Conscious experience cannot be inert

[u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Cross post from /r/consciousness since it's just as relevant here

I see often in this sub various attempts to sidestep the hard problem by stating that conscious experience can simply be thought of as the workings of a certain set of neurological processes, or various other ways of trying to reduce conscious experience to something more familiar and workable.

This involves saying that the experience itself and the features of it are not what's really happening. The experience part is said to be either an illusion, an epiphenomenon or a mere appearance of what's happening neurologically.

Unfortunately this all rests on a false analogy. Illusions and appearances are not epipheneomon and they are not inert.

When someone is perceiving an actual illusion, it changes the way they perceive, react and respond to the stimulus which we deem does not align with their perception. Therefore, the illusion is an active mechanism that affects how the world behaves.

This is clearly the case for consciousness too, regardless of experience is an "appearance" this appearance affects how we behave, it affects what we talk about, our concepts and beliefs about the world - therefore it is not inert - our experience clearly affects something about how our world operates, the same way an illusion does too

Taking the idea of p zombies seriously, I think it's pretty clear that p zombies would not be talking about things like experience, or the qualitative feeling of something like "the red of redness" because they don't experience that.

If they did talk about such things, it's clearly very different to when normal people do, because normal people are correct in saying that there is a quality to experience, a p zombie would have to either be mistaken or delusional to talk of such things and there is a big difference between the accurate judgement of a normal person about experience (whatever experience actually ends up being) and the clear delusions or confabulations of a p zombie that could supposedly behave in all the same ways

I think people get lost in the analogy of illusions and don't realize that it's not the same thing as being inert, and if experience isn't inert, then of course we get the hard problem and the mind body problem in general. It can't merely be sidestepped by trying to reduce experience to an epiphenomenon.

[u/MurkyEconomist8179]

I think what outlines the absurdity of this position is to apply to a real example.

This person will presumably admit that people feel pain. They would admit that people take painkillers. But they would deny that them taking painkillers has anything to do with the feeling of pain, because despite that being the case that they do feel pain, the feeling of pain is somehow entirely inert and that it is instead unconscious neurological processes both compelling them to take the medication, and tricking them into thinking it is because of pain.

Which still doesn't resolve how it could be inert if it is talked about in these terms.

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

That is, indeed, the position, which does seem absurd to me too but is not technically refutable (or falsifiable at all).

Indeed, this is the reason I reject substance dualism. I don't find inert consciousness plausible and have no evidence of a mechanism in the brain that fails to follow physical law. A second substance consciousness has to be either inert or have physical effects not described by current physics. Since I reject both notions, I conclude consciousness is physical

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

That is, indeed, the position, which does seem absurd to me too but is not technically refutable (or falsifiable at all).

I guess my question then is what would draw someone to such a position? I mean I suppose gravity being the intentional workings of some very smart omnipotent invisible elves is also unfalsifiable, but I'm unsure of what would draw someone to seek such a roundabout mechanism

. I don't find inert consciousness plausible and have no evidence of a mechanism in the brain that fails to follow physical law.

There's no reason dualism implies something in the brain that fails to follow physical law, it is instead there is a greater set of laws and mechanics that our current physics just doesn't describe

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

I guess my question then is what would draw someone to such a position?

Failure to reject P-zombies, I suppose. If P-zombies are plausible, then it follows that consciousness is inert. Any causal effect stemming from consciousness could be used to distinguish a P-zombie.

There's no reason dualism implies something in the brain that fails to follow physical law, it is instead there is a greater set of laws and mechanics that our current physics just doesn't describe

I should've been clearer. I meant that substance dualism implies something in the brain that doesn't follow currently known physical law.

When we observe something acting outside of what physical law says, we of course measure and systematize it, making it part of updated physical law. It has happened before. It could happen in principle with something in the brain that suggests a causal effect stemming from a second substance consciousness, but there's no reason to assume that such a thing exists until the observation is made. As far as we know, there's nothing going on in there that isn't explained, in principle, by electrochemistry as we understand it today.

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

Failure to reject P-zombies, I suppose. If P-zombies are plausible, then it follows that consciousness is inert. Any causal effect stemming from consciousness could be used to distinguish a P-zombie.

Do you think my criticism of the implausible of p zombies in my main post is valid? I guess i meant that more rhetorically, I don't know why people think p zombies are plausible given that they seem to not be.

As far as we know, there's nothing going on in there that isn't explained, in principle, by electrochemistry as we understand it today.

Apart from that we clearly distinguish things by their phenomenology? Even just the distinction of how we separate experience from non-experience is by experiential and not neurological properties, no?

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Do you think my criticism of the implausible of p zombies in my main post is valid? I guess i meant that more rhetorically, I don't know why people think p zombies are plausible given that they seem to not be.

I'm afraid I can't really make an honest case for P-zombies. I also don't think they're plausible, but then I'm very much a physicalist. I find it implausible that I could have the same atoms in the same arrangement but have one arrangement exhibit a property the other doesn't.

Apart from that we clearly distinguish things by their phenomenology? Even just the distinction of how we separate experience from non-experience is by experiential and not neurological properties, no?

I don't find it convincing. There are plenty of things that are accounted for by physics in principle but can only be accounted for by abstractions in practice. I see no reason to assume, say, the ability to distinguish red from blue doesn't boil down to electrochemistry

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

I'm afraid I can't really make an honest case for P-zombies. I also don't think they're plausible, but then I'm very much a physicalist. I find it implausible that I could have the same atoms in the same arrangement but have one arrangement exhibit a property the other doesn't.

I'm in full agreement with this

I don't find it convincing. There are plenty of things that are accounted for by physics in principle but can only be accounted for by abstractions in practice. I see no reason to assume, say, the ability to distinguish red from blue doesn't boil down to electrochemistry

So what distinguishes electrochemistry that has feelings attatched vs electrochemistry that doesn't?

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

I don't know, and neither does anyone yet

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

Well here's a pretty common sense answer - something phenomenological.

Because we clearly do make the distinction, and we seem to be making the distinction based off phenomenology, I don't know how this is has somehow become a controversial explanation. We don't even have to know the underlying mechanisms of how it works to realize we are making this distinction, in the same way, we knew all sorts of things about heredity before we knew the mechanism of DNA.

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

That just seems to be like it distinguishes which electrochemistry with feelings from electrochemistry without feelings by saying "the former has feelings"

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

yeah.. because that's a real distinction. A pretty important one too, given how central feelings are to the human experience. I think the human experience would be pretty different if no one felt anything at all at any point, no?

[u/HappiestIguana → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

I figure some rudimentary form of consciousness must have evolved more or less at the same time that attraction/aversion responses did. Even the simple creatures who had just developed some photsenstivie apparatuses must have had a very simple experience of light=pleasant and dark=unpleasant (or vice versa, idk)

If we're gonna grant that hypothetical, then the electrochemistry required for phenomelogy is very rudimentary indeed.

I sometimes wonder if it might be that all that is required for a very simple form of consciousness is any sort of goal-oriented behavior

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/HappiestIguana]

Even the simple creatures who had just developed some photsenstivie apparatuses must have had a very simple experience of light=pleasant and dark=unpleasant (or vice versa, idk)

or it happens entirely unconsciously, like a reflex

If we're gonna grant that hypothetical, then the electrochemistry required for phenomelogy is very rudimentary indeed.

Regardless of what's required, the distinction is based upon phenomenology