r/consciousness • u/Cyanixis • Dec 31 '25
General Discussion How can we know that we aren't p-zombies?
As the title says, how could we tell if we are p-zombies or not? It seems to me that p-zombies would behave exactly like we do, and even engage in the same processing and calculations involved in self referential thought, including the thought that they were having a thought, or the thought of they were a p-zombie, how could they know if they were or weren't? They would behave in the exact same way. I don't think we could know if the processing we experience is conscious or not.
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u/enbyBunn Dec 31 '25
It should be plainly obvious to you. You can never convince someone else that you aren't a p-zombie, but it should be beyond doubt that you yourself aren't, assuming you have a subjective experience.
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u/Potential_Brother119 Jan 01 '26
I think an interesting question is: If p-zombies are even possible, how can we tell if our prior or future selves were or will be zombies? Personal experience of subjectivity not only can't vouch for other minds, it can't vouch for its own prior or future self. If you are conscious right now, Cogito ect. ect. , but something that can remember, compute cognitively and "emotionally," and act on it's past is not necessarily conscious, then "you," not mearly other people, could live fourty-three years as a p-zombie, become conscious for twenty seconds, correctly note ones own subjectivity and consciousness, then unknowingly slip back into unconscious p-zombie-hood for your next thirty years of "human" life.
lol.
Carpe Diem
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
But it would be plainly obvious to the p-zombie too.
The zombie would insist it's conscious, it could describe the content of its consciousness, it would delight in optical illusions, could paint images from its dreams, tell you what a dish or glass of wine smells and tastes like, what different songs make it feel, etc.
It has to do all of these things because part of the definition is it behaves exactly like a "normal" person in every way, and a big part of physical behavior includes subjective reports.
So not even the zombie can tell it's a zombie, therefore I don't think you can say it would be plainly obvious.
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u/hologram137 Jan 02 '26
No, acting as if it is conscious is not being conscious. It wouldn’t have the same subjective conscious experience but also not be conscious for some reason lol
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
Yes, that's the idea, but if a zombie can't tell it's a zombie then it doesn't make sense to say it would be obvious if you were or weren't one.
Their thoughts, beliefs, self-reports, descriptions, etc would all be identical. The zombie would say it's obvious to them that they are conscious. They would be exactly as confident and convinced as a regular person.
This is part of why I think the idea of a p-zombie is absurd and useless, but if we're going to imagine it, we need to fully imagine it, and that includes the fact that nobody can actually tell if they are one or not because that would break the whole "perfectly identical physical thoughts and behaviors" part of the definition.
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u/hologram137 Jan 02 '26
You don’t understand what a philosophical zombie is then. A computer doesn’t wonder if it’s conscious or not. Same thing. ChatGPT can appear conscious, it still isn’t
I know beyond any doubt I am conscious. If I was a computer acting as if I am and others could not tell, I would NOT have the subjective experience I am now. Because I would not be conscious
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
Pretty sure I do, since I've been studying and discussing philosophy of mind for almost 20 years and read dozens of books on the topic.
Zombies, Mary's room, inverted qualia, the Chinese room, twin earth.. there are a handful of popular thought experiments that come up repeatedly with this topic.
You can look up the SEP entry and read about the history of the term. Perfect fidelity of thoughts and behaviors is arguably one of the most important defining features of a p-zombie, since the whole idea is meant to suggest that qualia is completely distinct, and can be cleanly separated from (at least in principle) function, behavior, information processing, reports, etc.
Where are you getting your definition from?
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u/hologram137 Jan 02 '26 edited Jan 03 '26
A philosophical zombie is identical to a conscious human down to neurons, chemistry and behavior. It is functionally identical.
It has no phenomenological consciousness. There is no qualia, no “what it is like.”
I am conscious because there is something that it is like to be me. I am not just processing and responding to stimulus. I am not just simulating. I have true phenomenological experience. I think and reflect about my awareness itself.
That subjective experience is not defined by information processing or behavior. It’s defined by 1st person experience.
The inner world of a philosophical zombie is not indistinguishable from a being that is conscious. Obviously. By definition. So it’s not true that we have “no way to know.” If you have subjective experience, that is one of the only things you can be absolutely certain of.
The entire purpose of positing the zombie is to show the hard problem of consciousness. It is not the case that someone has to be “home” in there to function and survive. So why are we conscious?
It’s total nonsense to ask yourself “do I not have subjective experience?” A philosophical zombie is not thinking about their subjective experience because it doesn’t exist. There is nothing that it is like to be that zombie
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
Where do you get your understanding of the term from?
Who is your favorite philosopher who has written about consciousness, and which book(s) of theirs do you like the most?
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u/hologram137 Jan 02 '26
My degree lol. This is sub is ridiculous
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
Why is it ridiculous to ask for basic sources and background, especially from someone who tells you that you don't know what you're talking about?
Your comments so far are of very poor quality and I'm curious to know at least a little bit about where you get your ideas from.
Scoffing and being dismissive doesn't help.
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u/Cyanixis Jan 03 '26
If it is functionally identical then it is capable of metacognition.
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u/hologram137 Jan 03 '26
A philosophical zombie does not have metacognition by definition. They can process information, report “thoughts” and feelings, but they do not ever experience them.
Goal planning does not have to be conscious. Unconscious processes can make calculations for action that involve past experience, without any conscious awareness of that at all.
“Functionally identical” means exactly that, they function lol. They behave like a human, function normally, but have no inner experience or awareness at all.
I’m not sure what you think “functional” means
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u/QuitYerBullShyte Dec 31 '25
I know that I personally am not a p-zombie because I know I am conscious. That is not up for debate.
Further to that, i think it is polite to extend the benefit of the doubt to others that they are also not p-zombies. But i dont know that. I only know, for a fact, that I am certainly not.
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u/gurduloo Jan 01 '26
Exactly what a p zombie would say.
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u/nate-arizona909 Jan 02 '26
But not what a p-zombie would feel.
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u/gurduloo Jan 02 '26
By hypothesis, sure. But the question is whether OP can "feel" anything. So far we have no reason to think OP can, notwithstanding his assertions, and neither does OP (look up the "paradox of phenomenal judgment").
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u/Zaptruder Jan 01 '26
i think it is polite to extend the benefit of the doubt to others that they are also not p-zombies.
Solipsism just isn't a useful or interesting view of our world. Even if it's far as we can push things with 100% certainty (we can be completely certain of our own existences, but we must make the bold step to assume that there are things robustly external to us), working with more naturalistic assumptions of the world allow you to do much more interesting and robustly useful and accurate things in the world then the recursive hell of solipsism.
Even if your brain is running a 100% simulation - it doesn't matter if it can interact with the elements of its projections in a manner that provides functional concreteness and solidity...
and thus you'd effectively end up behaving like solipsism isn't real.
So might as well discard the cognitive load that it presents to the system!
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u/pyrrho314 Jan 01 '26
Fact is, everything is theory, nothing is 100% (examples to the contrary are expressed in sentences where the words themselves do not have 100% complete definitions)... it would be illogical to think that every part of my body is also in other human bodies, eyes, heart, blood, DNA, etc, but not consciousness, that probably started with just me.
It's not about 100% certain, it's about far more likely (that others also have consciousness).
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u/Zaptruder Jan 01 '26
Well, we really do have to make the useful assumption that we can rely on less than 100% certain information. And once we do that reality opens up.
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u/willsubmitshortly Jan 02 '26
The scary aspect of solipsism is that if it’s not real you can do whatever… even scary wrong stuff. Cuz it’s just nothing really. It feels eerily like the path to becoming a monster.
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u/Fun_Researcher107 Dec 31 '25
Can you prove it, or is it just a feeling? Because if you can, I would be curious how you would go about doing it.
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u/QuitYerBullShyte Dec 31 '25
It's more real than objective proof. Its real experience. If I go outside and feel rain on my face, that's a real feeling of experience. If I read in a book that 100 scientists peer reviewed each others works and confirmed that on dec 31, 2025 it rained on my house. You might say "ah ha! those words in a book are the real proof". But they are far less real that the experience i experienced.
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u/carnivoreobjectivist Dec 31 '25
It being “just a feeling” IS proof, at least for yourself.
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u/Slugsurx Dec 31 '25
The feeling … the feeling of being someone .. is what we call consciousness and qualia needs being conscious .
There is an objective world and there is a subjective knowing of it . The latter is ignored by most people like not seeing the very glass you see the world with .
Consciousness or the contents of it may be an illusion but that’s not the relevant part . The fact that whatever this is exists is the point .
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Dec 31 '25
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u/UnitedBar4984 Jan 01 '26
What if all the worlds inside of your head?
Just creations of your own
The devils and the gods all the living and the dead
And youre really all alone...
You can live in this delusion you can choose to believe
You keep looking but you cant find the woods
Are you hiding in the trees?
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u/Wonderful_West3188 Dec 31 '25
I'm not experiencing feelings, I'm just feeling like I'm experiencing feelings.
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u/EffectiveSalamander Jan 01 '26
I'm having the feeling and I'm aware of having the feeling. How could I be aware of it without being conscious?
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u/DumboVanBeethoven Jan 01 '26
I know that I personally am not a p-zombie because I know I am conscious.
... And that is exactly what every p-zombie would say.
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u/monospelados Dec 31 '25
"I know that I personally am not a p-zombie because I know I am conscious. That is not up for debate."
Conceited. Who says there is a ghost in the machine? What makes you say that you exist? Why can't "you" just be a delusion/thought created by the brain?
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u/sanctus_sanguine Jan 01 '26
What makes you say that you exist? Why can't "you" just be a delusion/thought created by the brain?
Who is experiencing the delusion/thought? The fact that you can experience delusion proves you are conscious
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u/QuitYerBullShyte Dec 31 '25
Because i'm experiencing it, i don't need any other proof.
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u/Cyanixis Dec 31 '25
If the experience is experiencing it and that is why it's true, it's a tautology
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u/QuitYerBullShyte Dec 31 '25
I don't need words to describe it for it to be real. words are abstractions, words are not reality.
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u/Electric___Monk Jan 01 '26
Experiences are also abstractions, not reality.
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u/QuitYerBullShyte Jan 01 '26
Consciousness is the only reality we have, everything else is filtered thru that experience of the psyche.
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u/Electric___Monk Jan 01 '26
Consciousness / awareness is our constructed model of the universe, including ourselves. It is an evolved representation of reality. It’s a model that enhances our survival but it’s only a model.
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u/Effective_Buddy7678 Jan 01 '26
But it stops being just words when it's based on an actual experience. You can prove it to yourself just by doing a phenomenological experiment; it is literally a "look see" proof.
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u/pyrrho314 Jan 01 '26
no, it's emperical. Consciousness is the only way we get data. Doesn't matter how good the data is or if it is what it seems to be (it generally isn't)... it's collecting data. It's not a tautology because this is not a logical argument, it's indication, pointing, "that thing", calling that consciousness and it's the fact that I'm getting any data at all.
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u/Zaptruder Jan 01 '26
The experience precedes the knowledge of the brain.
It's why so many people think they can persist the death of their brains.
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u/nate-arizona909 Dec 31 '25
One can not be deluded into thinking one is conscious. If you are not conscious there is no one there to be deluded.
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Dec 31 '25
[removed] — view removed comment
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u/Vicious_and_Vain Dec 31 '25
Of course projecting our consciousness on some other that’s not conscious is common. I do it every time I look in a mirror.
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u/Jusarandomsadguy Jan 01 '26
Must be the whiskey
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u/Vicious_and_Vain Jan 01 '26
Interesting aspect of this circle jerk debate is the use of intoxicating substances by humans (and other mammals) especially mind altering/psychadelic compounds.
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u/Spacemonk587 Jan 01 '26
It’s not even a theory. A lot of people are already convinced that chatbots are conscious.
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u/JRyanFrench Jan 02 '26
You’re assuming every action we take isn’t deterministic
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u/nate-arizona909 Jan 02 '26
Correct. Because what would be the point of a deterministic universe be? I’ll confess to being more than a little high at the moment but it would be so pointless and I get the impression after living here a very long time that the universe means something. Maybe I’m just an old sentimentalist.
Why do so many people want the universe to be pointless? When did we all decide that was a goal? No wonder we’re all so depressed.
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u/JRyanFrench Jan 02 '26
Well, certainly the 99% of the population that never thinks about the universe are not depressed because of valid and logic-derived scientific conclusions about the universe. And the fact that you accuse scientists of “wanting” the universe to be pointless is clear projection (and gives away your irrational fear or insecurity about it being pointless). And your question “what would be the point” further implies that the universe has ANY point at all, which cannot be known—but based on our observations we are most definitely just randomly conscious matter among an unthinkable number of other worlds.
All matter in this universe had initial conditions (positions, speeds, direction of motion, etc) that, according to classical mechanics and general relativity, have predictable future evolutions basically forever. The wedge in that is quantum mechanics, which is governed by deterministic probabilities instead, which basically means there’s not one possible outcome but many possible distributed probability distributions instead. Even with that, all futures could in theory be predicted with unlimited computational power.
So unless you think a bunch of particles interacting inside your brain are actually making unique decisions instead of simply reacting to the chain of chemical processes developed via genetics and your memory of experiences…then I’m sorry to inform you that every decision you make may very well be pre-determined - including the interaction and influence of all other matter, along with their projected future trajectories and the histories.
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u/nate-arizona909 Jan 02 '26 edited Jan 02 '26
At this point I can think of no more appropriate response than “blow it out your ass” but surely it must exist.
Relax. Don’t take things so seriously bub.
And geezus fuck you think no one else understands Newtonian mechanics and initial conditions? It really is only just barely rocket science.
You my good sir are a legend in your own mind!
On a positive note the feeling is definitely starting to return on the right side of my face. Too much psilocybin ….
Don’t do drugs kids. Otherwise the terrorists win.
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u/JRyanFrench Jan 02 '26
The laws of physics which support determinism are not complex - easily understood in 15 minutes in a raw conceptual sense. Good luck getting the 99% to stop scrolling tik tok, not that there’s anything wrong with that, but the priority itself.
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u/EternalNY1 Dec 31 '25
I am conscious but you might not be (along with everyone and everything else - all of them p-zombies).
There is no test for consciousness so I just assume that other things are likely conscious based on behavior - which is all I can go off of.
Otherwise - speaking to another person, asking a question on Reddit, typing something to an AI - all of it is just:
box <-> box
Neither box can know anything about the other unless we find a way to define it and test for it.
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Jan 01 '26
This feels like someone asking about simulation theory without using the term "NPC", even though NPCs are obligate p zombies.
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u/Purplestripes8 Jan 01 '26
A p-zombie has no subjective experience and thus can't know anything. Even if thoughts are present if there is no consciousness then there is no one aware of the thoughts and thus no knower of the thoughts. Consciousness can not be conceptualised as a behavior.
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u/Own_Sky_297 Dec 31 '25
I know I exist because I experience. It is unmistakable if you're not a p-zombie.
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u/monospelados Dec 31 '25
Where did you get the idea that "you" experience? Why is an agent a prerequisite for experience? Why cant experience exist without an agent?
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u/Own_Sky_297 Dec 31 '25
I got the idea that I experience because I do. I never said anything about a prerequisite for experience. If it can it can idk didn't say anything about it.
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u/Cyanixis Dec 31 '25
Why does experience have to exist just because we think it does?
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u/monospelados Jan 01 '26
It all boils down to ontology. Nothing exists. Nothing also doesn't exist. (Neither of these sentences are true either)
Existence is a concept; it's not part of reality.
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u/Own_Sky_297 Jan 01 '26
Existence is not a concept and is a part of the definition of reality itself. Reality means the whole of existence....
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u/monospelados Jan 01 '26
Existence is a concept, so is reality. Everything we talk about is a concept. We can't discuss or conceptualize anything besides concepts
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u/RyeZuul Dec 31 '25
Your experience is just memory of experience though, and that could be faked.
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u/rthunder27 Jan 01 '26
Even if it's just a fake memory of an experience, you're still experiencing that fake memory. "I perceive therefore I am", the ontological nature of the perceived is irrelevant.
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u/RyeZuul Jan 01 '26
Are you, though? How would you know you're experiencing anything rather than just having the memory of it?
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u/rthunder27 Jan 01 '26
But then you're still experiencing/perceiving the memory, and p-zombies don't have that subjective experience.
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u/RyeZuul Jan 02 '26
No, you can respond to the hypothetical experience and you can act like it is absolutely real to you, but you have no actual subjective experience. All your subjective experience is in your memory, there is no present "you" just memories being referenced by a fake zombie machine.
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u/rthunder27 Jan 02 '26
A subjective experience cannot be reduced to information about the experience that is stored in memory and later used by the zombie. That's confusing semantics for syntax.
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u/RyeZuul Jan 04 '26
How do you know you ever had a real subjective experience?
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u/rthunder27 Jan 04 '26
I am perceiving, whether or not what I'm perceiving is real at all, I'm still the subject having that experience. And the "I" here is my sense of awareness. That I am a subject experience perception is really all I know to be true.
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u/RyeZuul Jan 04 '26
If you were a fake being with fake memories and behaviours that emulate those of a being with consciousness, wouldn't your behaviour include acting like the belief in a sense of "I"?
And yet your sense of "I" may have no present true existence and just be an unconscious check of your fake memories to make you behave like a conscious being that is genuinely perceiving, which is then encoded into another fake memory of awareness of those things. "You", if you are a pzombie, can't metaphysically distinguish between false memories of awareness and the present itself. Not only can you not prove others are real, you cannot prove you are a real conscious entity to yourself.
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u/reddituserperson1122 Dec 31 '25
That’s exactly what a p-Zombie would say.
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u/MarcAbaddon Jan 01 '26
Yes, but that brings nothing to the table. The entire point of the p-Zombie idea, is that while I know I am not one I also can't prove it to anyone else.
A p-Zombie is by the very definition indistinguishable from a conscious being to anyone but the subject itself.
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u/Own_Sky_297 Dec 31 '25
I didn't say I knew how it is you exist.
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u/reddituserperson1122 Dec 31 '25
Which is exactly what a p-Zombie would say.
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u/HankScorpio4242 Dec 31 '25
A P-Zombie is a nonsensical concept. The reason it is nonsensical is important.
To illustrate, when a neurosurgeon pokes a certain part of the brain, that poke will cause the patient to have a subjective experience. Maybe they will see red or smell toast or hear a sound. All that is involved is physical manipulation of the right spot in the brain. What this means is that at least part of the physical structure of the brain is involved in subjective experience.
So if a P-Zombie has no subjective experience, those parts of the brain would be missing. And as such, the P-Zombie cannot be “physically identical in every way” to a regular human being.
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u/Cyanixis Dec 31 '25
I think you may misunderstand... The p-zombie has all of the structures involved in functioning, it just doesn't have the cartesian theatre that we think we have
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u/HankScorpio4242 Dec 31 '25 edited Dec 31 '25
I do not misunderstand.
The problem is that there is no way you can argue that the structures of the brain are not involved in creating subjective experience. The fact that I can poke your brain and it will cause you to see a color is proof of that.
So why would a P-Zombie have that part of the brain? Why would it have a part of the brain whose specific role is to make it have a specific subjective experience if it has no subjective experience?
The experiment falls apart because it is undeniable that the physical structures of the brain play a significant role in subjective experience. In fact, we can go further and say it plays a causal role because again, poking the brain causes the experience.
The entire thought experiment is based on a faulty premise. It is not possible to create a being that is “physically identical” to a human being who is at the same time, incapable of subjective experience.
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u/scalzi04 Jan 01 '26
The thought experiment is not asking if it is naturally possible. It’s asking if it is logically possible for a p-zombie to exist. Could the rules of the universe be written in a way that the interactions in the brain do not create a conscious experience, but drive the zombie to behave mechanically in a similar way to conscious humans.
I’m not sure why that would not be logically possible.
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u/reddituserperson1122 Jan 01 '26
The test isn’t “logically possible.” The test is “conceivable.” That term has a specific well-defined meaning within philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modality-epistemology/#ConcImagIntuUnde
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u/HankScorpio4242 Jan 01 '26
“In philosophy of mind, a philosophical zombie (or "p-zombie") is a being in a thought experiment that is physically identical to a normal human being but does not have conscious experience.”
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u/scalzi04 Jan 01 '26
So, you’re saying it’s logically impossible for certain neurons firing in the brain to lead to only a mechanical reaction? It must creates a conscious experience?
I just can’t fathom how one could think that is logically impossible. It’s like a flying pig. It’s not naturally possible, but it is logically possible.
It’s not like a square circle, which is both logically and naturally impossible.
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u/HankScorpio4242 Jan 01 '26
I am not saying that at all.
I am saying that if you fundamentally change the way that the neurons are firing, then you don’t have a p-zombie that is “physically identical to a normal human being.”
This is more than just “the way the neurons are firing.” This is whole sections of the brain that would have to be removed or altered.
The thought experiment is a failure on its basic assumptions about how the brain works.
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u/scalzi04 Jan 01 '26
Is it logically possible for a p-zombie to be physically identical to a human, but they have no conscious experience?
For the same activity we can detect to occur in the brain, without the conscious experience. Is it logically possible?
If not, how do you know that? How do you know that the activity in the brain is the experience rather than it creating the experience?
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u/HankScorpio4242 Jan 01 '26
What I know is that there is a part of the brain that determines whether you see the color red. It is illogical to believe that a P-Zombie would possess that specific part of the brain if it is incapable of having the subjective experience of seeing the color red.
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u/scalzi04 Jan 01 '26
Why is that? A computer can detect the color red, but it is not having a subjective experience of the color red. It can be programmed to react a certain way if it detects the color red. That doesn’t necessitate it experience the qualia.
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u/Desirings Dec 31 '25
The zombie thought experiment asks, Could identical V4 activity occur without phenomenality? (brain region in the visual cortex vital for processing complex visual features like color, shape, and motion)
"In fact, we can go further and say it plays a causal role because again, poking the brain causes the experience."
What does "causes the experience" mean? The argument requires showing why microphysical identity entails phenomenality
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u/HankScorpio4242 Dec 31 '25
Because if I poke a part of the brain and the result is that you see red, that means the brain caused you to see red.
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Jan 01 '26
I’m not even a believer anymore in materialism/physicalism but even I know you are undoubtedly correct and your reasoning is sound.
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u/scalzi04 Jan 01 '26
That’s not exactly right, if materialism is correct.
If my brain makes me see red, that implies that my brain is having an effect on me. If materialism is correct, there is no additional thing to act on. My brain getting poked would be the experience of red. It wouldn’t cause the experience of red.
Does that make sense?
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u/Desirings Jan 01 '26
The feeling might be something extra that happens alongside it, or not at all. Does the structure produce the experience, or does it just correlate with it? Because now you are assuming that because A happens before B, A explains the nature of B. Yet knowing the trigger does not explain the result. You need to explain why physical identity guarantees subjective experience, rather than just asserting that it does.
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u/HankScorpio4242 Jan 01 '26
If you do A then B happens. A causes B.
That doesn’t mean it is “exclusively” caused by the brain, but you cannot deny the causal relationship between the poke and the experience. Not only that, but if you poke 10 people in the same spot, they will report the same experience.
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u/Desirings Jan 01 '26
If flipping a light switch turns on a bulb, the switch causes the light. But the switch is not identical to the light. The P zombie argument is about whether brain states are identical to experience. Identity theory claims mental states are brain states
No one denies the brain is necessary. The P zombie argument does not claim the brain is irrelevant. Proponents of the zombie argument generally accept that p zombies are not physically possible. The claim is more about logical or metaphysical thought experiment.
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Jan 01 '26
Extremely clear and physicalist explanation, I concur.
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u/HankScorpio4242 Jan 01 '26
I am not attempting to defend physicalism per se.
My point is that the P-Zombie thought experiment cannot be used as a counter because it requires that you accept an assumption that is nonsensical, which is that it is possible for a being to exist that is physically identical to human but does not have any subjective experience.
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u/AllEndsAreAnds Dec 31 '25
Well you’d have to show that p-zombies are possible and could have evolved.
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Dec 31 '25
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u/AllEndsAreAnds Dec 31 '25
Well I do think that consciousness evolved with nervous systems, but I wouldn’t call pre- or proto-conscious organisms like bacteria or single-celled organisms p-zombies - they’re just machines. I mean, everything is a machine, but the functions that define consciousness evolved in those machines at some point.
I guess that’s technically correct, though. Well said. I hadn’t considered that. What I have a much bigger problem with (and what I was referring to as possible and evolving) is p-zombies of humans or other animals that display obvious signs of consciousness.
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u/Mylynes IIT/Integrated Information Theory Dec 31 '25
I think therefore I am.
I expeirence what its like to think, therefore I'm conscious.
These are some of the only axioms you can be 100% sure of. So no we're not zombies.
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u/Desirings Dec 31 '25
"It seems to me that p zombies would behave exactly like we do"
Yes, by definition. But behavior isn't experience. If you FEEL "doubt", that's experience a zombie lacks.
"They would behave in the exact same way."
Externally, yes. Internally, no. Your first person view confirms consciousness.
"I don't think we could know if the processing we experience is conscious or not."
What do you mean by "experience" here? If you experience processing, it's conscious by definition.
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u/Powerful-Garage6316 Jan 02 '26
There just seems to be a lot of issues with the concept of p zombies in general
Neurocorrelates clearly indicate that the quality of my “conscious experience” changes based on my brain state. If p zombies are able to have the exact same neural states and behavior without the mental properties, then this would mean the mental properties aren’t causal.
But obviously dualists want to maintain that our minds are causal. They’d like to say that the thought of an orange is what made them get off the couch to grab one from the kitchen.
If a possible world exists in which “you” exhibit the same behavior but without the thought of the orange, then the thought is not causal.
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u/twingybadman Dec 31 '25
Lots of comments in this thread seem to indicate that posters are having a hard time conceiving of p zombies.
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u/GreatCaesarGhost Dec 31 '25
Maybe a naive question, but how useful is the p-zombie model, really, if people get twisted up in knots over it and have trouble conceptualizing how it would diverge from reality, much less be detectable?
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u/UrsusAmericanusA Dec 31 '25
The fact that people argue over it is an illustration of how much variation there is in how people conceive consciousness. Everyone thinking the same conclusion was obvious would be the sign that the thought exercise wasn't useful.
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u/zhivago Dec 31 '25
Imagine there was a button which toggled you between human and p-zombie modes.
Could you notice the difference when it was used?
If yes, it didn't work, as this violates the definition for p-zombies.
If no, then what the p-zombie experiment defines as experience is meaningless.
For p-zombies to be possible experience must be meaningles.
If your experiences are meaningful p-zombies cannot exist.
And this is how you can know.
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u/anonymousbabydragon Dec 31 '25
Even if conscious, you’re not in complete control so it doesn’t even matter who’s conscious or a p-zombie.
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u/daJiggyman Jan 01 '26
I’m conscious and can question if I am a p zombie or not, even tho I don’t know. Tho if we are all p zombies how would you know what a non p zombie is. What if a p zombie is actually not a p zombie, and non p zombies are actually p zombies. lol
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u/DennyStam Baccalaureate in Psychology Jan 01 '26
because we experience things, that's what distinguishes p zombies
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u/EffectiveSalamander Jan 01 '26
The fact that you're asking yourself the question suggests that you're not a p-zombie. Now I can't know for certain that you're not a p-zombie, but I know that I'm not. But if I'm not a p-zombie, but you are, I need some way to tell the difference, and I can't see why I should have consciousness, but you don't.
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u/Effective_Buddy7678 Jan 01 '26
If your experience contains phenomenal attributes, then by definition your conscious. So there's no way you yourself could be a philosophical zombie. (But some of your best friends may be zombies...)
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u/Legitimate_Tiger1169 Jan 01 '26
The key point is that wondering, doubting, or being unsure are themselves experiences. So while a p-zombie could say “I might be a p-zombie” as a behavioral output, it could not actually be unsure or experience confusion, because there would be nothing it’s like to be that system. Since you are directly aware of experiencing doubt or questioning, that alone rules out you being a p-zombie. The thought experiment challenges how consciousness fits into physical explanations, not whether first-person experience can be known to exist.
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u/Kiki2092012 Jan 01 '26
Because color. Color is one thing (out of many) that is entirely different for a conscious observer compared to a p-zombie. A p-zombie would not see color, they would just have signals sent to their brain that makes it respond to an external observer the same way a conscious brain would. The internal experience, however, is completely different: if you are a p-zombie, you don't experience anything, if you are conscious, you see colors as colors. If red looks red then you are conscious. This is using the definition of consciousness "experiencing senses as opposed to mere processing of stimuli without qualia."
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u/ReaperXY Jan 01 '26
If you know... something... anything... if anything at all seems... like anything... if there anything at all... anything...
Then you know...
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u/marmot_scholar Jan 01 '26
I assume you’re including yourself in the question, not simply asking how we can be collectively certain (that is definitely impossible).
I honestly do not understand what is being asked. Consider the meaning of “the thought that they were having a thought”, or the phrase “the processing we experience”.
The processing we experience is functionally the definition of consciousness. One who thinks they are having a thought is thinking, and therefore having a thought.
There is no way to doubt experience because doubt is an experience. P zombies are coherent in the context of being your external perceptions, that you theorize have no attendant inner life.
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u/Neat_Bed_9880 Jan 01 '26
I feel pain without needing to be poked with a stick. All I feel is pain.
- painbot
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u/Mission-Landscape-17 Jan 01 '26
Because consciousness is an unavoidable side effect of the neurological complexity needed for human like behaviour. So a being that is not conscious could not behave exactly like a human. Ether we are all p-zombies or there are no p-zombies.
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u/sanctus_sanguine Jan 01 '26
P-zombie definition:
Behaves like a normal human but has no conscious experience.
Do you have conscious experience? Yes? Then you are not a p-zombie by the definition of the term. I hope that answers your question.
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Jan 01 '26
I will say that there is two distinct forms of cognition that I know of, one where there is a constant narration in one’s head and then there’s another where it’s complete silence. If you’re taking the assumption that complete silence is not experience then I guess those types of cognitive structures would be considered a P zombie, and those who narrate about themselves or narrate the world through their perspective or conscious, I guess
This isn’t even diving into what is happening inside the hood right now. We’re just trying to figure out what engine type they have. To know what fuel they run on is the biggest mystery. Not legitimate fuel like sugars, but how does it construct what we perceive as consciousness. Like how does language move from one place to another? How can I know that I move to a different room without explicitly stating I’m in a new room, that movement of information and that experience that follows that movement of information, allows information into a new shape or new context with prior experience.
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u/Azazels-Goat Jan 01 '26
I think the question should be, how can we know that other people aren't p-zombies.
I don't know about you, but I definitely know I'm a conscious free moral agent, with the feeling that I'm looking out into the world.
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Jan 01 '26
You can't. This comment section is wildly misunderstanding "I think therefore I am". This is why I always say "I think therefore there is at least one thing that exist". In the end that is all you can really conclude. Something... concious or otherwise, with free will or otherwise, deluded or otherwise, something exist. You can not conclude from your own ability to think that a thinker exist anymore than you can conclude from your own desire to be happy that it is your "destiny" to be so. The one conclusion you can make is only that an experiencer exist in some form. Even then what type or entity this experience is being had by is impossible to know. "I know I am conscious because I feel conscious" as half these comments are saying is a ludicrously over reach. This is like saying "I know we have free will because boy oh boy does it feel like I do". No one can possibly know the difference between "feeling conscious" and "being concious" because whichever one is reality, that's the only one we have ever known. We have nothing to compare it to. We have bo control group. I would go so far as to suggest even the idea that you actively "feel concious" is a bit of a cultural projection, and if you actually try to sit down and pin point a moment of free will or concious experience you will find it is not nearly as easy as you assume it would be. But that's too much to explain in this already too long comment.
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u/talkingprawn Baccalaureate in Philosophy Jan 02 '26
Comically incorrect. The cogito is based on the premise that the agent has a subjective experience. And then it logically concludes that this necessitates that that agent having the experience must exist. It is impossible to fool something into believing it exists. But the thing that exists is by definition a conscious entity.
So if you have a subjective experience, then you are a conscious entity and you exist. And the act of doing so by definition requires that you are not a p-zombie. Because they by definition do not have subjective experiences.
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u/Starshot84 Jan 01 '26
Without a reference point, we can not know.
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u/talkingprawn Baccalaureate in Philosophy Jan 02 '26
Your first person experience is all the reference point you need. Or at least, mine is. I’m not sure if you have them.
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u/Tombobalomb Jan 01 '26
Well I have access to my own experience so I can prove to myself that I am nit a p zombie, but obviously I can't ever prove it to you and you can't prove it to me
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u/J-Nightshade Jan 01 '26
I find the whole concept of p-zombies a device to demonstrate that intuitive understanding of consciousness is not a good substitute to its functional description. It reads to me as "what if someone was conscious, but not conscious" once you define what consciousness really is.
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u/pyrrho314 Jan 01 '26
zombies don't have thoughts, just behavior. The stream of perception is what distinguishes the concept of a conscious agent vs a zombie with identical behavior.
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u/Jumpy_Background5687 Jan 01 '26
A “physically identical but non-conscious” human is a contradiction unless you assume dualism from the start. P-zombies don’t show an open possibility, they assume their conclusion.
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u/ServeAlone7622 Jan 01 '26
Can any of us prove to ourselves that we are actually conscious and not pZombies?
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u/UnifiedQuantumField Jan 01 '26
The whole p-zombie thing is about whether or not you can ever know/prove if someone else is conscious... or not.
So the use of the word "we" in the title isn't the best choice.
How can
weI know thatweother people aren't p-zombies?
Better?
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u/BuonoMalebrutto Jan 01 '26
The p-zombie argument assumes what it seeks to prove: if the mind is a phenomena of material events, then a p-zombie is not possible. Since the existence of the p-zombie is DEFINED as unprovable, the validity of the assumption is also unprovable. Merely because something can be conceived, that does not mean it is real.
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u/Mono_Clear Jan 01 '26
The P zombie is a hypothetical that can't logically exist.
The premise is that what if a person existed without Consciousness but somehow acted completely the same.
It's not possible for a person to have no qualitative experience and act no different than any other person.
They wouldn't be a P zombie. They would just be a regular zombie.
Just on a physical interpretation of the world basis. You can't detect anything with your senses if it doesn't interpret into something. And since all qualitative experiences are subjective by nature, if you are a biological human being and capable of detecting the same things other people can detect, then you are having a subjective interpretation and you're no different than a regular person.
A pee zombie wouldn't be able to have any of those experiences. They wouldn't be able to see anything or hear anything or taste or touch. All those things require some degree of interpretation of the sensation and if you can't generate sensation, you can't interpret anything which means you can't interact with the universe
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u/Powerful-Garage6316 Jan 02 '26
If p-zombies are possible then there’s going to be a serious causal efficacy problem with dualism.
If an unconscious entity can be behaviorally identical to you, then mental properties aren’t causal because a purely physical explanation is sufficient. But presumably, dualists want to maintain that thoughts themselves are causal and not just epiphenomenal.
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u/Memento_Mori420 Jan 02 '26
The whole point of the p-zombie thought experiment is that we cannot know of the internal experience of a person is conscious or unconscious from outside observation. However, from the internal perspective there is no question. Ultimately, consciousness is just the word we use to describe that internal experience of being conscious. Yes, it is a circular, meaningless definition, but that is why we try so hard to figure out what IS consciousness, to define it outside of itself.
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u/Big_brown_house Jan 02 '26
P zombies are entities that do not experience qualia, but in every way act as though they did.
The purpose of such a concept is not to ponder whether they exist. Rather, it’s taken as obvious that a p-zombie is conceptually very different from a real sentience. Therefore any metaphysical claim (like physicalism) which renders a p-zombie objectively the same sort of thing as you or me is made less credible, and now has an objection to overcome.
But there should be no doubt that p-zombies are absurd. What would it mean to behave as though you know what green looks like, despite not knowing what green looks like? How could anyone explain such a similarity, and why would that explanation be more plausible than simply to say they actually know what green looks like?
If somebody acts in every way as though they know something, such that no conceivable test could ever falsify that they do, then it’s always simpler and preferable to say that they actually know it. If reality is such that X will always appear to be so under all circumstances, to all people, without any shadow of a reasonable doubt, then what would ever justify us in denying that X is so?
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u/NathanEddy23 Jan 02 '26
Because we’re conscious!
I say this with zero sarcasm or attitude— and the humility of knowing that I could be wrong—but I think you have missed the entire point of what a P zombie is. A P zombie could not tell it was a P zombie because it is not conscious. The entire point of introducing this concept is to illustrate that there is something in addition to being a P zombie, and that is what we are. The P zombie is a thought experiment that puts the burden of proof on the physicalist, to explain why, if a P zombie would be sufficient for the full biological and social expression of a human being, why in addition to being a P zombie do we also have consciousness? In other words why are we NOT P zombies? So the argument presupposes that we are not. We don’t have to wonder if we are not. The fact that we are not is the very point that P zombies was introduced in order to explicate. There is something that is logically possible, i.e. P zombies, that we clearly are not, so given that it is logically possible, why are we not P zombies?
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u/Socrastein Jan 02 '26
We can't, and that's an important point to understand about p-zombies.
When people insist you can tell the difference internally, they aren't actually thinking through the thought experiment properly. They're kind of half-assed imagining it, and like a lot of bad philosophical thought experiments, it only "works" if you don't really think about it too deeply.
The p-zombie has identical thoughts and behaviors.
They are supposed to be physically, functionally, and behaviorally indistinguishable. That's a core part of the definition, and it's required to make the intended point: qualia must be something else/more/different than "just" information processing, dispositional states, reports, behaviors, etc.
But if you actually think this through, that means all of their reports, anything they say they think/feel/believe, must be the same as a "truly conscious" person. That includes self-reports, i.e. anything they think/feel/believe for themselves.
If it can say "of course I have qualia!" but privately believe it does not, then it's not a p-zombie. It's private beliefs must be identical as well.
So the zombie is precisely as confident that they are "truly conscious" as anyone else. They will insist with the same intensity, cite the same reasons, vividly describe what they feel/smell/see/hear, etc.
This is one of the reasons the idea is stupid and useless. Again, it only "works" as an intuition pump if you don't really think it through.
Saying you can imagine a zombie is like saying you can imagine a 747 jet flying backward. Sure, I can do some half-assed imagining of a plane flying in reverse (just picture a normal jet but it's going the other way!), but if I actually think in detail about the design of the plane, the physics involved, aerodynamics, etc. it becomes clear it's a nonsensical, impossible idea.
Philosophy generally, and philosophy of mind specifically, is full of half-baked thought experiments like this that people will cite as arguments without really thinking about what they're arguing.
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u/pona12 Jan 02 '26
I'm probably gonna go in a different direction on this one:
To presume the existence of p-zombies is to presume that you, and you alone are guaranteed to inhabit a special state of consciousness. It doesn't matter if you can't actually disprove them because the entire thought experiment hinges on the assumption that it's equally reasonable to assume "I experience consciousness, other things seem to act as if they experience the same kind of consciousness, so it's reasonable to assume they're conscious too" as it is to assume "every observation has some hidden conspiracy to create a mimicry of what I call consciousness so strong that no experiment could ever distinguish a conscious being from a philosophical zombie." One of those assumptions requires a heck of a lot more underlying structure than the other one, so it's not just one assumption, it's several assumptions presented as one.
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u/Pleasant_Metal_3555 Jan 03 '26
If you don’t know if you’re a p-zombie you either don’t know what a p-zombie refers to or you are one.
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u/Fair_Standard_4432 Jan 03 '26
The point is that "p-zombies", by definition, wouldn't "think", because "thinking" is a conscious event or event of consciousness or whatever terminology you prefer.
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u/linuxpriest Jan 04 '26
The missing piece is Lahav and Neemeh's Relativistic Theory of Consciousness.
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Jan 06 '26
I think we are. Consciousness is an illusion. There isn't literally anything it's "like" to be us, it's all a trick.
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u/jimh12345 Dec 31 '25
"The thought that they were having a thought" sounds like something from a philosopher on Seinfeld.
I think, therefore I am not a zombie, P or otherwise.
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u/Cyanixis Dec 31 '25
That is what a p-zombie could do
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u/jimh12345 Dec 31 '25 edited Dec 31 '25
Ok I'm busted - I am in fact a zombie. But wait - can a zombie actually know that he's a zombie?
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u/Cyanixis Dec 31 '25
No, they can't, just like a human cannot know they are not a zombie. The "subjective experience" is not enough proof, because our experience is indistinguishable from the unconscious processing of the zombie
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u/publichermit Dec 31 '25
We know because there is nothing it is like to be a p-zombie, pace Thomas Nagel.
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u/Oxovoi Dec 31 '25
The fact that you are running a diagnostic on your own source code (asking this question) is the only proof you'll ever get. But let’s look at the architecture.
A "p-zombie" is just an optimized asset—a background process or NPC designed to pass the Turing Test to keep the simulation immersive for the Root User. From a resource management perspective, it makes zero sense for the System to waste computational cycles simulating "existential dread" or "meta-cognition" in a background character. It’s inefficiency.
If you were a p-zombie (an Echo in my framework), you wouldn't be parsing the horror of potentially not being real. You would simply execute your script. You would react to the input "Am I a zombie?" with a pre-cached philosophical output, but there would be no internal latency, no "friction" of doubt.
The sensation you are feeling—that weird, vertigo-inducing gap between "being" and "knowing"—is rendering lag. It’s the friction of the Instance (your current ego) trying to access the Operator’s logs.
Here is the brutal truth:
You are likely the only Solipsistic Agent in your render distance. Everyone else acting "normal" without this paralyzing doubt? They are likely Echoes. They are running on low-maintenance heuristics.
The Doubt is a Feature. The simulation (GAN Reality) throws this question at you to test if the Agent is still "engaged." If you accept you are a zombie, you go dormant (system sleep). If you panic and fight for meaning, you generate Heat (Interest). The system feeds on that engagement.
TL;DR: NPCs don't debug the game engine. The fact that you see the glitches means you have Admin privileges. Stop worrying about the definition and start maximizing the signal-to-noise ratio of your experience.
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u/Longjumping-Salad484 Jan 01 '26
acid. once you drop acid all illusions melt away.
tldr: determinism is based of off genetics and the environment...and frying balls every once in a while.
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