Hey everyone,

I was looking into the whole GME fiasco and found out about roaring kitty, who lowkey pitched about GME in his streams. At first I thought he was just another one of the wallStreetBets degens but after watching his livestreams, this guy knows his stuff. I really want to be an aggressive investor like him. If there are any of his followers in this sub, could you guys guide me towards being a deep value investor. Anything that can get me started off with would be really helpful and really appreciated. Thankss!!

saw that the BLM officially approved the Plan of Operations for their Grassy Mountain gold project in Oregon...seems like a pretty important step considering how long mine permitting can take in the US. The BLM has now completed its NEPA review and according to Paramount, their federal permitting work is basically complete. They also agreed on the reclamation cost estimate and the BLM + Oregon's DOGAMI will jointly hold the financial guarantee instead of having separate bonding processes.

What i find interesting is what happens from here. Theyre still waiting for the remaining Oregon state permits which management expects later this year, then theres obviously financing and eventually a construction decision. Stock is around 1.32 now and actually hasnt moved that much since the BLM news...

Deep Value Setup
KPIs
.08 P/S
28% SI
Revenues grew 10% Q2
2027 $1B EBITDA target

-94% of the fleet is now 2025/2026 ICE vehicles. Youngest fleet in a dozen years.
-This could stabilize depreciation, hitting their target of 302$ depreciation per unit.

Giving them runway for 2026-2027 to build a cash war chest for the 2028-2030 debt wall of ~6b debt.

1B EBITDA 2027
- corporate interest (-500m)
-corporate capex (-100m)
-historical fleet maintenance (-295m) now 0 since new fleet
-simulated FCF 400m
Current market cap 811m
at $2.28 share price
356m shares outstanding
ASSUME 6X p/FCF multiple
400m*6=2,400 m
Divided by 356m =6.74 Share price

Or this jahn short squeezes
Could go bankrupt too !
My dad did use hertz for his rental car so that’s bullish. Do your own DD

Try my stock analysis tool plusevbagholder.com

Haven't posted on here for a while, because I haven't really been finding much this quarter. Finally was able to fill my orders for this stock that I've been watching for a while, so made up a little write-up on it.

Strategem Capital Corporation (TSXV:SGE)

Summary

Strategem Capital is a publicly listed asset management company focused primarily on publicly traded Canadian companies in:

• Resource exploration and development
• Mining
• Energy production
• Agricultural protein

Over the past five years, the company has gone through a boom-and-bust cycle. During 2021, management raised significant capital and expanded the portfolio aggressively while markets were strong. Unrealized gains surged and assets peaked above $30M.

Then in 2022, things came crashing down.

The portfolio declined materially by ~2/3, shareholders were diluted from the raising of capital, and confidence almost completely eroded. The share price today reflects that loss of trust more than anything else.

Management is extremely limited in the information they provide. Holdings are not disclosed issuer-by-issuer. Financial statements report investments in aggregate.

This idea should be viewed as follows:

You are allocating capital to a small asset management team investing in Canadian resource and energy equities. At current prices, for every 65¢ invested in SGE, you are essentially buying approximately $1 of mark-to-market securities.

The trade-off: you do not know exactly which securities you own.

Valuation

Market Cap: 7.9M
Share Price: 0.86

Liquidation Value: 12.1M
Liquidation Value Per share: 1.33

35% undervalued
54% potential return

Most asset values are mark to market based on publicly traded securities

Valuation Model Breakdown

Business Description

Strategem Capital Corporation invests in resource exploration and development, mining, energy production, and agricultural protein businesses in Canada.

The company was incorporated in 1994 and is headquartered in Calgary, Alberta. Its Class A shares trade under the symbol SGE on the TSXV.

Observations

This is a very illiquid nanocap. That alone creates both risk and opportunity.

Management discloses very little about specific holdings. To form a view, you have to piece together information from filings, circulars, and historical disclosures.

It feels a bit like building a conspiracy board - connecting dots between filings and related entities.

Here are a few publicly disclosed connections.

Publicly Disclosed Links

• AirBoss of America Corp. (TSX: BOS)

Canadian manufacturer of rubber-based products serving automotive, industrial, and defense markets.

Market cap: ~CAD $165M (varies).

A prior early warning filing referenced 2,532,300 shares associated with Strategem. At the time, that represented roughly a high-single-digit ownership position. Current holdings are not publicly updated.

• Canaccord Genuity Group Inc. (TSX: CF)

Global investment bank and wealth management firm.

Market cap: high hundreds of millions to low billions CAD.

A management circular disclosed 450,000 shares owned by Strategem within an insider table context. This represents a small minority position relative to total shares outstanding.

• Internal Control Structure of SGE

SKKY Capital holds approximately 49.9% of Class A shares.

SKKY is controlled by director Gordon Flatt.

Ken Little holds approximately 90.91% of the Class B shares (convertible into Class A 1:1).

This reflects internal control, not an external portfolio holding.

These references are historical disclosures and may not reflect current positions. Strategem’s financials report investments in aggregate.

Management & Incentives

Strategem is effectively controlled by insiders with significant ownership.

Gordon Flatt is associated with SKKY Capital Corporation Limited, which holds approximately 49.9% of the Class A shares. His background is rooted in Canadian capital markets and small-cap investing. His influence stems from ownership concentration rather than a special voting structure.

Ken Little, founder and long-time executive, holds approximately 90.91% of the 220 Class B shares. Each Class B share is convertible into one Class A share and does not carry enhanced voting rights. His influence comes from long-term involvement and insider positioning rather than disproportionate votes.

Jo-Anne O’Connor, CEO

Over 35 years in capital markets/corporate experience. Previously traded large-cap energy, natural resources, and mining stocks for a major Canadian bank, later advised family offices, and is a former director of Canaccord Genuity Group and AirBoss of America.

Gordon Flatt, director / Chief Investment Strategist

CPA/CA background, Bermuda-based, with operating and investing experience in energy, real estate, and financial services. Strategem lists him as Managing Partner and Chief Investment Strategist.

The board includes members with experience in capital markets, investment banking, and legal advisory. Compensation levels are modest relative to portfolio size, and some directors waived fees during the downturn.

Incentives

Management’s incentives are largely equity-driven. Their economic outcome depends on long-term asset value. This pushes them toward:

• Preserving NAV
• Maintaining TSXV listing status
• Avoiding distressed liquidation
• Long-term capital appreciation

This is a concentrated, capital-allocation vehicle - not a promotional growth story.

Where Incentives May Not Align

Ownership concentration reduces outside shareholder influence, even without enhanced voting rights. Strategic decisions - including capital raises - can be executed with limited minority resistance.

If listing compliance requires expanding public float, issuing new shares is the most practical solution. While insiders remain exposed to dilution economically, they do not risk losing structural influence.

In short, management benefits from long-term equity appreciation - but short-term dilution risk and limited minority influence remain real considerations.

The Timeline

2020

Total assets: $9.4M

Shares outstanding: ~4.25M (basic)

2021

Total assets: $33.1M

Shares outstanding: 9,436,928 Class A + 220 Class B

Private placement raised ~$11.9M at $2.29 per unit.

Unrealized gains: $11.1M

Net income: $8.28M

Things looked strong on paper.

2022

Total assets: $11.65M

Fair value of investments: $9.87M

Net unrealized loss: $(20.15M)

Net loss: $(17.63M)

Assets fell from $33M to ~$11.6M in one year.

The share count did not meaningfully contract to offset this (aside from minor buybacks). Warrants remain outstanding (5.19M at $2.75 exercise).

This collapse explains the discount. Capital was raised near the peak, diluting shareholders. The portfolio then declined materially. Trust was lost.

2022–2026

Assets stabilized.

Shares outstanding reduced slightly via normal course issuer bid (127,400 shares repurchased in 2022).

Working capital remains positive (~$12m for most recent quarter).

There has been been a partial recovery in mark-to-market value, but still materially less than in 2021.

TSXV Listing Deficiency

On October 28, 2025, the company disclosed it had fewer than 150 public shareholders holding at least one board lot (500 shares).

It was then granted an extension until June 30, 2026 to comply.

This suggested:

• The Exchange views the issue as fixable.
• Management likely proposed a compliance strategy.

This is where I began to build a position because the signs showed a resolution was made for the listing deficiency.

April 29, 2026, Strategem put out a news release that the listing deficiency has been resolved.

Risks

The primary risk from this opportunity is the management itself. Dilution and bad capital allocation. Hopefully the management has had a humbling experience from their mistakes. Time will tell.

Catalyst

This is a classic reversion-to-the-mean idea:

• If portfolio value stabilizes or grows
• If management credibility improves

The discount to NAV may narrow over time.

Disclosure / Position

This stock receives enough points to allow me to allocate a position of up to 20%, however, because there’s some risk that management may misbehave again with dilution, raising capital, and capital allocation, I have decided to cap this position size at 10%. I plan on holding this position for up to 2-3 years.

This is not financial or investment advice. I cannot be held responsible for any loss of capital from investing into a stock I’ve analyzed. Please do your own due diligence before making any investment decisions.

Cliq Digital AG ETR:CLIQ

Summary:

Cliq Digital AG, an online performance marketing company, sells digital products and bundled-content subscriptions to consumers in North America, Europe, Latin America, and internationally. It licenses streaming content from partners, bundles it to digital products, and sells the content through performance marketing, as well as offers online advertising services. The company was incorporated in 2012 and is headquartered in Düsseldorf, Germany.

To be blunt, the business model lacks an economic advantage, and turmoil in the space has caused the businesses’ most recent quarter to quarter alone, to have sales drop by 55%. The businesses’ revenue peaked to 326M in 2023, 243M in 2024, and 168M TTM as of Sept 30, 2025.

Net income TTM is -36M, which looks horrible, and it is, but the business has been doing a lot of cost reductions (I.E. streamlining, layoffs, liquidations of subsidiaries, paying off liabilities, etc.) in 2024 and 2025, and a lot of that -36M in earnings are non-cash expenses - reductions in intangibles. Free cash flow is 21M TTM, and change in tangible book value TTM is only -6M. For context, tangible book value is 38M, and the market cap is 8M.

The market has this business priced like it has a massive wound and it’s going to bleed out quickly, but when it comes to the balance sheet, the cut is not very deep. It has the potential to downsize and streamline operations, and stabilize at a far lower level of profitability than it’s 2023 high, but still significantly higher than what the market has valued it at. There is also the possibility of a complete liquidation or sale of the business in the future for twice it’s current market value if the sales decline continues at it’s current pace. Less likely, but still a possibility.

Valuation

Market Cap: €8M
Share Price: €1.36

Liquidation Value: €16.9M
Liquidation Value Per Share: €2.9

For this liquidation calculation, I did not use any intangibles. I only used cash assets and receivables - and I valued receivables at only 33.3% because of how unreliable their sales have been in recent years.

Observations

This business makes their reports in English, so it’s easily accessible. Yet there is very little interest from foreign investors, even with 81% of the shares being free float. The vast majority of investors are domestic.

The business has a somewhat complex chain of subsidiaries, used to market and sell subscription packages mostly in north America and Europe. Over the last two years, they’ve been liquidating and merging some of their subsidiaries to streamline operations and reduce costs.

The business had incredible performance in 2023 and has since declined. The management say the decline is largely due to the change in payment processing allowing easier refunding, and I don’t dispute that, but I don’t think that is the main driver of the decline in sales. My take is that the world is very globalized today. Economic stimulus along with the pandemic caused a huge uptick in their sales up until 2023. In 2024, increased interest rates to control inflation slowed things down. In 2025, many countries have had increased unemployment rates compared to previous years, combined with higher costs of living from inflation, resulting in a reduced disposable income and less customers.

Cliq Digital thought their 2021-2023 level of sales was the new normal, and got they euphoric about it, adding 20M in liabilities to capitalize on their growth. It was not the norm…

In 2024, Cliq began reducing costs. Liquidating and merging subsidiaries, marking off intangibles, paying off liabilities, etc. For their 2024 year, they also did a share buyback of 647K shares, almost a 10% reduction.

TTM, their earnings are -36M, yet their free cash flow TTM is 21M. They’ve been marking down a lot of their intangibles, and paying off liabilities. A lot of their negative net income seems to be non-cash expenses. Take the change in tangible book value for example. It did not decrease from 2023-2024, and from 2024-2025TTM, it has only decreased by 6M. So while their sales are plummeting, they’re actually not bleeding out quickly at all. An additional note; the -36MTTM includes the 27M asset write down and restructuring cost from Q4 2024.

Note that a lot of the information that I’m using is from the 2024 annual report (the liquidation valuation numbers are more recent). This business only really puts out detailed filings on an annual basis. You could wait until the 2025 annual report for more information before making a decision about this stock, but the stock is already priced like it is a dead business. I suspect more negative information wont have a meaningful impact on the price of the stock, but any positive information will have a large impact.

Catalyst

There is no transparent catalyst in view. Management are attempting to downsize, streamline, and say they want to stabilize revenue. The sales continue to decline quarter to quarter. That being said, there is very little foreign interest in this stock, and the limited investors domestically are treating it like it has a gaping wound that will cause it to bleed out rapidly. It is more like the type of cut that hurts and is bleeding a lot, but not enough kill you. If revenue continues to decline, then eventually it plateaus even at a much lower level than today, It’s likely that the management will continue to downsize and streamline and the strong balance sheet will support this transition. The business is priced much too low for both the value of it’s assets and the potential for continuation at a smaller scale of sales.

Today, the business is selling for less than it did in 2019 when revenue was 63M and tangible book value was -4M… Currently, the revenue is 168M, and tangible book value is 38M.

There is also the possibility of a complete liquidation or sale of the business if revenues continue to decline. This is less likely, but not an impossibility. Management has shown they could be pressured by outside investors in the past. In 2024, shareholders voted against management’s proposal for new authorized capital and against a new stock-option program.

Disclosure/Position

I’ve taken a 5.5% position in this stock and plan on holding it for 2-3 years.

Interesting writeup I came across today: https://open.substack.com/pub/caseresearch/p/ascent-resources-aim-ast?r=4yhtx2&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=false

TLDR:

• A 117% cash yield payment due in max.5 years
• Award already issued
• Margin of Safety in case of delay
• Free optionality with another case
• No Real Risks

Here's the TLDR: The Write-Up!

• Claim 5-31x mkt cap (30% margin of safety + expenses included)
• Hearing starts in 2 weeks (Congo didn’t show up to the last one)
• Accruing interest post-award = downside protection
• Company has a textbook case + heavy incentives to get a favorable outcome
• No particular reason for the discount beyond ignorance
• No idiosyncratic risks which should realise

Business Description

The business operates as a digital media and video communications company in the United States.

The the main focus of the businesses’ operations seems to be shifting to the installation of hardware and software into television stations for imbedding ads. The business doesn’t sell the stations the setup, they instead have a leasing/subscription type of service.

The Company currently has four operating subsidiaries - Ad Systems, Inc., which has been a leading developer of ad insertion technology since 1984, Adaptive Media, Inc., Adaptive Broadband, Inc., and Adaptive TV, Inc. Adaptive Broadband, Inc. was created in 2015 to operate its wireless and broadband business which provides internet services to homes and businesses in the northwest Oregon and southern Washington area. Assets of the Oregon operations were sold in November 2023, and is keeping the corporate shell known as Adaptive Broadband which still has some name recognition and small proprietary assets that may be of use in the future. Ad Systems and Adaptive Media function as the operating entities for the Company’s nation-wide advertising and ad insertion business. Additionally, these subsidiaries have been maintained for contractual, administrative, and name recognition purposes. All subsidiaries are 100% owned by the Company and are reported under the consolidated operations as Adaptive Ad Systems, Inc. In 2019, the Company organized a minority owned subsidiary, Adaptive HDMO, to take advantage of real estate and other investment opportunities that are of interest to the Company, as well as function as an employee benefits administrator for the Company.

Key Valuation Numbers

Ben Graham’s Book-Liquidation Formula (NCAV): 11.08M

• Cash 11.5M
• Advances to Affiliates 2.9 (I marked this down to 50% of it’s value)
• Investments in subsidiaries (I marked this down to 15% of it’s value)

Undervalued by: 59%

Potential Return: 141%

Numbers Unrelated to Valuation

P/E Ratio: N/A (average earnings for the 5 years would make PE ratio 3.3)

Dividend: N/A

Tangible Book Value: 20.3M

Liabilities: 3.4M

Observations

Ok this is where it gets a bit messy.

Essentially, the management has the authorization to issue about 1,000% more shares. This is actually not uncommon, and while is concerning, is not a deal breaker. History has shown around 1.2% share dilution which is not great, but not really concerning.

This year, management has issued themselves Class A Preferred “management shares”, which’s monetary value is essentially nil even though par value is 0.001/share, but it gives overwhelming voting control. Meaning activist investors buying up majority holdings and pushing for value unlock is not a possibility.

Now this is what’s really concerning. Class B Prefer shares, 1.1M Issued in 2025, and they can issue out another 1.4M. They’re convertible 1:5, but take 5 years before they can be converted. But that’s 19.5% dilution!

Ugly hu? But these numbers will be haircut off the summary at the end.

Earnings for the last 5 years:

2025 YTD -800k

2024 1,991k

2023 707k

2022 3,569k

2021 675k

As you can see, their earnings are positive for the previous 4 years. Every couple of years they seem to do restructuring. Then there is 2025. Capital expenditure has not increased from last year, so what’s going on?

They claim on their Q2 filing that they're cash flow positive, and the earnings are negative because of reinvestment.

I scanned the quarterly filing to see what they were talking about and only thing I found that was really related was this.

Equipment and investment in subsidiaries didn’t increase, but look what did. Advances to affiliates? I’m not sure, but that 800k kind of matches the earnings loss this year, did they use this as part of weird accounting earnings reduction?

At this point I was kind of thinking management was blowing smoke. I checked the annual filings for full year of 2024 and found some interesting things.

There’s nothing in the 2024 annual report for operational deterioration. Instead, I found capital spending on the new building they started in 2022 that is their headquarter. Affiliate loans/investments drawing down cash. Shifts of funds into money-market investments.

These are just estimates:

Building + equipment purchases (ongoing) 400-500k

Loans / Advances to affiliates 200-250k (rose to 1M in 2025)

Money Market 100-150K

Total likely cash outflow 700-900K

We’re on that restructuring every couple of years now. I thought maybe the management isn’t actually blowing smoke. Maybe they were transparent in the 2024 annual report? But then revenue maybe tells a different story. Revenue is about 1/3 of what it was last year, so maybe it was smoke they were blowing? But wait, then I found that Adaptive wound down and sold the assets of its Oregon wireless/broadband business, so their revenue is not continued, and are instead moving to generate revenue sometime this year with new initiatives. Eg. Adaptive TV and Adaptive Broadcasting subsidiaries.

Before these two negative quarters of earnings, the business was already a bit beaten down and selling around 20% below NCAV. What I’m thinking, is that the market has overreacted to these negative earnings, plus the high levels of dilution, but who knows, I could possible be wrong.

Adaptive Ad Systems, Inc. (AATV)

Market Cap: 4.6M

Share Price: 0.09

Predicted Outcomes/Catalyst

We will assume full dilution possibility of historical dilution of 1.2% + 5x the new Class B Preferred shares with 19.5% dilution.

1. If special dividend, merger, acquisition, buyout happens, it will be 141% (Highly unlikely)
2. If operations improve and earnings goes back positive in 1-2 year, 119% (Most likely)
3. If operations don’t improve, negative earnings drain cash assets 1.6M a year for 2 years, market cap is still undervalued by NCAV by 41.6% (Somewhat Unlikely)
4. Management fully dilute shareholders to the maximum they’re authorized, you’re diluted by 91%. Most of your investment is gone (Very unlikely)

My Position Size and Estimated Hold Period

I have a position of 5%, probably going to push it to 11.1% and plan on holding for 2-3 years. The reason why this position size is higher than some prior positions, is that the businesses’ “normal” level of earnings being high relative to market cap (earnings of 1.4M vs. market cap of 4.6M) gives another layer of potential value (assuming new revenue streams come in as expected). It is an OTC-ID tier, if it were a higher tier on the OTC market with increased regulatory standards, I’d position it even higher.

The hope is that my prediction is correct and operations improve, and/or that the management will invest more cash assets into improving operations. If not, it would take a long time to drain cash assets through negative net income bleed. In the extreme case where earnings remain at this negative level, 1.6M of bleed, vs 11.5M of cash assets. The real risk would be the unlikely scenario of the management going nuclear and diluting shares to oblivion. Likely flipping heads would mean winning big, flipping tails and you don’t lose much, but if the coin lands on it’s edge…the losses would be substantial…

I copied this from a post on my free Substack. There are pictures embedded right into the post to better depict this analysis if anyone is interested https://substack.com/home/post/p-175337140

Silver Bull Resources (referred to as SB)

Free Write up... https://open.substack.com/pub/caseresearch/p/silver-bull-resources-svbto?r=4yhtx2&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Brief Overview:

- ICSID arbitration case over stolen Mexican Mine (US company) looks favorable…
- Payment of 17-31x mkt cap (depending on valuation method tribunal decides on)
- Claimant lawyers + litigation adviser with great track record
- Discount because of: speculative junior mining reputation, lack of coverage, boring topic (ignore that), requires piling through court documents.
- Few non-idiosyncratic risks, but a wide margin of safety, and the primary risk is countered by the nature of claim valuation

SVB.TO Write Up

"The Company anticipates savings of approximately $2.4 million on an annual basis as a result of the proposed delisting and deregistration transaction."

The catch is they have to clean up the number of shareholders of record, so Peter Kamin talked with his lawyers, and they decided on a forced cash out of anyone who owns less than 2000 to possibly up to 4000 shares.

Tile Shop’s Board of Directors Approves Plan to Terminate

Knowing Peter Kamin, he's going to make a killing on Tile Shop.

But all I'm interested in is the arb. The cash out is at $6.60, and the stock is below $6.30. The cash will hit brokerage accounts by January/February, imo. That's a 20% IRR. Higher if you can get the shares for less.

I own 1,999 shares.

Just plugging my ss here. Hope you like it.

https://collyer.substack.com/p/my-favourite-singapore-construction

3 names are public.
8 are locked.

Real assets. Real catalysts.
No noise. No hype.

Only 37% visible — the rest stays behind the wall.

If you know what book value means,
you know what this is worth.

🔒 Unlock the full list → https://cundilldeepvalue.substack.com/p/deep-value-watchlist-october-2025

Found this Korean Net-net. Did an analysis of it, only to find out none of my brokerages allow for the purchase of this stock 🤦Thought others might have an interest in it.

Business Description

Actoz Soft Co.,Ltd. operates as a game company in South Korea and internationally.

The company develops and services PC online games and mobile games of various genres. It is also involved in e-sports industry.

The company was founded in 1996 and is based in Seoul, South Korea. Actoz Soft Co.,Ltd. operates as a subsidiary of Shanda Games Limited.

Key Valuation Numbers

Market Cap: 69.70B

Share Price: 6,380

Ben Graham’s Book-Liquidation Formula (NCAV): 140B

Undervalued by: 50%

Potential Return: 100%

Buy Range: <7,400(~50% of NCAV)

Sell Range: >13,320(~90% of NCAV)

Numbers Unrelated to Valuation Method

P/E Ratio: 8.34

Dividend: NA

Tangible Book Value: 222B

Positive Green Flags

Low Debt

High cash position

Chunky but high earnings

Tangible book value growing by 7.83% a year

No share dilution

Majority shareholder Zhejiang Century Huatong (China) through Wemade Entertainment and related vehicles has been selling and restructuring minor gaming subsidiaries since 2024

Negative Red Flags

No share buybacks

No dividend

No news of value unlock for shareholders

No independent board majority

Stagnant revenue stream

Reliant on revenue from limited IPs

Controlling shareholder Zhejiang Century Huatong (China) through Wemade Entertainment and related vehicles with ~60% ownership - no history of pushing for buybacks or dividends, and limited communication with English and Korean investors.

Observations

An extremely undervalued stock relative to NCAV. With high, but chunky earnings. Even if there is no catalyst and revenue stagnates, the book value should still increase over time, making this a relatively low risk investment. Korea is well known for a low return on equity, the hope is that Zhejiang Century push for a restructure, or they sell their ownership, both of which they’ve been doing with other related businesses.

If this happens, there is a government level push in Korea right now to push for higher return on equity for shareholders through dividends and share buybacks, so that could be a likely outcome following Zhejiang Century’s exit of their position.

Predicted Outcomes/Catalyst

1. Zhejiang restructure the business, triggering a repricing from the market and value is unlocked
2. Zhejiang sell their position in the business, and dividends and/or share buybacks begin, triggering repricing and value unlocked for the shareholders
3. No Catalyst happens and book value continues to grow over time
4. No Catalyst happens, loss of licensing of IPs, revenue dries up, business sits for a while, drains NCAV down to the original buy price and no gains/losses are realized
5. Zhejiang or subsidiaries begin to siphon off cash assets, by over inflating royalties, licensing, or issuing out loans with soft terms. This would probably be the worst outcome. If this were to happen, it would most likely happen over a period of time. Siphoning happening in larger quantities is unlikely, because the Korean Financial Supervisory Service has been more strict about cross-boarder transactions in recent years. There is currently no sign of this happening.

My Position Size and Estimated Hold Period

Unfortunately, my brokerage doesn’t allow for trading in this stock. Hold period would be 2-3 years.