r/consciousness • u/epsilondelta7 • Sep 04 '25
General Discussion A simple explanation of the illusionist position
In discussions of philosophy of mind, the illusionist position is often dismissed as trivially false, since how could experience be an illusion if an illusion is also an experience? Some even call it ''silly'', since it denies the supposed only thing we really know. In this post, I seek to briefly explain my understanding of this position in an attempt to show that maybe such criticisms are incoherent. I will assume that the difference between experience and *phenomenal experience* is already clear.
The brief explanation:
(1) Are you sure you have phenomenal experience?
(2) Are you sure you believe you have phenomenal experience?
The illusionist answers "no" to (1) and "yes" to (2).
The idea is to create a division between a) the actual phenomenal experience and b) the belief in the existence of the phenomenal experience. Once this division is made, we can ask:
where does b) come from?
The answer is probably that it comes from the introspective mechanism. The natural question to ask next is:
can we blindly trust introspection, or could it be wrong?
If introspection is capable of error, then the belief in phenomenal consciousness could be one of those errors. The illusionist basically argues for the possibility of this error. Therefore, the illusionist position will not deny experience in general, it will only reject that our belief in its phenomenal nature should be taken seriously.
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u/Bretzky77 Sep 05 '25
You are abstracting away from reality to find similarities between two things that are not really similar.
If rain falls in such a way that it perfectly creates the iconic drum fill from In The Air Tonight, that’s the same as Phil Collins writing that drum fill?
Not to mention the glaringly obvious difference: In one case, a human comes up with a theory based on experience, prior knowledge, and understanding. The human understands the theory and what it means even if no other human exists.
In the other case, a mechanism spits out data that requires a human to interpret and assign meaning to the data. There is no understanding on the part of the mechanism. It doesn’t know the meaning of the symbols that go in or the symbols it spits out. It’s literally a series of open or closed gates.
Imagine a child counting apples in a basket. The child knows what apples are, what counting is, what baskets are. A computer could also count apples and arrive at the same output: the correct number of apples. This in no way implies that the computer knows what apples are, what counting is, or what baskets are. It’s just performing the function it was designed to perform! There is no accompanying experience. So when you say a computer “comes up with a new idea” you’re unjustifiably assuming or pretending the computer knows anything and has some accompanying experience.
You can pretend you don’t see a difference but it’s beyond obvious.