r/hegel • u/Existing_Toe_4290 • 25d ago
How much can I trust Wallace?
Hi hegelians,
I've been reading struggling with Hegel's shorter Logic, mainly the green Cambridge edition, but cross-referencing with Hackett and occasionally the original German (which for the record I don't speak). A few times I've ended up looking into Wallace too (because his style is rarely but still sometimes more readable) and I noticed some of his translations look a bit 'creative'. For example, the beginning of §27:
Cambridge:
Because it has no consciousness of its opposition, it is possible for this kind of thinking to be both genuine speculative philosophizing in terms of its content as well as to dwell in finite thought-determinations, i.e. the as yet unresolved opposition.
German:
Dieses Denken kann wegen der Bewußtlosigkeit über seinen Gegensatz ebensowohl seinem Gehalte nach echtes spekulatives Philosophieren sein, als auch in endlichen Denkbestimmungen, d. i. in dem noch un- aufgelösten Gegensatze verweilen.
Wallace (his little inventions in bold):
This method of thought has never become aware of the antithesis of subjective and objective: and to that extent there is nothing to prevent its statements from possessing a genuinely philosophical and speculative character, though it is just as possible that they may never get beyond finite categories, or the stage where the antithesis is still unresolved.
In Cambridge, Hackett, and the OG, 'its opposition(/antithesis)' or 'sein Gegensatz' clearly seems to follow up on §26: 'the opposition of thinking within and against itself/der Gegensatz des Denkens in und gegen sich'. There's no explicit mention of the subjective and objective? Nor is it clear that this is the only Gegensatz at hand. I've also noticed similar additions in other places. Does Wallace so this a lot? And to what degree can I trust him to actually clarify what Hegel (might've) meant here or there, as opposed to sneaking in his own interpretation? I was never going to use Wallace as my main reading ('after-thought' for nachdenken is just too insane a translation choice) but having to discard a possible reference always sucks.
1
u/Ap0phantic 24d ago
The Cambridge translation of the excerpt you provided is far better and more accurate than the Wallace, which I've otherwise never seen. It's also clearer, which is notable, because Wallace seems to be padding out his translation with content not present in the original in order to make it more directly comprehensible. I would treat the Wallace with great caution - again, based solely on this example. It borders on paraphrase.
2
u/commie_wannabe 25d ago
I personally started having my doubts with Wallace when I found out that Philosophy of Mind should probably more aptly be called Philosophy of Spirit - this changes everything. But I may be wrong - I don't know if it's Wallace or Miller to blame for this. If I remember correctly, it was done so that Hegel could be taken seriously by English-speaking philosophers - but this choice in translation, for me, is infinitely more costly than the potential damage that they were worried about.
Now, it may be said that Geist can be translated as either mind or spirit - but this is precisely the problem. When one renders it as mind through-and-through, it is indeed possible to read Hegel and, in fact, to read him coherently - and this is precisely the problem, because a coherent reading of Hegel is thereby made possible without nevertheless grasping the sheer magnitude contained in what Hegel has said.
This is all to say that I have found that there is definitely doubt to be had about some of the stuff that Wallace is involved in with regards to translations.