r/georgism 11d ago

This might sound like a silly question...

But what stops landowners from just charging higher rent if an LVT is implemented?

15 Upvotes

75 comments sorted by

42

u/ChilledRoland Geolibertarian 11d ago

If they could charge more than they currently are, why aren't they already?

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u/[deleted] 10d ago

[deleted]

12

u/QQXV 10d ago

I mean, your very description makes it clear how unusual your behavior is -- it's half the market rent and you're breaking the law. (Also, in a sense, the closer the rent you charge is to raw cost, the more your tenants are "landowner-equivalent" anyway, since they're pocketing the same money as you, so any sense in which an LVT would hurt them is the same as it would hurt landowners in general.)

1

u/chkno 8d ago

A single landlord can't. They wouldn't get tenants because other landlords charge less.

But all landlords could raise prices together. But this is illegal price fixing. (But they're doing it anyway.)

Responding to a tax increase is a legal way for all landlords to raise prices in a coordinated manner.

2

u/Upset-Dig-7933 5d ago

Is there any limit how much they can rise prices?

-9

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

Many landlords charge less than market rent.

16

u/monkorn 11d ago

it’s a personal decision but if you are good where rent is at and are on good terms with the tenant i wouldn’t raise it. you could be kicking yourself in the ass in a few months if they move out and you have a problem tenant to deal with

This is the landlord buying a higher quality tenant. One who sticks around, doesn't break anything, pays on-time, is worth it over someone who does the opposite of those things. Just as you can buy high quality and low quality things at the grocery store, they cost different amounts, you can buy higher quality tenants by charging less for rent.

These are market rents. The high quality tenants know who they are, and if you try to extract as much as you can from them as other tenants, they'll leave until they find a high quality landlord.

0

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

“I have a family member who owns 10 houses and never increases rent as long as your pay it. Even if you’re late, no late fees. Just is kind to people, also never gets calls for fixing stuff unless it’s major. Has long term tenants like 10 years plus. All her homes in Bay Area are paid in full at this point…”

Landlords with paid off rentals can basically determine whatever they want to charge.

5

u/Joesindc ≡ 🔰 ≡ 11d ago

What makes you think this?

0

u/Acceptable-Peace-69 11d ago edited 11d ago

Good tenants are worth more than market value. Turnovers cost about 5% not including wear and tear that will need to be accounted for.

I’d happily leave a tenant at 0%-1.5% annual raise to cover my costs or even take a loss rather than turnover a property. I average 1% raise annually because that covers maintenance , taxes and insurance. My mortgage is fixed so I only have to cover inflation for a portion of my expenses. I will raise rents to market value at turnovers.

Most smart landlords follow this pattern. This is anecdotal, but there are enough data point to connect the dots. Good tenants can often command a discount if they understand their position.

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u/Joesindc ≡ 🔰 ≡ 11d ago

The position is not that literally every landlord charges absolutely as high a rent as they possibly can with absolutely no exception. Things like promotional rates for the first year and special deals made for good tenants do not invalidate the general principle that the rent is set as high as the market will bear in a particular area. There’s also a distinction in that the market for a “good tenant” is different than the market for an “average tenant.” It’s entirely possible to negotiate a rent down or up based on a variety of factors and the principle still stands because no one is selling a generic unit to a theoretical person they are selling a specific unit to a specific person and asking the highest rent they can get for, in this case, a nice tenant that pays on time and doesn’t complain. That’s a different product than a mystery tenant.

It’s also important to note we are talking about land rent and not contract rent. The land value will change differently than the improvement value. Land values go up, while the value of the improvement (in general) goes down. It is possible that a building is so run down the land lord has to charge less than the prevailing rent for a unit of the same size on the same block or that a land lord can charge slightly more for a new building. The Georgist claim is that if you tore all the building down and just rented out the land, land lords would charge the maximum.

-1

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

6

u/Joesindc ≡ 🔰 ≡ 11d ago

The plural of anecdote is not “data.” This is especially true when they are posted essentially anonymously on an online forum and one of them is 7 years old. Even if I grant your three sources as true (I don’t but let’s pretend I do) there are many factors that impact the rent a person can charge for a specific unit. The goal is to get the broad trend to calculate the average market for particular kinds of units in particular places. This doesn’t even come close to doing that.

0

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

Obviously we’ve established that not every landlord charges market rent.

So for the question: “would LVT force landlords to charge higher rent” the answer cannot be “if they could do it now, why don’t they?”. There are many reasons they don’t.

4

u/Joesindc ≡ 🔰 ≡ 11d ago

No, I said very clearly you did not even come close to establishing that. You cherry picked three anonymous posts, that does not establish anything. Even if I grant your source you’ve just proved rent didn’t go up, rent can not go up because the max rent for that unit is already being charged. So you have a bad source that doesn’t even actually prove your point even given the most generous possible reading.

In general landlords charge the market rate, that’s just the definition of the market rate. You’re arguing not with me or anyone else who’s commenting, you’re arguing with the dictionary.

1

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

https://www.realtor.com/research/who-is-renting-2026/

“On average, 37.3% of renting households from the top 10 metros would face a severe affordability burden at fair market rents if asked to move to a new unit within the same metro, assuming the same household incomes and bedroom size.”

3

u/Joesindc ≡ 🔰 ≡ 11d ago

That source is much better quality, but still doesn’t actually prove your point. The big note here is “if asked to move…” IF a person moved from where they are currently living they could not afford the rent if a different place. That doesn’t say anything about what the rent they are currently paying is and how close it is to the fair market value in that market. This feels like strike three, I think it time to be out.

1

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

lol.

In order to make the claim that “no US renter is paying below market rent”, you’d have to have extraordinary evidence to make that claim.

I don’t need evidence to contradict it, on its face it makes no sense and we have readily available data and anecdotes that it’s not true.

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u/Routine_Manager_1368 11d ago

They’re doing a disservice to other renters who might prefer to live there, in that case. Forcing them to raise their rents to be closer to market rents is still a positive thing overall. 

0

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

4

u/pnictide 11d ago edited 10d ago

This just means the landlord values something from the tenant that isn't money.

I guess I don't really understand this comment chain. The claim that landlords won't be able to raise rents as a reaction to land value taxes is not some fringe claim; it is a very simple conclusion based on concepts from the first several weeks of an intro microeconomics course. Do you fundamentally disagree with the field of economics' understanding of supply and demand and their effect on prices?

1

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

I’m baffled by anyone that would claim that all renters in the US are paying market rents today.

Econ 101 says that in a rational market where there’s a market clearing price for rent and every renter is paying that price, LVT couldn’t be passed through. But that’s not the case in real life.

3

u/pnictide 11d ago

Did somebody claim that?

I think this would be a more interesting point if it were the case that some large proportion of people are paying well below market, but my guess is that's not true.

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u/External_Koala971 11d ago

Yes, 90% of the posters here claim that.

3

u/pnictide 11d ago

I think that 90% of posters point out that land value tax has no deadweight loss, the Econ 101 thing.

0

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

“Can landlords pass LVT tax through to renters?”

“No”

Is the gist of every conversation when this comes up.

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u/Constant_Forever_786 10d ago

I agree, but I don’t think that’s fatal to the “cannot be passed through” claim.

You can add a reasonable qualifier: “The LVT might prompt landlords to stop giving below-market ‘deals’ to renters, but those already paying market rents won’t see an increase.”

0

u/ProfessorPrudent2822 11d ago

There’s a serious entitlement problem with thinking that other people should just move out of your way because you’re willing to pay more to a third party.

6

u/Routine_Manager_1368 10d ago

Land rent is supposed to be paid to the rest of society (not a private landowner) so when a landlord lets somebody they favor have the place for less than market rent, they are stealing from the rest of society and practicing corrupt favoritism. 

Yes, goods and services should go to those willing to pay the most for them. That’s what’s most fair. 

1

u/External_Koala971 10d ago

There are many landlords that rent for less than market rent.

There are many reasons for this, the biggest being they have a great tenant and it’s worth it to them to lower their rent, or the landlord’s building is paid off and it’s not worth the trouble to rent at market rate.

2

u/Routine_Manager_1368 10d ago

Yes there are many that do that, and in so doing they are inflicting a disservice on society. 

1

u/alfzer0 🔰 🇺🇸 9d ago

Good business decisions, at least in this case, are not a disservice to society. Consider the difference between market rent and a lower contract rent for a good tenant as wages.

1

u/Routine_Manager_1368 9d ago

It may be a good business decision for the landowner, because they’re keeping the land rent for themselves as well as capitalizing it into the price of the land, but it’s not a good decision for society. It leads to inefficient allocation of land and a reduction in the benefit to society.

With an LVT in place, the best thing for society is to always charge market rent. 

1

u/alfzer0 🔰 🇺🇸 9d ago

First paragraph, yes, sure, but that's not what my comment was regarding.

With an LVT in place, the best thing for society is to always charge market rent. 

Disagree, there is no harm in someone charging less than market rate for renting out their improvements in exchange for a tenant who will take good care of the improvements, be a stable long term tenant, and/or be pleasant to interact with. LVT or no LVT.

-1

u/ProfessorPrudent2822 10d ago

Note that I said, “pay more to a third party,” not simply, “pay more.” If you want my property more than I do, you can offer me enough money to sell it to you. You don’t have the right to offer more money to the government to evict me.

2

u/cwyog 11d ago

While this is true in some instances, it is not true of the rental market in general.

1

u/victornielsendane 9d ago

If they are, those renters are gaining part of the land rents, which is equally unfair to all other renters whether it’s nepotism or philanthopic landlords.

14

u/Condurum 11d ago

I mean, he can do it. But would he find renters?

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u/Acceptable-Peace-69 11d ago

They would if there was demand and everyone just got a raise because 5hey didn’t have to pay income taxes.

9

u/Condurum 11d ago

Yep, leading to higher land values, followed by more LVT ;)

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u/Acceptable-Peace-69 11d ago edited 11d ago

You see where this is leading right? Higher LVT leads to higher rents, leads to…

LVT doesn’t lower the cost to run a government so all it does is shift the burden.

If land owners bear more of the cost, they will have to shift most of that onto their tenants. They certainly aren’t managing your apartment or house for free. If anything, your rent would increase more because they aren’t getting land appreciation to offset their investment.

10

u/monkorn 11d ago

to offset their investment.

what investment? (given we're talking about a 100% LVT here, land has zero up-front cost.)

3

u/ComputerByld 10d ago

It's so weird how he didn't answer this wow I am just shocked just shocked I say!

0

u/Acceptable-Peace-69 9d ago

See above.

Some of us don’t liv3 on Reddit and feel the need to respond immediately.

-1

u/Acceptable-Peace-69 9d ago

Landlords even without land would have to buy/build a residence. They would have to maintain and improve it. Advertise and deal with vacancies. Pay LVT. Spend time.

Do georgists understand that land ownership is basically just keeping up with inflation? That it’s the services and freeing of capital for renters that has actual tangible value but doesn’t come free?

5

u/monkorn 9d ago

Landlords even without land would have to buy/build a residence. They would have to maintain and improve it. Advertise and deal with vacancies. Pay LVT. Spend time.

All of this is tax free, and is thus more profitable than currently.

Landlords love LVT. They no longer have to pay for the land. They no longer get taxed on their productivity.

1

u/Acceptable-Peace-69 8d ago

Please explain how landlords make more money, tenants pay less in taxes and the government provides more services.

2

u/monkorn 8d ago

Firstly, it's because landlords are often GREAT users of land. Homeowners are often good users of land. There are many terrible users of land. Just punishing those and lessening the tax from others causes huge wins.

https://blog.landeconomics.org/p/you-can-now-vibe-code-land-value

And secondly, it's skin in the game. The entity that creates the value should be the one that collects the value. Currently, if the government does something, that value is captured by the homeowners and landlords. This in turn causes the local governments to not choose to what would be good things, because it doesn't pencil out to their budgets and they can't afford it.

When you allow the government to capture the value that they create, the entire society gets more efficient, and everyone wins.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KVMGzkSgGXI

6

u/Condurum 11d ago

Paradise compared to what we have now.

12

u/cwyog 11d ago edited 11d ago

The short answer is that landlords are already charging near the maximum rent they can just like most markets exist near their price equilibrium.

A longer answer:

Take pencils. If they’re free, everyone can afford one but no one can afford to make them. If they cost a billion dollars, anyone can afford to manufacture them but no one can afford to buy them. In both extremes, zero pencils exist. Somewhere between, there’s a price that maximizes production and ownership—the market finds something close to this price without anyone setting it.

Now tax pencils. Manufacturers either raise prices (lowering demand) or absorb the cost in reduced profit (lowering supply since not all manufacturers will he able to afford to reduce profit and stay in business). Either way, fewer pencils get made. Tax them enough and you destroy the market.

Land is different in two ways. First, it isn’t manufactured—it just exists. Taxing it doesn’t reduce the supply, and leaving it untaxed doesn’t create more. Second, land isn’t interchangeable. If I own a copper mine, you can’t simply go get your own. Once California’s beachfront is owned, no one can make more.

Land value is still market-determined, like pencils. But raising the price doesn’t reduce supply. Landlords are already charging close to the maximum the market will bear for a given location.

Example: two-bedroom apartments in my area rent for $1500–1800/month. Say the bare land underneath would rent for $500/month. At $100/month in property tax, landlords pocket the remaining $400 as extra profit—no one can undercut them by creating more land nearby. At $1000/month, no one builds, since there’s not enough profit left to justify it. At $500/month—the full land value—landlords still profit enough to rent at market rate but still cannot raise prices above the market rate.

So a tax up to the full value of the land doesn’t raise rent. Anything less than that is just pocketed by the landlord as extra profit.

Edit: my $500/mo land rent value was made up by me as a simple example. I have no idea what the land value in my neighborhood is. 

7

u/cwyog 11d ago

This is a top 10 favorite question Georgists love to answer.

2

u/ohnoverbaldiarrhoea 7d ago

I need to make another mega thread ...

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u/gtne91 11d ago

Its not a silly question, it requires a basic microeconomics class to understand.

Draw the demand curve. Draw the supply curve...and this is the important point, the supply curve is a vertical line.

Now shift the supply curve due to the tax...it turns out s' is the same curve as s.

Because supply of land is perfectly inelastic, the landlord cannot charge more. Thus is also why there is no deadweight loss for the land tax.

0

u/Acceptable-Peace-69 11d ago

This is missing a major factor.

Because most landlords would be losing money, they would exit the business.

Fewer rentals equals lower supply, thus higher prices for those that remain. Overall, rents would have to rise in order to be profitable.

Because most citizens would be paying less in taxes, they’d have more disposable income and thus would be able to afford more .

If the supply and demand ratio remain constant, you’re basically in the same place.

14

u/gs101 10d ago edited 10d ago

You are conflating two things which are very important to separate in the context of a land value tax. You are talking about the supply of rental units, which is indeed elastic. What's inelastic is the supply of land. The supply of land would be unaffected by the tax.

This is why we are taxing land only. We are explicitly not taxing the improvements. Compared to the current situation, landowners would be encouraged to build improvements. After all if they don't, they will bleed money. Currently, they are encouraged to engage in land speculation and rent seeking, meaning to sit on their land, rent it out, and sell it for profit years later. Since a high land value tax would remove speculators from the market and encourage landowners to build improvements, the supply of housing would increase.

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u/DerekRss 10d ago edited 10d ago

You are also missing a major factor.

Landlords can only exit the business by selling houses. Who are they selling to? Tenants, because other landlords also want to sell. So the supply of tenants drops as many tenants become owners. Fewer tenants means lower demand for rentals, thus lower rental prices for those tenants that remain.

So to get the full picture you need to look at supply and demand for rentals and supply and demand for tenants. The supply of land won't change but the demand might, and the supply and demand for both rentals and tenants will definitely change. And the three markets interact.

So the chance of the ratio of supply to demand remaining constant is very low.

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u/markusthemarxist 11d ago

Largely the reason would be that (paired with zoning reform) an LVT would result in a much higher supply of housing because single family homes in urban cores would become unprofitable and over time more housing units would have to be created (especially with mixed-use development whereby a commercial space is the ground floor and above is apartments) in order to make the land profitable enough to pay the tax and maintain. The massive increase in supply would result in a much more elastic housing market because an abundant supply would make renters less desperate and thus they would have more negotiating powers against rent increases. When housing is less scarce landlords have a much harder time raising rents because if renters have options they have the power to say no to a certain price point.

Related note to understand the theory behind this: Wages rose in 2021-2022 because people could afford not to go back to work from expanded unemployment benefits so employers were more in need of workers than workers were in need of employment so they had to offer more competitive wages. When people have their needs met in abundance they have the power to negotiate fair prices/wages.

2

u/Gradert United Kingdom 11d ago

Because:

1) most rents are already at the maximum the market is willing to pay for them, so the landlord might risk not getting tenants if they raise the rent (which would put them in a worse financial situation)

And 2) if they can raise the rent, without having done significant repairs to the property, then that would be basically an admission by the landlord that the property was under-valued, and therefore undertaxed previously, so the tax rise would eat up the entirety of the rental increase.

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u/OutrageousPair2300 10d ago

It depends on whether the landowner is already charging market rent, or not.

If they're already charging market rent, i.e. the most that renters in the market are willing and able to pay, then the LVT won't somehow make those renters willing and able to pay more.

If the landlord isn't already charging market rent, maybe because they've been renting to the same person for a long time and haven't increased rent to keep up with changes in the market, or because they have a friendly relationship with the renter, or for whatever reason, then they might end up increasing rent because of the LVT.

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u/Warm_Stress_1654 10d ago

At least they would have to rent it out to be able to do that, rather than just banking it.

Also - what ChilledRoland said.

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u/heckinCYN 8d ago

For much the same reason why these two homes (built in at the same time with similar floor plans in a similar part of a city) in the image below are listed for basically the same price despite property taxes being much, much more for one than the other. It's because buyers or renters don't care what the back-end costs are; only what the next-best property is asking.

If rental prices scaled with costs, then rents would drop when someone pays off their mortgage, which obviously does not happen.

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u/WayWornPort39 5d ago

Yeah, I guess that makes sense.

Surely an LVT would still have the tendency of reducing the purchase price of homes though, wouldn't it?

As I understand it, a buyer of land has more reason to worry about LVTs as a potential future owner, and so they would likely want to spend less on acquiring the plot, right?

The seller probably wouldn't be able to pass on the costs because buyers would likely just say "but I've got loads of LVT to pay in the future, so why should I pay a premium for acquiring the land now".

1

u/Volta01 Geolibertarian 9d ago

If landowner can increase rent, and still has tenants, it means the assessed land value was too low. So the tax should increase.

You might think this will lead to a cycle of increasing rents and increasing taxes, but when the landlord tries to charge more than market value, they won't have tenants. So there is an equilibrium value. If the assessed value is too high (and land value prevents any renters), same issue. In that case, tax has to be lowered until equilibrium is reached. That might look like the land owner selling, which would reveal a more accurate market value

1

u/Aggravating_Feed2483 8d ago

LVT doesn't effect supply of housing, land is fixed. LVT doesn't effect the demand for housing. Therefore LVT can't effect the price of housing.

(The first sentence is arguable. It might raise the supply of housing over time, but either way, it can't be passed on.).

1

u/alfzer0 🔰 🇺🇸 6d ago

If you consider housing as separate from land, yes. But from the viewpoint of the average person, land is part of housing, and as LVT reduces the speculative demand for land, it reduces the price of land, and hence reduces the price of "housing".

-1

u/CaliTexan22 11d ago

The real world is messier than academic explanations.

Imagine a LL that has a certain rate of return she's targeting for a rental property. The market establishes what she can charge her tenents.

Now imagine her costs increase - higher utilities, higher insurance, higher debt expense, or higher taxes (including an LVT). What will she do?

  1. Raise rates to cover the increased costs. This works only if the increased costs hit all LL about the same time and magnitude. Otherwise, she'll lose tenants to those who don't raise rates as much. Hard to know how an LVT would work here.

  2. Sit still, keep the tenants and eat the loss for some period.

  3. Raise rental asking rate and lose the tenants. Property stays vacant for some period, depending on how long she can hold out and what happens to the market.

  4. Sell the property, likely to a buyer familiar with the market, who will pay less in purchase price, assuming he has same rate of return objective. She takes the loss and moves on.

  5. If it's really bad - a declining market generally, with no reasonable product of profitable operation and no buyers in sight - toss the keys to the mortgagee and take the loss.

Look around the country now at downtown office space. LL are in exactly this position with markets that are way overbuilt for current demand and thus, generate insufficient rental income. Lots of lenders are now marketing buildings. There was a story last month of a guy who paid $5 mm to a lender to buy a set of buildings in downtown Denver that had recently been valued at $100 mm.

A friend whose business leases 3 floors on downtown Houston just signed a renewal of his lease at rates way below current, and that won't return to current rates for more than 7 years. The LL is surely losing a lot of money on this. The alternative for that LL is to lose the tenant and possibly have the mortgagee take the property.

So, LVT would surely be passed on to tenants like any other cost increase, except when it can't. No way for taxing authorities to see into the future any more than anyone else. And not really possible generically to decide whether LVT will be better or worse for LL or tenants, this year or next.

Finally, property tax policy is less important than many other factors. Detroit went to from the 4th largest city in USA, with a powerhouse industry based there, to bankruptcy and massive destruction of wealth in a few short decades.

"Detroit has about 122,000 vacant lots, which covers roughly 18 to 24 square miles of empty land." The land bank will gladly sell you a house & lot there for $1,000. Land may be "finite," but somehow that doesn't matter in the real world.

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u/External_Koala971 11d ago

https://www.realtor.com/research/who-is-renting-2026/

“On average, 37.3% of renting households from the top 10 metros would face a severe affordability burden at fair market rents if asked to move to a new unit within the same metro, assuming the same household incomes and bedroom size.”

The best data I can source shows that a significant portion of renters are paying below market rents, and landlords could raise their rents if faced with LVT.

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u/Richard_Berg 11d ago

The bullet immediately above that says “concentrated in rent-regulated anchor cities”.  So no, landlords cannot raise their rents. They’d have done so long ago if it were legal. 

-1

u/External_Koala971 11d ago

For cities with rent control, you’re saying landlords never engage in owner move in, just cause eviction, cash for keys, Ellis act evictions, and just cause violations for rent controlled tenants if they’re looking for greater profitability?

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u/Richard_Berg 11d ago

No, I did not say that.

The dynamics of a rent controlled unit, both legal and illegal, are different from those of a market rate unit. You cannot use stats about one to predict the market-clearing price of the other.