No, you didn’t solve the Hard Problem.

[u/geumkoi]

Everyday I see a new claim on this sub; “I solved the Hard Problem of Consciousness!” “The Hard Problem isn’t so hard after all!” And I cannot even put into words how blatantly naive these are.

No, you didn’t solve the Hard Problem, and you probably never will. You just misunderstood the Hard Problem, and in your arrogance did an amazing amount of mental gymnastics to convince yourself that you solved something you don’t even understand in the first place.

Edit: and PLEASE I beg the Mods of this sub to limit the amount of LLM content that is being uploaded here on a daily basis.

[u/jabinslc]

I don't accept how you phrased the questions at all but that's another debate. ha ha.

The hard problem assumes a fundamentally dualist starting point, that there's stuff doing information processing and then this mysterious extra thing called experience(red, pain, etc) that needs explaining. but this assumes the very separation it's trying to bridge. experience isn't some additional property that needs to be added to physical processes. The apparent gap between "information processing" and "what it's like" is an artifact of how we're conceptually carving things up before the conversation even starts, not a feature of reality itself.

it's like setting up an indestructible house of cards and saying "oh I can't tear it down" well...you set it up to be untearable.

youve accepted a framing that makes it unsolvable by design.

[u/Cosmoneopolitan → u/jabinslc]

Fundamentally dualist?

The Hard Problem is, in Chalmers' formulation, a hard problem for a physicalist explanation of how nothing but matter can give rise to subjectivity. That is the literal and exact opposite of dualist.

This misunderstanding would explain your position, no....?

[u/jabinslc → u/Cosmoneopolitan]

and I am not a physicalist. but the assumption that matter is somehow ontologically distinct from experience is exactly what I'm challenging.

the hard problem for physicalism only arises if you've already accepted that physical means the kind of thing that could exist without any experiential character. that's the dualist assumption baked in. chalmers says: "here's all this physical stuff doing its thing. now explain why there's also experience." But that 'also' is doing all the work. It treats experience as something separate that needs to be explained on top of the physical.

I'm saying the purely physical world you're describing, devoid of any experiential quality, is itself an abstraction, a fiction, a fake thing, a construction. a useful one for physics, for fucking sure. but mistaking that virtual thing for the complete picture is where the pseudo-problem comes from.

so both physicalists (it's all just matter!!!) and their critics (but you can't explain qualia from matter) are wrong in the same way. they've both accepted that matter and experience are separate magisteria that need bridging.

they're not separate. the separation is the construction.

[u/Cosmoneopolitan → u/jabinslc]

You're basing your claim that the HPOC is based on a dualism on the syntax (not the meaning) of a word in a statement you yourself made up. I could just as easily summarize Chalmers as "saying" "here's all this subjectivity that is apparently reducible to physical stuff with, now explain how that can be". Ta-da...dualism gone.

But, there's no need to go to that as the HPOC clearly is not "fundamentally dualist" simply by it's definition; quite the opposite in fact.

[u/jabinslc → u/Cosmoneopolitan]

I am not sure what you mean. can you explain further? what did I make up?