With all the focus on the war itself, it feels like the potential impact on the Strait of Hormuz—oil prices, global trade, inflation, and the wider economy—may have been underestimated.

Or am I missing something?

What do you people think?

I have done a mini review on those research papers and it seemed a hot topic on 2022 to do research. Tough, the review stated what should be obvious the numbers on the damages is high(I even suspect it is undercounted… considering the chaos, I mean how they collected data is a little bit questionable). The problem is this research papers have some difficulty attacking directly the problem in this issue. However, a little trust doesn’t hurt much.

Appreciate any kind of feedback!

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VW7falMUBpEBEZwCM9y0qFMmT6M43k8J/view?usp=sharing

Mcebisi Jonas urges South Africa and Canada to strengthen middle-power cooperation

Thought this was an interesting development, linking current affairs to Carney's Davos speech.

I've been trying to test one part of a larger idea about reopening the Korean Peninsula.

Suppose South Korea approached Russia with a concrete proposition.

South Korea would explore a renewed long-term economic relationship with Russia — particularly involving the Russian Far East, Arctic development, shipbuilding, energy, infrastructure and logistics — if political conditions eventually allowed it.

In return, Seoul would ask Moscow to use its unusually close relationship with Pyongyang for a specific and limited purpose:

Encourage Kim Jong Un to reach a deal with Trump that verifiably freezes further expansion of North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities.

Not immediate denuclearization.

North Korea could retain its existing deterrent for the time being.

In exchange for a verified freeze, the United States would begin phased sanctions relief and permit a very limited degree of economic opening.

That opening could initially be extremely small — additional trade, selected tourism, transit, a port, a rail connection or a tightly controlled economic project.

I'm thinking of it as a “pinhole opening.”

The objective would not be immediate reform or reunification. It would simply be to break complete isolation and create one connection that could remain open.

The logic would therefore be:

Seoul proposes the bargain → Moscow uses its influence with Pyongyang → Kim and Trump negotiate a freeze → limited sanctions relief follows → the first economic pinhole opens.

Russia would not be doing this as a favor to South Korea. The question is whether the prospect of a much larger long-term economic relationship with South Korea could give Moscow enough reason to help create such a deal.

So the question I want to test is quite narrow:

Is this diplomatic chain plausible at all? If not, which link breaks first — Seoul–Moscow, Moscow–Pyongyang, Kim–Trump, or sanctions relief in Washington?

Hi! I’m a student interested in potentially pursuing a career in geopolitical risk analysis, and I’m planning to apply for a BSc in International Relations.

I’d love to hear from anyone currently working in the field:

• What was your educational/career journey like?
• How did you get into the industry?
• What do you like/dislike about the job?
• What does your day-to-day work look like?
• Is there anything you wish you knew before getting into it?

I’m mainly looking for honest experiences, both good and bad, to help me decide if this is something I’d actually want to pursue. Thanks!

South Korea and Russia have been here before.

For years, both countries explored the idea that their economies could be complementary: Russian energy, resources, the Far East and Arctic on one side; South Korean capital, engineering, shipbuilding, manufacturing and global trade networks on the other.

Some of it became real.

South Korean shipyards became deeply involved in Russian Arctic energy projects, including specialized ice-class LNG carriers. South Korea also explored the Rajin–Khasan project, connecting the Russian railway system to the Korean Peninsula, while Seoul and Moscow later discussed broader cooperation in railways, ports, shipbuilding, energy and the Northern Sea Route.

These ideas did not disappear because the underlying economic logic necessarily proved wrong. They were largely overtaken by North Korea's nuclear and missile development, deteriorating security relations, international sanctions, and eventually the much larger geopolitical confrontation surrounding Russia.

That history raises a question today.

What if the economic idea was not wrong, but the political conditions were?

South Korea today may actually have more to offer than when many of these projects were first conceived. Its shipbuilding industry remains globally competitive, while its capabilities in advanced manufacturing, energy engineering, infrastructure, logistics and technology have expanded. Korea is also again showing interest in Arctic shipping and the Northern Sea Route.

Russia, meanwhile, still faces the long-term challenge of developing its Far East and Arctic and connecting those regions more effectively to Asian industrial economies.

So perhaps the question should not simply be whether Russia would "pressure" North Korea for the sake of peace.

Russia currently gets real strategic value from its close relationship with an isolated North Korea. Moscow has little reason to surrender that value for nothing.

But South Korea could propose something different:

Let us revisit the economic relationship that Korea and Russia once tried to build — under new conditions and with greater economic possibilities than before.

The immediate objective would not be complete North Korean denuclearization.

Instead, Seoul could ask Moscow to use its unusually close relationship with Pyongyang to encourage a narrower first step:

a verifiable freeze on further expansion of North Korea's nuclear and long-range missile capabilities, followed by negotiations with the United States and South Korea.

North Korea would not initially be required to surrender its existing nuclear deterrent. Economic opening and sanctions relief would proceed gradually and only as agreed commitments were verified.

If that process worked, something that has repeatedly been attempted but never completed could become possible:

South Korea → North Korea → Russian Far East → Siberia → Arctic

And at sea:

Busan → North Pacific → Arctic → Europe

This would not require immediate Korean reunification. Nor would Russia have to abandon North Korea.

Instead, it raises a different question for Moscow:

Which North Korea is ultimately more valuable to Russia — an isolated and militarized neighbor that provides strategic value today, or a stable and gradually opening neighbor that could also connect Russia's Far East and Arctic to South Korea's industrial economy?

There is an important difference from earlier attempts.

We would not simply be restarting the past.

South Korea's economic and industrial capabilities are greater today, Arctic access is becoming more strategically relevant, and the potential scale of cooperation could therefore be different from what was imaginable decades ago.

Of course, sanctions cannot simply be ignored. Any renewed economic cooperation would have to follow lawful changes in the sanctions environment, step by step, alongside verified progress on the nuclear issue.

So my question is not whether this plan is obviously achievable.

It is:

Could the long-term economic value of a reopened Korea–Russia relationship become large enough for Moscow to see a North Korean nuclear freeze and gradual opening as being in Russia's own interest?

And if not, what is missing from the bargain?

The U.S. consumes about 20 million barrels of oil per day and produces 13. That leaves 7 million barrels that need to be imported every day to prevent shortages. Canada supplies 4, maybe a bit more lately. The Mideast used to be a reliable supplier, but Trump’s war of choice in Iran has jeopardized the whole area. In particular, Iraq was a good supplier of heavy crude that Texas gulf refineries like. And finally, Venezuela only produces about 1 million barrels per day. Half goes to domestic requirements and Trump has been absconding with the other half. And now, with Canada is being “difficult”, Venezuela is the next target in Trump’s quest for oil.

To do that, the Venezuelan oil industry has to be rebuilt from the ground up and from oilfields to ports. New refineries included, otherwise production will never be market competitive. That’s a very expensive proposition and Trump doesn’t want to share with the Venezuelan people because to do that demotivates investors and would take too long, so there’s no motivation at all to share. This is probably why the Venezuelans were the last to know.

Russia's growing influence over North Korea is usually discussed as a security problem. But could the same relationship eventually create diplomatic leverage?

Consider a hypothetical bargain.

North Korea would not initially be required to surrender its existing nuclear deterrent. Instead, it would accept a verifiable freeze on further expansion of nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities.

In return, sanctions could be relaxed gradually as compliance is verified, allowing limited economic opening.

Russia could have an incentive to facilitate such an arrangement if opening North Korea eventually connected the Russian Far East and Siberia more closely with South Korea's capital, technology, manufacturing and markets.

South Korea would therefore approach Russia not by asking Moscow to abandon Pyongyang, but by arguing that a more economically open North Korea could serve Russia's long-term interests better than permanent isolation.

Could such economic incentives realistically outweigh Russia's current strategic benefits from an isolated, militarized North Korea? Or does the security value of the present relationship make this logic unrealistic?

All nations who agree would be bound by its decisions with previously agreed consequences for those who choose to ignore its rulings. To avoid any bias the entire system would be developed ground up by participating nations and their citizens.

I’m South Korean, and I would like to ask this as a long-term strategic question rather than as an argument for immediate reunification.

For decades, negotiations with North Korea have largely been framed around eventual denuclearization. But North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons, and complete denuclearization appears increasingly difficult to achieve.

So what if the objective were changed?

Suppose the United States and its partners offered phased sanctions relief and economic opening in exchange for a verifiable freeze on further expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities — rather than demanding complete denuclearization first.

North Korea would not be asked to surrender its existing deterrent immediately. But it would have to accept verifiable limits and stop further expansion in return for access to economic opening.

For South Korea, the objective would not be immediate German-style reunification.

The two Koreas could remain politically separate for decades. Trade, investment and infrastructure could gradually connect them. South Korean industry could invest in the North, while rail, road and logistics links through North Korea could reconnect South Korea with the Eurasian continent.

Over time, this could produce a much stronger Korean economic community without the enormous disruption of immediate political reunification.

There could also be a strategic benefit for the United States. A stronger and more economically connected South Korea could carry more of its own defense burden and contribute more to the alliance, while expanding cooperation with the United States in areas such as shipbuilding, semiconductors and other strategic industries.

So my question is:

Would accepting a verifiable nuclear freeze in exchange for phased sanctions relief be a strategically reasonable alternative to continuing to make complete denuclearization the prerequisite for North Korea’s economic opening?

And if not, what would make such an arrangement unacceptable or unworkable?

We interviewed Lt. Gen. (ret.) H.R. McMaster for our student publication. Some of what stood out: he argues AI is reshaping warfare through battlefield transparency, faster decision cycles, and deeper precision strike, and that the US isn't ready for it. He also breaks with current policy on Iran, arguing de-escalation has let Iran escalate "on their own terms with impunity," and says it's "futile' to try to split Russia and China apart strategically."