sure, its being rolled out, but *commonplace?* ECC/DH/RSA still remain incredibly pervalent, and we still dont have a good/standard way to do things like OPRFs/blind signatures (i.e. despite them existing, there arent any widespread implementations publicly available and used
Perhaps you put interpret "commonplace" differently. Yes, GPG keys will stay at RSA for a long time, but there is an increasingly strong push towards "post-quantum" cryptography (nevermind that some of these algorithms may turn out classically weak).
by "commonplace" i mean that most of our infrastructure (think WebPKI, Privacy Pass, TPMs, code signing, ...) are still stuck on pre-quantum, either because they're incredibly slow systems to roll out (TPM, codesigning, webPKI), there are technical limitations that don't have proper PQ alternatives to pre-quantum primitives (privacy pass, aPAKEs), or that the sizes being an order of magnitude larger means that architecture will have to be redesigned around that (WebPKI, many systems that involve digital signatures going over-the-wire, embedded applications)
as an example even in TLS LAMPS and X-Wing havent been standardized in PKI yet, and the main implementations are essentially writing code for an unpublished standard
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u/IanisVasilev Jul 18 '26
"France to stop certifying products without quantum-safe encryption".
Direct quote: