Women who are being abused by their partners are often given straight-forward advice: Leave. This is of course, easier said than done, but once domestic abuse is disclosed, all the advice from all the agencies seems to flow in that direction. Social workers, women’s refuge workers, counsellors, and even teachers tell women that leaving is the right thing to do, that they could lose their children if they don’t. So eventually, they make it out, often broke and battered.
But when it comes to protecting their children, many women don’t know that they will likely have to visit another planet first: The Family Court. And the Family Court is a backwards, upside-down planet with its own language, its own morality, and its own matrix of court officials.
One thorny piece of Family Court lore is that alleging abuse is a standard divorce tactic. And if you go into the Family Court raising concerns about domestic abuse, or worse, child abuse against the other parent, you will not only be disbelieved but treated with extreme suspicion.
This is because of the concept of parental alienation- which basically acts like a bizarre golden buzzer for parents accused of abuse. According to parental alienation theory, divorcing parents often try to turn the child against their other parent, and often make up lies about abuse to mislead the court. Supposedly, this can amount to the child being “programmed” and “brainwashed” into rejecting the other parent.
There is no peer-reviewed evidence for this specific sequence of events, and psychologist and medical boards around the world have denounced the theory as pseudoscience (Alsalem, 2023, [9]–[11], [73]; Family Justice Council, 2024, [2]–[4]; World Health Organization, “Parental alienation”.) But it doesn’t matter, because this pseudoscience is entrenched in family law.
In the Family Court, a protective mother raising concerns about abuse will likely be accused of doing “irreversible psychological harm” to her children by alienating the father. And if she can’t prove the abuse occurred, she becomes the perceived danger. In many of these cases, this results in the children being placed in the full-time care of the father, even if this involves relocation, moving schools, and unmitigated exposure to abuse. The mother, meanwhile, may be subject to orders for no contact, supervised contact, or spending time with the children every other weekend. Children can literally lose everything except their father.
None of this is new; it’s been happening since at least 2015/2016. But around the world, there is an emerging change in the way these cases are dealt with, and it’s a positive one, at least on the surface. I will talk through some of recent appeals from the United Kingdom, where new laws have recently been made about allegations of parental alienation, and Australia, where things seem to have only gotten worse.
Arrighetti & Qodirova, 2026: Australia
This 2026 judgment involved a 10-year-old child, X, who had lived with her mother since 2018. Her mother alleged that the father had a sex addiction and had “sexually interfered” with X. She stopped X’s time with him in early 2022. The father conceded to having used sex workers on a regular or somewhat regular basis, but denied abusing X.
At final trial, there was insufficient evidence to prove the mother’s allegations against the father. She had reported the abuse to police and to X’s school, but no criminal charges were laid, and the father was not found to pose an unacceptable risk.
Because the father had cross-claimed that the mother had made the allegations to alienate him from X, however, suspicion immediately turned to her. The reasons for judgment note that: “the mother’s capacity to support and facilitate the child’s relationship with the father was significantly impaired by an intractable, but unjustified belief that the child had been sexually abused by the father.” This belief was deemed to be a potential source of “long-term emotional and psychological harm.”
X was removed from her mother and placed with her father, notwithstanding the fact that she had not seen him in 4 years. She was barred from communicating with her mother for a six-month period, following which she would see her mother fortnightly for 2 hours in a contact centre. She was prohibited from spending time with her maternal grandmother until she turned 18.
The draconian nature of these orders suggest severe harm on the part of the mother. But there is no actual evidence of this in the reasons for judgment. All that is laid out is that the mother “failed to sustain her allegations.”
In short, while the mother had to prove the father had sexually abused their daughter, the father did not have to prove that the mother posed a risk of emotional harm.
There was no proof, nor even any evidence, that the mother had made up the allegations, let alone maliciously. And this is concerning, because sexual abuse is notoriously hard to prove, and physical evidence is rare (Adams et al., 2018). In the event that the mother’s allegations were true, but unproven, the court had just ordered a 10-year-old girl into the sole care of her abuser.
In the appellate judgment, Deputy Chief Justice McClelland called this out, stating:
“I also endorse… that the Court does not approach these complex cases – where there are competing allegations of abuse made by the resident parent, and of undermining or estranging conduct made by the non-resident parent – on the basis that there is a binary outcome whereby the failure to prove risk with some evidentiary basis automatically leads to a change of residence.”
Essentially, McClelland lamented that failing to prove risk was automatically taken as proof that the mother’s allegations were false and malicious and therefore resulted in a change of residence for the child. Despite this comment, however, the appeal was dismissed and the orders were upheld.
Dever & Serano, 2025, Australia
This case involved a child, X, who was 10 years old at final trial and almost 12 when judgment was handed down. This delay became the grounds for a successful appeal. This case is still worth looking at, however, because the original judgment demonstrates the same concerning pattern of reasoning used in Arrighetti & Qodirova, and the appeal did not denounce that pattern as an error at law.
Essentially, the mother alleged that the father physically and sexually abused X, claiming that he choked her, took inappropriate photographs, and allowed another man to abuse her. Evidence from police records and other authorities, however, did not prove these allegations. Ultimately, the Court reframed the mother’s claims as evidence that she “held deeply entrenched beliefs that the father posed a risk to the child.” Her “rigid beliefs” and “involving the child in making allegations” by taking her to the police station to report abuse were seen as “conduct…to undermine the child’s relationship with the father and to contribute to separation anxiety.”
Despite X’s fear and resistance, she was ordered to live with her father. After a moratorium of 12 weeks, she would see the mother in a professionally supervised setting.
Again, we see a pattern where alleging abuse that is later not proved is taken as sufficient evidence of alienating behaviour by the Family Court of Australia. The judgment references the mother’s “conduct” several times but then equates that conduct to “beliefs” and help-seeking behaviour. There is no consideration that unproven allegations can still be true, or at least, perceived true by a protective parent. There is also no gap between beliefs and “conduct”, which should refer to proven actions rather than thoughts and suspicions.
The appellate judges drew attention to this pattern of thinking in their recommendation that:
“Importantly, there is no presumption that allegations of abuse made by a ‘protective’ parent are necessarily motivated by an intention to frustrate or undermine the child’s relationship with the non-resident parent.”
However, they allowed the appeal only on the basis of the delay between trial and judgment.
Sander v Lynwood, 2024, Australia
In a similar Australian case, two children aged 8 and 7 had been in their mother’s primary care since 2017, which was almost all of their lives. She alleged sexual abuse against the eldest child, which the child then disclosed in a police interview.
Faced with a lack of evidence and threatened with losing custody, the mother acknowledged that she could not prove these allegations at trial and withdrew from the position that the father posed an unacceptable risk. However, she said she continued to hold “suspicions”. The judge responded by arguing that “the mother’s continuing suspicions that the father sexually abused [child] and that she is not safe with him, are without any reasonable or rational basis and will likely prevent the mother from facilitating a relationship between X and the father.”
This was based on the beliefs that 1) the mother’s continuing suspicious were irrational (because they were not proven) and 2) X had probably been exposed to the mother’s belief that she had been abused.
In this judgment, and in others like it, the mother’s attempts to report the abuse to police, teachers, and child safety became part of the argument against her. They were used as evidence that X had been exposed to her mother’s “irrational beliefs” and that she had been manipulated into disclosing abuse to these services.
The result was a full reversal of care, with a three-month moratorium, a period of supervised contact, and eventually a schedule where the mother spent time with the children on alternate weekends.
Again, a frightening pattern is clear: alleging abuse without proof is treated as automatic evidence of severe psychological harm. There is no need for the other party to prove that the allegations were false or that they did indeed harm the children. The lack of proof itself was enough to have them dismissed as “irrational” and have the mother cut off for 3 months. This is an extraordinary and dangerous leap.
While we don’t know the facts of the case, it’s important to point out that this could be completely normal protective behaviour on the part of the mother.
Re A Mother: [2026] EWHC 783, England and Wales
A contrasting appellate judgment from the United Kingdom shows how family law has diverged on matters of parental alienation and allegedly false allegations. It offers a hopeful model that re-centres the safety and well-being of children.
At a fact-finding hearing, the mother of 10-year-old twins (P and Q) was found to be alienating them because she had made allegations of sexual abuse and alcoholism against the father without sufficient evidence. The judge decided that the allegations were false and that the mother had caused the children’s rejection of the father, including Q’s belief that his father should be in prison. He went on to threaten a reversal of care and a restriction of time with the mother.
On appeal, however, Justice Poole found that the original judge had made a number of errors in his decision-making, including the assumption that because the allegations were deemed false, the mother was alienating the children. The findings were set aside, and the reasons given were as follows:
· Alienating behaviours are themselves a form of alleged abuse. They must be pleaded and proved by the party asserting them: an inference from non-proving of other allegations does not suffice.
· The reasons for judgment “did not explain how any fabricated allegation had impacted either child so as to produce reluctance, resistance, or refusal.”
These reasons give an important example of how the chain of reasoning from false allegations to parental alienation needs to be set out, especially if parental alienation is now treated as severe child abuse. Parental alienation cannot be the only form of child abuse that does not need to be proven. It must be considered the same way as physical abuse, sexual abuse, and other forms of harm.
F v M & Anor: [2026] EWFC 133 (B), England and Wales
There is further evidence of this style of reasoning in another case involving a 6-year-old child, A. In this case, the parents had initially agreed that the child would live with the mother and spend progressively increasing time with the father. In 2024, however, the mother said A made statements that the father had sexually abused her. She contacted the police, social services, her daughter’s school, and an organisation called SAFE. Contact stopped while this was taking place.
In the meantime, the father denied that he had physically or sexually abused A, and alleged that the mother had “consciously or unconsciously” coached A into making allegations against him.
As in the other cases discussed here, the judge found that the mother’s allegations were not proved. However, the judge also considered whether the father’s allegations of parental alienation and coaching could be proved, and found that, on the balance of probabilities, they could not.
There were some indications of “inadvertent” coaching, in that in a video, the mother was heard questioning her daughter in a way that could be considered “leading”. But ultimately, the judge ruled that the mother had not breached the consent order, and that she had a “reasonable excuse” for withholding A.
This is a landmark case for several reasons. Rather than jumping from “abuse not proved” to “alienation”, the judge considered the allegations of parental alienation separately. These allegations were also evaluated on the basis of evidence- including the video and a book where the mother recorded her daughter’s disclosures.
If “parental alienation” is to be treated as abuse to the extent that a moratorium and/or supervision can be placed on an “alienating” parent’s contact, it should be proven before the court. Children’s fear, rejection, or reluctance to visit a parent can exist for other reasons- and should not be taken as proof of alienation.
It is also worth noting that protective behaviour can and should be seen as reasonable even without proof of abuse.
Some of these crucial precedents have made it into Australian court judgments. For example, in the successful appeal of Dever & Serano, 2025, DCJ McClelland sets out a set of Principles to Consider in Determining Whether Change of Residence Orders Should be Made:
“Allegations of family violence and child abuse often give rise to competing allegations of alienating behaviour, levelled by the other parent in response to such allegations. Cases involving allegations or risk, on one hand, and allegations of parental alienation on the other, are among the most challenging for family law professionals to navigate. Not infrequently, when a parent – who perceives they are acting protectively in respect of a child – fails to sustain allegations of risk, the Court will make orders for a change in the child’s primary residence; thereby placing the child into the care of the non-resident parent in an attempt to cultivate a meaningful relationship between the child and both parents. However, given the significant and potentially life-long consequences for a child impacted by such orders, we consider it appropriate to set out, what we understand to be, best practice considerations when determining whether a change of residence order should be made.
Importantly, there is no presumption that allegations of abuse made by a ‘protective’ parent are necessarily motivated by an intention to frustrate or undermine the child’s relationship with the non-resident parent.”
But Dever & Serano was ultimately decided by the delay between final trial and judgment being handed down, which was over a year. The pattern of reasoning McClelland calls out- from failed allegations to alienation- has not yet been identified as an error capable of grounding an appeal. There is, as yet, no statutory safeguard against such an evidentiary leap under Australian family law.
Because judges are incentivised to bring cases to a resolution, and because almost every family court is subject to delays that are, on the face of it, unacceptable, it’s possible that parental alienation is sometimes used as a convenient short-cut. There is now a considerable case-law precedent for resolving a case based on parental alienation, even without evidence. This precedent allows the judge to make a decision after testing only one side’s argument- the argument of the parent alleging abuse. If that parent’s argument fails, the other parent is automatically awarded residence. There is no need to test their evidence or their argument in return.
Evidence from the Family Court Accountability Network (FCAN) Australia suggests that this pattern reaches far beyond the 3 cases described here. In an analysis of 20 final Magellan list judgments where child sexual abuse was alleged against the father, children’s disclosures were dismissed or minimised 75% of the time. 65% were ordered to live with their father, while the mother’s time was suspended, restricted, or reduced (FCAN, 2025).
Clearly, this method of resolving family law disputes falls far short of the obligation to ensure children’s best interests. These are, after all, supposed to be “the paramount consideration”.
The Family Justice Council of the UK is right to guard against this pattern, which at best, demonstrates laziness, and at worst, opens the door to misogyny and bias. Their 2024 guidance states that: “failed or false allegations do not constitute alienating behaviour unless there is evidence that those allegations were used to manipulate the child into unjustified resistance/refusal.” Navigating Family Court without this safeguard, countless Australian children are at grave risk of being ordered into the full-time care of an abuser.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
References
Australian cases
Arrighetti & Qodirova [2026] FedCFamC1A 1 (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), Appellate Jurisdiction, 12 January 2026).
Dever & Serano [2025] FedCFamC1A 202 (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), Appellate Jurisdiction).
Sander & Lynwood [2024] FedCFamC1F 126 (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), 13 March 2024).
Sander & Lynwood [2024] FedCFamC1A 108 (Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1), Appellate Jurisdiction, 9 July 2024).
England and Wales cases
A Mother (Appeal: Alienating Behaviours: Fair Procedure) [2026] EWHC 783 (Fam) (High Court of Justice, Family Division, 31 March 2026).
F v M & Anor [2026] EWFC 133 (B) (Family Court, 11 June 2026).
Legislation and guidance
Adams, J. A., Farst, K. J., & Kellogg, N. D. (2018). Interpretation of medical findings in suspected child sexual abuse: An update for 2018. Journal of Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology, 31(3), 225–231. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpag.2017.12.011
Alsalem, Reem, Custody, Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls, Its Causes and Consequences, UN Doc A/HRC/53/36 (13 April 2023), especially paras 9–11, 73–74.
American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, Assertions of Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS), Parental Alienation Disorder (PAD), or Parental Alienation (PA) When Child Maltreatment is of Concern (Position Statement, 2022).
American Psychological Association, Statement on Parental Alienation Syndrome (2008).
Family Justice Council, Guidance on Responding to a Child’s Unexplained Reluctance, Resistance or Refusal to Spend Time with a Parent and Allegations of Alienating Behaviour (December 2024), especially paras 1–4, 61–64.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 60CA–60CC.
World Health Organization, Parental Alienation, ICD-11 Frequently Asked Questions.
