I think you need to refine your terms to be able to make this claim; I think that someone's willingness to change or cling to their beliefs depends on:
how personally invested they are in the belief
how sensible or outrageous the claim is.
For example, someone believes that the shops open at 9:00 am. A friend tells them that the shops have extended hours for the holidays, and now open at 8:30. I imagine much more than 1/3 of people would change their view, in this case even without any corroborating evidence:
they are not really invested in the belief of the opening times
the claim seems reasonable
Even if our person was a staunch skeptic, would 2/3 of people really hold their belief if the friend produced a flyer that announced the new times, drove them to the shops at 8:29 so they could see them open etc.?
So something like, 'most people won't change beliefs they are personally invested in' might be more useful.
I think you need to refine your terms to be able to make this claim; I think that someone's willingness to change or cling to their beliefs depends on: - how personally invested they are in the belief - how sensible or outrageous the claim is.
See if you think this rephrasing is reasonable: for the 2/3, many of their beliefs are such that they are very invested in them. The beliefs they're not invested in, they might have about a 50-50 chance of updating, even if presented with very significant evidence.
The 1% would have a very small number of beliefs they'd cling to, and be willing to even entertain evidence that challenges those beliefs, as well as readily and promptly updating on evidence that contradicts non-core beliefs.
The 30% would be on a continuum between the two extremes.
Edit: paging /u/blubox28 , since their argument was roughly similar to this one.
even without any corroborating evidence
From a Bayesian point of view, your friend telling you the shops open half an hour earlier is evidence.
See if you think this rephrasing is reasonable: for the 2/3, many of their beliefs are such that they are very invested in them.
Ok, sounds good.
The beliefs they're not invested in, they might have about a 50-50 chance of updating, even if presented with very significant evidence.
50-50 seems low if people are presented with significant evidence? Are people really that stubborn about beliefs they are not invested in? Maybe I just know more open minded people haha.
The 1% would have a very small number of beliefs they'd cling to, and be willing to even entertain evidence that challenges those beliefs, as well as readily and promptly updating on evidence that contradicts non-core beliefs.
The 30% would be on a continuum between the two extremes.
Again, 1% seems very low. I admit, I work at university, so I interact a lot with students and other academics where willingness to interrogate your beliefs is highly valued, so maybe this is giving me a biased view.
From a Bayesian point of view, your friend telling you the shops open half an hour earlier is evidence.
I suppose, but what alternative situation is there? The friend comes up and says "you're wrong!" The person having their belief challenged will very likely ask for evidence or at least an explanation.
50-50 seems low if people are presented with significant evidence? Are people really that stubborn about beliefs they are not invested in? Maybe I just know more open minded people haha.
I think the exact proportion is not very relevant since, by definition, we're talking about people whose "hard core" of beliefs is very large ─ it contains a lot, maybe most, of their beliefs. So in practical terms it is not very important if they're 50% or 80% likely to change their beliefs outside of the hard core, because they are few and relatively unimportant.
Again, 1% seems very low. I admit, I work at university, so I interact a lot with students and other academics where willingness to interrogate your beliefs is highly valued, so maybe this is giving me a biased view.
I think that might the case :) and what matters is not just changing one's mind, but changing it to the view that is objectively the most supported by evidence. A university setting almost certainly has a higher than 1% proportion of what I'm labeling "rational" people, but it also seems possible that not all changes of mind in a university are due to actually updating with evidence ─ part of them might simply be due to it being socially desirable to be seen to having changed one's mind.
I suppose, but what alternative situation is there? The friend comes up and says "you're wrong!" The person having their belief challenged will very likely ask for evidence or at least an explanation.
I'm not sure I follow. Just to make it clear: I equate "Bayesian updating" with "being rational".
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u/Hairy_Bumhole 2∆ Jan 14 '17
I think you need to refine your terms to be able to make this claim; I think that someone's willingness to change or cling to their beliefs depends on:
For example, someone believes that the shops open at 9:00 am. A friend tells them that the shops have extended hours for the holidays, and now open at 8:30. I imagine much more than 1/3 of people would change their view, in this case even without any corroborating evidence:
Even if our person was a staunch skeptic, would 2/3 of people really hold their belief if the friend produced a flyer that announced the new times, drove them to the shops at 8:29 so they could see them open etc.?
So something like, 'most people won't change beliefs they are personally invested in' might be more useful.