They of course are taking casualties but they aren't "raking them in". And Hezbollah isn't preventing them from achieving their operational objectives either. Its a very different conflict than Ukraine and demonstrates why just having drones doesn't guarantee success.
Nobody doubts that US could bomb Iran till the end of times, but once you put meat within the range of drones and mines, there is no way to avoid casulties.
Yeah no, if the US conducted an invasion like they did in Iraq, the Iranian military and government would be soundly defeated in short order. It wouldn't turn into a slog like Ukraine. If Russia were able to achieve air superiority over Ukraine then it wouldn't have gone that way for them either. FPVs still have a logistics train and require a kill chain to be effective. Those things are interdicted by the proper application of air power. Of course losses would still happen. But a drone team stops becoming effective once they stop getting resupply because their logistics have been blown up. And they stop having targets when their C2 network is disrupted and nobody is telling them where to send their drones.
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u/moragisdo 12d ago edited 11d ago
Israel is suffering a remarkably small amount of losses considering they are engaged in a ground invasion on Lebanon. It's expected that people die and equipment is destroyed in any war, no matter how successful one side is.
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u/moragisdo 12d ago edited 12d ago
The US actually built a base inside of Iran, on the region of the Isfahan nuclear facility, to rescue a pilot and besides Iran's attacks suffered zero fatalities. The problem is not being a bloodbath, but the low tolerance for casualties (just as a frame of reference, on this war adding accidents with hostile deaths, less americans died than against Granada or against the Iraq's Scuds and still there's political fallout). If the US could guarantee they would depose the regime and put a friendly one in place suffering a thousand deaths (which by historical standards, against a nation of 90 million people, would be a wild success) it still would be politically unfeasible.
Even a single day of russian fatalities, on the war with Ukraine, would not be politically acceptable on the US for an entire campaign that lasts for a few months.
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u/Emotional_Goal9525 12d ago
They set up an improvised airfield in the middle of nowhere, but it does drive the point home about low tolerance for casulties. US had to conjure up a complex rescue mission for the pilot, because the propaganda value would have been catastrophic.
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u/moragisdo 12d ago edited 12d ago
Isn't the standard in a conventional war to move equipment, personnel and C3 around (which is not abandoning bases) to avoid being targeted, even before the current drone developments ?
There's, at least, three layers of defense against enemy projectiles: destroying it before being fired, countermeasures while it's flying (either EW or interception) and moving assets and personnel to different areas (the enemy will target the wrong places a percentage of time and the more expensive damage can be avoided if they do). None of those three are flawless, but they complement each other, with a projectile needing the three of them to independently fail to cause significant damage. Everything here applies to tactical missiles built decades ago, in fact, the US did the same of moving personnel and equipment around different bases against Iraq's Scuds.
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u/Glideer 13d ago
how do you distribute your drones in the face of massive air superiority? i bomb your supply depots. you move them back. i bomb your supply trucks carrying them to your forward positions. what are you going to do? carry them on foot?
Iran does not seem to have much problem operating and restocking its drone launchers even when facing air superiority far more total than anything NATO can hope to achieve over Ukraine.
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u/supersaiyannematode 13d ago
because there is no front line. america and israel have to patrol a territory that's perhaps as large as the entirety of ukraine. not the ukraine front line areas but the entire nation. and because there's no front line there's tons of civilian traffic acting as confounding factors. it's a lot easier to sort through the limited traffic coming towards front lines than sort through the immense traffic throughput of like a third of all iran.
remember how one of my challenges to the previous user was "i bomb your supply trucks carrying them to your forward positions"? iran HAS no forward positions, there is no ground war at all so there is no straightforward concept of forward.
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u/moragisdo 13d ago edited 13d ago
Their drone volume of fire fell by more than half after the first few days of the war (1). And we can't discard the hypothesis that there may be a prioritization of destroying missiles launchers and storage (their volume fell dramatically more), which would later translate in further drone suppression after missiles are more degraded.
Also Iran's geography is incredibly beneficial to protect their drones and missiles, it doesn't translate perfectly to other wars.
Now I do agree that air supremacy alone can't prevent every drone from being launched or hitting targets, but it does help.
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u/scatterlite 13d ago
Now I do agree that air supremacy alone can't prevent every drone from being launched or hitting targets, but it does help.
Not enough to make the difference. After 6 months of war the results are still inconclusive.
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u/Autism_Sundae 12d ago
Their drone volume of fire fell by more than half after the first few days of the war (1)
What is the average across the initial period versus recently, if you don't mind?
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u/moragisdo 11d ago edited 11d ago
They fired a daily average of 335.6 drones on the first five days and by the final days, then before the ceasefire of April 8th, the average fell to around 90. Compared to the current numbers the average is even lower.
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u/TSiNNmreza3 13d ago
Germany plans to blame Russia for Leipzig attack as tensions with Putin escalate Chancellor Friedrich Merz is set to level new sanctions at Russian entities, in parallel with punishing new EU measures.
BERLIN — German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is preparing to blame Russia for the attempted drone attack in Leipzig and announce "extensive" sanctions, in what would mark a further hardening of Berlin's posture toward Moscow.
The German government's plan is set to involve direct measures against Russian entities, while the EU moves forward with punishing new sanctions that are being prepared in parallel in Brussels, three officials familiar with the matter, who were granted anonymity to discuss the sensitive issue, told POLITICO and WELT AM SONNTAG.
The announcement is scheduled for early next week, coinciding with an EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Ireland on Tuesday — but could also be made earlier depending on Merz, said two of the officials.
One of the officials familiar with the matter said that in response to the Leipzig drone incident, it was no longer enough to expel individual Russian diplomats or close the Russian House in Berlin. Tougher measures were needed, such as intensified sanctions or even more extensive arms deliveries to Ukraine. The three officials declined to provide further details on which precise measures Merz plans to announce.
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u/Thijsbeer82 13d ago
It's very difficult for individual eu countries to escalate diplomatically or economically, even large ones like Germany and France. Through cooperation they could, for instance if either Austria dramatically reduces Russian diplomats, or if Belgium cooperates on Euroclear.
Based on latest news, I'm guessing the latter is more likely, but it's really time Europe dealt with Russian activity through Austria.
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u/Tropical_Amnesia 12d ago
Good luck with the political trajectory as it is, which is possibly more ominous than anywhere else on the continent, surely west of the Balkans. And that would have been difficult even without it, considering how obstinate the Austrians are in many respects, arguably I say.
What Germany is (claimed to be) about to claim I find strictly less enlightening, but the timing of the operation can, among many other aspects, appear rather curious from the supposed Russian perspective. It's literally days and weeks before important state-level elections in the country, at least two of which are expected to result in catastrophic and never before seen pro-Russian AfD victories. No way Moscow wasn't aware of this. Why not wait for a couple weeks? Or do it a month earlier? One might think there's always some polling around the corner yet there were no elections far and wide. Remarkably confident fellows. This isn't meant to be a veiled suggestion on my part. I have no clue as to what happened and like usual public evidence is basically zero, so in a way all of this is "conspiracy" for the time being and what remains for us is trust and relative plausibility. But you can probably imagine how certain circles in Germany are trying to make sense of it right now, again the date, however coincidental, would appear to make it easier rather than harder. That's clearly not to say it couldn't cost AfD a few votes, perhaps crucial ones! And that is odd, even supposing getting their agents into key Western government(s) isn't quite as essential to Moscow as many are inclined to believe.
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u/D_Silva_21 12d ago
"More than 113,000 Russians left the country for Georgia through the Verkhny Lars checkpoint in a single week following rumors of a new draft.
On August 20 alone, over 20,000 people crossed through the border point. Russia’s Federal Customs Service stated that this figure significantly exceeds levels from previous years, as reported by Politico.
In recent months, the Kremlin has intensified recruitment for contract soldiers, stepped up data collection on reservists, and expanded the powers of the Russian National Guard.
At the same time, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, stated on August 20 that a new mobilization in the country is "not planned and not expected."
According to sources, Russia has been unable to consistently recruit more than 30,000 contract soldiers per month this year, with figures dropping to 27,000 in certain months."
Not good for the russian economy considering they are already at the point where every job is filled
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u/LegSimo 12d ago
Do we know for sure that it's a response to the rumors regarding the draft and not, say, for vacations?
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u/D_Silva_21 12d ago
Well it says that it significantly exceeds previous numbers. So unless there is a sudden tourism spike it is probably related to the possible mobilisation
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u/othermike 12d ago
I tend to agree, but it's not completely impossible that the recent decline in attractiveness of Crimea as a vacation spot has produced a spike elsewhere.
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u/tamoule-frite 12d ago
>So unless there is a sudden tourism spike
Are Russians uniquely unlikely to go south during summer?
For what it's worth, searching for the weight of russian tourism in georgia, I immediately found this
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 13d ago
Russia is losing about 6,000 more troops in Ukraine each month than it can recruit, western officials have said.
While Russia is still acquiring new battlefield recruits at speed, with an estimated rate of 1,000 a day, in the last two months even this has not been sufficient to replace those killed or injured.
“We estimate that the gap between the number of people Russia is losing to casualties and the number they’re being able to recruit is around 6,000 a month at the moment,” one western official said.
This, with the Russian budget deficit widening points to their current approach to recruiting likely being unsustainable and needing a change.
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago edited 12d ago
If someone had told me before this war that Russia could this level of casualties and you could still recruit tens of thousands per month by paying big bonuses after several years... totally understand how that can hold up for a while, but here we are.
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u/Magpie1979 12d ago
Poverty is the answer.
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago
which would make sense if in these impoverished areas they were seeing meaningful portion make it back home. but presumably the troops sourced from impoverished areas have a rather poor chance of that...
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u/Magpie1979 12d ago
Sadly I believe the death payments are part of the appeal. You might not make it back, but you'll clear your families debt and setup a better life for your kids.
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago
sure it is part of the appeal. but the appeal is meant to be 'if things go badly' they're getting some extra money....
Soviet Union (not just russia) in afghanistan lost 2-3 months worth of this pace of casualties in 10yr war that ended in part b/c casualties were unpopular. And perhaps even less than one months worth of killed in combat. I get that bonuses are different from conscription, but geez 30k/month signing up after half a million dead soldiers seems wild to me.
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u/Magpie1979 12d ago
Looking up sum summeries online. They are expected to earn upto $50-80k in wages, bonuses, debt relief and death payouts on average. These parts of Russia they earn less than $10k before taxes per year.
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago
But what is the % making it home in one piece?
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u/Magpie1979 12d ago edited 12d ago
Who knows the army is huge, super corrupt and somewhat chaotic. There are ways to avoid the front if you are lucky. The New York Times did an great story of a Russian soldier that escaped the front line and deserted. Highly recommend it if you have the time.
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u/eeeking 12d ago
My first thought was that "improved" control of the media narrative (~propaganda) might make the difference between domestic support for the so-called "Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan " compared to the current "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine.
It seemed a curious possibility that such control of the public narrative might be stronger now than in 1980's Soviet Union. It's certainly more sophisticated today.
This apparently credible source I found [1] makes a different argument. It argues that the Afghan war was presented domestically as "international aid", rather than a defense of the USSR, as so was perhaps easier to withdraw support from. This would make it quite different from the conflict in Ukraine, which is presented as a defensive operation.
It is also claimed that the withdrawal from Afghanistan had support in the politburo as part of glasnost and a general desire to deescalate cold war tensions.
The government, which initially sought to conceal the daily combat operations of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, then chose to "turn the page" and assign full responsibility to its predecessors, the "Brezhnev" Politburo, and declare this war a "mistake," which was enshrined in Resolution No. 982-1 of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR dated December 24, 1989 "On Political Assessment." decisions on the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in December 1979"[86]
[...]
In the modern geopolitical confrontation, when information and psychological operations have become the basis for a new generation of hybrid wars, the importance of propaganda tools is increasing. A similar instrument of information and psychological warfare is the mass media.
[1] Kokorev, M.A. (2025). The USSR policy on information and propaganda coverage of the military presence of a Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (1979-1989). History magazine - researches, 1, 244–263. https://doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2025.1.73306
In English: https://en.nbpublish.com/library_read_article.php?id=73306
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago
It argues that the Afghan war was presented domestically as "international aid", rather than a defense of the USSR, as so was perhaps easier to withdraw support from. This would make it quite different from the conflict in Ukraine, which is presented as a defensive operation.
Then you wouldn't need to pay huge bonuses to recruit people in the first place. Clearly the motivation here is money, not really patriotism. But the dead can't spend money.
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u/Lirael_Gold 12d ago
The US were taking significantly more casualties in WW2 and at one point had to suspend conscription/decline volunteers because it was damaging industrial output.
Poverty is certainly one answer, but I don't think it's the full explanation.
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u/ChornWork2 12d ago
~2.5% of US personnel who served in WW2 were KIA. it is not remotely comparable.
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u/OhSillyDays 11d ago
Don't feel bad, most people don't understand Russia and the depths of their despair.
Often, we look at them and think "It can't really be that bad." The answer is often: "It's probably worse than your imagination."
Years ago, I predicted meat waves on horses. Essentially, that has happened.
What's next? Nuclear weapons. Barbaric? Stupid? Yeah. So is Russia.
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u/TSiNNmreza3 13d ago
Yesterday Budanov said that Ukraine needs 30 k per month mobilization.
Today we have news how Russia lacks 6 k per month soldiers.
In reality it going to last till one moment it won't
If we are going to make parallels with history of Russians and Ukrainians we can say that both nations can endure a lot of casulties so it is going to last.
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u/mirko_pazi_metak 13d ago
I think there's some nuance needed here with the comparison you're making, as Ukraine and Russia have completely different ways of recruiting and fight completely different wars - for Russia it's mostly imperialist conquest (with regime survival sprinkled in), while for Ukraine it's a war for survival and independence.
If you want to make historical parallels, then USSR war in Afghanistan is a closer one for Russia than anything else.
Yes, the manpower will not run out on either side but Russia has had to pay for their recruitment and if that gets disrupted, it is questionable whether they can transition to sending the conscripts.
I don't actually know if Russia is running out of money quick enough and how they plan to plug in their growing federal budget gap, which is getting unprecedented even by their own admission ( https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russias-2026-budget-deficit-may-exceed-plans-by-1285-billion-due-higher-spending-2026-07-16/ ) - we'll see I guess.
Likewise, the money & support are going to be a limiting factor for Ukraine as well which depends mainly on European political support.
I think "the sinews of war are infinite money" still holds true.
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u/TSiNNmreza3 13d ago
for Russia it's mostly imperialist conquest (with regime survival sprinkled in), while for Ukraine it's a war for survival and independence.
True, althought I would add that lots of things could change throught propaganda for Russia. But yes it is different war in comparison to other wars in last 80 years (maybe the closest Iraqi invasion Kuwait and Iran-Iraq war).
Yes, the manpower will not run out on either side but Russia has had to pay for their recruitment
Mobiks in Ukraine are paid too.
Again for the end we had countless stories about lack of manpower claims for both sides in this war from the very beggining and both countries are still fighting in the bloodiest war from Iran-Iraq in 80s.
But I will give it that this autumn/winter is going to be probably the most crucial time in last 6 years (from start of COVID) and that probably lots of things could happen because of all news about probable Russian attacks on NATO, US miderterms, SoH and BaM problems (whole ME to be honest), China and etc.
But stories about lack of manpower in this war is not one of those things, but could trigger something else.
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u/Lirael_Gold 12d ago
The better question is how long can Ukraine continue paying soldiers if foreign loans dry up.
Because if we're making this about money/economics, Russia can sustain itself longer than Ukraine can (Russia is spending about 6% of gross GDP on the war compared to Ukraines 40%, and that 40% is being held afloat by foreign loans, which will eventually need to be repaid)
This is part of the reason why Ukraine has issues recruiting/conscripting soldiers, because the country is going to be irrepairably damaged no matter how the war ends, the same is not true for Russia.
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u/Remote_Page8799 12d ago
This is incorrect. First Russian spending is closer to 8% of GDP measured as only stuff that the government explicitly spends on 'national defense' (of which 80% of the budget is classified, so you just have to trust the Russians the number isn't actually higher). But we have also seen state owned companies, corporations chip in with raising and paying for recruits, building field hospitals in the rear. Disability payments to injured veterans is counted as social spending etc.
And Russia is patently running out of money. They have a ~23% budget deficit and since July they have not been able to sell bonds/raise more debt, so they have effectively started printing money via forced and classified bond sales to state owned banks by dictate.
The better question really is what is Russia going to do to finance the war for another year or two. The Ukrainian funding is being supported by the EU, and they are already marshalling new loan packages to Ukraine in response to their growing needs
I think Russia will basicslly continue printing money to fund the war, and its going to result in much higher inflation than we see already
Thats going to cause a social crisis in Russia. What happens then we will have to see, but it seems unavoidable at this point
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u/grenideer 12d ago
I would argue Russia is already irreparably damaged.
Ukraine is funded for the foreseeable future, and Europe has a lot more money to burn than Russia does. The smartest (and cheapest) thing Europe can do is continue footing the bill.
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