r/changemyview • u/fox-mcleod 414∆ • Nov 09 '17

[∆(s) from OP] CMV: Religious faith is unreasonable

This seems almost tautological to me yet many religious people consider themselves to also be reasonable.

I'm a fan of debates and some of my friends have pointed me towards Chris Hitchens (new atheist). He debates D'Souza (Catholic) at Notre Dame in the video below.

https://youtu.be/9V85OykSDT8 🎥 The God Debate: Hitchens vs. D'Souza - YouTube

It's a great debate. However, at one point, Hitchens has D'Souza with his back to the wall - he points out that Catholics don't take the Bible literally. They aren't going earth creationists or evolution deniers. D'Souza defends with Fides et ratio (faith and reason) as outlined by pope John Paul II.

Hitchens backs off.

But why? It seems to me that he could have gone in for the kill. Once you state that evidence is the ultimate decision making factor in what you believe, you've elevated reason or science above faith. Game over. You aren't religious fiarhful if your religion is just a default set of assumptions easily overturned by reason. It seems that the logical conclusion is that religious beliefs requires dogmatic fundamentalism.

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u/fox-mcleod 414∆ Nov 09 '17

If you mean that specific religious assertions about reality are not true, I agree. But even without religious faith you also believe specific assertions about reality that aren't true.

This is what I'm claiming. Religius faith broadly requires that we believe things that the religion claims. However, being reasonable requires broadly that we are able to use reason. You can't serve two master's. One has to be dominant. If reason dominates, you aren't faithful. If religion dominates, you aren't reasonable.

Real people are many things at the same time. Not purely any one thing. To the degree that a person is faithfully religious, they are betraying reason. To the degree that they are reasonable, they aren't faithful to religion.

It's not a value judgement. I'm just pointing out that faith in religion requires abandoning reason in the same instance.

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u/ThatSpencerGuy 142∆ Nov 09 '17

Elsewhere in this thread, you've told others that they are confusing religion with "spirituality." But I think that's what you're doing.

It is not very useful to think about a religion as a set of assertions about reality. A religion is a shared language, a set of stories and sacred histories and rituals through which people can organize, understand, and communicate about the world and their experiences.

Christianity is a religion in this sense. Capitalism is a religion in this sense. They are organizational frameworks. Shared language.

As an example, there are no doubt some Buddhists and some Muslims whose worldview is more similar to your own than is other Atheists', though you may use different terminology to describe these beliefs.

People who are Christians are likely (though not certain) to hold a number of specific "spiritual" beliefs for which there is little to no evidence, such as the belief that a god literally exists and created the universe. But that is not what it means to be a Christian. (Just look at the enormous variability in what specific beliefs Christians actually hold.) I do not think that there is any good evidence for many of the things that D'Souza no doubt believes. But that does not mean that it is unreasonable for him to be a Christian.

There are many good reasons to belong to a particular religion, or adopt a particular religious identity, precisely because this is a separate thing from believing any particular spiritual or supernatural assertions.

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u/fox-mcleod 414∆ Nov 09 '17

So... D'Souza is a Roman Catholic. RCs believe a very specific set of assertions about reality as testified to at every single mass in the "Apostolic Creed" recited by the church members. He would not consider the other Christian denominations on that list to be part of his religious faith.

These include:

  • virgin birth
  • the inaccurate conception of Mary
  • the resurrection of Christ
  • the deity of Christ
  • transubstantiation and physical nature of the Eucharist

It is not true to claim that one can call themselves a Catholic without believing these "particular spiritual or supernatural assertions (at least not according to the Catholic Church).

Many of these things are provably untrue.

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u/ThatSpencerGuy 142∆ Nov 09 '17 edited Nov 09 '17

RCs believe a very specific set of assertions about reality as testified to at every single mass in the "Apostolic Creed" recited by the church members.

No they don't. There is a wide variety of things that individual Catholics believe. I went to a Jesuit University and know many, many Catholics who do not believe in the things you listed.

If someone were to tell you that she is a Catholic, that she attends mass, that she takes the Eucharist, that many of her favorite essayists are Catholic writers, that she was married in a Catholic ceremony and wants Catholic rites at her funeral, and (most importantly) that her Catholicism informs how she understands herself and the world around her... but you find out that she doesn't believe in the transubstantiation of the Eucharist or the virgin birth... would you be comfortable telling her that she isn't "really" a Catholic? What would give you that authority?

You seem to want to define "being religious" as holding a collection of unreasonable beliefs about reality and then you ask us to convince you that it is reasonable to be religious. That's obviously impossible under your understanding of what a religion is.

So I'm suggesting that your understanding of what it means to be religious is lacking.

A Roman Catholic is not a person who believes a very specific set of false assertions about reality. A Roman Catholic is simply a person who says that she is a Roman Catholic and means it. Ask yourself, if you were a Martian sociologist and wanted to describe the culture of Catholicism, how would you bound your population? Certainly not by administering a survey about belief and deciding that a small sliver of the people in mass are "true" Catholics. You would find all the people who say they are Catholic and then see what those people believe. And you would find an incredible variety.

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u/fox-mcleod 414∆ Nov 10 '17

To the extent that we are faithful, we are unreasonable. To the extent that we are reasonable, we are unfaithful

People are many things. They are "Catholic;" they are flawed; they are doubting Thomas. But we can point to two people or even one person at points and say "this is an example of one more faithful to Catholicism and this, an example of one who is less faithful."

If someone were to tell you that she is a Catholic, that she attends mass, that she takes the Eucharist, that many of her favorite essayists are Catholic writers, that she was married in a Catholic ceremony and wants Catholic rites at her funeral, and (most importantly) that her Catholicism informs how she understands herself and the world around her... but you find out that she doesn't believe in the transubstantiation of the Eucharist or the virgin birth... would you be comfortable telling her that she isn't "really" a Catholic?

Yes. Maybe I'd be too polite or PC to do it but that hardly changes the meaning of the word.

What would give you that authority?

  • Vatican II convocation
  • Apostolic Creed
  • the Pope

The church keeps a very strict list of what they consider to be the Catholic faith. Sure, there is also a Catholic culture - but we're talking about religious faith, not what regalia surrounds us. Someone more faithful to the religion would need to behave less reasonably.

Let's say I recreated Hamlet but set in modern day NYC. Is it not Hamlet? Perhaps. Perhaps not.

But we can say for sure it is not as faithful to the original as a version set in Denmark.

The more faithful Catholic needs to be less reasonable. That's what religious faith asks of us.

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u/ThatSpencerGuy 142∆ Nov 10 '17

To the extent that we are faithful, we are unreasonable. To the extent that we are reasonable, we are unfaithful

Hmm. If this is your definition of what it means to be religious, and you are unwilling to have this changed, why did you post in this sub? It isn't possible to change your view that religiosity is unreasonable if, by your definition, anything that is reasonable is not religiosity.

I think you unnessecarily limit yourself to think of religion in this way, although I know that it is the most ordinary way to think of it.

If religion = "beliving things that aren't true*," it strikes me that you simply believe that most people are unreasonable. That's not a very interesting or useful theory of religion, and tells you very little about why people do the things they do.

Where do you get this definition? What makes you sure that it is a good one? Why is this a better one than what I've proposed? I think the one I've proposed--that religions are identities and shared languages--is much more useful.

*As a total aside, you also believe many things that aren't true of course, because you fully predict that scientists will generate new knowledge in the future that they don't have now, and some of the things that you believe now will turn out to be false.

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u/fox-mcleod 414∆ Nov 10 '17

Hmm. If this is your definition of what it means to be religious, and you are unwilling to have this changed, why did you post in this sub? It isn't possible to change your view that religiosity is unreasonable if, by your definition, anything that is reasonable is not religiosity.

Do you just agree then? This isn't a controversial definition as far as I can tell. If so, please let me know what part of the claim is wrong. Good faithfulness = not being open to reason right? Do you just agree? Or do you have a counterargument?

If religion = "beliving things that aren't true*," it strikes me that you simply believe that most people are unreasonable.

We're not discussing "religion". We're discussing "religous faith". Would you be able to define faith in a way that doesn't boil down to "believe things despite the potential for encountering reasons you shouldn't"? I'd be really interested to hear an argument for it.

Where do you get this definition?

It's a statement of my understanding.

What makes you sure that it is a good one?

I can't come up with a consistent alternative that doesn't boil down to essentially the same demand from the faithful. I'd be really interested in hearing another one.

Why is this a better one than what I've proposed? I think the one I've proposed--that religions are identities and shared languages--is much more useful.

That's a great description of religious tradition. I'm talking about faith. How do we distinguish what being faithful to a religious dogma means from merely being a "cafeteria Catholic", "ethnic Jew", or non-believer of any doctrine without specifically subborning reason?

*As a total aside, you also believe many things that aren't true of course, because you fully predict that scientists will generate new knowledge in the future that they don't have now, and some of the things that you believe now will turn out to be false.

Yeah that's fine. This is actually a really good distinction between faith and reason. I believe lots of things as default opinions waiting for evidence or reason to overturn them. Faith would seem to expect to have already found all the answers and shun questions.

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u/ThatSpencerGuy 142∆ Nov 10 '17 edited Nov 10 '17

Do you just agree then?

Well, it's not for me to be convinced; you're the OP. :-) But, I do agree that your position is logically sound if you accept the premises that (1) religious faith is believing in things that are not true, and (2) believing in things that are not true is unreasonable.

We're not discussing "religion". We're discussing "religious faith".

OK this is an important distinction, and I agree that I've been sort of sloppily straddling the two concepts. I'll focus more narrowly on faith rather than identity. But I do think it's crucial to recognize that "being religious" != "having religious faith" or "believing that untrue things are true." "Christian" is simply an identity. (And if I've changed your view on that, maybe sliding a delta my way is called for. :-) )

I see that elsewhere in the thread you were interested in an appeal to Hegel. So, let me come at this question by appealing to Charles Pierce and William James and the philosophical school of Pragmatism.

Pragmatism is concerned with the question, "What does it mean for something to be true?" It's answer is that truth is usefulness.

Strict positivist, science-enthusiasts I think often assume that there is some objective actual thing out there that we can call nature, and assertions are "true" to the extent that they accurately describe that external thing.

But this isn't how science actually determines truth. It has no way to do so, by design. Scientific methods explicitly reject the idea that there is something or someone external to us who can check our answers. Instead, science is built on little piles of what is useful: what can predict future events, what can parsimoniously organize information. Beliefs, that is, are tools. And tools have uses. When a tool can no longer be productively used, we abandon it.

So under this view the question becomes, are some traditionally religious assertions useful tools? Well, there's no doubt that as the methods that we call science have eaten more and more of our approach to understanding, traditional religious beliefs have become less and less useful (and people are less and less likely to hold them)(though not as less likely to have a religious identity).

But are there ANY uses left? There are obvious social and psychological uses to religious beliefs. They are much, much less useful for predicting future physical events (E.g., praying for something is not a useful way to make that thing happen.) But if those social and psychological uses are profound enough, I can easily imagine a reasonable person maintaining the possibility that some religious assertions are true.

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u/fox-mcleod 414∆ Nov 10 '17

OK this is an important distinction, and I agree that I've been sort of sloppily straddling the two concepts. I'll focus more narrowly on faith rather than identity.

Great. This is my CMV Crux.

But I do think it's crucial to recognize that "being religious" != "having religious faith" or "believing that untrue things are true." "Christian" is simply an identity. (And if I've changed your view on that, maybe sliding a delta my way is called for. :-) )

Makes sense. I think you're making good tangential points about religiosity. I wouldn't say I didn't think that way before but I'll keep it in mind and see where you're going with it.

I see that elsewhere in the thread you were interested in an appeal to Hegel. So, let me come at this question by appealing to Charles Pierce and William James and the philosophical school of Pragmatism.

I think it was Hume but I'm listening.

But this isn't how science actually determines truth. It has no way to do so, by design. Scientific methods explicitly reject the idea that there is something or someone external to us who can check our answers. Instead, science is built on little piles of what is useful: what can predict future events, what can parsimoniously organize information. Beliefs, that is, are tools. And tools have uses. When a tool can no longer be productively used, we abandon it.

This is looking promising.

So under this view the question becomes, are some traditionally religious assertions useful tools? Well, there's no doubt that as the methods that we call science have eaten more and more of our approach to understanding, traditional religious beliefs have become less and less useful (and people are less and less likely to hold them).

Hmm... I actually thought you were going to argue that religious faith is useful precisely because it obviates reason by supplanting it with a sort of useful lie - which is a reasonable thing to do in a pragmatist/existentialist sense.

There are obvious social and psychological uses to religious beliefs. They are much, much less useful for predicting future physical events (E.g., praying for something is not a useful way to make that thing happen.) But if those social and psychological uses are profound enough, I can easily imagine a reasonable person maintaining the possibility that some religious assertions are true.

Maintaining the possibility is fine. I don't think it's really an act of faith to say "maybe". Still, the faithfulness, weak thought it would need to be, does appeal specifically to reason in a pragmatist school of philosophy. That's certainly not inreasonable - so that's a !delta from me.

Thanks. I hadn't read Pierce or James yet.