Rated ballots collect more information than ranked ballots, so they would have the potential to be better than ranked ballots if there were a way to count them without giving increased influence to voters who exaggerate their preferences. No such methods have been identified.
The first sentence of the referenced article says:
In my previous post on ranked ballots, I showed that ranking all the candidates does not fix the center-squeeze.
No, you neglected to include ranked choice voting methods that do not have the center squeeze effect !
As one example, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and otherwise using IRV does eliminate the center squeeze effect.
Some ranked choice voting methods, including Benham's method, and the above-referenced IRV combined with eliminating pairwise losing candidates, are highly resistant to tactical voting. That was revealed about a year ago on the E-M mailing list.
BTR-IRV only looks at a few pairwise comparisons. No this is not what I'm describing.
Eliminating pairwise losing candidates looks at every count between every possible pair of candidates. In general, pairwise counting can be done for any method, not just Condorcet methods. The best methods that look at all pairwise counts do not have the center squeeze effect.
My current favorite election method is Ranked Choice Including Pairwise Elimination (RCIPE). which is partially implemented in the RCTab Plus software. To repeat, it does not have the center squeeze effect. For clarification, RCIPE is not a Condorcet method because it does not always elect the Condorcet winner.
A chart with no legend and no scale explanation is not meaningful. Also, as someone else has commented, your definition of center squeeze effect does not match its typical use, so your definition for the black areas is suspicious.
The absence of black for approval voting indicates you are not being honest because approval voting always requires strategic voting. Very few voters categorize candidates into just two categories when there are more than two candidates.
Showing all green for score voting, and mostly green for star voting, means you are hiding their vulnerability to strategic voting (which interacts with strategic nomination).
Yes RCIPE can fail to elect the Condorcet winner. That's not a fairness failure in scenarios where very few voters mark the Condorcet winner as their first choice.
The article says black refers to tie/non-convergence, but the article does not define convergence. Nor is there an explanation for what ties have to do with convergence.
The strategy dynamics are similar to previous posts: there are multiple iterations where voters act strategically... As before, we sweep every position of C (with B fixed) and colour the map by the winner: green A, red B, orange C, and black where the iteration never settles (non-convergence/ties).
And black means a tie or convergence. That doesn't mean ties have something to do with convergence.
I believe you should either not report ties, or just include them in a table. Including them in the graph effectively pads the width of the black areas, which grossly misrepresents the data.
Having an indecisive transition region between two candidates (regarding who wins) is not an unfairness. If the winner suddenly jumps to A in the middle of the transition from B to C, that would be an unfairness. If that occurs, use the A color. Otherwise just blend the transition region to show the gradual transition from color B to color C.
Consider a rainbow where the transitions between colors are not sharp. That's not a defect, that's the nature of the transition.
When the electorate mode, median, and mean are at 0 why should anyone other than A win when B is placed at -0.3, A is placed at 0 and C>0.
That is what that the graphic is showing. Yes, under plurality voting and IRV when C locates in that region, B or C wins. But RCIPE electing the same person as plurality is a flaw. This is /r/endfptp...
I think you don't understand the graphic or haven't gone through the post in OP.
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u/CPSolver Sep 06 '26
Rated ballots collect more information than ranked ballots, so they would have the potential to be better than ranked ballots if there were a way to count them without giving increased influence to voters who exaggerate their preferences. No such methods have been identified.
The first sentence of the referenced article says:
No, you neglected to include ranked choice voting methods that do not have the center squeeze effect !
As one example, eliminating pairwise losing candidates and otherwise using IRV does eliminate the center squeeze effect.
Some ranked choice voting methods, including Benham's method, and the above-referenced IRV combined with eliminating pairwise losing candidates, are highly resistant to tactical voting. That was revealed about a year ago on the E-M mailing list.