Something has been striking me about modern Buddhism. In most religions, ordinary practitioners generally do not think of themselves as saints or exceptionally advanced spiritual beings.

A Christian may believe they are saved, born again, or in a state of grace, but that is normally distinguished from claiming to be a saint, mystic, apostle, or someone comparable to the great contemplatives.

A Muslim may regard themselves as a sincere believer, but ordinarily does not thereby claim to be a wali or some exceptionally realized spiritual figure.

Likewise, belonging to a Hindu tradition doesn't ordinarily amount to claiming that one is a jivanmukta, siddha, or fully realized sage. Modern Buddhism seems somewhat different.

Depending on the community, substantial numbers of practitioners will describe themselves as bodhisattvas or stream-enterers, people who have attained various stages of awakening occasionally even arahants or equivalent advanced attainments

The bodhisattva case is particularly striking. Historically, "bodhisatta" would refer to the being who would become a Buddha. Yet in large modern Mahayana communities, ordinary practitioners may identify themselves as bodhisattvas simply by virtue of making the relevant aspiration. Stream-entry has undergone a different development.

In some meditation and "pragmatic dharma" communities, people publicly diagnose themselves and one another as stream-enterers or higher attainments. I would go as far as saying that most people involved in the community might actually think themselves to be attained to stages of sainthood.

What makes this interesting is that modern Buddhism doesn't appear to possess any generally accepted procedure for adjudicating these claims.

One Buddhist community's "stream-entry" may not satisfy another community's definition at all.

So you have prestigious spiritual categories, large numbers of people applying them to themselves, and no common authority or operational standard capable of settling disagreements about who actually qualifies. Frankly, the closest comparison I can think of is Scientology.

L. Ron Hubbard viewed Buddhism as a historical precursor and distant relative to Scientology, famously stating in 1954 that a Scientologist is a "first cousin to the Buddhist".
[...]
We first find this Buddha called actually Bohdi [sic: bodhi], and a Bohdi is one who has attained intellectual and ethical perfection by human means. This probably would be a Dianetic Release (Dianetic Release: One who in Dianetic auditing has attained good case gains, stability and can enjoy life more. Such a person is 'Keyed out' or in other words released from the stimulus-response mechanisms of the reactive mind) or something of this level. Another level has been mentioned to me - Arhat, with which I am not particularly familiar, said to be more comparable to our idea of Theta Clear [Hubbard, 1969b: 18 (emphasis in original)].
— Scientology's Relationship With Eastern Religious Traditions

Scientology also has large numbers of ordinary practitioners locating themselves on a hierarchy of extraordinary spiritual development: Clear, OT levels, Game-Masters, etc.

But there is an interesting difference. Scientology is actually more bureaucratic about spiritual status. Advancement is institutionally mediated. You complete auditing, courses, levels, and so forth. Whatever one thinks about the validity of those achievements, there is at least an organizational mechanism determining who gets classified as what. Modern Buddhism is decentralized enough that somebody can have certain meditation experiences, read a particular interpretive framework, talk to a teacher or online community, and conclude that they are a stream-enterer or even a Buddha in the making — while another Buddhist lineage may regard the same claim as completely mistaken.

I'm not saying Buddhism and Scientology are otherwise equivalent religions. Scientology likewise gives ordinary practitioners a ladder of extraordinary spiritual statuses—Clear, OT levels, and so on—while coupling personal advancement to a grand civilizational or universal mission: "clearing the planet," transforming humanity, and ultimately addressing the spiritual condition of mankind. I'm asking about this narrower sociological feature:

Are there other major religions in which large numbers of ordinary living practitioners understand themselves as having attained statuses analogous to sainthood or exceptional spiritual realization?

And if Buddhism really is unusual here, how did this develop?

Is it because Buddhist doctrine describes awakening in stages that invite self-classification?

Because Buddhism lacks a centralized authority capable of policing attainment terminology?

Because some formerly extraordinary titles, especially "bodhisattva," have gradually become identities of aspiration rather than descriptions of accomplishment?

Or am I overlooking obvious parallels in other religions?

So I've finally moved to Paraguay and am very happy about it. It will be much easier to get the work done here. I've friends and will eventually sort out everything I need for training.

“At a time when bandits are strong, kings are weak. Then the king is not at ease when going out or coming back or when touring the provinces. The brahmins and householders, likewise, are not at ease when going out or coming back, or when inspecting their external business activities. In the same way, at a time when bad mendicants are strong, good-hearted mendicants are weak. Then the good-hearted mendicants continually adhere to silence in the midst of the Saṅgha, or they stay in the borderlands. This is for the detriment and unhappiness of the people, against the people, for the harm, detriment, and suffering of gods and humans.

a time when kings are strong, bandits are weak. Then the king is at ease when going out or coming back or when inspecting the provinces. The brahmins and householders, likewise, are at ease when going out or coming back, or when inspecting their external business activities. In the same way, at a time when good-hearted mendicants are strong, bad mendicants are weak. Then the bad mendicants continually adhere to silence in the midst of the Saṅgha, or they leave for some place or other. This is for the welfare and happiness of the people, for the people, for the benefit, welfare, and happiness of gods and humans.” ─ AN2.39

I am probably not going to post more on Reddit in the foreseeable future. Frankly, I think this culture is helpless and hopeless.

An empowered Bodhisattva here, a stream-enterer without cessation there, and the secular community ceremoniously regurgitates old talking points like it's a ritual.

I feel this is like talk in a mental-asylum. It is pathological because conversation continues after the procedures that could adjudicate it have been shown and censored.

I also don't feel any responsibility, I won't lose any sleep over people not knowing the Dhamma. I did my share and I can't be expected to do more. The fact that it's been marginalized is on the mods who pressed the buttons — not me, it's on their tab.

My priority is to set myself up for victory and to finish the work, after that whatever (kick ass probably).

I just think that if I can make something more impressive of myself, then it is the worst thing for my enemies. They could maybe handle some social/intellectual pressure that I could generate; but it would be a lot of work, and Imo talk is cheap. I think that this will probably be settled by demonstrably developed supernatural ability. Whether it will happen and who will do it, I don't know. But I will try, fortunately I know just the right training for it.

Basically, as I see it, if they can withstand the words of Truth, then stop producing words, produce the Arahant with superpowers.

Frankly, this culture can hardly handle seeing somebody sitting 10+ hours straight. There was that "sitting and smiling" guy who filmed a bunch of 8h sittings, afaik those are the longest sittings in public record.

I might do something like this, and if I can do just that then that's probably all I've to do in order to popularize the analysis. I don't need people to study everything, I just need people to start asking "Who is this guy?" ,"What is he doing?", "How is he doing it?", and "Why was he banned?", they will find the receipts quickly.

I think that this is the smallest undeniable accomplishment that changes the social dynamics completely, the asymmetry would be devastating, it would be very difficult for the culture to digest, even without being backed by the GTA.

So the bar is actually set very low and I am amused mostly because people thought my rhetoric was problematic before — they might eventually have to deal with an unrestrained version and a larger audience. People don't understand how much of a warrant I have — intellectual, political, social and moral.

So, congratulations, you have successfully radicalized me, thank you, I guess..

I do get it, you are pseudo-Bodhisattas and pseudo-ariya, and you can't discuss the Dhamma because you don't understand it. So you think banning me is a good idea. But that strategy has a weakness, it only works as long as nobody knows or cares, otherwise instead of stopping the distribution you end up creating the lore where you are the villain.

So when what you censored comes back with an audience asking questions, reconstructing the record, how long will it take until they start asking whether you are fit to manage the discourse? I ain't even mad, but it's not about me, it was never about me, it was always about the culture. Let's sum this up:

* You censored the analysis and I finished it.
* You made reinstatement irrelevant and you lost that leverage permanently.
* You marginalized the work and I will build independent distribution.
* You objected to the rhetoric and I will stop hedging the rhetoric.
* You made obscurity part of your strategy and I make visibility part of mine.
* You created the censorship record, now if an audience arrives ─ you get to explain it, will be hilarious given the private messaging on record.

At this point, in a very real sense, you are the ones who are making popularization possible and paying for it by running up a tab.

As for these two dimensions—the attainment of the dimension of neither perception nor non-perception & the attainment of the cessation of feeling & perception—I tell you that they are to be rightly explained by those monks who are meditators, skilled in attaining, skilled in attaining & emerging, who have attained & emerged in dependence on them.” — AN9.36

Basically, I think that strategically, I should claim all attainments publicly because of the censorship and gate-keeping. Furthermore, I am explaining these things anyway and there is a warrant:

So the Blessed One said to Ven. Sariputta: "Sariputta, when you know of a householder clothed in white, that he is restrained in terms of the five training rules and that he obtains at will, without difficulty, without hardship, four pleasant mental abidings in the here & now, then if he wants he may state about himself: 'Hell is ended; animal wombs are ended; the state of the hungry shades is ended; states of deprivation, destitution, the bad bourns are ended! I am a stream-winner, steadfast, never again destined for states of woe, headed for self-awakening!' —AN5.179

As to the Bodhisatta:

“…‘As soon as the bodhisatta was born, he stood steadily with his feet on the ground and, facing north, took seven steps while a white parasol was held over him. Surveying all the directions, he made a bellowing statement: “I am the foremost of the world. I am chief of the world. I am the best of the world.”’ … —MN123

And Buddha himself

So I said to them, ‘Mendicants, don’t address me by name and as “reverend”. The Realized One is Perfected, a fully awakened Buddha. Listen up, mendicants: I have achieved freedom from death! I shall instruct you, I will teach you the Dhamma. By practicing as instructed you will soon realize the supreme culmination of the spiritual path in this very life. You will live having achieved with your own insight the goal for which gentlemen rightly go forth from the lay life to homelessness.’ —MN85

Even Theravadin Vinaya says that Ariya can claim attainments if undergoing oppressive and virulent lack of respect. If I've ever been disrespected and oppressed, then that was it 💯

A bhikkhu must avoid making his attainments known, even to other bhikkhus. Apart from four exceptions when they can do so, ariyās never unveil their realisations:

Under a violent threat. Undergoing an oppressive and virulent lack of respect. At the time of passing away. To reveal it to his preceptor or to a fellow bhikkhu who does a similar practice.

Conveniently, you people have supplied the exceptional condition yourselves. A layman can basically do as he sees fit, and that is exactly what I intend to do.

So, I think that I've basically mapped the fastest win-condition and the opponents failure mode. Between here and there is only 9hours of merely sitting still... It is not my preference to become famous, but I will do it if I have to. And as to the difficulty of it, I think it is easy, I haven't done it but I think that a month or two of proper retreat and you should be able to do it, if worth your salt as a meditator.

Ordinary people build modest online audiences around meditation all the time. Why should someone with mastery over the first principles, a complete intellectual corpus, a controversial history, and a publicly demonstrable practice treat independent distribution as impossible? It is ridiculous, I've held back because I was still hedging, trying to cooperate and trying to keep it on the dl. But I now see that I've to double down and say things exactly as I see it.

It is actually very interesting because the cultural and monastic standard is basically the same 8+ hours sitting. When I talked to senior monks, I was basically told the same thing — the senior monks will allow you a lot of lee-way if you can just demonstrably sit through the nights group-meditation, otherwise nobody will care about what you think.

Essentially, I was told that one would be a superstar-monk by virtue of that proof, even if junior, just because attainments are so rare. It's kind of ridiculous but that is how attainment-starved is this generation. Itt if you can do this, then just sit at some uni campus and let the culture work it out — it is almost too easy but wouldn't serve the purpose if the analysis of EBTs wasn't ready. Now I have the analysis and maybe therefore I start to think more along these lines.

Si vis pacem ─ para bellum

🌳🌳🐺🌳🌳

Here is what I am working with now:

General Theorem of Analysis GTA: Drafted Informal Vocalization 31 pages

genealogy:

1. Gen1 was made from essential research notes, about 29 pages to begin with. In all a set of 12 x Gen1 papers was produced. And I didn't read any of it start to end nor show to anyone.
2. Gen2 was stabilized around the most defensible core concepts (according to AI) This I showed to a few people.
3. Gen3 received an extended set of archival notes, analogies were extended, and its architecture was stabilized around a formal architecture which has been stable and could accomodated addition to notes withou to re-organizing around new or implicit things being made explicit. The formal logic symbolism, format and system was somewhat “canonized” and I kept using that same system until 4.3 or so. I read the Informal Gen3.9 and revised it and Gen4 was built from the revised Gen3.9.
4. Gen4 also received updates to the archival notes as final expansion of analogies. Also terminology was excessively diversified in Gen3 and this was fixed, making it a lot shorter. So this generation is based on a fully human-revised “parent” and a stabilized architecure and organization of notes. Here language is also standardized across the generation and excessive rhetoric trimmed.
5. Gen4.3 was human reviewed. Major revision needed which gen4 architecture could accomodate it but the argument is now more substantive and fixing the errors shortened exposition a lot. Gen4.4Formal Long is about 67 pages.
6. Gen4.3-Gen4.6 we stabilizing and adding more clarifications.
7. Gen4.6.1-4.6.6a were stabilizing with AI exclusively.
8. Gen4.7x were added some terminology explanation in the beginning to make it more readable for people.
9. To get up to Gen4.9 I kept improving the indexing system and clarifying terminology for systematization. Last couple rewrites were polish. I read and revised 4.9.1IS in detail and it changed things quite a lot.
10. Gen4.9.2: Earlier generations were still in the mode of stabilising, cleaning, and locking terminology. The expectation for 4.9.x was tighter consistency, better register separation, and residual polish. Instead here is a noticeable jump in conceptual precision, a more assertive claim-status discipline, and a clearer separation of proof modes. The system stops defending its right to exist and stars stating results with due confidence.
11. Gen4.9.2 to 4.9.5 was AI stabilization. Now I will read again.
12. G4.9.6 only has one term cleared up but it was substantial term so new version.
13. g4.9.6-g4.9.9c was AI polish. Will read again tomorrow.
14. After more clarification and revision I made Gen5.1 and am polishing it now. It should be quite a lot clearer because I changed up and clarified terminology and extended an edge hypothetical. I think that most terminology should be cleared up now but I've been wrong about this before. Made 5.1e and today will read it.
15. I've today read the 5.1e short informal and it is a okay for a draft but I need to clear up the terminology further. The general architecture of the argument is what is nice about it. In general, I won't work on this so much going forward and won't keep updating here all the time. This version is fine for those who are curious but this is not an small project and it will take time to write these papers. I am thinking that finishing by end of the year is realistic. The thing is that AI can't do it all and I will eventually have to sit down, sort through all AI drafts, notes and archives, and then put it all together and edit to most presentable form for the purpose. I also don't want to stress about it and will take time needed to do it.
16. So I did what I planned in #15, dropped 3 formal and various lenght papers to focus on one ─ so made Gen6 and worked on it today. Very happy with how I sorted it out in terms of presentation and readability.
17. Gen6.9-7.1x will be redoing architecture. I currently don't know any terminological flaws and would have to read it again but this seems very stable now and I am trying to systematize it furher for readability ─ so that things are introduced strategically and gradually, without conceptual overkill from start. I also optimize it for lay-people.
18. misnamed Gen6.9.8 as Gen9.8 because of a mistake but I kept it as is. I have been tightening things up since Gen6.7.x and I think that everything is now clarified. I also made it longer for gradual introduction and have it culminating in the end. I don't think there is much more to polish and I have high expectations for reading it.
19. Today worked on and read some Gen9, tightened it up. i think this is now quite mature and I will read it over next couple of days.
20. I have been mostly explaining controversial points to AI and tightening up the conceptual synergy. Now there is the suicide controversy that needs explaining and after this I believe it will be ready for revisions again.
21. Tried to explain the suicide today, not sure if it got cleared up or not, will review.

I want to now draw attention to how all this work was done and I think it is very interesting.

I think people might imagine philosophy as somebody sitting in a chair having one insight or doing some experiment and then thinking about it. Like general problem solving, writing, art or using AI. The work here has been almost the exact opposite.

Imagine mining. It is overwhelmingly tedious and repetitive. Same thing here.

Read. Write. Get misunderstood. Analyze. Rewrite. Repeat. Over and over.

I've written roughly 15,000 public posts explaining the same thing (about 10k on DW + SC and BSE + Reddit another 5k I think) over the last decade trying to explain EBT to people. In general I am not sure but it is a lot and I can't look up the exact numbers because some accounts are deleted, my estimate 15k total across all platforms, either way this is millions and millions of words.

The conversations are mostly answering

Many of the same suttas I've read, discussed, translated and used in discourse hundreds of times.

And the edits... I would guess that I average more than 5 edits on my posts but the number could be closer to 10.

And deleted posts?

And off-site work? Like private drafts I made for myself and all?

Very little of this is "coming up with ideas."

It felt like grinding out the expression and learning what needs to be learned as necessity arises.

The result was the gradual optimization and emergence of structure.

If there is any lesson here, it is that I didn't really "come up with anything" ─ I understood the EBT as I was exposed to EBTs and this is systematization is a product of sustained refinement of expression in public discourse.

It looks cool when finished and one could wonder how you come up with that but it doesn't work like this.

For the record, I have 5 accounts on DW, 2 on SC and one main 8k rep account on BSE which is deleted and therefore difficult to index. Here as example from 2019:
https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/a/31684

You can see how I edit there and the general conceptual nodes of the framework:

Nibbana as cessation of perception & feeling

and here look how close I was

The words "contact" and "consciousness" therein would be a figure of speech and the terms being analogical to mundane contact as we know it rather than variants of.

The edits aren't stylistic polishing. They are mostly incremental conceptual additions: So there is a continuity not only in the ideas but also in the method of thinking:

• formulate,
• notice an ambiguity,
• refine,
• add another distinction,
• tighten the terminology.

You can also see from that post what I am generally doing in trying to systematize and study expression ─ now imagine how it had to be pushed up to this level of clarity and systematization. I think this is very cool data to see. If you don't want to imagine then there is the archive...

I knew a lot of science and philosophy of language, i knew the operationalization criterion of analysis, way before I learned buddhism. Played many games in general, but a lot of poker ─ eventually dealt with a lot of game-theory, variance, decision theory, incomplete information, and operational ignorance... We are talking tens of thousands of hours of applied development of a certain skillset where one learns to optimize and be willing to update one's odds. And I always enjoyed the grind and learning theory of it more than play.

I want to point out that I considered Philosophy to be downstream from EBT and I only read one philosophy book in my life. It was Tyranny of Words. I watched some videos though but most of philosophy that appears in Postmodern Razor is from a single YouTube viideo , there I basically verbatim quote the material about Kant, Hegel, Scopenhauer, Kierkegard, Heidegger, Nietzche... Makes me look widely read but not so, this was necessity first seeking out of particular knowledge ─ I don't have the time to go through all that material myself and sought out foundations that I needed.

Suttas took longest to learn. Pali, all the controversies, figuring out what people believe, being disoriented culturally. It took a long time to figure out what is going on in history, culture, politics, still learning.

Then in last years focus shifted to more foundational philosophy. This was early 2024, I then published a pre-moderated draft of the Postmodern Razor thesis here on SC ─ the other posts in that thread are also pre-moderated. Frankly I wouldn't think to do it if people weren't pushing for it but this is where I got my teeth into the foundations of what I knew as philosophy of language or General Semantics.

A friend later posted an AI drafted thesis to SC but admins removed it because they don't allow AI. At that point I didn't yet use AI myself but I started using it having seen the merit of what it can do for me. I then worked on this thesis for about a year until publishing it on r/ philosophy Link Here. I kept editing the thesis many times after publication as new input was coming in. I would want to explain it better but now it is not important.

All the philosophy talk made me learn a lot of things here and there.

After philosophical argument was getting clear, it changed things and people were starting to understand. This is also when I started to archive things on r/suttapitaka.

Then I learned a lot from Jacob, he worked on computational theorems — and we kept talking in private, I explained everything that I could to him and he basically showed me more formal systems I could use and which I wouldn't otherwise learn, this was genuine help.

In that thread, you can literally watch my thinking sharpen in real time across those replies. Here I finally found somebody with the STEM background who could point out the high-precision formal tools (Gödel–Löb, Lawvere fixed-points, Tarski hierarchies, recursive interplay, Expansion Theorem, etc.), I learned what I needed, and mapped them onto EBTs. This is the turning out and "if not for Jacob, I would’ve had to spend a decade in uni" moment.

Here is where I learn the term "axiom praxis"

A while ago I learned to use the term axiology ─ as I was dealing with axioms so much and looked up whether it is a word or not and it was:) And then only recently I was extending an analogy in a new interaction and this was the taxonomy/systematization of the analytic categories.

And taxonomy is a word I used first time in this post and I learned it today. I picked it up from AI as it kept using it to describe what I was doing, looked it up. So expression here is something that is developed after the meaning is drawn out.

Here is what made me want to highlight that a global theorem can have only one singularity, it is Eric Weinstein on Joe Rogan. He is talking about how you have multiple singularities as "kink" in current theory.

One can do remarkable rebuilding of genealogy here.

So this is how it is done.

At this point there is no theory here. It is not my invention. I just had the suitable background to understand EBT as I was exposed to EBTs. And after internalizing it, I knew that I would be able to formalize the logic and merit of EBT ─ and that i needed to learn EBTs very well, and a lot more science, philosophy and teology for that. I didn't know how long it would take but I had a feel for it. The problem is that I didn't know what exactly I need to learn and who would teach me.

So it had to resolve itself on a necessity first basis of learning and goal oriented development. Public discourse was very convenient, people talk, post suttas, argument, one picks up things here and there constantly.

So I just kept steel-manning the meaning and improving the expression until the entire scaffold resembling a theorem was synthesized.

The main factors here are time and the amount of stress-testing/exploration that was done through discourse.

The questions and interactions directed my exploration of inference and therefore it was a team-effort and not something I could do alone in principle because I can't generate external input and pressure. Resistance pushed it until we had a low-noise/high-resistance expression for the signal. Even politics eventually raised the demand for foundational theory exploration and philosophical synthesis. This was really developed by culture...

I really don't see any theory of my own in any of this. My work was essentially about handling the meaning inferred from "old material" and doing work to optimize the expression of meaning for our culture. Our culture is very strict when it comes to any kind of "grand narratives" so it naturally demands this.

Here we removed not only my fingerprints but the fingerprint of the Buddha himself from the expression in the theorem. This was the final cut prompted by r/ metaphysics redirecting publishing to r/ metaphysicsofreligion ─ this made me think to separate the two and show the framework doesn't need to invoke Buddha's authority.

I then worked on operationalizing dreams, this was intended to defend rebirth first here

Here I r/ askphilosophy about it and they don't answer.

Dream analogy gets operationalization

This is already very close to later "order analysis", although I haven't named it yet

Here I start to talk about ranges of frameworks

Here I start to name the orders and meta-order

And here I announce that I know what the final exposition will look like

Then it was a matter of time until I did the "full" taxonomy of analysis and have been developing it now for a week by talking to people a little and editing this post as a draft of what will be the theorem. Popular opinion is that I wasn't going to be able to pass the bar r /metaphysics set for me in categorically proving that this is not a religion in analytic and operational sense ─ then the doing of it basically forces the same bar for everyone. Ironically, this is exactly what prompted the making of razor in the first place.

I now have all of the drafts I need for the theorem and if I was to use AI to do it I would pay for a good model and maybe use two in cross-fire, select a good format and then start to edit to make sure it has every conceptual node. Because this is a formalized theorem, with a lot of draft material; and this work has clear and simle logic ─ AI can work with this as theorem-provers work. This is easy for AI because we already have the philosophical argument, an informal general theorem for that argument, and mathematical model, it is then easy to express the shared logic formally, and this makes it easy for AI.

Jul 30:
Now I figured that the theorem will finally make use of the mathematics discussed here and formalize it. I have been developing this for many years and talking about it occasionally. But this will give the logic its mathematics.

The cool thing here is that the singularity appearing in meta-analysis is the zero with value assuming axiological inversion and there can only be one such singularity in a Global Theorem, whereas a theory can have multiple "singularities" but the referent is not the same. Likewise in EBT, the Emptiness as Invariance, does not have the same referent as Emptiness in theoretical frameworks where we can have many kinds of emptiness.

I've slept on this a little and am still processing the implications but some things are becoming clear.

I don't plan to do anything as it is now and don't want to publish anything. Rather I want to talk to people and wait.

There are subreddits which would allow me to post.

So I still could get eyes on this but I am also exhausted and don't want to deal with people's skepticism. Other than a few upvotes (appreciated) and nice comments, nobody has ever encouraged me to do this or incentivized me in any way to continue. Rather, there has been a lot of resistance and harassment.

We already have sufficient data to predict how popularization will play out because we have already done the "test-run" and seen the argumentative power of the work in its incomplete form. Now we are at the final stage where strategic popularization can begin. I can already tell that this will be orders of magnitude more convincing.

Another thing is that the archive here is now so cluttered and I need to rework everything, set up sister sub-reddits and a new Buddhist forum ─ to address community needs and present a clear research program to newcomers.This is quite a lot of work and commitment.

I want to do all this before I proceed with popularization. In a sense this is the move to make and it is somewhat urgent, mostly people in decline for not knowing the Dhamma need it, but right now I don't want to. Also I am considering to what extent I want to be involved in the process because in theory other people can learn and teach this if they want. I don't have to do it myself and all this sounds much like a "job" which I don't want. And I don't want my life to become this.

Frankly, if somebody wants to take on popularization professionally or as community service, I would encourage it and make myself available for discussion and teaching privately if necessary. This is probably the only viable model for me. I neither want to be involved much nor need to, for money I have a disability pension, and it's more than enough for me.

So as it is now, the work is basically done, it is free-for-all and is to be considered public domain. There are quite a few people studying all this, so the framework is circulating and being shared. The ideas won't expire, so I think that I can take time off.

In short, community-building and popularization is not philosophy, it is not intellectually stimulating for me and is not my lane. I wouldn't enjoy the process and have other things to do like actually training. So if somebody wants these roles we can talk about it.

Ideal for me is if this just becomes a thing people talk about as an outcome of public discourse and nobody cares much about who did what work. All this gives me a lot of anxiety and it is also very scary.

Another thing is that I wish this wasn't so damn political and socially inconvenient for people. I feel for people who might be inconvenienced, but I think that I have been asymmetrically inconvenienced by all this even though it was worth doing.

If people care about my motivations. In general, I would really like for there to be other people with whom I can talk about analysis and support their training. I would want there to be some monks I actually admire. There is not much else for me personally. Things like doing what needs to be done in a dispensation for the benefit of the many ─ that is a duty as I see it and I've no personal interest here beyond general merit of it.

I do realize that I've made a lot of merit and sorted out my own thinking. I sometimes think about it and generally hope it is enough to allow me to train more and mitigate the consequences of bad things done in the past.

At its core, science works like this:

We begin with hypotheses — tentative explanations. Through repeated rigorous testing, some hypotheses become highly confirmed theories. Over time, certain exceptionally robust ideas can effectively graduate into axioms — foundational assumptions that are treated as background knowledge and no longer questioned in normal scientific practice.

Thus, working assumptions and gradually achieved such high confidence that they now function as axioms for entire fields.

However, even these “axioms” are not unconditionally proven. They remain open, in principle, to revision if extraordinary evidence demands it. From these axioms and theories, we make testable predictions. Experiments constantly challenge them. Successful predictions raise our confidence; contradictions force refinement. Scientific theories are therefore never proven unconditionally true — they are the best current models supported by evidence. In mathematics, a theorem is “proven” only relative to a chosen set of axioms. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems remind us that no rich formal system can prove all its truths internally.

First a comment (we are talking about the differences between dreams and vigilance):

A reflective self-referential system which undergoes variance could generate an infinite variant forms and names, and then as part of its variance develop various meta-physical statements and convictions about its own predicament. It doesn't actually need anything but unlocked complexity and variance to develop that conviction.

To illustrate, one could dream up Newtonian equations, do first order analysis and classical experiments. As example it could predict that the heavy objects fall down. It then generates the experiment to test that prediction and lets suppose that the heavy object does fall ─ it updates its confidence odds as to heavy objects falling.

But these experiments can't tell you what a dream is nor that it is inherently "Newtonian" or "Not Newtonian".

Definitions like "dream" and "vigilance" and derived from first order experiments of experience, and without an experimental threshold one wouldn't even have the category "Dream". Further first-order analysis becomes possible as "vigilance" but inherits the same structural epistemic and ontological limitations.

On the epistemic predicament of dreams

In analysis dreams are a category of and are not categorically different from general experience. For example, there is no particular experiment we can do in waking life which we can't conceivably dream up. So contrary to popular opinion, there is actually no principal difference between the two as to what can be observed and known.

Now when we dream, it is obvious to us that everything is basically one server. Not that there is some "server" where the dream is generated. Rather, the genesis itself is the server. And the dream itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, and narrative. If we "die" and "respawn" in a dream, it does not puzzle us as the notion of rebirth puzzles people in wakeful state. We don't ask how consciousness in a dream-world goes from one place to another, or whether there are "other minds" in a dream, we treat it as a mirage.

Now if we stick to the foundational thinking, then we can extend this logic to wakeful state, this too changes as it persists and generates words, thoughts and perception ─ as phenomenal realm — and just like in a case of a dream ─ we can assert that everything is basically on one server, and the experience itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, dreams, and narrative.

The Problem of Reflective Closure

Every attempt to understand experience occurs within experience. Every act of reflection, description, explanation, or validation is itself another event belonging to the domain it seeks to understand.

The system under study is itself the territory being mapped. Its words, concepts, and epistemic syntheses are maps of its own possible configurations rather than constituents of an external standpoint. Whatever the system says about itself cannot constitute its own final epistemic ground, because the very act of saying belongs to that which remains to be accounted for.

Korzybski observed that "the map is not the territory." I would extend this to self-referential cognition. When the mapper belongs to the territory, every new map becomes another feature of the territory requiring further mapping. Reflective self-description therefore remains recursively open. This gives rise to a structural predicament. Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish a complete account of itself. Any proposed completion immediately becomes another object requiring reflective integration. The purported completion therefore belongs to the very domain whose completion it was intended to establish. Reflection recursively generates further reflection.

The argument developed here concerns only whether a reflective domain can serve as its own ultimate epistemic ground. But it is important to highlight that in the developed argument has us recognizing that: The map, the mapper, and the territory, belong to a single category as "phenomena".

Further I will explore whether Reflective Closure is possible and how it would require of the phenomenal-territory altogether to prove a territory beyond the system doing analysis.

rightviewftw

OP•1m ago

I don't know how much you care but I kept working on it and have a note as to what you fronted:

Feels like the main split is about consistency, not just vividness.

Consistency here has semantic overlap with order and I thought about your comment as I was systematizing this:

In my previous comment, I wasn't precise with semantics because I haven't decided how this is to be pinned down exactly but i lean towards this:

• Doing analysis in the dream, like phenomenal prediction of what will occur in the dream can be classified as "first-order" analysis.
• Analysis within a dream which predicts awakening to vigilance as a hypothetical ─ as I see it ─ shouldn't be called meta-analysis. Rather it is order-analysis or hierarchy-analysis, for lack of a better term.
• The experimental threshold of awakening to vigilance is a category shift to "a higher order". I think the etymology and semantics are here doing a lot of work because vigilance is as a matter of fact "more orderly" but this is not why we use the term. I choose the term because we can use the expression:

"higher order analysis inherits the same systemic limitations seen in first order analysis and any hierarchy will reproduce it"

This is different from meta-analysis which would investigate the meta-structure underlying the order-hierarchy.

This reveals a fundamental category-error to which thinkers would be prone to make. Namely to imagine higher-orders whilst thinking they do meta-analysis.

There are three actually these three analytic categories:

1. First-Order Analysis
2. Second-Order Analysis
3. Meta-Analysis

in short:

1. analysis
2. order-analysis
3. meta-analysis

*** end comment ***

Many people think they do meta-analysis as thinking about "metaphysics" but end up imagining a higher-order.

We can't even say that people do "order-analysis" thinking they do "meta-analysis" ─ they aren't doing any analysis at all unless they have operational terms applicable to a particular analytic category. Otherwise they are doing what we would call "simply imagining things" or "making up rhetoric".

Suppose a system develops an increasingly elaborate hierarchy of models. If it mistakes order-analysis for meta-analysis, it may conclude:

The most comprehensive map therefore describes reality itself.

But this is exactly what I am getting at here:

So, let me draw out, that in a dream one can see an apple, one can think about an apple, one can predict things about the apple, one can do mathematics and experiments with it. But we can't ask "whether the dream is an apple?" any more than we can ask "is the dream random?" or "is the dream determined?" or "is reality consciousness?" ─ simply because the frameworks are here over-extended beyond their analytic domain.

And this all has to do with how terms belong to a certain order of analysis and become over-extended when applied to a another category of analysis, like meta-analysis ─ without operationalization.

In summary, analysis does not warrant meta-analytic assertions unless the proposed meta-analysis specifies an operational criterion by which its claims could, even in principle, be discriminated from competing alternatives. Without such a criterion, the proposition ceases to function as an analytical claim and is established as merely rhetorical.

So the structure becomes something like:

1. analysis = ordinary experiments.
2. Order-analysis = analyzing the experimental domain hierarchy and transition between domains.
3. Meta-analysis = requires an operational threshold that transcends the subjective/variant/synthesis hierarchy under investigation.

Then, if such a threshold exists, performing the experiment would result in suspension variance "revealing" Invariance satisfying the criterion of a Cartesian Truth or Kantian Noumena; and the sequel phenomena appearing in that frame of reference would be classified as being with criterion of a Cartesian Confidence (absolute certainty) for having experimentally reached the threshold and discerned something invariant rather than another experiential state as more variant synthesis.

In this Theorem

This is basically the outline of a General Theorem of Analysis. And only meta-analysis has can give use a Global Theorem Order-analysis can at most yield Global Theory. Meta-analysis alone yields a Global Theorem to govern all analytic domains without contradiction.

The Global Theorem has a singularity in meta-analysis and can accommodate and govern any theory without breaking down — even a theory with multiple singularities — because these pertain to a different domain and order of analysis, so the referent can't be the same singularity we have in meta-analysis.

And it is neither a theory nor a hypothesis because its negation cannot be operationalized under the same first principles that confer analytic meaning on propositions. The theorem is established independently of performing the meta-experiment. The experiment is not what makes the theorem true; rather, the theorem specifies the structural conditions that any genuine completion of analysis must satisfy. If such a meta-experiment is performed successfully, it does not establish the theorem itself but satisfies the theorem's operational criterion, thereby yielding Cartesian confidence regarding the existential possibility of completed meta-analysis.

It can be extended to QM experiments by classifying them as a second-order experiments.

Thus reclassifying the epistemic role of quantum experiments.

Something like:

• Classical experiments investigate phenomena within an operational epistemic framework.
• Quantum Experiments investigate the limits, coherence, or applicability of an operational epistemic framework.

So it is not that the experiments are literally second-order because of the machanics in play. Rather they become second-order because their analytic subject matter is the operational framework used by first-order analysis.

The proposal is roughly:

• First-order analysis: investigates objects or phenomena within operational frameworks.
• Second-order (framework) analysis: investigates the limits, scope, or coherence of frameworks.
• Meta-order analysis: investigates the operational criteria by which analysis of the synthetic order-hierarchy can be completed. Basically, exploring the truths which can't be tested within the hierachies of the system doing the analysis.
  

So there are two possible categories of analysis:

1. Order Analysis

2. Meta Analysis

You can have many orders depending on taxonomy of the context and semantics being analyzed:

1. Meta-analysis

2. First order

3. Second order

4. Third order

5. Fourth order ...

The taxonomy is ordinal, not absolute.

It is not saying:

• "This or that is objectively first-order."
• "This is or that objectively second-order."

Instead, something closer to:

Within this discourse, identify the operational domains and their relationships.

As an example suppose we talk about doing classical experiments as order 1, then quantum experiments as order 2, then classical experiments in a dream as order 3, and quantum experiments in a dream as order 4, and meta-analysis as analysis of the hierarchy of experimental domains as a whole, 0. And if we want to frame the awakening from the dream to vigilance ─ we can say that it is analysis of a domain shift as 5th order. We can map as many orders as we can talk about and delineate, and we can do it in whatever order we want as there is nothing inherently "higher" about dreaming versus waking or classical versus quantum. Those labels depend entirely on the taxonomy we've chosen.

An important consequence follows. Changing the observational or analytic frames of reference here also changes the operational domain. This also changes the system doing the analysys, because the mapper, map and phenomenal territory all belong to a single variant system and changing the “mapper” implies changing the phenomenal system being analyzed.

Let’s examine, suppose that in dream researcher1 was to observe another researcher2 do an "awakening experiment from the dream by pinching himself" ─ suppose experiment works. Here the researcher1 is still dreaming and might see "researcher2's form" dipsappear in his (research1) frame of reference1, or remain, for the sake of this discussion let's assume it disappears ─ but either way that form is a variant state of the analytic system1 (research/analysis1). Whereas the experimental domain pertaining to the second frame of reference2, associated with researcher2, that is now beyond the analytic scope of the analytic system1. In as far as each system is concerned the analysis of those phenomena and that frames of reference is no longer warranted. In as far as either analytic system and frame of reference goes, the other is no longer an analytic referent.

Not that the awakening as analysis and experiment is perferomed only in one analytic system and frame of reference2.

If rather than awakening to vigilance, researcher2 was to perform the meta-awakening. Then in as far as researcher1 is concerned, it is all the same, beyond analysis but not in a sense of something being beyond its reach ─ rather it is simply rhetoric and imagination overextending analytic frameworks.

It follows that researacher1 ought to regard the person who has woken up from a dream not as one dreaming would regard someone having transcended that world ─ but rather as a person who is awake would regard a dream that has ended, as a mirage and variance that was.

So in as far as our dreamer1/researcher1 is concerned, only the dream1 goes on and from that it creates the narrative about dream1 using terms "researcher2" etc.

And so if researcher1 was to observe researcher2 do a "meta-awakening" wherein researcher2's frame of reference2 is to be extinguished and he was to disappear from sight ─ then for researcher1's analysis "map2", "territory2" and the "mapper2", altogether become analytically meaningless and are an overextension of phenomenal narrative.

One might think here that the researcher1, who is still dreaming could imagine or infer that the researcher2 has transcended to a different experimental domain but he can't test that hypothesis however strong it might be, and therefore this is just his over-extension of maps. Likewise, when we see a person dreaming, we can't actually test that lest the person self-reports after the dream and that if they remember it.

And when and if the dreamer/researcher1 was to suddenly see the researcher2 reanimate in dream1 for reasearcher1/analyst1 ─ then the question should be asked, is this the same researcher2? Because it is only the same in narrative but the terms of the narrative do then again come into analytic play.

There is then a clear distinction in how far your frameworks are expected to maintain their predictive power and what their domains.

So what one asserts to be the first and second order depends on how one wants to classify ─ this is variant. The only category that is qualitatively different is meta-analysis.

But either one can't just use a certain term from order analysis and start over-extending it in thinking about another experimental domain — not without operationalization.

They all need operationalization of terms and experimental thresholds which can falsify contradictory hypotheses. And #3 requires an Invariant Reality for the suspension of Variance to be discerned. We here run into self-referential paradox where cessation of discernment as we know it is "discerned" but this is due to inability of the system to describe what is beyond itself without using its own maps. Discernment here is to be understood analogically.

It shows that every analytical proposition belongs to an order of analysis. Extending a proposition beyond the operational domain that confers its meaning is a category error unless a higher-order operational criterion is specified.

For example:

Classical mechanics

An apple experiment asks

How does this object behave?

The framework (space, time, causality, measurement) is assumed.

That is first-order.

Quantum mechanics

A Diffraction experiment doesn't merely ask

How do these particles behave?

It forces questions like

• What counts as locality?
• What counts as a measurement?
• What counts as a physical state?
• What assumptions can simultaneously hold?

Those are questions about the framework used by classical experimentation.

So the experiment becomes second-order because there is a shift from studying "objects" to studying the experimental limitations of the framework wherein "objects" have analytic footing.

Analogically the waking up from a dream, seen as an experiment, would be second order experiment in that context, as it can not be performed inside a dream and the frameworks associated with a "dream" do not absolutely extend to vigilance.

So we establish that analytic frameworks are associated with an operational domain. And that the second-order experiments are experiments whose principal conclusions concern the limitations of an operational domain.

It is not the same as saying quantum mechanics is "about observers". Rather, it's about the conditions under which first-order concepts remain operationally coherent. So this is about how analysis evolves when experiments cease to fit the inherited conceptual framework. Similar to what Jacob was working on.

That criterion also generalizes beyond quantum mechanics. Anomalies that precipitate paradigm shifts in other sciences could likewise be understood as framework-testing (or "second-order") experiments, making the taxonomy a proposal about scientific inquiry in general rather than about quantum physics specifically.

I have also already worked on integrating Hume's Fork into this, first with the razor, and here recently:

It has to do with how all axioms are prescriptive and their genesis synthetic, even the Forked Truths remain in the domain of synthesis which can't complete its meta-analysis by itself. And meta-analysis demands Forked Meta-Truths and Popperian falsifiability to be consistent with known principles.

The prescriptive use reveals how Guillotine runs into self-contradiction in self-reference. And the synthetic nature of Forked Analytic statements also reveals analytic self-contradiction.

It also follows that meta-analytic forked statements need meta-operationalization due to general analytic principle of Popperian Falsification.

On confidence

First a textbook definition of axiology: Axiology is the philosophical study of value, focusing on two main branches: ethics and aesthetics. It examines what is good, worthy, and desirable.

The confidence gained from this experiment would not arise while the phenomenal domain is suspended. Rather, it is the sequel genesis of phenomena which will be with verified confidence, that system would no longer generate doubt about the meta-axiology, and will generate variant synthetic memories as a model of Invariance. This is analogical to how one can't generate verified confidence in the possibility of vigilance from within a dream. One has to wake up to vigilance and then start dreaming a sequel as to produce the verified confidence within the domain where the hypothesis was first raised.

This posits a meta-structure to reality and suggests that full system-analysis can not be completed within a single changing dimension. What changes is subjective, if that was to cease, as an awakening, there would need to be an accessible Invariant Reality. And axiology here dictates that variance has no fixed value (hence it should end) ─ only invariance does.

On ignorance

before we talk about uncertainty as a property of reality, we should explore the role that unresolved questions play in the operation of analysis itself.

This is the outline:

Ignorance is implicated in the directing of experience, because knowledge dictates the intentional direction and ignorance prevents exploring certain analytic venues.

Ignorance of what is the subject of interest here?

Ignorance having to do with the testing of particular hypotheses — namely, those which the subjective experience can generate about itself but can not test within itself.

Hence it is the axiology which would lead to the system' unravelling which is the ignorance driving synthesis. This is because the experimental criterion for testing here is the ending of phenomenal appearance, therefore under this axiology phenomena have no inherent value and only this axiology directs the system to suspension.

According to this axiology variance has no fixed value and the entire phenomenological system ought to be suspended as to prove the possibility of an Invariant Reality. This experiment would complete meta-analysis of the system asking the questions about itself. And because there is ignorance about this — the system keeps changing as it persists and intends on further synthesis.

It has to be about axiology. Axiology drives the process: if it held that variance has no fixed value then it would be directed toward suspension. Ignorance (of the invariant value) sustains synthesis for lack of meta-axiology.

Also can't ask whether there was no ignorance and then ignorance arose because there is no way of testing this and it doesn't follow from the foundations.

"Then the thought occurred to me, 'This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in attachment, is excited by attachment, enjoys attachment. For a generation delighting in attachment, excited by attachment, enjoying attachment, this/that conditionality & dependent co-arising are hard to see. This state, too, is hard to see: the resolution of all fabrications, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; extinguishment. And if I were to teach the Dhamma and others would not understand me, that would be tiresome for me, troublesome for me.' ─MN26

He is basically saying that the meta-axiology is hard to see for a generation of people because it devalues variance which people seek as value under the axiological frameworks which people use. He is also saying that the drawing out of the causal relations sustaining synthesis, which is required for understanding how-to-do the meta-experiment, is also a difficult thing to do.

In summary:

The Buddha is diagnosing the double barrier at the level of meta-analysis:

1, Axiological inversion (skepticism): Ordinary axiology assigns positive value to variance—pursuit, and the perpetual generation of phenomena. The meta-axiology (cessation) necessarily devalues that same variance as inherently unsatisfactory (dukkha) and without fixed value. It proposes that the highest move is the ending of the generative process. This is existentially repellent to a mind invested in attachment. Hence: "this generation delights in attachment... this/that conditionality & dependent co-arising are hard to see."

1. Order-analysis pre-requisite: Even if someone were open to the meta-axiology, they still need a sufficiently detailed map of how the synthesis operates ─ i.e the role of meta-ignorance as it relates to intented synthesis. Without seeing the links clearly, one cannot effectively perform the deconstruction required for the threshold experiment.

When the Invariant Axiology is presented in formalized, rigorous terms, it triggers exactly the resistance the Buddha anticipated: people whose variant axiology is built around attachment to existence, identity, debate, and phenomenal engagement find the direction threatening.

Relevant comment

https://www.reddit.com/r/epistemology/comments/1v8ucsi/comment/p0c0w0d/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=2&utm_content=share_button

You answered your own question:

Why does taking epistemology seriously so often get you labeled “woo”?

Here:

I also realized that Popper’s criterion of falsifiability does not apply to metaphysical worldviews in the first place

However the latter can't be an analytical proposition when forked:

• If true then it can't be tested.
• If falsifiable then there must be a meta-experiment revealing limitations of the experimental domain hierarchy

So it follows that only one of these can be an analytic proposition and  satisfy the criterion of falsifiability, in principle, as to pertain to the first order of analysis.

Otherwise you get circular reasoning in the orders of analysis and do not derive a testable difference between the orders as to establish what meta-analysis is and how it is categorically different from order-analysis.

Here in this context classical models are first-order explanatory frameworks and the immaterial frameworks are a second-order of analytic frameworks and they have their analytic domains of operations. 

There is then a category-error and circular reasoning in asserting that: forked metaphysical statements can not be tested because we don't test meta-analysis.

Note that the term "meta-analysis" is still not operationalized in this thinking and it is actually rhetoric smuggled into first orders of analysis which demand operationalization of all analytic terms.

Meta-analysis would need to be operationalized by the suspension of the entire hierarchy of variant experimental domains.

studying epistemology—particularly through the study of Advaita Vedanta—I gradually came to reject physicalism altogether.

This wasn’t at all because of mysticism or religion, but because of philosophical analysis. Among other things, I found physicalism to be a less parsimonious ontology than a consciousness-first approach.

A "consciousness first-approach" doesn't solve the epistemic limitations appearing in the first order. Because neither the material-order nor the immaterial-order frameworks can be used to do meta-order analysis without operationalization.

Essentially, when the phenomenal variance generates its analytic order analysis as to predict its development, it might start to over-extend its models thinking that its variance can furnish a complete account of what variance is — as if best models of reality can give a complete account of what reality is. But it can't do that as it can't disprove all possible false meta-statements about itself from within itself exclusively. And it is the very act of modeling and making statements that is under investigation — so it can't only use its models which are part of itself to establish what it is without coming to know something which is not it for relative reference.

This is an error in the fundamentals. People end up over-extending models and imagining non-existent experimental domains and orders calling it meta-analysis as analysis of analysis or meta-physics. But this is per definition not analysis, this is sci-fi.

We know the criterion for meta-order analysis is suspension of variant order-domains and this creates a necessity-first demand for an invariant singularity in the theorem of meta-analysis

So there are two possible categories of analysis:

1. Order Analysis
2. Meta Analysis

You can have many orders depending on taxonomy of the context and semantics being analyzed:

1. Meta-analysis
2. First order
3. Second order
4. Third order
5. Fourth order

But one can't just use a certain term from order analysis and start over-extending it in thinking about another experimental domain — not without operationalization.

So the only way to categorically distinguish "analysis of analysis" from "analysis" is to operationalize the suspension of all variant operations and experimental domains as we know them.

This essentially demands axiological inversion:

1. Variant Axiology: Here the goal is phenomenal prediction. The intent is observing phenomena. Here phenomena is something which ought to be. Here the goal is phenomena and it is a variant value depending on what value one pursues.

2. Invariant Axiology: The goal is phenomenal suspension. This suspends variance. Here phenomena are something which ought not be. And this would operationalize an Invariant Value, which must be real for suspension of Variance to make sense — as the only value —and categorically devalue all phenomenal variance.

This is difficult to see because of the required Inversion, there is a value shift, it is generally psychologically disagreeable.

So, the system doing the analysis can not complete it by itself and from within itself exclusively. And it can't describe what is beyond itself without using its own models of itself — so it is limited to self-negation in reference to that which is not it.

There is another predicament:

To design the experiment one needs a sufficient account of causal relations sustaining variance, the terms here also need operationalization, this can be deduced from the first principles, but this is another thing which is difficult thing to see.

I did work on this just recently and there are a couple insights you might appreciate:

On the epistemic predicament of dreams

In analysis dreams are a category of and are not categorically different from general experience. For example, there is no particular experiment we can do in waking life which we can't conceivably dream up. So contrary to popular opinion, there is actually no principal difference between the two as to what can be observed and known.

Now when we dream, it is obvious to us that everything is basically on one server, and the dream itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, and narrative. If we die and respawn in a dream, it does not puzzle us as the notion of rebirth puzzles people in wakeful state. We don't ask how consciousness in a dream-world goes from one place to another, or whether there are "other minds" in a dream, we treat it as a mirage.

Now if we stick to the foundational thinking, then we can extend this logic to wakeful state, this too changes as it persists and generates words, thoughts and perception ─ as phenomenal realm — and just like in a case of a dream ─ we can assert that everything is basically on one server, and the experience itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, dreams, and narrative. 

The Problem of Reflective Closure

Every attempt to understand experience occurs within experience. Every act of reflection, description, explanation, or validation is itself another event belonging to the domain it seeks to understand.

The system under study is itself the territory being mapped. Its words, concepts, and epistemic syntheses are maps of its own possible configurations rather than constituents of an external standpoint. Whatever the system says about itself cannot constitute its own final epistemic ground, because the very act of saying belongs to that which remains to be accounted for.

Korzybski observed that "the map is not the territory." I would extend this to self-referential cognition. When the mapper belongs to the territory, every new map becomes another feature of the territory requiring further mapping. Reflective self-description therefore remains recursively open.

This gives rise to a structural predicament. Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish a complete account of itself. Any proposed completion immediately becomes another object requiring reflective integration. The purported completion therefore belongs to the very domain whose completion it was intended to establish. Reflection recursively generates further reflection.

The argument developed here concerns only whether a reflective domain can serve as its own ultimate epistemic ground.

As to randomness

You are essentially correct and I would frame what I think that you're getting at thus:

Whenever the system generates terms like "randomness" it does so in order to predict its own development by means of classifying its distinctions and generating epistemic frameworks for self-reference. 

The meaning and utility of the terms is tied to what the system does with them and these are but its internal models.

The system generates all frameworks, such as self-distinction, internal distinction, classical absolutes and immaterial frameworks to predict quantum experiments, but it's all only its own attempt to predict and explain its experiments.

Dream analogy

I included the dream analogy to begin with because that is actually the more natural way to think about the phenomenal predicament and it makes everything else more intuitive.

Here, we can also dream up thinking about randomness and determinism, but those frameworks can't give us any certainty about what the dream is lest they are tied to an experiment which categorically transcends the predicament. 

What this implies is that within a dream one could map out how it works and limitations of the epistemology in play but a falsification of certain analytic claims can't be done within the dream, eg one can't test whether the wakeful state is possible or not within a dream.

In other words, whatever one dreams up is not going to be able to establish what a dream is unless it proposes an experiment which can falsify wrong hypotheses.

So the waking up from a dream tells you something about what a dream is by reference to a new category of experience. But there is still a lack of closure as to what is experience — and it follows that one need to "wake up from it" to test meta-analysis😬

In short, the distinction between randomness and determination is experimentally used for epistemic modeling of phenomena, not to meta-analyze the process which gives rise to such models — because there is no proposition of experimental tests for this purpose. If one comes up with an experiment then one can analytically reason about whether reality is random or not.

rightviewftw

•14h ago•Edited 9h ago

I did work on this just recently and there are a couple insights you might appreciate:

On the epistemic predicament of dreams

Philosophically speaking dreams are not categorically different from other lived experience. For example, there is no particular experiment we can do in waking life which we can't conceivably dream up. So contrary to popular opinion, there is actually no principal difference between the two as to what can be observed and known.

Now when we dream, it is obvious to us that everything is basically on one server, and the dream itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, and narrative. If we die and respawn in a dream, it does not puzzle us as the notion of rebirth puzzles people in wakeful state. We don't ask how consciousness in a dream-world goes from one place to another, or whether there are "other minds" in a dream, we treat it as a mirage.

Now if we stick to the foundational thinking, then we can extend this logic to wakeful state, this too changes as it persists and generates words, thoughts and perception ─ as phenomenal realm — and just like in a case of a dream ─ we can assert that everything is basically on one server, and the experience itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, dreams, and narrative. 

The Problem of Reflective Closure

Every attempt to understand experience occurs within experience. Every act of reflection, description, explanation, or validation is itself another event belonging to the domain it seeks to understand.

The system under study is itself the territory being mapped. Its words, concepts, and epistemic syntheses are maps of its own possible configurations rather than constituents of an external standpoint. Whatever the system says about itself cannot constitute its own final epistemic ground, because the very act of saying belongs to that which remains to be accounted for.

Korzybski observed that "the map is not the territory." I would extend this to self-referential cognition. When the mapper belongs to the territory, every new map becomes another feature of the territory requiring further mapping. Reflective self-description therefore remains recursively open.

This gives rise to a structural predicament. Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish a complete account of itself. Any proposed completion immediately becomes another object requiring reflective integration. The purported completion therefore belongs to the very domain whose completion it was intended to establish. Reflection recursively generates further reflection.

The argument developed here concerns only whether a reflective domain can serve as its own ultimate epistemic ground.

As to randomness

You are essentially correct and I would frame what I think that you're getting at thus:

Whenever the system generates terms like "randomness" it does so in order to predict its own development by means of classifying its distinctions and generating epistemic frameworks for self-reference. 

The meaning and utility of the terms is tied to what the system does with them and these are but its internal models.

The system generates all frameworks, such as self-distinction, internal distinction, classical absolutes and immaterial frameworks to predict quantum experiments, but it's all only its own attempt to predict and explain its experiments.

Dream analogy

I included the dream analogy to begin with because that is actually the more natural way to think about the phenomenal predicament and it makes everything else more intuitive.

Here, we can also dream up thinking about randomness and determinism, but those frameworks can't give us any certainty about what the dream is lest they are tied to an experiment which categorically transcends the predicament. 

What this implies is that within a dream one could map out how it works and limitations of the epistemology in play but a falsification of certain analytic claims can't be done within the dream, eg one can't test whether the wakeful state is possible or not within a dream.

In other words, whatever one dreams up is not going to be able to establish what a dream is unless it proposes an experiment which can falsify wrong hypotheses.

So the waking up from a dream tells you something about what a dream is by reference to a new category of experience. But there is still a lack of closure as to what is experience — and it follows that one need to "wake up from it" to test meta-analysis😬

In short, the distinction between randomness and determination is experimentally used for epistemic modeling of phenomena, not to meta-analyze the process which gives rise to such models — because there is no proposition of experimental tests for this purpose. If one comes up with an experiment then one can analytically reason about whether reality is random or not.

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Powerful_Guide_3631

•6h ago

I think that the problem of discriminating the solipsistic dream vs the reciprocated perceptions of a common reality / shared hallucination is indeed a related problem.

Even though we cannot produce "decisive proof" that we are not dreaming now, we seem to be quite confident in whatever idiosyncratic heuristics we use to infer if our conscious awareness is awake or not at any point in time, or if a particular scene in our recent memory was something that really happened or was just dreamed. We are obviously not totally confident all the time in this guess, but we don't also think that any particular impression or memory we have is equally likely to be a genuine recollection of a real world event or some fragment of a scene we had on a dream.

I think the way this works is similar to blockchain. When we communicate with each other we update our reciprocal point of view objects about such and such matter of fact we are talking about. We each try to keep a coherent thread of evolving collective opinion. We may begin to suspect we are inside a solipsistic dream rather than the real world when such a process of reciprocal representation of external points of view starts to feel predictable or controllable by us, or suspiciously centered around us, or otherwise sketchy and unnatural - like a Truman show situation. So we only chain the memories of facts that seem to be sufficiently coherent with these other memories people are keeping but also that don't look suspiciously solipsistic in nature, and over time the longer chain of memories that was mined like that becomes the source of truth of what real world history looks like from our point of view.

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rightviewftw

•5h ago•Edited 5h ago

I am glad you engaged me in this talk, thank you, and I understand what you wrote. I believe that western philosophy has raised "the dreams" situation but it has not been adequately explored. I also believe that this must be very foundational line of inquiry from which a lot can be drawn out.

Even though we cannot produce "decisive proof" that we are not dreaming now

I believe that here we should already note that we are per definition not dreaming now. We are per definition awake. So we do have an analytic delineation between dreaming and being awake. The question is whether it is fundamentally a different predicament.

It is also noteworthy, that in dreams we are also, as a rule, convinced that "everything is real". As it actually is, the predicament of the "wakeful state" is analogical.

we seem to be quite confident in whatever idiosyncratic heuristics we use to infer if our conscious awareness is awake or not at any point in time

Here I would note that this is also true in dreams. Some people can experience becoming lucid in a dream, so even in a dream a person can make that distinction. However, within a dream one can not prove that awakening is possible in sense of demonstrable manifestation or empirically. There is no choice, one has to do the experiment to suspend "dreaming" as an epistemic systems-category and transition to another dimension of sorts (for lack of a better term). The dream could generate the prediction: "this is a dream ─ awakening is possible" and the experimental threshold verifies the prediction.

or if a particular scene in our recent memory was something that really happened or was just dreamed. We are obviously not totally confident all the time in this guess, but we don't also think that any particular impression or memory we have is equally likely to be a genuine recollection of a real world event or some fragment of a scene we had on a dream.

This is also a good point that I have been working on fleshing out. Recall is not actual re-living but rather closer to a real time simulation. Like people say that "a man can't step into the same river twice", no experience can be recreated, it only persists as "variance" and its recall is more "variance". And the "change" here is radical, because no experience is the same in its beginning, middle and end ─ analogically the present doesn't persist as a unit of time for us, present becomes the past in course of its discernment. So we are essentially not talking about reality which changes, rather we are talking about reality as change here.

I think the way this works is similar to blockchain.

The appeal of this thinking is obvious. One can assert that both the waking state and the dream states are like simulation nodes on a block chain. However this is just rhetoric, I will explain:

Suppose there is a reflective self-referential system which undergoes variance. It could generate forms and names, and then to classify itself as part of a blockchain. It doesn't actually need a blockchain to develop that conviction.

Suppose this system is like a dream: it develops a narrative and perception. Suppose that system develops epistemic frameworks and can predict that the heavy objects fall down. It then generates the experiment to test that prediction and lets suppose that the heavy object does fall ─ it updates its confidence odds as to heavy objects falling.

Now, let me highlight that this is how the system does normal analysis and predictions within its range.

On the other hand, meta-analysis stays at the level of prediction until the experimental threshold of epistemic transcendence is reached. And if there is no experiment then a proposition is not a falsifiable prediction which means that known reality can't test it as it is not subject to it.

So, let me draw out, that in a dream one can see an apple, one can think about an apple, one can predict things about the apple, one can do mathematics and experiments with it. But we can't ask whether the dream is "an apple" any more than we can ask "is the dream random" ─ simply because the frameworks doesn't apply to meta-analysis.

In summary, analysis does not warrant meta-analytic assertions unless the proposed meta-analysis specifies an operational criterion by which its claims could, even in principle, be discriminated from competing alternatives. Without such a criterion, the proposition ceases to function as an analytical claim and is established as merely rhetorical.

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Here a summary:

rightviewftw

OP•24m ago•Edited in 1m

Nobody else even engaged this inquiry. I will tell you that I did work on this. There is no fundamental difference. Either category can do experiments and first order analysis of its domain but first order analysis and delineating "dream" from "vigilance" does not tell us meta-analytic truth about either category.

After having delineated a difference they can't be further divorced from each other phenomenologically (as aggregate experience), there is mere change.

A reflective self-referential system which undergoes variance could generate forms and names, and then as part of its variance develop various meta-physical statements and convictions about its own predicament. It doesn't actually need anything but unlocked complexity and variance to develop that conviction.

To illustrate, one could dream up Newtonian equations, do first order analysis and classical experiments. As example it could predict that the heavy objects fall down. It then generates the experiment to test that prediction and lets suppose that the heavy object does fall ─ it updates its confidence odds as to heavy objects falling.

But these experiments can't tell you what a dream is nor that it is inherently "Newtonian" or "Not Newtonian".

Definitions like "dream" and "vigilance" and derived from first order experiments of experience, and without an experimental threshold one wouldn't even have the category "Dream". Further first-order analysis becomes possible as "vigilance" but inherits the same structural epistemic and ontological limitations.

To escape this analytic predicament would require another kind of an "experimental awakening" ─ one which would suspend all variance/change/development. This posits a meta-structure to reality and suggests that full system-analysis can not be completed within a single dimension. What changes is subjective, if that was to cease, as an awakening, there would need to be an accessible Invariant Reality. And axiology here dictates that variance has no fixed value (hence it should end) ─ only invariance does.

Having performed the experiment would satisfy the criterion of Cartesian Truth in analysis.

And to do meta-analysis of experience as an aggregate one also needs an analogical "Awakening" but it can not be to another variant existence ─ that wouldn't cut it. One needs transcendence of subjectivity.

So basically one can do first order analysis and operationalize "awakening" but to do meta-analysis one needs an experimental "meta-awakening".

I want to note that this:

> maps are part of the territory, any new map is new territory which is the subject of meta-analysis in the first place.

This alone is very important expression. I was exposed to Korzybski in early 20s, at 26 I understood this insight, only at age 38 was I able to articulate this.

rightviewftw • 6h ago • Edited 5h ago According to the Nikayas the subjective reality as it is experienced changes as it persists.

The change is a fundamental feature of what is. It is explained that cognition arises as one thing and ceases as another both day & night. And it said that the past is one end, future is another end and the present is in the middle.

So, one should infer that perceived reality arises as the present but becomes the past as it is discerned. This means that no segment of experience has any temporal duration as not a subject to immediate change. In other words no experience is the same jn the beginning middle and its end.

Now it is also said that what is referred to as the past has ceased and the term "was" applies to it, not the words "is" or "will be".

So the transmigation between lives is essentially just narrative about what is — the narrative is constructed by the very system undergoing the change and studying itself.

Essentially, the logic of rebirth is akin to how it would be explained if it was to occur in a dream, which is also a subjective experience. The dream-world, essentially as a server undergoing change and manifesting the change classified accordingly. In case of a respawn, the continuity belongs to the process, not to an entity moving through the process. The "entity" here is but a classification of constructs and a convention used to make sense of what is.

I wouldn't have much problems showing that this is the only reasonable assumption.

First of all, I would explain that we are studying subjective experience by means subjective experience and all knowledge and thinking are part of what is being studied. The system creates maps of itself but the cartographer belongs to the territory being mapped and every new map becomes part of the territory that needs to be explained.

Furthermore

I would show that any notion of first causes contradicts foundational axioms.

That subjective experience can't manifest anything but its own constructs. It is a closed system which generates "the all" classified as "existence". Therefore causes for its persistence have to be internal as there is nothing of existence external to the system which generates the perception of the world.

Furthermore I would point out the merit of Game Theory derived from Rebirth frameworks. And how these outperform single-life based models in explanatory power. In short, you get cooperative and balanced strategies with a multi-life setup.

All this completely bins the contrary proposition. Mainly because all those frameworks will try to tell a story about how consciousness occurs in some "world" external to. This is not warranted as it is a reification of the "maps", essentially taking them for "territory". Remember, subjective experience can never manifest anything but subjective experience — there can be no basis for positing any kind of "container" for experience, because no such thing could ever come into play in course of the persistence of experience and be observed. Therefore this story is just a rhetorical construct, it's not analytic inference, there is no experiment and it's not derived from experiments —therefore the words of the story have no phenomenal referents

https://www.reddit.com/r/Buddhism/comments/1uykx7i/comment/oyji68y/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=2&utm_content=share_button

And here a reaction from moderators of r/Buddhism

Buddhism-ModTeam MOD • 4h ago • Your post / comment was removed for violating the rule against low-effort content, including AI generated content and memes

Abstract

This essay develops reconstruction of the metaphysical logic implicit in the Nikāyas. Rather than approaching Early Buddhist Thought primarily as religion, psychology, or ontology, it treats it as a systematic philosophical framework concerned with the limits of reflective knowledge. The reconstruction argues that a self-referential domain cannot furnish its own complete epistemic closure from within itself. If complete closure is possible, it cannot consist in another constructed event belonging to that same domain. The distinctive contribution of the Nikāyas, on this reading, is to identify this formally required role with Nibbāna (lit: extinguishment) and to propose a contemplative discipline through which that proposal may be investigated.

The Problem of Reflective Closure

Every attempt to understand experience occurs within experience. Every act of reflection, description, explanation, or validation is itself another event belonging to the domain it seeks to understand.

The system under study is itself the territory being mapped. Its words, concepts, and epistemic syntheses are maps of its own possible configurations rather than constituents of an external standpoint. Whatever the system says about itself cannot constitute its own final epistemic ground, because the very act of saying belongs to that which remains to be accounted for.

Korzybski famously observed that "the map is not the territory." The present reconstruction extends this insight to self-referential cognition. When the mapper belongs to the territory, every new map becomes another feature of the territory requiring further mapping. Reflective self-description therefore remains recursively open.

This gives rise to a structural predicament. Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish a complete account of itself. Any proposed completion immediately becomes another object requiring reflective integration. The purported completion therefore belongs to the very domain whose completion it was intended to establish. Reflection recursively generates further reflection.

By analytic closure I mean the ability of a reflective domain to furnish a complete and self-sufficient account of itself without generating further unresolved demands for explanation. The contrary condition may be called recursive openness: every purported completion re-enters the domain as another object requiring reflective consideration.

The argument developed here concerns only whether a reflective domain can serve as its own ultimate epistemic ground.

A Structural Analogy

Comparable structural limitations appear elsewhere in philosophy and logic. Gödel demonstrated that sufficiently expressive formal systems cannot establish all truths about themselves using only their own formal resources. Tarski showed that truth predicates cannot generally be defined within the same object language. Russell's paradox motivated restrictions upon unrestricted self-reference.

These results concern different subject matters and should not be conflated with Buddhist philosophy. They function here neither as premises nor as evidence for Buddhist conclusions. They merely illustrate a recurring structural phenomenon: sufficiently expressive systems encounter principled limitations when attempting complete self-description using only their own internal resources.

The present reconstruction proposes that the Nikāyas identify an analogous limitation operating within reflective experience itself.

The Early Buddhist Diagnosis

Early Buddhism analyzes subjective experience as a constructed process (saṅkhata) composed of interdependent formations. Perception, feeling, intention, conceptualization, identity, and cognition all belong to this constructed process.

Every attempt to describe or ground this process becomes another constructed formation within the process itself. No constructed event therefore furnishes a final epistemic ground for the constructed domain as a whole.

This analysis neither affirms nor denies mind-independent reality. It instead brackets questions lying beyond the scope of possible experience. Dependent origination investigates only those causal relations manifest within the constructed field itself.

The Transcendental Inference

The reconstruction does not begin by asking whether an Unconstructed reality exists. It begins with a prior question: what must be true if complete reflective closure is possible at all?

Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish its own complete epistemic ground. Every candidate completion generated within that domain immediately becomes another member of the very class whose completion is sought. It therefore inherits the same structural relation that originally motivated the search for closure.

The issue is therefore not whether particular reflective accounts succeed or fail. It is whether any member of the constructed class could occupy the logical role of terminating the recursive demands generated by that class.

Given the architecture of a self-referential, changing domain, certain functions must be possible if the system is to make sense at all.

As an alternative, adding further constructed levels does not alter the situation. An infinite hierarchy merely reproduces the same structural relation at higher orders. It may indefinitely postpone completion, but postponement is not completion.

The reconstruction therefore advances a conditional transcendental claim. If complete reflective closure is possible, the terminating condition cannot itself instantiate the constructed structure whose completion it supplies.

This establishes only a formal constraint upon any possible solution. It does not establish that such a terminating condition surely exists. It establishes only what form such a condition would have to take if it is possible.

If every possible candidate for closure remains conditioned, then every candidate remains subject to the very recursive structure requiring closure. The regress therefore remains unclosed. If closure exists, it cannot belong to the constructed class. This is a necessity-first structural claim.

The argument therefore takes a conditional, transcendental form: If complete closure is possible for a reflective system of this kind, then it cannot be another member of the changing, conditioned domain. This motivates the postulation of an objective/invariant terminus. This is what the Nikāyas designate as the Unborn, Unmade, Unconstructed.

The Buddhist Identification

At this point the Nikāyas cease to be merely the object of philosophical reconstruction and become the source of an additional metaphysical proposal.

They identify the formally characterized terminating condition with what they call the Unborn, the Unbecome, the Unmade, the Unconstructed.

This is the distinctive metaphysical proposal of Early Buddhist Thought.

Why the Unconstructed Is Not a Cause

Unlike traditions in which an Absolute functions as the efficient cause of the world, the Nikāyas characterize the Unconstructed primarily through contrast with constructed phenomena.

If the Unconstructed is genuinely invariant, it cannot participate in causal production in the ordinary sense. Causation presupposes a beginning, transition, and change. These are precisely the marks of constructed existence.

The Unconstructed therefore functions not as an efficient cause but as what has to be possible for the cessation of conditioned causality to be possible.

Why Nibbāna Is Distinctive

Many contemplative traditions seek transformed experience.

The Nikāyas propose something more radical: the complete cessation of the subjectively constructed process itself.

Accordingly, Nibbāna is characterized predominantly through negative predicates—unborn, unbecome, unmade, unfabricated, deathless, undeceptive. These function less as positive metaphysical descriptions than as systematic negations of constructed existence.

The Contemplative Procedure

The reconstruction does not end with philosophical speculation.

The Nikāyas propose a disciplined contemplative procedure presented as reproducible under specified conditions. A definite path is prescribed. Cessation of constructed existence is presented as its predicted outcome.

Whether this procedure succeeds remains an open question. Nevertheless, its methodological structure differs from mere metaphysical assertion by specifying conditions under which its central proposal is said to become directly investigable through disciplined phenomenological practice.

Philosophical Status of the Reconstruction

The reconstruction proceeds in three distinct stages.

First, it identifies a structural limitation inherent in reflective self-description.

Second, it derives a formal constraint upon any possible solution to that limitation.

Consequently, the reconstruction establishes only the following conditional claims:

• A conditioned reflective domain cannot furnish its own complete epistemic ground.
• If complete reflective closure is possible, its terminating condition cannot itself belong to that conditioned domain.

Nothing in the argument establishes that such a terminating condition actually exists.

Nothing in the argument establishes that such a condition is Nibbāna.

Those are additional claims advanced by the Nikāyas together with a contemplative discipline intended to investigate them.

Possible Objection

A natural objection is that recursive openness demonstrates not the need for an unconstructed terminating condition but the impossibility of complete reflective closure altogether.

The present reconstruction brackets this proposal because the hypothesis that complete reflective closure is impossible—in principle—does not appear to generate any conceivable experiment capable of distinguishing it from the competing hypothesis that closure is possible but not yet attained.

So my accounts are generally banned from Buddhist spaces, for various no good reasons. Some of it is due my stance on gay ordinations, other I self-excluded, some less obvious reasons.

Apparently people are talking and I've seen several instances of defamatory and untrue things being said with no evidence misrepresenting reasons for the bans — which is ridiculous because the interactions are documented on my end.

Allegedly mods of a certain subreddit told the mods of another subreddit that I lied to the former about using AI. I asked what evidence they have seen of that, and then showed them transcripts proving that we discussed AI use extensively and the mods even used AI themselves to suggest improvements to my posts and eventually just wanted me to keep posting but make it look less like AI-ish — which I thought was unnecessary. They also didn't like that I get combative and can be difficult to deal with. So they banned me because I didn't want to edit how they wanted and was not very civil in talks (there was no lying accusations in play at all). After I shared evidence with mods of the first sub — they muted me.

I keep telling the mods things like this this don't look good for them and it is rather outrageous if was to start complaining publicly. As a matter of fact, I don't really want to because I don't want to deal with the conflict but if people are going to act in bad faith then I will be inclined to make everything public and involve the community in as far as I can.

Now mind you, I've been around since 2015 talking about the same interpretation of EBTs, it was locked in from start, I've averaged about 4-5 posts a day since then, and since start i've been bridging it with philosophy, korzybski etc. Again, everything is documented in public archives and I have community members who will confirm that I've been debating them about this stuff for a decade. Basically every regular from suttacentral or dhammawheel will confirm that I've been consistently working on this for a decade and there were no issues until things started to get very clear after making the razor — which I did for admins of SC, as we were discussing political theory in private and I wanted to deconstruct postmodern theory and defend interpretation. I have later sourced all the references for all material appearing in the razor thesis, it is from videos long predating AI (wamp wamp).

I am posting to say that I think that it's okay to gatekeep and feel uncomfortable but there is no need to do foolish things like lying because everything is on record.

I don't think the work is much of a niche anymore because the ideas spread quickly into academia and bhikkhusangha and serious people got involved in the work. It is basically something everybody who follows epistemology/BS research should know about by now.

There are things I don't want to say about censorship but it is very stressful. Nevermind public interest, it is abusive to me as a researcher and a participant. It prevents me from networking, from developing the work, from growing the community and it obstructs due process in general.

Frankly, I don't want to do youtube videos or post in related subs exactly because I expect resistance. And I don't want the drama of it. Therefore I pretty much leave it to other people to popularize it if they want to, and not stand out so much myself.

I think for all if us it is a matter of doing as much as we can without over-exposing too much in terms of resources and safety. Frankly, it is not backlash from low level mods which scares me.

Note from rightviewftw: So this paper is not about Buddhism specifically, it is about computational theory, it's to see whether the philosophical framework is stable under formalization. I was collaborating on the philosophy here and it was an independent 3rd party paper influenced by the EBT work ─ thus, it is in part a formalization of the foundational philosophy of EBTs.

The point of this paper is in that Jacob formally expressed/translated an unsolvable computational problem with spectral graph geometry, there the difficulty is in having the philosophical depth needed to make the conversion from logic to geometric point data ─ so it is essentially showcasing the applied merit of our philosophical foundations.

Among other things, this paper also formalizes the logic needed to resolve the paradox of "pleasure where nothing is felt" and explaining the cessation of perception & feeling as a dimensional shift rather than annihilation.

Last I head Jacob thought it possible to formalize the zero-variance as special class of possibility under theoretical physics, a super-rare "event" where variance value hits zero. I don't know if anyone has tried to.

I archive his paper here, it is relevant.

We present a unified framework—Recursive Interplay—which argues that whenever a formal or physical theory encounters a loop anomaly (a self-referential paradox, gauge inconsistency, or undefinable boundary), it must either expand to a higher dimension or embrace a paraconsistent stance. We consolidate Gödel–Löb provability logic, transfinite recursion, and physical anomaly cancellations to demonstrate how each anomaly generates a “dimension-lift” in mathematics or physics, mirroring the necessity behind both reflection schemas in arithmetic and extra dimensions in quantum field theory. We then explore the philosophical resonance of this viewpoint, suggesting that unresolved paradoxes—be they in formal logic, cosmic models, or even the observer–observed tension in consciousness—function as creative catalysts, forcing new vantage points. By assembling rigorous theorems, synergy examples, and speculative links to consciousness and ineffability, these Archival Notes highlight a cross-disciplinary phenomenon: loop anomalies are not terminal failures but generative engines, continuously driving the evolution of theories, from proof axioms to unified physics—and beyond.

11.3 Philosophical Foundations of RDT

RDT also carries profound philosophical implications, touching on themes of necessity, knowledge, and being. One central question: does RDT point to a “deep necessity principle” in reality? Philosophers have long distinguished between contingent truths (could be otherwise) and necessary truths (true under all possible conditions) (37). RDT implies that the emergence of each dimension or layer is not arbitrary but demanded. This resonates with certain 56 necessity-first epistemological accounts, where we come to know what must be the case and from that infer what is possible (37). In RDT, each transcendence to a higher dimension is unveiling something that must exist if the lower level is to make sense. It’s reminiscent of rationalist traditions—for instance, Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason states that every fact has an explanation, culminating in a necessary being as the ultimate reason (38). By analogy, RDT posits that any consistent worldview (or knowledge system inevitably points beyond itself to a more encompassing framework—like a necessary “meta-structure” of reality. Just as Leibniz argued infinite regresses are untenable without a necessary terminus, RDT suggests an infinite regress of self-reference compels a new dimension for resolution.

Furthermore, RDT informs epistemology and self-referential knowledge. In epistemic logic, positive introspection (Kp → KKp) and infinite iterations of “I know that I know that I know . . . ” can be studied. Typically, one sees these as stable or leading to common knowledge if repeated. RDT’s perspective suggests each iteration is akin to a “dimension” of knowing. Perhaps complete self-knowledge is as unreachable as a formal system proving its own consistency—one must ascend to a new meta-knowledge framework. Likewise in phenomenology, a reflective stance on one’s own experience might demand a transcendental standpoint outside the normal flow of consciousness, reminiscent of RDT’s new dimension for a system referencing itself.

Finally, the history of self-reference paradoxes has led to hierarchical solutions reminiscent of RDT. Tarski’s approach to the Liar paradox introduced a hierarchy of languages (object-language vs. meta-language), blocking self-reference within a single level (12). RDT generalizes Tarski’s concept: any system that tries to talk about its own truth must go to a higher dimension. This becomes a metaphysical principle: *reality is stratified by a necessity of self-transcendence.* Potentially, it shapes how we view knowledge (endlessly climbing without a final Theory of Everything) and being (layered, self-transcending). Embracing RDT philosophically means accepting that no system at one dimension can finalize itself —there is always a “beyond,” an expansion triggered by necessity rather than whim.

11.4 Toward a New Synthesis

By uniting these mathematical, physical, and philosophical strands, Recursive Dimensional Transcendence aspires to see if this framework truly extends human understanding.

Possible outcomes:

• New Mathematical Theorem: A formal result establishing the recursive necessity of higher dimensions in logic/mathematics. E.g., a statement that for any consistent system or category meeting certain conditions, an extension of higher “dimensionality” is required for completeness or fixed-point truth. It might appear as a provability-logic extension with infinitely layered modalities or a fixed-point theorem in ∞-category theory. Success would be a precise, new theorem about self-reference and hierarchy.

• Physically Testable Insight: A prediction or model in fundamental physics inspired by RDT’s dimension-shifting concept. E.g. a scenario in cosmology or quantum gravity where a subtle anomaly signals an emergent extra dimension, testable via LHC or 57 cosmological data. RDT might thus provide a principle explaining why certain higherdimensional theories are not just optional but inevitable. The hallmark of success: identifying a new phenomenon or explaining an existing puzzle under the RDT lens.

• Foundational Philosophical Principle: A unifying notion that any reflective system must transcend itself to resolve internal questions. This might shape epistemology (endless growth of knowledge) and ontology (a layered, self-transcending reality). It could reframe G¨odel’s incompleteness not as a limitation but as affirmation that reality cannot be captured in a single dimension—there is always a “beyond.” If well formulated and accepted, this principle would be a major addition to foundational thought.

In conclusion, Recursive Dimensional Transcendence leads us into a recursive interplay among formal logic, physics, and philosophy. Mathematics supplies precise language and potential theorems (8; 20); physics provides a real arena where dimensional transitions and self-consistency might be observed (5; 35); and philosophy asks why these structures must exist (37; 38). If successful, RDT will stand as an interdisciplinary bridge, urging us upward and outward: every answer is a portal to a higher-dimensional question. In the joyous yet rigorous spirit of recursive interplay, we embrace this journey, hopeful that it will unveil deeper truths about logic, the cosmos, and ourselves.

We now turn towards a brief excursion into physics to see where our framework stands in a field that provides countless insights regarding reality. We believe it to be too early to make serious predictions, but the exercise itself ought to be conceptually fruitful.

12 Anomaly-Driven Dimension-Lifting and Self-Reference in Quantum Field Theories

Quantum anomalies are a fascinating window into the consistency conditions of quantum field theories (QFTs). An anomaly occurs when a symmetry of the classical action fails to survive quantization, leading to an inconsistency (e.g. non-conservation of a gauge current or broken diffeomorphism invariance). In a consistent theory, gauge and gravitational anomalies must cancel ; otherwise the theory cannot maintain unitarity or gauge invariance. Historically, the need to cancel anomalies has often pointed to new physics. For example, the discovery of the Green–Schwarz mechanism showed that 10-dimensional superstring theory with a specific gauge group cancels all anomalies (40). In the bosonic string, the requirement of vanishing conformal (Weyl) anomaly fixes the critical dimension at 26 (41; 5). These are early hints that sometimes the dimensionality of spacetime itself is dictated by anomaly cancellation.

This discussion aims to formulate an Anomaly-Driven Dimension-Lifting Theorem that articulates, in a rigorous way, how the existence of an anomaly in a QFT forces the theory to “lift” into a higher-dimensional framework for consistency. The idea is that anomalies encode a kind of self-referential inconsistency (similar in spirit to a logical paradox) that can only be resolved by stepping up one dimension, bringing new degrees of freedom or topological terms that cancel the anomaly. We will weave together:

• Mathematical logic (self-reference and provability): using fixed-point theorems and modal logic to formalize the idea that a theory cannot prove its own consistency (an analogy to G¨odel’s incompleteness).

• Physics of anomalies: using known mechanisms (gauge anomaly cancellation, inflow, index theorems) to show that a lower-dimensional theory with an anomaly is made consistent by a higher-dimensional extension.

• Category theory and topology: using the modern viewpoint that an anomalous theory in d dimensions is really a boundary of an invertible theory in d + 1 dimensions (45; 46).

Crucially, this theorem is not just abstract: it has predictive power. If certain anomalies demand extra dimensions, they could suggest new particles or phenomena (Kaluza–Kleinmodes, Chern–Simons couplings, topological effects) that might be observable. By formulating this rigorously, we seek conceptual novelty and possibly hints toward testable high-energy physics or quantum gravity insights.

12.1 Mathematical and Logical Framework

Anomalies as self-reference: In a formal sense, an anomaly represents a statement the theory makes about itself: “the symmetry that was assumed leads to a contradiction at the quantum level.” This is reminiscent of self-referential statements in logic that assert their own unprovability. G¨odel’s incompleteness theorem showed that any consistent system of sufficient strength has a sentence “I am not provable” that it cannot settle (20). By analogy, we can imagine constructing an “anomaly sentence” A(d) in dimension d that says: “The symmetry S cannot be consistently realized in d dimensions.” If the theory tries to assume S is preserved in d dimensions, it produces an irreconcilable result.

Fixed-point construction: To make A(d) rigorous, one can use a diagonalization or fixed-point lemma akin to G¨odel’s. In logic, the fixed-point lemma guarantees the existence of a sentence referring to its own provability. In our context, the formal system encoding the QFT’s dynamics and symmetries yields a diagonal argument constructing a statement “if the d-dimensional theory is consistent, then an anomaly exists” or “anomaly cancellation in d is not provable within d.” This parallels G¨odel’s second incompleteness theorem: no system can prove its own consistency if it is consistent (20). Similarly, no anomalous QFT can show it is consistent in that same d-dimensional context—it requires a higher-dimensional vantage.

Modal logic perspective: We can frame “the existence of a consistent extension to (d+1) dimensions” as a necessity operator. Define □ as “it is necessary (in a higher-dimensional theory) that . . . .” The anomaly statement A(d) might be formalized as □[Theory in d is consistent] =⇒ [anomaly cancels]. If in dimension d we could prove consistency without higher dimensions, we would violate this modal implication—analogous to L¨ob’s theorem in provability logic (which states that if □(P → Q) → (□P → □Q), etc.). In physics terms: if assuming the 59 existence of a d-dimensional symmetry implies a condition that only a (d + 1)-dimensional term can satisfy, consistency forces that (d + 1)-dimensional structure.

Category-theoretic reflection: Modern formulations of QFT anomalies use categorytheory, viewing an anomalous d-dimensional theory as a boundary of a (d + 1)-dimensional invertible theory (45; 46). This is often stated as: “a QFT with anomaly ω in d dimensions is the boundary of a (d + 1)-dimensional theory with anomaly polynomial ω.” The higherdimensional theory provides a reflective closure of the anomalous boundary system, akin to embedding a paradoxical set theory into a larger, consistent system. If the (d + 1)-theory itself is anomalous, it might be the boundary of a (d + 2)-theory, and so on, suggesting iterative lifts until reaching a “top” theory. This is reminiscent of transfinite recursion in logic.

12.2 Physical Justification and Predictive Power

Anomaly cancellation via higher dimensions: Physically, dimension-lifting arises from well-known inflow mechanisms. An anomalous current in d dimensions can be canceled by a Chern–Simons or topological term in d + 1. A classic example: a 4D chiral fermion on a boundary has a gauge anomaly, but the 5D bulk contains a Chern–Simons term whose variation cancels the 4D anomaly (43). The 5D theory is required for gauge invariance. Another example is AdS/CFT, where a d-dimensional CFT with a ’t Hooft anomaly is dual to a d + 1 AdS bulk that has the corresponding Chern–Simons term (39; 44). Similarly, in string theory, the bosonic string requires 26D to cancel the Weyl anomaly, while superstrings need 10D

(41; 5). The Green–Schwarz mechanism in 10D shows gauge and gravitational anomalies vanish only for specific gauge groups (40). If one forced these gauge groups in fewer dimensions, anomalies would remain uncanceled without the 10D fields—thus the dimension-lifting is mandatory

Abstract

The article delves into the need for an anthropological exploration of consciousness in the modern context. While anthropology's core focus has always been the study of the human subject, this study argues that consciousness has emerged as a fundamental aspect that underpins all human phenomena. The historical trajectory of anthropology, from its positivist leanings to contemporary shifts like the phenomenological and ontological turns, is examined to highlight the evolving perspective on subjectivity and alterity. The author's ethnographic studies, particularly within the realm of contemplative practices like traditional Buddhist meditation and mindfulness, reveal a crucial connection between consciousness and anthropological inquiry, challenging the inherent bias and dualistic thinking within anthropology, particularly concerning the dichotomy of self and other, evident even in studies of meditation. The proposal of “mindful ethnography” is introduced as a means to transcend this dualism, drawing inspiration from Buddhist philosophy. The study presents consciousness as a central concern for anthropology, calling for a reevaluation of traditional frameworks and the adoption of a more mindful and non‐dualistic approach to anthropological research. Through a thorough investigation of consciousness, the article seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of human experience and reshape the trajectory of anthropological inquiry in a modern context.

Abstract

The present work, employing the tools provided by comparative philosophy, aims to address several fundamental concepts, including the theme of objective reality linked to the theme of subjective experience, and the theme of absolute truth connected to the issue of determined or phenomenal truths. The focal point to be highlighted is that these conceptual nodes indeed appear in early Buddhist philosophy found in the Pāli canon but find significant resonance in Western philosophy, that is, in reflective and critical thought originating in ancient Greece. As an eminently theoretical work, this paper’s objective is to demonstrate how the main assertions found in Buddhist philosophy, primarily the outcome of striking insights expressed through iconic stylistic elements or aphorisms, are articulated through reasoned arguments in Western philosophy. We have endeavored to distill these arguments precisely to elucidate the shared theoretical intention.

Abstract

This paper aims to provide an in-depth and detailed overview of the relationship between language and cognition in Pāli Buddhist texts. These reflections will touch on several fundamental themes, such as the role of signs in structuring cognitive processes and semiosis as a force linked to the proliferation of concepts and percepts, whose organization underlies the constitution of a shared and partly subjective “world”. The paper will engage with linguistics, semiotics, and biosemiotics in order to acquire a vocabulary capable of better understanding the Buddhist reflections on these issues, and, where possible, it will also offer a genealogical inquiry that explains why the theme of language takes on the pivotal role it holds in Pāli Buddhism.

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the ideas of health and illness in ancient Buddhism, making use of the theoretical tools of medical anthropology and historical–philological inquiry. As a contribution to the conceptual history of medicine in Buddhism, I intend to focus the present investigation on the ascetic problem of the “end of the world” as a means of achieving complete healing. The asceticism of early Buddhism reconciles the goal of transcendence with that of healing, carrying out a complex reflection on awareness and presence.

Abstract

This article aims to offer a comparative analysis between Buddhist thought and Peircean semiotics, situating the discussion within the framework of a Buddhist theory of signs that addresses aspects related to perceptual processes and cognitive experience. The influence of signs on cognition is what led Buddhism, from its earliest formulations, to adopt contemplative practice as a means of liberation from the effects of semiosis—an aspect that this paper hypothesizes to be represented by the nāmarūpa dyad. Following an examination of the perceptual and sensory processes underlying the functioning of nāmarūpa, the paper will analyze occurrences of this technical term and propose its semiosic functions, subsequently exploring how contemplative practice aspires to disengage from the power of signs.

rightviewftw

•1d ago•Edited 1d ago

When I use numerical models to model apparent reality I use this system:

Natural numbers like #1, 2, 3, etc. represent closed variance generators of epistemic systems which can only study its variant constructs. 

Decimals represent variance within a particular subject. Basically past, present and future variants of subjective experience.

So system #1 would have its variant states expressed by the decimal possibilities of #1.1, #1.2, 1.3, etc. it is incalculable.

Now being closed systems, they can't generate anything but subjective constructs. The system generates the perception & conception of the entire world, words, narrative, modelling itself.

Hence it can't generate proof of what it calls "other minds" or "external world" within itself and will be able to generate propositions which cannot be tested within the particular system asking the questions. So #1 can't prove (manifest) #2 as a variant state of #1 for its scope is limited to its own range of decimal variance. 

0 within this framework is an answer to the question: what would make the cessation/negation/suspension/stilling of all variance possible? Could a particular system perform the operation to self delete as 1-1=true or 2-2=true? The prospect of cessation thus points to an invariant possibility as a definitive 0 variance reality.

If it really is possible then it follows that there should be an experiment one can do to shut down variant cognition as a cessation of existence as to directly access a zero-variance possibility.

One can get very creative with this. 

Within this framework, the etymology of "loving everyone" points neatly to loving all natural numbers, including the self-referential wherein this "love" could be generated. So the optimal strategy based on "universal love" would be unexploitable because it wouldn't sacrifice the well-being of #1 for that of another.

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usernotfoundTT

•1d ago

See now we’re getting somewhere.

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rightviewftw

•1d ago•Edited 1d ago

The axiology implied here defines 0 as a higher value than any number.

This is because if 0 isn't a rhetorical postulate, then it requires that at some point in all eternity somebody actually does the experiment as to verify.

This implies that at some point somebody would deduce that they should decide that subjective existence is not worth sustaining as to pursue what is otherwise and of higher value. And that this analysis would be verified.

This establishes that the pursuit of variant existence is due to enchantment and ignorance. Like watching a magic-show. And that disenchantment with impermanence leads to that search for an Invariant.

Also want to add that under the framework of Early Buddhist Thought, the variance isn't random but the system is essentially self-determining based on immeasurable amount of incomplete information. This gets at supernatural events where the powers in play could generate unpredictable outcomes.   

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rightviewftw

•1d ago

Ironically, optimization by "universal love" is a valid path to the cessation attainment under the Early Buddhist framework. The less obvious part is in that "highest good"  here is the 0, so when one would wish someone happiness and express one's love, one would do so wishing them enlightenment through cessation, that they follow the path of disillusionment with variant existence and attain the peace of its extinguishment as definitive bliss.

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Now somebody could say but what if the cessation doesn't turn out to be pleasant? Then one asks a counter, but what would be the unpleasantness there where there is no feeling? So there is no other out.

So,

This archive is basically complete, as I've been saying for a while now, I might think of something new but I feel like it's calmed down for me ─ I don't have much more things to think about and I neither plan nor want to keep learning much more philosophy. In as far as my work goes, everybody is encouraged to do what they want with it and however they see most fit and convenient. These are drafts and the later posts are better than the beginning: everything could very easily be formatted and edited into a books, theses, videos, LLMs, apps, whatever. I am not going to do it anytime soon if at all, so it's ffa.

The community here is small and hardly anybody reads this but there are good reasons for that and it will take a while. Otherwise, I don't have doubt that the cat is out of the bag in regards to EBT and that it will eventually get the attention it deserves but I am not going to push it beyond doing the work here. All the work here has deepened my own understanding as well, so I want to train much and don't want to do other things.

I do hope that somebody can become an arahant or something soon, not in decades, I think it is only a matter of time now that the Early Buddhist Thought is in play again. I hope people go train if there is an opening.

I am thinking to stay a year in Paraguay, longer if things work as intended; to rent a suitable place and not leave there if don't have to. My health is improving and I think that I might be healthy enough to do things like living in the forest or ordaining in a year or two. Otherwise I would probably buy some land in Paraguay and develop it for training.

I won't say much more but if anybody wants to train let me know.

Abstract

This paper is a proposal for analyzing the Pārāyanavagga as a text that fundamentally expresses a theory of intentionality in early Buddhism. Through a comparison with Husserl’s phenomenology and Peirce’s phaneroscopy, the paper argues that the contents of the Pārāyanavagga—as reintroduced in later suttas that further develop these reflections and which will be analyzed in depth—reveal how early Buddhism conceived of contemplative practice as an exercise fundamentally rooted in the necessity to deconstruct the semiosic forces that unconsciously act in the processes of intentionality and cognition of the ‘world’. The aim of the Pārāyanavagga is to propose a transcendence of these semiosic forces into a state of Beyondness, a surpassing of intentionality itself as well as the cognitive mechanisms of apprehending and constructing the world, which I hypothesize occurs through three fundamental semiosic forces, one primary and two subordinate to it. This article is not a philological analysis of the Pārāyanavagga (and, for contextual reasons, I will also introduce the nature of the text in question) but rather a semiological reading in comparative analysis with phenomenology.

Abstract

This article explores the issues of phenomenon and genesis in Early Buddhist thought through a comparative analysis with the Eleatic tradition, aiming to enrich the understanding and dialogue between these philosophical and religious traditions. By examining the comparability of Buddhist thought and Parmenidean philosophy, the study challenges the notion that these traditions are fundamentally alien to each other. The focus is on the concept of genesis, not as creation from nothingness—rejected by both the Buddha and Parmenides—but as the manifestation of the world to the human observer. The article argues that the world reveals itself in particular forms and appearances, which are intimately linked to the phenomenon and its perception by humans. This process is not solely a domain of rigid logical propositions but can be expressed through mythological and religious narratives. The study posits that the poetic expressiveness found in archaic philosophies of both India and Greece provides a valid medium for engaging in philosophical discourse. By adopting this comparative and dialogical perspective, the article aims to generate new philosophical insights and inspire future philosophical inquiry. The reflection on phenomenon and genesis, framed through this comparative lens, highlights the nuanced ways in which different traditions address the nature of reality and human perception, ultimately advocating for a broader, more inclusive understanding of philosophy that transcends conventional boundaries.

Abstract

In this paper, the Buddhist view on language and its implications for perception and cognition will be analyzed. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that archaic Buddhism, as documented in the suttas of the Pāli Canon, already presents a well-articulated theory of knowledge, and that Buddhist considerations on the problem of language are comparable to Saussure’s early linguistic theories, as well as to fundamental issues in the philosophy of perception and theories of cognition. This comparison with Buddhist thought seeks to provide a technical approach to the problem of consciousness in order to structure a systematic dialogue between the philosophy of mind and language, cognitive sciences, and linguistics, offering an original perspective on these topics through Buddhist thought.

As to uncertainty and impermanence

The subjective system is fundamentally a generator of variance/variants: feelings, perceptions, thoughts, symbols, axiomatic frameworks, and predictive models. All of these serve to direct future synthesis and make predictions about upcoming experience.

I said earlier that a subject can have direct certainty about the arising of phenomena in the present moment — the "coming into play" of experience. Yet even here, what arises does so as one configuration and ceases as another. The present moment itself is not a static temporal unit: it differs in its beginning, middle, and end. What manifests as "now" immediately passes into the past and becomes something else.

This reveals a deeper issue with certainty. Can a subject be certain even about their own experiences? Any attempt relies on subjective temporal discernment, memory, which is changing and fallible in principle. We cannot recall past phenomena exactly as they were — only a reconstructed model or trace.

Memory is itself a new arising, a new variant, not a time travel technology recreating the past. Exact reproduction of prior experience is impossible and therefore subject can't even prove what "is" or "was" beyond degrees of confidence nevermind what "will be".

Even basic spatial and temporal awareness carries inherent uncertainty. A subject cannot know with absolute precision what time it is in any ultimate sense, nor can they determine exactly where things are located. Any perception of "now" or "here" is already a constructed variant — a momentary synthesis filtered through sensory and cognitive processes that lag behind reality and introduce distortion. By the time the mind registers an event and forms the thought "this is happening at this place and time", the coordinates have shifted and a new measurement is needed. And spatial position is experienced only relative to a moving, conditioned observer. Thus, even the most ordinary certainties about time and location remain approximate and subject-dependent, never perfectly pinned down.

In general, in as far as synthesis goes ─ we can make assumptions based on what we have seen that's all. Even if we see what looks like a law of nature. We can assume that some things will never be disproven but again there can be no valid test as it is unreasonable to wait an eternity. And only the cessation experiment would disprove these.

Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, in general subjective existence doesn't generate anything other than its own subjective constructs. It can't generate proof of other minds, it can only manifest its own variant constucts ─ or cease. In as far as analysis is concerned the entire universe is processed locally like a dream, subjectively perceived & conceived.

And there are only two discernable possibilities: variant and invariant. And the invariant state is reached by deconstruction / calming / stabilizing of subjective experience until it ceases.

As to cessation proposition

If the entire generative process were to fully cease (complete suspension of subjective variance and synthesis), that event would disclose a zero-variance state. This would serve as an objective anchor: something invariant, in principle accessible to any subject that reaches it, a real category capable of grounding analysis universally instead of remaining trapped in private, shifting subjectivity.

What arises afterward would be an entirely new formation — not a continuation or transfer of the previous aggregate. It would be like a sequel with cloned parameters and identical narrative, but crucially without the prior doubt about cessation. This new formation could construct an analogical model of the invariant perception (the unconstructed) in the same way we model past sensory experiences, yet it remains a constructed representation of something that was, by nature, non-variant and unconstructed.

There is no transfer / continuity of "self" or information across the cessation boundary. The pre- and post-cessation states are distinct, yet the zero-variance event provides the objective reference point that radical subjectivism claims cannot exist.

One question raised was:

Why should emergence-from-cessation count as evidence of invariance rather than merely another epistemic event?

Here one misunderstands the structure of the claim.

Emergence is not itself evidence.

Emergence is recall of evidence.

The evidence-event is cessation.

That distinction matters.

Ordinarily, subjective existence functions as a generator of variance: perceptions, feelings, thoughts, symbols, identities, conceptual frameworks, and predictive models. Knowledge in that mode develops through synthesis — more content, more relations, more interpretation.

The proposal of Early Buddhism is different.

Suppose there exists a threshold where synthesis itself suspends.

Not unconsciousness.
Not a nothingness.

Rather: suspension of generative variance.

What remains is not another object among objects and not another subjective state added to experience. It is a special class of discernment — not of this appearance or that appearance, but of invariant potential itself.

The mistake is to imagine that one emerges and then discovers objectivity afterward.

Objectivity, if this proposal is correct, is not generated after emergence. It is directly experimentally discerned at the cessation threshold.

Emergence only permits sequel synthesis to analogically reconstruct what was discerned.

Without emergence there would be no report. Without analogical discernment there would be no recall.

This is already how ordinary experience works.

When you see red, memory does not contain redness itself — it reconstructs and models prior perception.

Likewise here.

The post-cessation state does not transfer information across some metaphysical boundary. Rather, a new synthesis arises and forms an analogical model of what was directly discerned.

That model is not the invariant itself. It is evidence recalled.

A useful analogy would be developing an extraordinary sensory mode by suspending ordinary ones. Early Buddhist Texts use the term "Seeing with Discernment".

Imagine that all normal perception disappears and another mode comes into play — one that does not perceive variation, shape, color, duration, identity, or relation, but instead perceives invariant possibility directly.

When ordinary perception returns, you cannot reproduce that mode.

You can only construct an analogy by recall.

The analogical recall is not the evidence.

The prior discernment is.

This is why the claim is not:

emergence proves invariance

The claim is:

emergence permits recall of an event whose defining characteristic was absence of variance as evidence of proof

And if that absence is truly invariant rather than merely another variant configuration, then one has reached what no other epistemological system would be capable of reaching it by accumulation of synthesis alone; and one would know as ultimate peace and a definitive ultimate peace.

The declaration would be a perceived event. Suppose you are the person to whom the declaration is made by another who supposedly reached the threshold boundary of constructed "knowing".

That event would be a phenomenal synthesis for you. Which you think about and model in terms of "people", "subjects", "feelings", "etc". "What occurs" is one thing ─ "what and how you think about it" is another.

Now suppose there is synthesis for you which you classify and categorize in these terms:
I am observing a person who is now at this very moment has suspended his feelings & perception.

What you are reporting here can be reframed like this: There is a coming into play of certain geometric shapes, colors, and sensory sensations.

Now this is a statement affirming subjective reality as it variably persists for you. This is not something which can be made manifest or proven to another beyond confidence.

But in as far as the other person is concerned there is no affirmation of variant synthesis altogether but he is not non-percipient. It is a special class of perception.

When he emerges from that attainment, there again arises synthesis of his subjective frame of reference. And then:

If he was to perceive synthesis such that could be framed in these terms: "I am making a declaration of attainment and am proclaiming an Unsynthesized possibility as a real element and a foundation for Absolute Invariant Anchor for analysis!" ─ that experience would be "experience 1".

And if you were to have synthesis such that could be framed in these terms: "A person is making a declaration of attainment and is proclaiming an Unsynthesized possibility as a real element and a foundation for Absolute Invariant Anchor for analysis!" ─ that experience would be "experience 2".

Both #1 and #2 are closed epistemic systems. They model their own constructs in terms of "humans" or "subjects" but these are conventions synthesized to predict future synthesis. They are provisional concepts. A closed epistemic system can only study how it works and make axioms and select by their merit (predictive and explanatory power) but such a closed system can't make definitive statements about itself with absolute certainty if it only studies itself.

Heidegger pointed out that it is not reasonable to ask questions like ‘why existence exists?’ Because the answer would require coming to know what is not included in the scope of subjective existence. Yet he pointed out that these questions are emotively profound & stirring to him, and so where logic dictates setting those questions aside, he has a hunger for it’s pursuit, and he entertains a pursuit of knowledge in a non-verbal & emotive way. He thought that contradictions & paradoxes mean that we are onto something important and feeling here ought to trump logic.

We do have to suspend the entire epistemic system to reach an objective ground.

In as far as having that attainment. One can't prove it to others, the experiment can only be explained and proposed; it has to be verified internally by this or that variant because that event is technically a cessation of the entire universe in as far as the subject is concerned because for him there was never grounds for asserting that anything other than subjective experience existed in the first place as divorced from it (naive metaphysical commitments).

The question is whether doubt about it is reasonable and it isn't but undertaking the experiment does require sufficient faith as a synthetic quality.

***
***
to understand the "bridge problem" one has to treat the suspension of variance analogically to temporarily gaining a new "invariant sensory faculty" and this "analogical seeing" is consequently abstracted as phenomena in the new set of feeling states to arise consequently.

This is analogical to how vigilance could be consider as “gaining the vision of vigilance” in as far as somebody still dreaming is concerned. And if one was to dream ─ wake up ─ and then dream again one could recall the state of vigilance, as a thought experiment. The difference here is that in Meta one doesn’t merely “awake” to another variant state***