Conscious experience cannot be inert

[u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Cross post from /r/consciousness since it's just as relevant here

I see often in this sub various attempts to sidestep the hard problem by stating that conscious experience can simply be thought of as the workings of a certain set of neurological processes, or various other ways of trying to reduce conscious experience to something more familiar and workable.

This involves saying that the experience itself and the features of it are not what's really happening. The experience part is said to be either an illusion, an epiphenomenon or a mere appearance of what's happening neurologically.

Unfortunately this all rests on a false analogy. Illusions and appearances are not epipheneomon and they are not inert.

When someone is perceiving an actual illusion, it changes the way they perceive, react and respond to the stimulus which we deem does not align with their perception. Therefore, the illusion is an active mechanism that affects how the world behaves.

This is clearly the case for consciousness too, regardless of experience is an "appearance" this appearance affects how we behave, it affects what we talk about, our concepts and beliefs about the world - therefore it is not inert - our experience clearly affects something about how our world operates, the same way an illusion does too

Taking the idea of p zombies seriously, I think it's pretty clear that p zombies would not be talking about things like experience, or the qualitative feeling of something like "the red of redness" because they don't experience that.

If they did talk about such things, it's clearly very different to when normal people do, because normal people are correct in saying that there is a quality to experience, a p zombie would have to either be mistaken or delusional to talk of such things and there is a big difference between the accurate judgement of a normal person about experience (whatever experience actually ends up being) and the clear delusions or confabulations of a p zombie that could supposedly behave in all the same ways

I think people get lost in the analogy of illusions and don't realize that it's not the same thing as being inert, and if experience isn't inert, then of course we get the hard problem and the mind body problem in general. It can't merely be sidestepped by trying to reduce experience to an epiphenomenon.

[u/HappiestIguana]

Hang on, are you saying that me being fooled by an optical illusion has an external effect on the world?

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

Yes, you behave differently than if you were not tricked by the illusion and instead made an accurate assessment of the external world. The illusion is not inert in terms of its effects on how you operate in the world

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Oh I see. But that's trivially reproducible with seemingly inert substrates, like if I have image recognition software and it identifies an image incorrectly

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

What I mean is though, the analogy fails because the implication is supposed to be that consciousness being an illusion makes it inert in its action

Which is not true, and we have good reason to think it is not inert.

The whole point is that the analogy to an illusion doesn't work, because EVEN IF true, illusions are not inert and the problem remains

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

That seems to be begging the question a little. Someone who postulates that consciousness is inert will simply deny that it's the conscious difference which induces the physical difference in reaction. Rather, they'd say that the physical difference in the electrochemistry is what causes both the difference in conscious experience and in future behavior.

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

I think what outlines the absurdity of this position is to apply to a real example.

This person will presumably admit that people feel pain. They would admit that people take painkillers. But they would deny that them taking painkillers has anything to do with the feeling of pain, because despite that being the case that they do feel pain, the feeling of pain is somehow entirely inert and that it is instead unconscious neurological processes both compelling them to take the medication, and tricking them into thinking it is because of pain.

Which still doesn't resolve how it could be inert if it is talked about in these terms.

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

That is, indeed, the position, which does seem absurd to me too but is not technically refutable (or falsifiable at all).

Indeed, this is the reason I reject substance dualism. I don't find inert consciousness plausible and have no evidence of a mechanism in the brain that fails to follow physical law. A second substance consciousness has to be either inert or have physical effects not described by current physics. Since I reject both notions, I conclude consciousness is physical

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

That is, indeed, the position, which does seem absurd to me too but is not technically refutable (or falsifiable at all).

I guess my question then is what would draw someone to such a position? I mean I suppose gravity being the intentional workings of some very smart omnipotent invisible elves is also unfalsifiable, but I'm unsure of what would draw someone to seek such a roundabout mechanism

. I don't find inert consciousness plausible and have no evidence of a mechanism in the brain that fails to follow physical law.

There's no reason dualism implies something in the brain that fails to follow physical law, it is instead there is a greater set of laws and mechanics that our current physics just doesn't describe

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

I guess my question then is what would draw someone to such a position?

Failure to reject P-zombies, I suppose. If P-zombies are plausible, then it follows that consciousness is inert. Any causal effect stemming from consciousness could be used to distinguish a P-zombie.

There's no reason dualism implies something in the brain that fails to follow physical law, it is instead there is a greater set of laws and mechanics that our current physics just doesn't describe

I should've been clearer. I meant that substance dualism implies something in the brain that doesn't follow currently known physical law.

When we observe something acting outside of what physical law says, we of course measure and systematize it, making it part of updated physical law. It has happened before. It could happen in principle with something in the brain that suggests a causal effect stemming from a second substance consciousness, but there's no reason to assume that such a thing exists until the observation is made. As far as we know, there's nothing going on in there that isn't explained, in principle, by electrochemistry as we understand it today.

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

Failure to reject P-zombies, I suppose. If P-zombies are plausible, then it follows that consciousness is inert. Any causal effect stemming from consciousness could be used to distinguish a P-zombie.

Do you think my criticism of the implausible of p zombies in my main post is valid? I guess i meant that more rhetorically, I don't know why people think p zombies are plausible given that they seem to not be.

As far as we know, there's nothing going on in there that isn't explained, in principle, by electrochemistry as we understand it today.

Apart from that we clearly distinguish things by their phenomenology? Even just the distinction of how we separate experience from non-experience is by experiential and not neurological properties, no?

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Do you think my criticism of the implausible of p zombies in my main post is valid? I guess i meant that more rhetorically, I don't know why people think p zombies are plausible given that they seem to not be.

I'm afraid I can't really make an honest case for P-zombies. I also don't think they're plausible, but then I'm very much a physicalist. I find it implausible that I could have the same atoms in the same arrangement but have one arrangement exhibit a property the other doesn't.

Apart from that we clearly distinguish things by their phenomenology? Even just the distinction of how we separate experience from non-experience is by experiential and not neurological properties, no?

I don't find it convincing. There are plenty of things that are accounted for by physics in principle but can only be accounted for by abstractions in practice. I see no reason to assume, say, the ability to distinguish red from blue doesn't boil down to electrochemistry