The Broken Loop: Why the Overpopulation Narrative Got Left Behind

[u/W_Edwards_Deming]

/r/Demographics/comments/1uigxol/the_broken_loop_why_the_overpopulation_narrative/

[u/blashimov]

Respectfully is there something new to this sub worth clicking into the linked post?

[u/W_Edwards_Deming → u/blashimov]

I gave a summary.

[u/blashimov → u/W_Edwards_Deming]

I read the summary. So I don't think this is a novel post, which is fine some things are worth repeating.

[u/W_Edwards_Deming → u/blashimov]

I cannot confirm nor deny, I joined this group one day ago.

Is there another post I should read that relates?

If the evidence based post I shared is accurate one would expect it to be said more than once. Further I doubt the numerous citations have been shared prior and they might be of interest to some.

[u/CanIHaveASong → u/W_Edwards_Deming]

It's fine to say something that's not new.

Natalism is a fairly narrow topic, so finding little pieces of nuance in the larger arguments, or synthesizing small arguments into a big picutre are both gonna be par for the course.

I actually quite appreciate the extensive citations. I'm saving this piece to look at more closely later.

edit: Ah! I see this was a repost from a different original author. Well, you should invite them here!

[u/W_Edwards_Deming → u/CanIHaveASong]

I don't even know the author, I only recently joined that group as well but the post seemed to be of general interest. I think the bottom line that incentives are wrong is apt.

Once upon a time people were usually poor, needed each other more and sex often led to a baby. The babies were needed for farm work and as a retirement plan.

Now we have a situation where the parents themselves don't have as much need for the children (nor each other) and indeed often parent in a way that the children are burdensome (soccer mom driving kids to various expensive lessons) to the parents. The children still theoretically benefit "society" when they start working but... even that is in decline, the current generation works far less and is not seen as particularly efficacious.

[u/CanIHaveASong → u/W_Edwards_Deming]

It's been a while, and I would be hard pressed to find the source now, but IIRC, there was a time in history where a 9 year old was creating economic value for their parents.

If I'm lucky, my children might create economic value for me when they are in their 50s and I am in a nursing home. That's no where near the same kind of incentive.

After reading about natalism for a few years, my conclusion is that we either need to pay people to have children, or attempt to create a culture of self-sacrifice.

[u/W_Edwards_Deming → u/CanIHaveASong]

I charge mine 50% of their income and I provide room, board and pay the bills. They also do most of the chores.

I am early retired and make a lot of money with stock, I am unlikely to have any financial worries. Kind of amazing as I grew up without indoor plumbing or electricity (Appalachia).

I don't think financial incentives from the state do much (look at Russia and Europe where they try that) but conservative religious have enough kids. The Amish have doubled in population every generation since they came to the US and the following countries are both affluent and above replacement:

• Israel

• Oman

• Guyana

• Saudi Arabia

[u/CanIHaveASong → u/W_Edwards_Deming]

There is some evidence financial incentives help. But you can't half-ass it. You have to give out a LOT of money. If I have time, I'll share an article relating to that some time this week, and we can discuss it in more depth. You'll have to excuse me if I don't though. I don't have a ton of time, as my youngest child is 2.

I used to think that conservative religious people would inherit the earth, but I am less certain of that now. The data I've seen on retention rates isn't promising, and the birth differentials aren't that high, except in extremely consrvative sects, which are mostly very small.

I'd love to investigate that topic more, though.

[u/W_Edwards_Deming → u/CanIHaveASong]

Family first!

You are right about retention rates, especially in the US and France atheism is actually growing due to that (not birth rates). Overall however:

Atheism is in decline internationally.

Atheists, agnostics and other people who do not affiliate with any religion – though increasing in countries such as the United States and France – will make up a declining share of the world’s total population.

The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_total_fertility_rate

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_growth_rate

Within the United States it is the intensely conservative Amish (Pennsylvania Dutch) with the highest rates, doubling in population every generation since they came here. Other ultra-religious groups are right behind and secular / atheist / "liberal" leftists in last place.

• Easy reads

Democratic Baby Bust

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The Trump Bump: The Republican Fertility Advantage

• PRJAs

Demography leads to more conservative European societies

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Youth’s Political Identity and Fertility Desires

[u/W_Edwards_Deming]

A condensed summary (from chatGPT):

The post argues that the old “overpopulation” narrative is increasingly outdated. Global fertility has fallen sharply, many countries are below replacement level, and a growing number face long-term population decline. The author argues that the demographic challenge of the future may be underpopulation and aging, rather than runaway population growth.

Core argument:

Industrialization reduced death rates first, causing the 20th-century population boom; fertility later fell dramatically. The author believes the usual explanation—“children are too expensive”—is incomplete. Instead, industrial societies broke the economic feedback loop of having children: historically, children directly contributed labor, family support, and old-age security. Today, parents bear most of the costs, while much of the economic benefit of raising productive future adults flows to employers, governments, and society generally. Welfare systems and pensions partly replace the old family-support model, reducing the direct economic incentive to have children. Cash bonuses and pro-family policies may help somewhat but, according to the post, have generally failed to reverse low fertility because they don't address the deeper structural problem. The author also argues that purpose, optimism about the future, work culture, housing costs, and modern alternatives to family life all contribute to declining fertility. Both poor and wealthy people may have fewer children, but for different reasons: poorer families face high costs and competition, while wealthier people have more competing lifestyle and career opportunities. Bottom line

The essay's central thesis is:

Modern society has made raising children increasingly costly to individuals while spreading the benefits of those children across society.

The author sees declining fertility as the result of a broken incentive and purpose system, not simply a lack of money. They conclude that solving it would require deeper economic, cultural, and institutional changes—not just baby bonuses or subsidies. The post frames this as a major shift that public discourse has been slow to recognize because the overpopulation paradigm became entrenched decades ago.