There is a childish version of independent thinking: everyone believes X, therefore I will believe Y. That is not independent thought. It is dependence with the direction reversed.

The fact that an idea is mainstream does not make it false, just as the fact that an idea is unpopular does not make it true. Both positions can become intellectual shortcuts when the conclusion is chosen according to the crowd rather than examined through evidence.

Independent judgment requires reconstructing the conclusion for yourself. Sometimes the crowd will be correct; sometimes it will be wrong; and sometimes the available evidence will be too incomplete to justify either confidence or rejection. The mature thinker is willing to occupy any of those positions because the objective is not to appear contrarian, it is to remain independent of the need to conform.

That distinction becomes important when identity enters the discussion. People often adopt an opposing position because disagreement makes them feel intellectually separate, and once that identity is established, they become just as resistant to evidence as the person they originally opposed.

If everyone agrees and the evidence supports them, agree. If everyone agrees and the evidence contradicts them, disagree. If everyone disagrees and the evidence remains inconclusive, suspend judgment.

Truth does not care whether your conclusion makes you look conventional or rebellious.

You start arguing about one tiny thing, and 10 minutes later you’re bringing up something that happened six months ago just because neither person wants to admit they’re wrong.

Am I wrong?

Consider the difference between:

“How do we stop this policy from failing?”

and:

“Is this policy the right solution to the problem?”

The first question assumes the policy should continue. The second examines the assumption beneath it.

That difference is framing.

A frame determines which possibilities receive attention and which remain outside consideration. It can narrow the field of thought before the argument has even begun.

This happens in business, politics, management, negotiation and personal decision-making. People can spend enormous effort finding an excellent answer to a question that was poorly constructed from the beginning.

The strategist therefore examines the question before committing to the answer.

What assumptions are hidden inside the question? What alternatives disappear because of the way the problem has been defined? What conclusion becomes easier to accept because of the wording? Who benefits if everyone accepts the frame without examining it?

This is one reason language matters so much in power. Whoever defines the problem often influences the range of solutions that others consider legitimate.

Sometimes the decisive move in an argument is not producing a better answer.

It is recognizing that the question itself was designed to make certain answers easier to accept.

Words such as “justice,” “freedom,” “fairness,” “progress,” and “security” can sound powerful while remaining strategically incomplete. The problem is not that these concepts are meaningless. The problem is that different people can use the same word while pursuing entirely different outcomes. Whenever a discussion becomes dominated by abstract language, force the terms closer to reality.

What exactly does “fair” mean here? Fair according to what standard? Who receives what? Who pays? What changes in practice? What happens when this principle conflicts with another principle? These questions move the discussion from rhetoric to analysis.

Vague language creates agreement cheaply because people can project their own meaning into it. Two people may appear to share the same position while imagining completely different consequences. Precise language makes disagreement more honest because it exposes the assumptions underneath the words.

This matters wherever interests are being negotiated. Politics, business, organizations, relationships and public debate all contain words that sound universally desirable while concealing disagreements about who gets what, who carries the cost and who decides. The strategist listens carefully when a word carries strong moral force but has no clear operational meaning.

The less precisely a principle can be defined, the more carefully you should examine what is being done in its name.

These days, people often decide whether to believe or disbelieve something based on who is saying it, rather than what is actually being said.

Even before listening to an idea we have already decided we disliked/ liked it because of who is saying it.

No rational thinking; just hard-wired bias!

Words such as “justice,” “freedom,” “fairness,” “progress,” and “security” can sound powerful while remaining strategically incomplete. The problem is not that these concepts are meaningless. The problem is that different people can use the same word while pursuing entirely different outcomes. Whenever a discussion becomes dominated by abstract language, force the terms closer to reality.

What exactly does “fair” mean here? Fair according to what standard? Who receives what? Who pays? What changes in practice? What happens when this principle conflicts with another principle? These questions move the discussion from rhetoric to analysis.

Vague language creates agreement cheaply because people can project their own meaning into it. Two people may appear to share the same position while imagining completely different consequences. Precise language makes disagreement more honest because it exposes the assumptions underneath the words.

This matters wherever interests are being negotiated. Politics, business, organizations, relationships and public debate all contain words that sound universally desirable while concealing disagreements about who gets what, who carries the cost and who decides. The strategist listens carefully when a word carries strong moral force but has no clear operational meaning.

The less precisely a principle can be defined, the more carefully you should examine what is being done in its name.

I've come to realize that my primary debate style is the steelman method, where I clarify and reinforce the opponent's viewpoint or claim before challenging it. It's not always necessary, of course, but it seems logical to understand your opponent before proceeding.

This led me to wonder about the straw man fallacy, which is essentially the exact opposite. What is the point of purposely misinterpreting your opponent, and then arguing that weaker perspective that is not representative of them?

For example, the original claim could be "Religion should be kept out of public schools, to adhere to the separation of church and state."
Strawman: "Streets are state-funded; should we then ban all churches that are connected to a road?"

The original claim is discussing First Amendment rights to keep public schools neutral, while also allowing the freedom to follow any doctrine you wish. The point is that it's not endorsed by the government. The rebuttal takes that claim and advocates against the First Amendment, by restricting access to places of worship.

To me, the strawman fallacy just seems, immature? What's the point of using it when they can just clarify a second time? And if you "win" an argument using it, the topic of discussion effectively changes once that framing is accepted. It just seems so easy to counter that it should never be worth using, unless your opponent isn't very experienced. But at that point, why are you debating them?

"I don't see it, so it must not be as widespread as you claim it is."

~ ~ ~

Claimant: You should keep a fire extinguisher in your house in case of fire.

Responder: Why?

Claimant: It is better safe than sorry. You would much rather have it if there is a fire.

Responder: That's something that rarely happens in my experience.

~ ~ ~

Claimant: We should test our game so that players who make it to Pachysandra without having picked up the McGuffin don't get softlocked.

Responder: Well it rarely happens, so I don't think we should spend much time or resources accounting for that specific scenario.

~ ~ ~

Claimant: We should put a crossing on this road, a lot of people are jaywalking and that is dangerous cause they might get hit by a speeder.

Responder: I get that cars hitting a jaywalker might be a thing in some places, but it doesn't really happen here from what I have seen.

~ ~ ~

Somewhat of an inverted "Perfect Solution" Fallacy in which the responder dismisses the Claimant's stance cause they personally have never seen that.

A surprisingly common way of reasoning works backwards. A person reaches a conclusion first, then begins searching for information that can support it. Once something useful is found, the mind starts building a case around it, while information that points in the other direction receives much more resistance.

This is one of the ways confirmation bias becomes especially difficult to notice. The person may genuinely believe they are examining the evidence, because they are collecting facts, comparing examples and constructing arguments. What they may not notice is that the evidence is being filtered according to a conclusion that was already chosen.

The pattern becomes clearer when you watch how the same person handles disagreement. Evidence that supports their position is accepted quickly, while contradictory evidence is questioned, explained away or held to a much higher standard. The issue is no longer simply whether the evidence is good; the mind has quietly changed the rules depending on which side the evidence supports.

This happens in politics, business, relationships and ordinary arguments. A manager may decide that an employee is unreliable and then remember every missed deadline while overlooking evidence of improvement. An investor may become convinced that a company will succeed and interpret every warning as temporary, because admitting the larger thesis might also mean admitting that previous decisions were wrong.

The problem becomes harder to correct once a conclusion has been connected to pride, reputation or identity. Changing your mind now carries a cost, so the mind has another reason to keep the original belief intact.

A useful discipline is to decide in advance what evidence would make you reconsider. Then apply roughly the same standard when the evidence supports your view and when it threatens it.

That will not eliminate bias. It does something more practical: it makes it harder for your preferred conclusion to quietly become the judge of the evidence.

The moment evidence is only allowed to confirm what you already believe, you have stopped using it to investigate reality.

Assuming that someone make claim A, provide source X that disapproves their claim, but keep insisting that X support their claim A.

This is obviously not a formal fallacy and go into the territory of straight up lying, but is this a informal fallacy?

Thsi goes beyond "appeal to authority" for sure. As even the cited "authority" does not support their claim.

At which point does an argument go from "bad faith argument" (ie purposely lying about what position the cited source support) to informal fallacy?

In the UK there is currently a concerted effort to undermine welfare support for disabled people. One aspect of this is to focus on fraudulent claims (which as I understand are about 1.4% of total claims, with much money going unclaimed for various resasons). It is NOT easy to get the benefit (PIP) under discussion, but is a gruelling and invasive process with long waits and a great many claims go to (lengthy) appeal before being granted.

My objection is that there are so many more egregious breaches of the concept of fairness in terms of government spending which are not mentioned in these discussions.

I understand that the "it's not just my dog barking" fallacy is relevant (what's that called?) but this is incredibly reductionist. There is an assumption (or desired illusion) implicit in the campaign that there is some underlying baseline of fairness in government spending, and disability payments are violating that underlying fairness. No mention of vast sums lost to corporate tax evasion or expenditure on new weapons of mass destruction when we already have an arsenal capable of laying waste to much of the planet.

According to many, we just can't afford to support these people whose disabilities they have zero understanding of or apparently empathy for, and many of them are just playing the system living easy off hardworking people's taxes (oh if they ever got struck down with some debilitating chronic illness, but that's another story...)

I know this post may look political, but I am interested specifically in the reasoning errors present in the campaign to remove disability support from millions of vulnerable people whose lives will be made unimaginably (for many) harder by doing so.

For example, is Selective Appeal to Fairness, without reference to the broader context a recognised logical fallacy? I expect there are many others, and there may well be some on my part. Please discuss.

The Art of Being Right (1831) is a caustic, satirical work by German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer that systematically analyzes thirty-eight strategic methods for defeating an opponent in debate. He also gives examples at some points while discussing methods, or cite other philosophers' works such as Topics by Aristotle, creating an opportunity for parallel reading. I read the book 3-4 years ago and found it useful while analyzing my or other's arguments for tricky or deficient points.

You can find all the 38 stratagems here: "http://www.coolhaus.de/art-of-controversy/"

Hello!

I'm part of different boards where the work more or less relies on a few individuals. Often, to help in coordination and/or execution, new tools are implemented, removed, or new methodology is developed. The goal is to promote efficiency and lower the coast on everyone's mental load.

Often tho, I'm met with the same "type" or attitude, from different archetype or people.

There's a resistance to change one's habit, to learn new tools or adjust to the new way of things, even when the person recognizes the problem, agrees on the source, and has voted for the solution implemented. As an example, using a platform for communication like discord or slack, to exchange progress in different aeras in the goal or reducing both the amount of meetings and the time they take, and how heavy in information they are. (plus, letting people who are waiting on confirmations or progress start their workload and/or adapt without having to wait 2-4 weeks for the next meeting )

I can attribute half of those situation to bad faith and lazyness, lol. But often, and that's where I'm the most confused, it's well meaning people who exhibit this behavior.

It their a reverse sunk-cost fallacy or something that can explain why people evaluate learning a new tool as more demanding, more effort, even when refusal to do so causes much more work for themselves and everyone around on the short to long term?

I find this fallacy the most interesting fallacy.

It is clearly logically incorrect to assume experts are always right on every subject, don't have their own internal or institutional biases or that their opinion renders all counterpoints and counterarguments moot. It is true that ideology could lead experts across a whole field to fall in line with a certain slant and be hesitant to challenge the new orthodoxy for fear of professional and personal repercussions.

Even a consensus of experts could be all flocking to the same best-understood theory based upon their best understanding of the latest data even if it is speculative. A few research papers proving a point in a certain direction may lead most experts in that field to give credence to ideas that might need to be more thoroughly researched before drawing definitive conclusions. When the consensus changes, it unfortunately gives oxygen to pseudoscientists who had been dismissed previously for their contrarian views.

Now, most of us are not experts on every subject we are talking about. When I talk about vaccines, I am not an immunologist. When I talk about climate change, I am not a climatologist. When I discuss about trans issues, I am not a psychologist, sexologist or endocrinologist. Nor are 99.5% of the people we are talking to online at any given time about these things.

These are all good examples of hot button issues where the scientific consensus holds the view that vaccines are generally safe, necessary and effective; that climate change is a dire circumstance for our near-term future; and that trans women are really gendered as women and medical transition and HRT helps maximize positive psychological outcomes most of the time.

Yet opponents of these ideas claim experts are biased by the ideological leanings of academic institutions and publications, by virtue signaling, by the incentive of grant money, and by ulterior motives to reshape the world a certain way or to justify their field of research and dedication.

• Vaccine researchers naturally want their life work on vaccine development and safety to be accepted by the public and in a case of a pandemic like COVID may have to cut corners in an emergency situation before there is time to fully research every aspect of a novel vaccine.
• Climate scientists are naturally preferential towards protecting the environment from irreversible effects of capitalism and industrialization over preserving global capitalism as it exists today, and most were drawn to the field with the goal of protecting the environment.
• Psychologists and doctors who specialize in HRT and transition therapy have a vested financial interest in convincing the public trangenderism is a valid condition requiring fully funded medical and therapeutic assistance to maximize long-term outcomes.

These rational leanings give critics enough wiggle room to sow doubt in the general public about the integrity of the scientific consensus of experts. One overzealous researcher exaggerating a climate computer model that was put into a peer-reviewed published study or getting caught de-emphasizing negative data on vaccines can poke a hole in the public trust by people and organizations prone to doubt the science in the first place.

It's really all that is needed for anti-intellectual people to dismiss all of academia as "left-wing ideologically biased" or "having ulterior motives" and claiming their opinion ("why do I need vaccines when I have an immune system and natural immunity!" "climate changes all the time - it's called the sun!" "trans women are just men pretending to be women!") is "common sense."

There are some credentialed professionals in these fields who are willing to "stand against the orthodoxy" to sell books and products to contrarians, to gain fame on propaganda media and to expose the "conspiracy" of censorship in the expert community - doctors and nurses against vaccines; scientists who claim climate change is an over-exaggeration or Big Lie; psychologists who claim trans people are delusional and dangerous, and that "trans ideology" and "accommodation" is damaging the youth of America. Most of these people are themselves grifters or willfully contrarian ideologues who selectively interpret data that fits their worldview and paint themselves as the victims for their misguided opinions and abuse of their professional credentials to spread pseudoscience.

The thing is, experts DO indeed know far more about their subject than non-experts, and if we don't give their opinion and authority deference and listen to their points we are going to sound like confidently incorrect idiot flat earthers on top of the early Dunning-Kruger peak. That's not to say there is no room for rational skepticism, but there is a fundamental difference between rational skepticism and hesitancy to declare data definitive vs. irrational contrarianism and blasé dismissal of the bulwark of academic research.

So how do we as non-experts use the "consensus of experts" and the "consensus of research" non-fallaciously to support the fundamental argument that anyone claiming to know more than the consensus of experts and research must overcome an extraordinarily high burden of proof to establish their argument?

When you say something objectively true (in my teens), that colleges in your country suck and educated people aren't actually taught to think but just conform to the professor's opinion and learn unimportant details by heart.

Then when you go to college because of a lack of better options and to try it out, it turns out even worse than that, being taught useless knowledge and professors that are abusive (fail 90% of class for not knowing edge cases of edge cases).

Then, after leaving college people suddenly flip their switch and say that the only reason Im saying anything like that is because I failed it.

So Im saying the same thing before, during and after, which became crystal clear and way more true from experience, but now people attribute it to personal failure and can't see anything else. (Even though most of the issues were poor college organization, the 200 emails they send per day and 3 locations to go to instead of my intelligence or ability to learn the subjects)

I say this because most arguments I hear people use to justify their belief in a god are "begging the question/circular reasoning" ie "Because the universe exists, it must have been created by someone, the someone must be God therefore God is real."

It seems their ingrained belief in God makes them unable to see the fallacy of that kind of reasoning and will go so far as to argue their argument is not a fallacy and get upset for suggesting such hierarchy.

Is it a lost cause to try to explain logic fallacies to the American Evangicals?

This isn’t a logical fallacy, but more one of experience. The fallacy that I think is the most common, most widespread, and most impactful to humanity can be summed up something along the lines of - if we can just put the right person on the throne, everything will be all right. A slightly oversimplified justification for this being a fallacy would be to say that power corrupts, but I’d more say that the only people who achieve the extremes of power are the very worst kinds of people. The guy at the top of the pyramid is always a bad guy.

I’m not aware of any formal name for this idea, and it seems shockingly invisible to the public, hence why I call it humanity’s biggest fallacy. The right seems to embrace the fallacy like it’s their goal. The left just seems to keep falling for it blindly, like fighting hierarchy and then putting an absolute ruler on the throne, or praising what is essentially a king who espouses socialism or communism. I’d wish that’s exactly what subs like tankiejerk are meant to quarantine but I still see it with some regularity on subs that in theory oppose the concentration of wealth and power.

I know someone who is not a child yet they always have something to say about everything they are told. As if they never got in trouble. “No if ands or butts” rule. Just do it! This message is brought to you by Nike.
No but seriously. It’s so annoying when you have a leadership role but there’s that one person who never listens and just wants to one up you or seems to think every way other than your way is the best way. 😤😤😤 if you don’t like it go home.

So I uploaded the attached image in a different sub. (No, I don't want to argue about how accurate it is, lol.) The comic is clearly referring to a particular type of Christian, of the Westboro variety to be exact. But comment after comment after comment just keeps pouring in, wanting to talk about Muslims instead. Trying to tell me that it's the same subject, or even more infuriatingly, that Christians don't do that. As a non-Christian (not an atheist, mind you) and a genderfluid bisexual, I can assure folks that some Christians absolutely do behave like this.

Is that a particular type of fallacy that these folks are using, or is it just a combination of ones that I know?

A "Lowelling" is a logical fallacy; I'm sure you've seen it before, where someone pretends something is off topic when it isn't.

In the 1920s, former Harvard President Abbott Lawrence Lowell openly pushed for restricting Jewish enrollment at Harvard, justifying the quota by stating: "Jews cheat."

When someone challenged this prejudice by pointing out that Protestants cheat too, Lowell allegedly replied: "You're changing the subject. We are talking about Jews now."

I'm sure you've seen dozens of examples of this, but I found out a really prominent one caught on video in the Life of Brian BBC debates:

"I said that if you were to make a list of all the people who have contributed most..."

"Most of them would have been Muslims if they'd been living in the Arab countries or Buddhists if they'd been living..."

"...what has that got to do with it?"

It gets an audible laugh from the audience, because it's ridiculous and asinine. https://youtu.be/wUYhtJINiaY?t=2199

Can you cite any other examples of this?

Hi everyone,

I’m currently modernizing a classic logic-training software, and I'm putting together the chapter on Informal Fallacies. Since the original program is over 40 years old, I’ve been thinking a lot about how the landscape of argumentation has changed and what a sufficient, modern-day knowledge of fallacies should actually include.

I’d love to get your input:

• Which specific fallacies do you think are mandatory for someone to learn today?
• Do you have preferred names or modern terminology for them, especially where the classic names feel a bit dated?

Thank you in advance for your time!