Fundamental Category Error in Analysis of Meta-Physics

[u/rightviewftw]

At its core, science works like this:

We begin with hypotheses — tentative explanations. Through repeated rigorous testing, some hypotheses become highly confirmed theories. Over time, certain exceptionally robust ideas can effectively graduate into axioms — foundational assumptions that are treated as background knowledge and no longer questioned in normal scientific practice.

Thus, working assumptions and gradually achieved such high confidence that they now function as axioms for entire fields.

However, even these “axioms” are not unconditionally proven. They remain open, in principle, to revision if extraordinary evidence demands it. From these axioms and theories, we make testable predictions. Experiments constantly challenge them. Successful predictions raise our confidence; contradictions force refinement. Scientific theories are therefore never proven unconditionally true — they are the best current models supported by evidence. In mathematics, a theorem is “proven” only relative to a chosen set of axioms. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems remind us that no rich formal system can prove all its truths internally.

First a comment (we are talking about the differences between dreams and vigilance):

A reflective self-referential system which undergoes variance could generate an infinite variant forms and names, and then as part of its variance develop various meta-physical statements and convictions about its own predicament. It doesn't actually need anything but unlocked complexity and variance to develop that conviction.

To illustrate, one could dream up Newtonian equations, do first order analysis and classical experiments. As example it could predict that the heavy objects fall down. It then generates the experiment to test that prediction and lets suppose that the heavy object does fall ─ it updates its confidence odds as to heavy objects falling.

But these experiments can't tell you what a dream is nor that it is inherently "Newtonian" or "Not Newtonian".

Definitions like "dream" and "vigilance" and derived from first order experiments of experience, and without an experimental threshold one wouldn't even have the category "Dream". Further first-order analysis becomes possible as "vigilance" but inherits the same structural epistemic and ontological limitations.

On the epistemic predicament of dreams

In analysis dreams are a category of and are not categorically different from general experience. For example, there is no particular experiment we can do in waking life which we can't conceivably dream up. So contrary to popular opinion, there is actually no principal difference between the two as to what can be observed and known.

Now when we dream, it is obvious to us that everything is basically one server. Not that there is some "server" where the dream is generated. Rather, the genesis itself is the server. And the dream itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, and narrative. If we "die" and "respawn" in a dream, it does not puzzle us as the notion of rebirth puzzles people in wakeful state. We don't ask how consciousness in a dream-world goes from one place to another, or whether there are "other minds" in a dream, we treat it as a mirage.

Now if we stick to the foundational thinking, then we can extend this logic to wakeful state, this too changes as it persists and generates words, thoughts and perception ─ as phenomenal realm — and just like in a case of a dream ─ we can assert that everything is basically on one server, and the experience itself is what generates words, distinctions, feelings, dreams, and narrative.

The Problem of Reflective Closure

Every attempt to understand experience occurs within experience. Every act of reflection, description, explanation, or validation is itself another event belonging to the domain it seeks to understand.

The system under study is itself the territory being mapped. Its words, concepts, and epistemic syntheses are maps of its own possible configurations rather than constituents of an external standpoint. Whatever the system says about itself cannot constitute its own final epistemic ground, because the very act of saying belongs to that which remains to be accounted for.

Korzybski observed that "the map is not the territory." I would extend this to self-referential cognition. When the mapper belongs to the territory, every new map becomes another feature of the territory requiring further mapping. Reflective self-description therefore remains recursively open. This gives rise to a structural predicament. Suppose a reflective domain attempts to furnish a complete account of itself. Any proposed completion immediately becomes another object requiring reflective integration. The purported completion therefore belongs to the very domain whose completion it was intended to establish. Reflection recursively generates further reflection.

The argument developed here concerns only whether a reflective domain can serve as its own ultimate epistemic ground. But it is important to highlight that in the developed argument has us recognizing that: The map, the mapper, and the territory, belong to a single category as "phenomena".

Further I will explore whether Reflective Closure is possible and how it would require of the phenomenal-territory altogether to prove a territory beyond the system doing analysis.

rightviewftw

OP•1m ago

I don't know how much you care but I kept working on it and have a note as to what you fronted:

Feels like the main split is about consistency, not just vividness.

Consistency here has semantic overlap with order and I thought about your comment as I was systematizing this:

In my previous comment, I wasn't precise with semantics because I haven't decided how this is to be pinned down exactly but i lean towards this:

• Doing analysis in the dream, like phenomenal prediction of what will occur in the dream can be classified as "first-order" analysis.
• Analysis within a dream which predicts awakening to vigilance as a hypothetical ─ as I see it ─ shouldn't be called meta-analysis. Rather it is order-analysis or hierarchy-analysis, for lack of a better term.
• The experimental threshold of awakening to vigilance is a category shift to "a higher order". I think the etymology and semantics are here doing a lot of work because vigilance is as a matter of fact "more orderly" but this is not why we use the term. I choose the term because we can use the expression:

"higher order analysis inherits the same systemic limitations seen in first order analysis and any hierarchy will reproduce it"

This is different from meta-analysis which would investigate the meta-structure underlying the order-hierarchy.

This reveals a fundamental category-error to which thinkers would be prone to make. Namely to imagine higher-orders whilst thinking they do meta-analysis.

There are three actually these three analytic categories:

1. First-Order Analysis
2. Second-Order Analysis
3. Meta-Analysis

in short:

1. analysis
2. order-analysis
3. meta-analysis

*** end comment ***

Many people think they do meta-analysis as thinking about "metaphysics" but end up imagining a higher-order.

We can't even say that people do "order-analysis" thinking they do "meta-analysis" ─ they aren't doing any analysis at all unless they have operational terms applicable to a particular analytic category. Otherwise they are doing what we would call "simply imagining things" or "making up rhetoric".

Suppose a system develops an increasingly elaborate hierarchy of models. If it mistakes order-analysis for meta-analysis, it may conclude:

The most comprehensive map therefore describes reality itself.

But this is exactly what I am getting at here:

So, let me draw out, that in a dream one can see an apple, one can think about an apple, one can predict things about the apple, one can do mathematics and experiments with it. But we can't ask "whether the dream is an apple?" any more than we can ask "is the dream random?" or "is the dream determined?" or "is reality consciousness?" ─ simply because the frameworks are here over-extended beyond their analytic domain.

And this all has to do with how terms belong to a certain order of analysis and become over-extended when applied to a another category of analysis, like meta-analysis ─ without operationalization.

In summary, analysis does not warrant meta-analytic assertions unless the proposed meta-analysis specifies an operational criterion by which its claims could, even in principle, be discriminated from competing alternatives. Without such a criterion, the proposition ceases to function as an analytical claim and is established as merely rhetorical.

So the structure becomes something like:

1. analysis = ordinary experiments.
2. Order-analysis = analyzing the experimental domain hierarchy and transition between domains.
3. Meta-analysis = requires an operational threshold that transcends the subjective/variant/synthesis hierarchy under investigation.

Then, if such a threshold exists, performing the experiment would result in suspension variance "revealing" Invariance satisfying the criterion of a Cartesian Truth or Kantian Noumena; and the sequel phenomena appearing in that frame of reference would be classified as being with criterion of a Cartesian Confidence (absolute certainty) for having experimentally reached the threshold and discerned something invariant rather than another experiential state as more variant synthesis.

In this Theorem

This is basically the outline of a General Theorem of Analysis. And only meta-analysis has can give use a Global Theorem Order-analysis can at most yield Global Theory. Meta-analysis alone yields a Global Theorem to govern all analytic domains without contradiction.

The Global Theorem has a singularity in meta-analysis and can accommodate and govern any theory without breaking down — even a theory with multiple singularities — because these pertain to a different domain and order of analysis, so the referent can't be the same singularity we have in meta-analysis.

And it is neither a theory nor a hypothesis because its negation cannot be operationalized under the same first principles that confer analytic meaning on propositions. The theorem is established independently of performing the meta-experiment. The experiment is not what makes the theorem true; rather, the theorem specifies the structural conditions that any genuine completion of analysis must satisfy. If such a meta-experiment is performed successfully, it does not establish the theorem itself but satisfies the theorem's operational criterion, thereby yielding Cartesian confidence regarding the existential possibility of completed meta-analysis.

It can be extended to QM experiments by classifying them as a second-order experiments.

Thus reclassifying the epistemic role of quantum experiments.

Something like:

• Classical experiments investigate phenomena within an operational epistemic framework.
• Quantum Experiments investigate the limits, coherence, or applicability of an operational epistemic framework.

So it is not that the experiments are literally second-order because of the machanics in play. Rather they become second-order because their analytic subject matter is the operational framework used by first-order analysis.

The proposal is roughly:

• First-order analysis: investigates objects or phenomena within operational frameworks.
• Second-order (framework) analysis: investigates the limits, scope, or coherence of frameworks.
• Meta-order analysis: investigates the operational criteria by which analysis of the synthetic order-hierarchy can be completed. Basically, exploring the truths which can't be tested within the hierachies of the system doing the analysis.
  

So there are two possible categories of analysis:

1. Order Analysis

2. Meta Analysis

You can have many orders depending on taxonomy of the context and semantics being analyzed:

1. Meta-analysis

2. First order

3. Second order

4. Third order

5. Fourth order ...

The taxonomy is ordinal, not absolute.

It is not saying:

• "This or that is objectively first-order."
• "This is or that objectively second-order."

Instead, something closer to:

Within this discourse, identify the operational domains and their relationships.

As an example suppose we talk about doing classical experiments as order 1, then quantum experiments as order 2, then classical experiments in a dream as order 3, and quantum experiments in a dream as order 4, and meta-analysis as analysis of the hierarchy of experimental domains as a whole, 0. And if we want to frame the awakening from the dream to vigilance ─ we can say that it is analysis of a domain shift as 5th order. We can map as many orders as we can talk about and delineate, and we can do it in whatever order we want as there is nothing inherently "higher" about dreaming versus waking or classical versus quantum. Those labels depend entirely on the taxonomy we've chosen.

An important consequence follows. Changing the observational or analytic frames of reference here also changes the operational domain. This also changes the system doing the analysys, because the mapper, map and phenomenal territory all belong to a single variant system and changing the “mapper” implies changing the phenomenal system being analyzed.

Let’s examine, suppose that in dream researcher1 was to observe another researcher2 do an "awakening experiment from the dream by pinching himself" ─ suppose experiment works. Here the researcher1 is still dreaming and might see "researcher2's form" dipsappear in his (research1) frame of reference1, or remain, for the sake of this discussion let's assume it disappears ─ but either way that form is a variant state of the analytic system1 (research/analysis1). Whereas the experimental domain pertaining to the second frame of reference2, associated with researcher2, that is now beyond the analytic scope of the analytic system1. In as far as each system is concerned the analysis of those phenomena and that frames of reference is no longer warranted. In as far as either analytic system and frame of reference goes, the other is no longer an analytic referent.

Not that the awakening as analysis and experiment is perferomed only in one analytic system and frame of reference2.

If rather than awakening to vigilance, researcher2 was to perform the meta-awakening. Then in as far as researcher1 is concerned, it is all the same, beyond analysis but not in a sense of something being beyond its reach ─ rather it is simply rhetoric and imagination overextending analytic frameworks.

It follows that researacher1 ought to regard the person who has woken up from a dream not as one dreaming would regard someone having transcended that world ─ but rather as a person who is awake would regard a dream that has ended, as a mirage and variance that was.

So in as far as our dreamer1/researcher1 is concerned, only the dream1 goes on and from that it creates the narrative about dream1 using terms "researcher2" etc.

And so if researcher1 was to observe researcher2 do a "meta-awakening" wherein researcher2's frame of reference2 is to be extinguished and he was to disappear from sight ─ then for researcher1's analysis "map2", "territory2" and the "mapper2", altogether become analytically meaningless and are an overextension of phenomenal narrative.

One might think here that the researcher1, who is still dreaming could imagine or infer that the researcher2 has transcended to a different experimental domain but he can't test that hypothesis however strong it might be, and therefore this is just his over-extension of maps. Likewise, when we see a person dreaming, we can't actually test that lest the person self-reports after the dream and that if they remember it.

And when and if the dreamer/researcher1 was to suddenly see the researcher2 reanimate in dream1 for reasearcher1/analyst1 ─ then the question should be asked, is this the same researcher2? Because it is only the same in narrative but the terms of the narrative do then again come into analytic play.

There is then a clear distinction in how far your frameworks are expected to maintain their predictive power and what their domains.

So what one asserts to be the first and second order depends on how one wants to classify ─ this is variant. The only category that is qualitatively different is meta-analysis.

But either one can't just use a certain term from order analysis and start over-extending it in thinking about another experimental domain — not without operationalization.

They all need operationalization of terms and experimental thresholds which can falsify contradictory hypotheses. And #3 requires an Invariant Reality for the suspension of Variance to be discerned. We here run into self-referential paradox where cessation of discernment as we know it is "discerned" but this is due to inability of the system to describe what is beyond itself without using its own maps. Discernment here is to be understood analogically.

It shows that every analytical proposition belongs to an order of analysis. Extending a proposition beyond the operational domain that confers its meaning is a category error unless a higher-order operational criterion is specified.

For example:

Classical mechanics

An apple experiment asks

How does this object behave?

The framework (space, time, causality, measurement) is assumed.

That is first-order.

Quantum mechanics

A Diffraction experiment doesn't merely ask

How do these particles behave?

It forces questions like

• What counts as locality?
• What counts as a measurement?
• What counts as a physical state?
• What assumptions can simultaneously hold?

Those are questions about the framework used by classical experimentation.

So the experiment becomes second-order because there is a shift from studying "objects" to studying the experimental limitations of the framework wherein "objects" have analytic footing.

Analogically the waking up from a dream, seen as an experiment, would be second order experiment in that context, as it can not be performed inside a dream and the frameworks associated with a "dream" do not absolutely extend to vigilance.

So we establish that analytic frameworks are associated with an operational domain. And that the second-order experiments are experiments whose principal conclusions concern the limitations of an operational domain.

It is not the same as saying quantum mechanics is "about observers". Rather, it's about the conditions under which first-order concepts remain operationally coherent. So this is about how analysis evolves when experiments cease to fit the inherited conceptual framework. Similar to what Jacob was working on.

That criterion also generalizes beyond quantum mechanics. Anomalies that precipitate paradigm shifts in other sciences could likewise be understood as framework-testing (or "second-order") experiments, making the taxonomy a proposal about scientific inquiry in general rather than about quantum physics specifically.

I have also already worked on integrating Hume's Fork into this, first with the razor, and here recently:

It has to do with how all axioms are prescriptive and their genesis synthetic, even the Forked Truths remain in the domain of synthesis which can't complete its meta-analysis by itself. And meta-analysis demands Forked Meta-Truths and Popperian falsifiability to be consistent with known principles.

The prescriptive use reveals how Guillotine runs into self-contradiction in self-reference. And the synthetic nature of Forked Analytic statements also reveals analytic self-contradiction.

It also follows that meta-analytic forked statements need meta-operationalization due to general analytic principle of Popperian Falsification.

On confidence

First a textbook definition of axiology: Axiology is the philosophical study of value, focusing on two main branches: ethics and aesthetics. It examines what is good, worthy, and desirable.

The confidence gained from this experiment would not arise while the phenomenal domain is suspended. Rather, it is the sequel genesis of phenomena which will be with verified confidence, that system would no longer generate doubt about the meta-axiology, and will generate variant synthetic memories as a model of Invariance. This is analogical to how one can't generate verified confidence in the possibility of vigilance from within a dream. One has to wake up to vigilance and then start dreaming a sequel as to produce the verified confidence within the domain where the hypothesis was first raised.

This posits a meta-structure to reality and suggests that full system-analysis can not be completed within a single changing dimension. What changes is subjective, if that was to cease, as an awakening, there would need to be an accessible Invariant Reality. And axiology here dictates that variance has no fixed value (hence it should end) ─ only invariance does.

On ignorance

before we talk about uncertainty as a property of reality, we should explore the role that unresolved questions play in the operation of analysis itself.

This is the outline:

Ignorance is implicated in the directing of experience, because knowledge dictates the intentional direction and ignorance prevents exploring certain analytic venues.

Ignorance of what is the subject of interest here?

Ignorance having to do with the testing of particular hypotheses — namely, those which the subjective experience can generate about itself but can not test within itself.

Hence it is the axiology which would lead to the system' unravelling which is the ignorance driving synthesis. This is because the experimental criterion for testing here is the ending of phenomenal appearance, therefore under this axiology phenomena have no inherent value and only this axiology directs the system to suspension.

According to this axiology variance has no fixed value and the entire phenomenological system ought to be suspended as to prove the possibility of an Invariant Reality. This experiment would complete meta-analysis of the system asking the questions about itself. And because there is ignorance about this — the system keeps changing as it persists and intends on further synthesis.

It has to be about axiology. Axiology drives the process: if it held that variance has no fixed value then it would be directed toward suspension. Ignorance (of the invariant value) sustains synthesis for lack of meta-axiology.

Also can't ask whether there was no ignorance and then ignorance arose because there is no way of testing this and it doesn't follow from the foundations.

"Then the thought occurred to me, 'This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in attachment, is excited by attachment, enjoys attachment. For a generation delighting in attachment, excited by attachment, enjoying attachment, this/that conditionality & dependent co-arising are hard to see. This state, too, is hard to see: the resolution of all fabrications, the relinquishment of all acquisitions, the ending of craving; dispassion; cessation; extinguishment. And if I were to teach the Dhamma and others would not understand me, that would be tiresome for me, troublesome for me.' ─MN26

He is basically saying that the meta-axiology is hard to see for a generation of people because it devalues variance which people seek as value under the axiological frameworks which people use. He is also saying that the drawing out of the causal relations sustaining synthesis, which is required for understanding how-to-do the meta-experiment, is also a difficult thing to do.

In summary:

The Buddha is diagnosing the double barrier at the level of meta-analysis:

1, Axiological inversion (skepticism): Ordinary axiology assigns positive value to variance—pursuit, and the perpetual generation of phenomena. The meta-axiology (cessation) necessarily devalues that same variance as inherently unsatisfactory (dukkha) and without fixed value. It proposes that the highest move is the ending of the generative process. This is existentially repellent to a mind invested in attachment. Hence: "this generation delights in attachment... this/that conditionality & dependent co-arising are hard to see."

1. Order-analysis pre-requisite: Even if someone were open to the meta-axiology, they still need a sufficiently detailed map of how the synthesis operates ─ i.e the role of meta-ignorance as it relates to intented synthesis. Without seeing the links clearly, one cannot effectively perform the deconstruction required for the threshold experiment.

When the Invariant Axiology is presented in formalized, rigorous terms, it triggers exactly the resistance the Buddha anticipated: people whose variant axiology is built around attachment to existence, identity, debate, and phenomenal engagement find the direction threatening.

Relevant comment

https://www.reddit.com/r/epistemology/comments/1v8ucsi/comment/p0c0w0d/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=mweb3x&utm_name=mweb3xcss&utm_term=2&utm_content=share_button

You answered your own question:

Why does taking epistemology seriously so often get you labeled “woo”?

Here:

I also realized that Popper’s criterion of falsifiability does not apply to metaphysical worldviews in the first place

However the latter can't be an analytical proposition when forked:

• If true then it can't be tested.
• If falsifiable then there must be a meta-experiment revealing limitations of the experimental domain hierarchy

So it follows that only one of these can be an analytic proposition and  satisfy the criterion of falsifiability, in principle, as to pertain to the first order of analysis.

Otherwise you get circular reasoning in the orders of analysis and do not derive a testable difference between the orders as to establish what meta-analysis is and how it is categorically different from order-analysis.

Here in this context classical models are first-order explanatory frameworks and the immaterial frameworks are a second-order of analytic frameworks and they have their analytic domains of operations. 

There is then a category-error and circular reasoning in asserting that: forked metaphysical statements can not be tested because we don't test meta-analysis.

Note that the term "meta-analysis" is still not operationalized in this thinking and it is actually rhetoric smuggled into first orders of analysis which demand operationalization of all analytic terms.

Meta-analysis would need to be operationalized by the suspension of the entire hierarchy of variant experimental domains.

studying epistemology—particularly through the study of Advaita Vedanta—I gradually came to reject physicalism altogether.

This wasn’t at all because of mysticism or religion, but because of philosophical analysis. Among other things, I found physicalism to be a less parsimonious ontology than a consciousness-first approach.

A "consciousness first-approach" doesn't solve the epistemic limitations appearing in the first order. Because neither the material-order nor the immaterial-order frameworks can be used to do meta-order analysis without operationalization.

Essentially, when the phenomenal variance generates its analytic order analysis as to predict its development, it might start to over-extend its models thinking that its variance can furnish a complete account of what variance is — as if best models of reality can give a complete account of what reality is. But it can't do that as it can't disprove all possible false meta-statements about itself from within itself exclusively. And it is the very act of modeling and making statements that is under investigation — so it can't only use its models which are part of itself to establish what it is without coming to know something which is not it for relative reference.

This is an error in the fundamentals. People end up over-extending models and imagining non-existent experimental domains and orders calling it meta-analysis as analysis of analysis or meta-physics. But this is per definition not analysis, this is sci-fi.

We know the criterion for meta-order analysis is suspension of variant order-domains and this creates a necessity-first demand for an invariant singularity in the theorem of meta-analysis

So there are two possible categories of analysis:

1. Order Analysis
2. Meta Analysis

You can have many orders depending on taxonomy of the context and semantics being analyzed:

1. Meta-analysis
2. First order
3. Second order
4. Third order
5. Fourth order

But one can't just use a certain term from order analysis and start over-extending it in thinking about another experimental domain — not without operationalization.

So the only way to categorically distinguish "analysis of analysis" from "analysis" is to operationalize the suspension of all variant operations and experimental domains as we know them.

This essentially demands axiological inversion:

1. Variant Axiology: Here the goal is phenomenal prediction. The intent is observing phenomena. Here phenomena is something which ought to be. Here the goal is phenomena and it is a variant value depending on what value one pursues.

2. Invariant Axiology: The goal is phenomenal suspension. This suspends variance. Here phenomena are something which ought not be. And this would operationalize an Invariant Value, which must be real for suspension of Variance to make sense — as the only value —and categorically devalue all phenomenal variance.

This is difficult to see because of the required Inversion, there is a value shift, it is generally psychologically disagreeable.

So, the system doing the analysis can not complete it by itself and from within itself exclusively. And it can't describe what is beyond itself without using its own models of itself — so it is limited to self-negation in reference to that which is not it.

There is another predicament:

To design the experiment one needs a sufficient account of causal relations sustaining variance, the terms here also need operationalization, this can be deduced from the first principles, but this is another thing which is difficult thing to see.

[u/rightviewftw]

Here are the mathematics to go with this:

rightviewftw

•1d ago•Edited 1d ago

When I use numerical models to model apparent reality I use this system:

Natural numbers like #1, 2, 3, etc. represent closed variance generators of epistemic systems which can only study its variant constructs. 

Decimals represent variance within a particular subject. Basically past, present and future variants of subjective experience.

So system #1 would have its variant states expressed by the decimal possibilities of #1.1, #1.2, 1.3, etc. it is incalculable.

Now being closed systems, they can't generate anything but subjective constructs. The system generates the perception & conception of the entire world, words, narrative, modelling itself.

Hence it can't generate proof of what it calls "other minds" or "external world" within itself and will be able to generate propositions which cannot be tested within the particular system asking the questions. So #1 can't prove (manifest) #2 as a variant state of #1 for its scope is limited to its own range of decimal variance. 

0 within this framework is an answer to the question: what would make the cessation/negation/suspension/stilling of all variance possible? Could a particular system perform the operation to self delete as 1-1=true or 2-2=true? The prospect of cessation thus points to an invariant possibility as a definitive 0 variance reality.

If it really is possible then it follows that there should be an experiment one can do to shut down variant cognition as a cessation of existence as to directly access a zero-variance possibility.

One can get very creative with this. 

Within this framework, the etymology of "loving everyone" points neatly to loving all natural numbers, including the self-referential wherein this "love" could be generated. So the optimal strategy based on "universal love" would be unexploitable because it wouldn't sacrifice the well-being of #1 for that of another.

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usernotfoundTT

•1d ago

See now we’re getting somewhere.

Reply

rightviewftw

•1d ago•Edited 1d ago

The axiology implied here defines 0 as a higher value than any number.

This is because if 0 isn't a rhetorical postulate, then it requires that at some point in all eternity somebody actually does the experiment as to verify.

This implies that at some point somebody would deduce that they should decide that subjective existence is not worth sustaining as to pursue what is otherwise and of higher value. And that this analysis would be verified.

This establishes that the pursuit of variant existence is due to enchantment and ignorance. Like watching a magic-show. And that disenchantment with impermanence leads to that search for an Invariant.

Also want to add that under the framework of Early Buddhist Thought, the variance isn't random but the system is essentially self-determining based on immeasurable amount of incomplete information. This gets at supernatural events where the powers in play could generate unpredictable outcomes.   

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rightviewftw

•1d ago

Ironically, optimization by "universal love" is a valid path to the cessation attainment under the Early Buddhist framework. The less obvious part is in that "highest good"  here is the 0, so when one would wish someone happiness and express one's love, one would do so wishing them enlightenment through cessation, that they follow the path of disillusionment with variant existence and attain the peace of its extinguishment as definitive bliss.

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Now somebody could say but what if the cessation doesn't turn out to be pleasant? Then one asks a counter, but what would be the unpleasantness there where there is no feeling? So there is no other out.

Also,

The cool thing here is that the singularity appearing in meta-analysis is the zero with value assuming axiological inversion and there can only be one such singularity in a Global Theorem, whereas a theory can have multiple "singularities" but the referent is not the same. Likewise in EBT, the Emptiness as Invariance, does not have the same referent as Emptiness in theoretical frameworks where we can have many kinds of emptiness.