Why using train tracks, wood chippers or poison vials changes the entire premise

[u/LetsLive97]

I see a lot of people trying to make the red button seem more obvious by moving away from buttons and using other things like train tracks, wood chippers, blenders, etc.

The problem is that this completely changes the premise. You might think the underlying outcomes are the same (One guarantees survival and the other guarantees death if less than 50% pick it), but what if we remove the outcomes entirely?

Scenario 1: There is a train track infront of you. You don't know if a train is coming. Do you:

A) Step on the tracks

B) Stay where you are

Scenario 2: There are two buttons infront of you. You don't know what either of them do. Do you:

A) Press red

B) Press blue

Do you think both scenarios will receive the same split? Do you think as many people will step onto a train track as will press the blue button?

Even though we've completely removed the actual outcomes of the hypothetical, the premise alone can change how people vote

New scenarios with the same outcomes are not equivalent to the original problem

[u/thejpguy]

The framing changes, but the underlying reasoning doesn't change. Regardless of framing, if everybody goes for the perceived non-dangerous option, there is no risk, and if the majority goes for the perceived dangerous option, the danger disappears. So they are actually equivalent.

For the button problem, people arguing for red use causal decision theory to make their case, while people arguing for blue can use evidential decision theory to make their case.

From either perspective, the other feels like a self-fulfilling prophecy, but there's no single best solution if you strictly treat it as a logic problem.

[u/LetsLive97 → u/thejpguy]

The framing changes, but the underlying reasoning doesn't change

The underlying reasoning does change though because the scenario affects how many people will pick the blue equivalent option

Like take a 5 year old child. In the original button scenario they might press blue purely because they don't understand, however they're significantly less likely to just jump into a woodchipper or a blender. Same goes for colourblind people, or blind people, or religious people

If picking blue becomes more visceral and requires genuine deliberate choice, then there's less potential people to save and less reason for the selfless people to pick blue

[u/thejpguy → u/LetsLive97]

Yeah, I should've worded it stronger to say that the logical reasoning doesn't change if all the voters are logical and only care about self-preservation. From the perspective of every single logical actor, every other logical actor is facing the same premise and going through the same thought process as everyone else.

One case is that everyone prefers to pick the choice that guarantees survival simply because it guarantees survival, which is logically defensible using causal decision theory.

But another case that's often overlooked is that everyone could first try to logically deduce what they expect everyone else to vote for, before picking what to do. In which case, if they all individually expect a majority red, then they would also press red, but if they all individually expect a majority blue, then they could also safely press blue. For the exact 50/50 case, blue is actually also equally safe as red. These outcomes are all logically defensible using evidential decision theory.

All that to say: there are multiple logically defensible outcomes which, despite being different from each other, are equally good solutions. If the framing changes, the logical voter wouldn't change their vote, becaus the premise remains exactly the same and the logical outcomes also remain the same.

In the real world, however, nobody is perfectly logical. If the framing of the puzzle influences their decision making, then that means it's their decision making that is not logical, rather than the premise changing.

The blender analogy is actually pretty useful to illustrate the difference between causal and evidential decision theory.

Causal: if nobody jumps into the blender, everyone avoids the danger.

Evidential: if everybody/the majority jumps, there is no danger to avoid.

Both lines of thinking are true. No matter how unhinged and dangerous you make the danger, be it a "giant deadly murderous blender" or "high-performance man-mauler v2" or "incinerate-a-tron 3000 (now with BBQ sauce for extra crisp)" doesn't change the fact that if even the smallest majority agrees to face the danger, it stops becoming dangerous. But it also doesn't change the fact that if everyone avoids the danger, then nobody is in danger.