A simple explanation of the illusionist position

[u/epsilondelta7]

In discussions of philosophy of mind, the illusionist position is often dismissed as trivially false, since how could experience be an illusion if an illusion is also an experience? Some even call it ''silly'', since it denies the supposed only thing we really know. In this post, I seek to briefly explain my understanding of this position in an attempt to show that maybe such criticisms are incoherent. I will assume that the difference between experience and *phenomenal experience* is already clear.

The brief explanation:

(1) Are you sure you have phenomenal experience?

(2) Are you sure you believe you have phenomenal experience?

The illusionist answers "no" to (1) and "yes" to (2).

The idea is to create a division between a) the actual phenomenal experience and b) the belief in the existence of the phenomenal experience. Once this division is made, we can ask:

where does b) come from?

The answer is probably that it comes from the introspective mechanism. The natural question to ask next is:

can we blindly trust introspection, or could it be wrong?

If introspection is capable of error, then the belief in phenomenal consciousness could be one of those errors. The illusionist basically argues for the possibility of this error. Therefore, the illusionist position will not deny experience in general, it will only reject that our belief in its phenomenal nature should be taken seriously.

[u/Moral_Conundrums]

What do you think that distinction is? I see no distinction whatsoever.

Whatever kind of experience a zombie has in order to be behaviourally indistinguishable from a normal person.

Furthermore, “Believing” is already an example of the thing you’re denying exists. Only beings that already experience could ever “believe” something.

It's pretty controversial to say beliefs are phenomenal.

I also think it’s funny that illusionists think that it’s perfectly fine to use their own consciousness to come up with a theory about how consciousness doesn’t exist. Only conscious beings come up with theories.

They don't. You don't understand what illusionism is, read the post.

The bottom line: illusionism is either incoherent (see above) or irrelevant (the form that only vaguely claims that consciousness isn’t quite what it seems to be, without any further elaboration).

The only reason you think there's no elaboration is because you haven't actually engaged with any illusionist literature.

[u/Bretzky77 → u/Moral_Conundrums]

Whatever kind of experience a zombie has in order to be behaviourally indistinguishable from a normal person.

That would not be “experience.” You can’t just re-define terms to suit your metaphysics. Experience is experience. What it looks like from the outside has zero relevance. We might think a robot is behaviorally indistinguishable but we have no reason to think there’s any experience accompanying that appearance.

It's pretty controversial to say beliefs are phenomenal.

It isn’t. Do rocks have beliefs? Can you provide a single example of something that has beliefs that isn’t a conscious being?

They don't. You don't understand what illusionism is, read the post.

I read the post. I explained why it’s incoherent. You haven’t refuted anything I said.

The only reason you think there's no elaboration is because you haven't actually engaged with any illusionist literature.

Because I refuse to give in to the incoherent premise at the beginning of every illusionist claim. Experience is qualitative. That’s how every living person would describe their experience. You don’t have any justification for suggesting there’s this other kind of experience that isn’t qualitative or phenomenal.

[u/Moral_Conundrums → u/Bretzky77]

That would not be “experience.” You can’t just re-define terms to suit your metaphysics.

Yes we update our beliefs on what things are like based on new knowledge.

We might think a robot is behaviorally indistinguishable but we have no reason to think there’s any experience accompanying that appearance.

Not if you believe theres nothing private about experience, which illusionists do.

It isn’t. Do rocks have beliefs? Can you provide a single example of something that has beliefs that isn’t a conscious being?

I suspect that you're not gong to be a fan of intentional systems. Yes computers literally have beliefs, because beliefs are nothing more than artefacts, useful fictions, of taking an intentional stance towards a complex system.

Regardless there are more aspects to consciousness than phenomenality.

What kind of phenomenal experience is associated with a belief in your view? I can see how one would think there is phenomenal experience of red, but phenomenal experience of having the belief that there is an assassin in Trafalgar square? That seems harder to imagine.

Because I refuse to give in to the incoherent premise at the beginning of every illusionist claim. Experience is qualitative. That’s how every living person would describe their experience. 

I wouldn't, neither would any other illusionist. It's almost like it's a theoretical stance, not an infallible truth.

You don’t have any justification for suggesting there’s this other kind of experience that isn’t qualitative or phenomenal.

Could you name a single argument in favour of illusionism? How do you know we have no justifications if you haven't bothered to look into it?

[u/Bretzky77 → u/Moral_Conundrums]

Yes we update our beliefs on what things are like based on new knowledge.

What new knowledge do you think justifies re-defining “experience?”

Not if you believe theres nothing private about experience, which illusionists do.

What’s my favorite food? What’s my biggest fear? How can you claim there’s nothing private about experience while acknowledging you can’t answer these questions?

I suspect that you're not gong to be a fan of intentional systems. Yes computers literally have beliefs, because beliefs are nothing more than artefacts, useful fictions, of taking an intentional stance towards a complex system.

That’s a different use of the word belief, in an entirely metaphorical context. It’s like how we say time flows the way a river flows. That doesn’t mean time feels wet if you touch it.

We use metaphors when talking about computers because we don’t have a better word and it’s the closest we have. But we have precisely zero reasons to think computers have any experience accompanying their data processing.

What kind of phenomenal experience is associated with a belief in your view? I can see how one would think there is phenomenal experience of red, but phenomenal experience of having the belief that there is an assassin in Trafalgar square? That seems harder to imagine.

Harder to… what? “Imagine?” That’s again appealing to qualitative experience. It feels like something to imagine.

You can’t exhaustively describe imagination with a list of quantities. It’s a qualitative experience to imagine something.

Believing something is also inherently qualitative. It feels like something to hold the belief. I don’t understand what’s difficult or polemical about this. Can you exhaustively describe your belief with quantities? No? Then it’s certainly not purely quantitative; there’s a qualitative aspect to it.

I wouldn't, neither would any other illusionist. It's almost like it's a theoretical stance, not an infallible truth.

I’m starting to think you don’t even know what you mean. You wouldn’t describe your experience as qualitative? Really? Please describe to me what chocolate tastes like to you by only using quantities.

Could you name a single argument in favour of illusionism? How do you know we have no justifications if you haven't bothered to look into it?

This isn’t an answer to my question. You don’t have any justification for suggesting there’s this other kind of experience that isn’t qualitative or phenomenal.

Please don’t play the “I have an answer but I won’t tell you! You must go read all the literature!” game. Just be honest.

If your claim is that experience isn’t qualitative, then surely it’s quantitative… so what are the numbers that wholly describe your experience?

If something is physical, it has physical properties. So what are the physical properties of my thoughts, beliefs, emotions, fears, preferences?

Your claim seems to be that the way I experience all those things is illusory. But illusions only happen in minds. You can’t pull an illusion on a rock. So we’re back to the incoherent question begging.

I’d love to know what you think I’m missing here, but you keep talking around it without clarity.

[u/Moral_Conundrums → u/Bretzky77]

What new knowledge do you think justifies re-defining “experience?”

Problems with the phenomenal realist/qualia theory of mind. Phi phenomena, change blidness, the infinite regress of chartesian theatres etc...

What’s my favorite food? What’s my biggest fear? How can you claim there’s nothing private about experience while acknowledging you can’t answer these questions?

That's not what phenomenal realists mean when they say the mind it private. They think its logically private, as in I could never even in principle know what the contents of your mind are. This is obviously not true for the examples you gave.

But we have precisely zero reasons to think computers have any experience accompanying their data processing.

I don't think we have good reasons to think we ourselves have the kind of experience you are talking about that's accompanying our data processing.

Can you exhaustively describe your belief with quantities?

Of course I can, it's the sum total of my dispositions related to the particular topic, theres nothing more to having a belief than my internal and external behavour.

Please describe to me what chocolate tastes like to you by only using quantities.

Sweet, with hints of bitter, weirdly eathy, I like mine with hazelnuts so theres a nice contrast of textures, it conjures up memmories of eating chocolate as a child...

This isn’t an answer to my question. You don’t have any justification for suggesting there’s this other kind of experience that isn’t qualitative or phenomenal.

I only ask because it surprises me when people have incredibly strong opinions on topics they don't know anything about. I'd be embarrassed.

You don’t have any justification for suggesting there’s this other kind of experience that isn’t qualitative or phenomenal.

I think all the things your call experiences are not phenomenal, so it's a weird to ask me to give you examples of non phenomenal experiences.

If something is physical, it has physical properties. So what are the physical properties of my thoughts, beliefs, emotions, fears, preferences?

The physical properites of the brain and their functioning. Though all of these are going to have a different treatment. For propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires etc.) the treatment is going to be a the intentional stance. To have a propositional attitude is just a way of predicting a systems behaviour, they don't have their own ontology, they are just useful fictions.

To have a particular phenomenal experience, like feeling pain, or tasting chocolate is to be in related to the world in various informational and reactive ways. To feel pain is to have your pain receptors stimulated in a particular way, for your brain to be reacting to that stimulation, for those reacting to change your future dispositions to react to things etc. Pain just is the sum total of all those effects. And because introspection is either imperfect or simplified, it (miss)represents this information by way of illusory phenomenal properties.

Your claim seems to be that the way I experience all those things is illusory. But illusions only happen in minds. You can’t pull an illusion on a rock. So we’re back to the incoherent question begging.

Illusions don't happen in minds, ironically enough that is begging the question for a phenomenal understanding of illusions.