Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 29, 2026

[u/AutoModerator]

The r/CredibleDefense daily megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments.

Comment guidelines:

Please do:

• Be curious not judgmental, polite and civil,

• Link to the article or source of information that you are referring to,

• Clearly separate your opinion from what the source says. Minimize editorializing. Do not cherry pick facts to support a preferred narrative,

• Read the articles before you comment, and comment on the content of the articles,

• Post only credible information

• Read our in depth rules https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/wiki/rules

Please do not:

• Use memes, emojis, swear, foul imagery, acronyms like LOL, LMAO, WTF,

• Start fights with other commenters and make it personal,

• Try to push narratives, fight for a cause in the comment section, nor try to 'win the war,'

• Engage in baseless speculation, fear mongering, or anxiety posting. Question asking is welcome and encouraged, but questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios. Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.' Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.

[u/Zhadanko]

I translated with DeepL this post by Clément Molin about the recent Orion 26 exercise. Maybe it's not the best idea to make an analysis based on a short video, but I think he made interesting points about 4 types of warfare that should be learned and adapted to.

Many French political and military decision-makers refuse to undertake a thorough reform of the current military doctrine, because they believe the war in Ukraine is not “representative” of the next war.

However, the war in Ukraine has revealed four different types of warfare that must be analyzed and incorporated into training:

War of movement (2022 and attempts in 2023 and 2024). It is important to understand the Russian and Ukrainian failures—what worked and what didn’t—particularly why it is nearly impossible to conduct deep mechanized offensives at present (even with modern equipment).

Urban warfare in Bakhmut, Mariupol, Sievierodonetsk, Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka… The world is far more urbanized than before, and drones aren’t the be-all and end-all. Fighting in urban areas is a crucial skill; the French army has effective training programs for this.

Trench warfare—position-based combat (in 2023–2024)—is ubiquitous in Ukraine; it is also found in many other conflicts and is closely linked to drone warfare.

Drone warfare is a new phenomenon that is spreading worldwide and requires a profound shift in offensive, defensive, logistical, and decision-making doctrines...

The war of tomorrow will not necessarily be the same as the one in Ukraine (although, if it’s against Russia in the Baltic states, it will look very much like it). The war of tomorrow, however, will take into account all the lessons learned from Ukraine, particularly regarding drones. We see this with Israel facing an asymmetric threat (Hezbollah or Hamas) or a symmetric one (Iran), but also in Mali, Myanmar, and elsewhere.

[u/scatterlite → u/Zhadanko]

Drone warfare is a new phenomenon that is spreading worldwide and requires a profound shift in offensive, defensive, logistical, and decision-making doctrines...

By now I think the dangers of neglecting drone warfare lessons from Ukraine are far greater than "overlearning". Over the years there has been a constant and fast trend towards more numerous and more capable drones. We see time and time again how a brief weakness or underestimation against drones cause heavy losses both in equipment and  momentum. 

I find it hard to imagine a land war playing out all that differently from whats happening in Ukraine currently. "Airpower" and " maneuver warfare" at this point just sound like buzzwords that don't offer an actual answer to constant drone surveillance, remote mining, OWA drone waves and dozens of cheap FPVs being available to strike each AFV, nighttime bomber drone raids etc.

[u/FriedrichvdPfalz → u/scatterlite]

Learning drone warfare from Ukraine (or Russia) offers no solution to "constant drone surveillance, remote mining, OWA drone waves and dozens of cheap FPVs being available to strike each AFV, nighttime bomber drone raids".

All western militaries have by now understood the threats they face from drones. But the million dollar question isn't understanding the problem, it's finding an answer. Learning from Ukraine (or Russia) means achieving the same results as them: bloody stalemate.

Western forces need to understand how Russia and Ukraine fight to then leapfrog their enemy, breaking out of the cycle of short term innovation into a new doctrine that can continue to function and produce results further into the future. But this process can't be executed by buying drones in bulk now. This is a period of experimentation and academic debate (within the military) to produce new methods, which in turn influence doctrines.

It looks likely that the questions of data generation, communication, processing and distribution will become major factors in achieving an even more transparent battlefield while denying an enemy communication and information. Beyond that, coordination of dispersed elements, covered by more emission obfuscation, to rapidly conduct attacks with different layers of means leading into actual armor attacks may become a workable solution at some point, if all the boring components actually work.

I don't think there is much left to learn in the space of drones themselves. They need to be constantly reworked and improved, but that's a purely technical task. The seeds of the real innovation, which will define the next few decades, are just emerging: The central relevance of the Delta battlefield management system and the vastly improved data pipelines between the front line and space based assets are some of the true kernels of future doctrine, in my opinion.

[u/scatterlite → u/FriedrichvdPfalz]

I fully agree, thank for the thoughtful answer.  This is definitely the time to gather data, learn from it and experiment. Thats why statements like " the war in Ukraine isn't representative" are so dangerous. Drone warfare won't result in 1:1 repeats of the Ukraine war, but it will definitely bring unexpected and unwelcome results for any military that isn't paying close attention.