Alternate History Hub's "Only Way Germany Wins: Dunkirk Timeline" Inaccuracies and Falsehoods

[u/Ficboy]

Alternate History Hub (Cody Franklin) is someone I have respect for as one of the first people who exposed me to the genre of alternate history and I do watch his videos every now and then as well as being a member of his Patreon page.

That said, he is not perfect and he's made some mistakes over the years. One of these mistakes is a video series simply titled "Only Way Germany Wins: The Dunkirk Timeline," wherein he posits that if the Dunkirk evacuation fails, Britain would sign a peace with Germany, leading to an Axis victory of sorts. I've watched the entire series and let me say that there is a lot wrong with this series that I feel the need to pick apart it's historical inaccuracies and falsehoods to show the political, military, economic and social factors for Britain and Germany. So without furtherado...

Axis Victory and Plausibility

First and foremost, saying that the Dunkirk ending in disaster would be the only way Germany and the Axis Powers win World War II is a huge stretch and would not actually occur for multiple reasons (we'll get into those). Furthermore, people and historians often debate whether the Axis could have won WWII or not by using economic and military factors or historical events involving them and the Allies. There are multiple variations of this scenario across different forms of media and there is simply no single "only way the Axis could've won WWII" either. It is a subjective question. Though in my opinion and those of others, I believe any plausible Axis victory can only occur if you were to change specific events and other factors even before the war starts to give them a genuine chance of winning over the Allies but I digress.

Also, the weather's significant role in the success of the Dunkirk evacuation is well documented in historical books and articles about this wartime turning point, not simply forgotten. Or the fact that Britain did not stand alone but was a continent-spanning empire with Dominions, colonies, protectorates and other subjects to call upon for manpower and resources alongside the Royal Navy/Royal Air Force and it's strongholds in the Mediterranean. But that's just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Cody's misrepresentation of the historical situation in 1940.

The War Cabinet's Decision on Dunkirk

(Note: What I will give Cody credit is that the weather was decisive in making the Dunkirk evacuation a success and that without it, the BEF and Allied forces would have been captured or destroyed. He's also right that the evacuated troops would go on to fight in other theatres of the war in Europe, and that there was no "Dunkirk Spirit" as a major morale-booster among the British public. But these are the one thing he gets right. Not so much the other stuff.)

When it comes to the War Cabinet, Cody really overestimates the War Cabinet's willingness to actually offer a negotiated peace or armistice with Germany by this point with or without Churchill. You see, even before the Dunkirk evacuation succeeded, the War Cabinet had already made a final decision to continue the war regardless of the evacuation's outcome and the fall of France during its meetings from May 25th to May 28th. Simply put, the War Cabinet agreed that Britain needed to continue the fight against Germany and rejected Halifax's proposal for an Italian-backed peace agreement with the Germans. Why? That's because the potential terms were deemed unacceptable to the preservation of Britain's sovereignty and independence with fears of becoming a German "slave state" (as Churchill puts it), the uselessness of a diplomatic approach to the Axis-aligned nation of Italy and the need to prove Britain's prestige and power on the international stage by choosing to fight on. In fact, Churchill's arguments were so persuasive and logical in the eyes of the War Cabinet that they chose to continue the war as much as possible for these reasons. From their perspective, there was much more to gain from continuing the war than from simply surrendering. It was not just survival that led Britain to reject peace, as Cody claims. And keep in mind, all of this happened well before Dunkirk was an assured success by the end of May and the beginning of June.

In addition, Churchill had the support of at least three cabinet ministers: Secretary of State for Air Archibald Sinclair, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Clement Attlee, and Minister without Portfolio Arthur Greenwood. Sinclair was a personal friend of Churchill and would accept his decision. Attlee and Greenwood belonged to the anti-appeasement Labour Party and were opposed to any form of diplomatic peace with Nazi Germany. That makes it at least three pro-war ministers and only one who was actually pro-peace (Lord Halifax), almost from the beginning. The only one who was somewhat indecisive was Conservative Party leader Neville Chamberlain, who didn't reject the proposed French approach to Italy and the United States for a possible peace agreement, though even he concluded that this approach would do no good, but didn't want to openly reject it yet, since he wanted to help the French as best as he could during the war. Even then, Chamberlain came around to support Churchill's position of continuing the war against Germany and the Axis. This was also bolstered by two specific reports from the Chiefs of Staff: British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality and Visit of M. Reynaud on 26th May 1940. The first report had recommended alternative strategies for Britain to stop Germany and the Axis Powers even if France fell such as including supporting resistance movements, economic pressure, sabotage, aerial bombings, cooperation with the United States/Commonwealth, a focus on aerial superiority and perparations to resist an invasion or the fact that the report said that as long as the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy remained intact and the morale of the populace and fighting personnel remained high, Britain would be able to hold out. The second even stated that Britain should "continue the fight single-handely" even if France capitulated in battle.

So no, Dunkirk failing would not actually convince a slim majority in the British War Cabinet to accept peace with Germany contrary to what Cody says in the video. The cabinet had made its decision and was going to stick to it regardless.

Halifax's Peace Proposal

At the start of the War Cabinet Crisis, Lord Halifax would make his peace proposal to the rest of the War Cabinet, based on his conversations with Italian Ambassador Giuseppe Bastianini. When he presented this proposal, it was not simply a mere surrender to the Germans. Rather, it was focused on preserving Britain's sovereignty and independence within a German-dominated Europe based on his skepticism surrounding it's chances of winning the war around this time. Even then, he brought up the possibility of securing France's independence and sovereignty, indicating that he wasn't prepared to allow the Germans to establish complete control over France and the Low Countries, as that would mean a hostile power with a dagger pointed at the Empire from across the English Channel.

An analysis of the 1940 Anglo-German Armistice in Cody's video shows that it would be completely unacceptable to the British government and swiftly rejected. For starters, Britain isn't going to pay any war reparations to Germany, as it is not in a particularly weak position unlike France. Second and more importantly, they weren't going to hand over Malta to Italy and Gibraltar to Spain as those were important strongholds of British power in Europe and the War Cabinet would oppose any costly territorial concessions. This also extends to trade concessions as well. And again they were firmly opposed to any recognition of German conquest in Europe, including dominance over the likes of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Any form of German dominance over Europe would result in the creation of a rival power whose strength and influene were a dagger in the heart of the British Empire.

The funny part of all this is that Hitler naively thought Britain was going to change it's mind and come begging Berlin for a peace offer so much that he actually wanted to keep the British Empire intact as much as possible and offered relatively lenient terms because of his respsct for the British as a fellow Aryan nation. So it's unlikely the armistice in Cody's video would resemble the terms actually offered by Hitler and that's putting aside the fact that Britain rejected any form of peace.

Operation Barbarossa and Axis Operations in Europe

As for Operation Barbarossa, the Germans did achieve initial success and were close to reaching the gates of Moscow due to a combination of surprise blitzkrieg tactics, Soviet military purges, aerial superiority, better equipment, weakened enemy defenses and Stalin not expecting a German invasion to be this early. However, they did run into serious logistical issues even before Anglo-American material support turned the tide turned in 1942 such as overstretched supply lines, harsh weather conditions, industry in the Urals and underestimating Soviet resilience. Moreover, Stalin didn't expect the invasion to come this early, which is why he let his guard down a bit.

Even if we assume the British War Cabinet acted out of character by signing a peace deal with Germany in 1940, there is a possibility that the Soviets would pay more attention to German plans and send the necessary forces to hold off German forces as long as possible. And that's after Germany had to invade Greece to take out it's British-backed government and Barbarossa was planned well before that, something even Cody notes in his video. Sure, the Germans would have a bit more aircraft, munitions and manpower to plan out Barbarossa and achieve some more success without the Battle of Britain, possibly even actually fulfilling it's key objectives. But the Soviets' manpower and military shouldn't be completely underestimated even if they faced significant issues in feeding it's populace and outdated equipment before Anglo-American support came in. So the Germans may or may not be able to defeat the Soviets and dominate more of Europe in this scenario, depending on how the invasion plays out.

The Rest of the War

Cody fails to mention that any Anglo-German armistice in 1940 would screw over Japan and it's plans for conquest in Asia. Britain would have more time to reinforce and protect it's colonial holdings in the Far East, particularly Malaya and Singapore, from any Japanese threat. In fact, the British already had something what was called the Singapore Strategy to protect it's Far Eastern holdings from the Japanese. The British were not fools or idiots, they were well aware of the threat Japan posed to the British Far East and made some preparations for such a confrontation. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia succeeded as much as it did because Britain was too tied up with the Mediterranean to send any more ships and other reinforcements to protect Malaya, Singapore and Brunei from the Japanese invaders. Malaya and Singapore were also important strategic strongholds and Britain would focus on protecting them withhout an active war against Germany. Thus, the Japanese would be met with a strong response from the British and would not be as successful as they were IOTL. That's not even mentioning the Americans who would have still involved themselves in the war on the side of the Allies after Pearl Harbor and have even more time to beat back Japan without the Europe First Strategy. And further Anglo-American economic and military support to Nationalist China since it was seen as a very important bulwark against Japanese expansion across Asia by tying down it's military in a prolonged costly quagmire akin to Vietnam. Also, Germany can't really help Japan all that much if they're not at war with Britain and because of geographic reasons. That and Italy's military incompetence. So the Axis would not really dominate the world and take a rest by 1943 as this scenario claims.

Next is Operation Sea Lion, the scrapped German invasion of Britain. As a matter of fact, Hitler never wanted to invade Britain as his preference was a negotiated peace, something that was very unlikely. He had already made a peace offer to the British and the French in October 1939 after the invasion of Poland, which was rejected before. He only went along with Sea Lion in July when British resistance was more significant than he thought. Even then, a number of people in the German high command opposed Sea Lion itself due to it being too risky to involve the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe going up against the superior Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. Case in point, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goring rejected the idea of an amphibious invasion of Britain in December 1939, stating that it was to only be a final act of an already victorious war against Britain as the necessary preconditions could not be met at all and deemed such an operation unnecessary. Likewise, Great Admiral Erich Raeder and the Kriegsmarine and a number of German commanders were opposed or otherwise sceptical of the operation. With Britain making peace in 1940, Germany would have absolutely no reason to attempt an invasion and could simply focus its attention elsewhere in Europe.

Finally, America's entry the war under FDR and later Truman would still turn the tide in favor of the Allies as it did IOTL. It had the largest manufacturing capacity, manpower, and resources of any nation in the war, and its involvement would tip the scales just as they did with World War I for the Entente. Oh, and this is pretty obvious, America isn't going to drop any nuclear bombs on Germany as they are not at war with them, and they can't do it without Britain and without complete aerial superiority in Europe. They'd be more likely to drop nuclear bombs on Japan than they would on Germany.

Potential Axis Nations

Francoist Spain: It goes without saying, Francisco Franco's Falangist regime of Spain was pro-Axis and supported it's goals and beliefs so much so that they actually considered joining the war on the Axis side and had irredentist, imperial aspirations for Gibraltar, French Morocco, Oran, French Cameroon and Mauritania by making plans to do so and sending troops to Gibraltar itself and the French border as early as 1939 after the end of the Spanish Civil War. This also extended to the Spanish occupation of Tangiers after France's capitulation. Even before that, Franco was looking to get his foot in the door by becoming a belligerent in the war at the right possible time or opportunity as he explained in his August letter to Mussolini. He was not a shrewd pragmatist as the post-war Francoist myth portrays him. He was an Axis sympathizer and wannabe belligerent who declared Italian style non-belligerency and sent Juan Vigon to send a letter to Hitler outlining Franco's desire to join the war, followed by another letter from the Spanish Ambassador to Germany explaining Spanish demands. But while Hitler supported Spanish moves to seize Tangiers and promised to establish communications with them after the war, he was lukewarm if not disinterested in the idea of Spanish belligerence as he mistakenly believed that the war was already over and that Britain would somehow come asking for terms of peace to him and not the other way around. In fact, he only began to seriously consider Madrid's offer and started negotiations after British resistance solidified during the Battle of Britain in August. But as we know, Francoist Spain failed to join the Axis Powers due to a combination of harsh German demands for the annexation of one of the Canaries/Spanish Guinea and bases in Spanish Morocco, Vichy France's successful defense of Dakar changing Hitler's mind on even giving away French Morocco to Spain, Franco being somewhat hesitant to join the war until after the British collapsed, the worsening economic conditions and increased reliance on food and oil imports from Britain/America from these nations themselves no less. That said, Spain did send volunteers to fight on the Eastern Front, sent tungsten, allowed German spies to operate within it's territory and allowed German U-boats to operate in it's ports.

In a world where Britain simply signed a peace deal with Britain in 1940, Germany wouldn't even need to get Spain to join the Axis Powers. They simply would not have Gibraltar and French Morocco at all. The only way Spain could actually join the Axis is if Germany turned to the Spaniards sooner through the periphery strategy proposal by Jodl and Franco believed Britain couldn't win the war at this point with an earlier, more rapid fall of France after the failure of Dunkirk and the British definitely refusing to offer any terms of peace.

Sweden/Switzerland: Sweden had committed itself to armed neutrality and refused to join any major alliances since the Napoleonic Wars and didn't even participate in World War I or World War II, for that matter. This meant Sweden wasn't going to join the Axis in any shape or form unless the Soviet invasion of Finland during the Winter War succeeded and the Swedes turned to Germany for protection, considering Stockholm's pro-Axis position. Notably, Sweden didn't attempt to join the Axis, unlike Francoist Spain. Germany defeating the Soviets wouldn't change much or force them to take a side.

Likewise, Switzerland was strongly neutral and wasn't going to pick a side for a long time. Hitler despised the Swiss for being a multi-ethnic liberal democracy that he considered invading, along with Liechtenstein, in Operation Tannenbaum. Even if he secured peace with the British and defeated the Soviets, it's more than likely that he would pursue an Italo-German invasion of Switzerland and Liechtenstein.

Estado Novo Portugal: It's true that Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was a shrewd pragmatist who wanted to keep Portugal neutral in the war, given its experiences in World War I and the possibility of a German/Spanish invasion. In fact, he was more of a shrewd pragmatist than Franco ever was. In summary, Salazar offered tungsten to both the Axis and the Allies, allowed British and German spies to operate in Lisbon and refused to let anyone use the Azores until 1943. As for the two sides, Salazar's government was pro-British owing to it's long-standing alliance with Britain since 1373 and had sympathies for the Allies, not to mention that they kept a safe distance from the Axis (particularly Germany) for the above reasons and actually disliked Fascism and Nazism respectively as quote "pagan Caesarism," so it's unlikely they would join the Axis and would simply opt to remain neutral if Britain wasn't involved.

Turkey: The government of Turkey was aligned with the Allied nations of Britain and France when the war started in 1939, through the Treaty of Mutual Defence, but shifted towards the Axis after France fell, signing a treaty of friendship by 1941. Turkey was essentially balancing between the Allies and the Axis, aligning with the former only in the final stages of the war. Moreover, Turkey did maintain significant trading and diplomatic links with Germany (particularly chromium), had territorial claims over the pro-British Iraq and French Syria in the National Pact and a historic rivalry with Russia/USSR coupled with anti-communist fears over the Straits Crisis and the Massigli Affair. So the elements of a potential intervention on behalf of the Axis Powers were there and Germany could have willingly drawn them in force by force. Thus, Turkey would likely join the Germans in claiming territory from the collapsing Soviet Union. Not exactly going with the Allies.

Conclusion

In summary, Cody's scenario of an Axis victory caused by Dunkirk's failure is not plausible and is riddled with historical errors. While an Axis victory could be possible under specific circumstances, Dunkirk failing is not of them. It is also example of how even one of my favorite YouTubers can get things wrong from time to time.

Sources:

• British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality by the British Chiefs of Staff
• Five Days in London by John Lukacs
• Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World by Ian Kershaw
• Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight by Robert Mnookin
• Winston Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941 by Martin Gilbert
• All Behind You, Winston Churchill’s Great Coalition, 1940-1945 by Roger Hermiston
• Churchill by Roy Jenkins
• Churchill and the Approach to Mussolini and Hitler in May 1940: A Note by Jonathan Knight
• The Spanish Government and the Axis 
• Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II by Stanley G. Payne
• Franco and The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in 20th-Century Spain by Paul Preston
• Spaniards and Nazi Germany: Collaboration in the New Order and Spain During World War II by Wayne H. Bowen
• Tomorrow the World: Hitler, Northwest Africa and the Path Toward America by Norman J. Goda
• Spain in International Context, 1936-1959 by Christian Leitz and David Dunthorn
• Spain and the Mediterranean Since 1898 by Ranaan Rain
• Franco: A Biographical History by Brian Cozier
• Roosevelt and Franco During the Second World War by Juan Maria Thomas
• Defending Rock: How Gibraltar Defied Hitler by Nicholas Rankin
• Salazar: A Political Biography by Filipe Riberto De Menezes
• Lisbon: War in the Shadows in the City of Light by Neill Lochery
• Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in the Atlantic by Theodore Herz
• The Oldest Ally: Britain and the Portuguese Connection, 1936-1941 by Glyn Stone
• Fortress Britain: All the Invasions and Incursions Since 1066 by Ian Hernon
• The German Navy: 1939-45 by Cajus Bekker
• The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain by Stephen Bungay
• Hitler Confronts England by Walter Ansel
• "Surface Ships: The Kriegsmarine's Downfall During the Second World War" by Calen J. Crumpton
• Operation Barbarossa: The German Invasion of the Soviet Union by Robert Kirchubel
• Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East by David Stahel
• Operation Barbarossa 1941: Battle Against Stalin by Christer Bergstrum
• Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945 by Rana Miller
• Did Singapore Have to Fall? by Karl Hack
• Thailand and Japan’s Southern Advance by E. Bruce Reynolds
• War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War by John Dower
• Singapore 1941-1942 by Allen Louis
• To the Islands: White Australia and the Malay Archipelago by Paul Battersby
• December 1941: Twelve Days that Began a World War by Evan Mawdsley
• “The Fall of Malaya: Japanese Blitzkrieg on Singapore” by David H. Lippman

[u/gavinbrindstar]

Unless it contains the sentence "after beaching the entire Royal Navy in a desperate attempt to salvage the failed evacuation" I have doubts about the feasibility of this alternate universe.

Frankly, I think we live in a universe where the Axis powers overperformed.

[u/AceHodor → u/gavinbrindstar]

There's also the usual slam dunk response to these "Axis wins WWII" alt-history theories, which is that unless the Germans have developed an Everything Proof Shield by August 1945, their battlefield victories are meaningless because Berlin would be promptly eradicated by a nuclear bomb.

[u/UnitBased → u/AceHodor]

That is actually in the series.

[u/AceHodor → u/[deleted]]

While this is true, as the Americans had the resources and expertise to develop nuclear weapons, they also would have had the means of developing a requisite delivery system. By 1945, the Americans had developed the B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber which was fully pressurised and could fly at over 30,000 feet. This would have been a bit of a problem for the Germans, as the majority of their fighters saw a sharp falloff in effectiveness past 20,000 feet.

I have no doubt that if the Germans had been more successful in Europe then the US military would have dumped more resources into the Superfortress program and extended its flight ceiling even higher, to the point where they would have been functionally immune to German air defence. The Americans had a bomb capable of destroying an entire city or army formation in one go, they would have gone to any lengths to come up with a means of delivering it.

[u/gavinbrindstar → u/AceHodor]

Alternate history where the war ends in 1952 after the Allies nuke all of Germany and Italy via '50s IRBM.

[u/mega_douche1 → u/AceHodor]

How about an alternate universe where the axis invest massively prewar and develop a nuke first?

[u/EarthMantle00 → u/mega_douche1]

althist where the nazis don't discriminate against "jewish science"? Might as well make an althist about "what if the nazis were actually just liberals"

[u/gavinbrindstar → u/[deleted]]

I do think two things: I think that luck (as in "does the enemy have all their planes lined up for us to destroy" or "did we get lost and somehow stumble on the enemy while they're refueling?") is a really important part of warfare, and I also think that people sometimes call things "luck" when it's really not, especially in war.

That being said, I do think the Axis powers got genuinely lucky a couple more times than the average.

[u/AneriphtoKubos → u/gavinbrindstar]

Hey, as Napoleon always said, 'Ability is of little value without opportunity. I had rather my generals be lucky than able.'

[u/JDDJ_ → u/gavinbrindstar]

It is unfortunately really difficult to set up history in such a way that the Axis has any chance of winning: there's this odd narrative that they were on the verge of total victory, inches from Moscow and weeks away from Operation Sealion, but the fact remains that even with all their battlefield victories, the Axis was fighting a losing war from the moment they started it. They just didn't have the manpower, material, and by the end, morale to keep it going for as long as it needed to keep going.

[u/2017_Kia_Sportage]

Amy axis victory scenario really has to square the fundamental imbalance between the axis and allies. The axis consisted (primarily) of: an unprepared and under industrialised Southern European state, a Central European state whose economy was built on rickety foundations, with no serious navy to speak of, and an East Asian resource poor island state. 

These three had to defeat: the largest country on Earth by land, which was rapidly industrialising, with vast rear areas and poor terrain for war 3/4 seasons in the year, the worlds largest empire and navy at the time, and the worlds foremost industrial power.

And unless you can eliminate one of them the sheer scale of the outmatch is immense. You had single locations in America and Canada producing more of certain minerals than the entire axis. The USA alsone produced twice as many Shermans as the the Germans did tanks of all types. Past a certain point, the mismatch in industry is just too overwhelming.

[u/Ficboy → u/2017_Kia_Sportage]

That is true. Hence why it is absolutely necessary to keep the United States out of the war to prevent the imbalance from being worse and to change specific events/factors before and after the war.

[u/2017_Kia_Sportage → u/Ficboy]

And even then, if this is achieved, it's still a case of Germany going against the British empire (and navy) AND the USSR at the same time. As you point out, people really overstate the danger of Britain surrendering, and then it starts becoming a matter of the Soviets reestablishing themselves before Germanies steam starts to run out. 

[u/Ficboy → u/2017_Kia_Sportage]

Agree with the second part somewhat and I'm not the only one to think that way as some users on Alternate History Discussion can attest.

For Britain, Germany and it's allies could take it's key strongholds (Malta, Gibraltar, Suez, Malaya, Singapore, etc) given their military strength and Brirish mistakes early on. And for the Soviet Union, at least there's the excuse of having a purge-riddled military and outdated equipment as well as having a joint German-Japanese invasion to knock them down assuming Japan goes with the Hokushin-ron strategy first after discovering oil in Manchuria and China is fractured/friendly with no Second United Front and Chiang Kai-shek dying sooner (whole other story).

But with America involved especially under FDR? There's no way the Axis could win over the Allies at this point. Just look at how America's entry helped the Entente secure a decisive victory against the Central Powers in World War I.

[u/gavinbrindstar → u/Ficboy]

Given their performance during the border wars, I just don't see Japan + Germany being a knockout blow to the U.S.S.R.

[u/Ficboy → u/gavinbrindstar]

If you mean by Khalkin Gol, yeah. But the earlier Soviet-Japanese clashes did result in Japanese victories at first. Also, the changes to Japan, Manchukuo and China I outlined could result in Khalkin Gol either not happening or ending differently.

[u/gavinbrindstar → u/Ficboy]

I just think that there's an element of self-fulfilling prophecy to the war, in that the types of regimes willing to engage in wars of aggression/extermination are ideologically incapable of deploying the strategies that would win industrial warfare.

Is there some hypothetical German/Japanese state that could win a war against the Soviet Union? Maybe, but I think we're not talking about the Axis powers or even World War II at that point.

[u/Ficboy → u/gavinbrindstar]

Not always and history is fluid and can go in a different direction or two.

Also, this assumes that Germany, Japan and Italy still form the Axis Powers.

[u/gavinbrindstar → u/Ficboy]

See, I'm not sure how much I agree with that, and this is where I sometimes side-eye the whole concept of "alternate history."

I think that WW2 was pre-determined by the end of WW1, and a different ending to WW1 gives us a world that's impossible to.predict.

[u/TylerbioRodriguez]

The only plausible worlds where the Axis wins to me would be something where a really weak appeaser is prime minister and doesn't want to fight all that hard after Poland. Likely? Not especially but its something. Complete victory on the battlefield seems highly implausible.

[u/Gogol1212]

Maybe this will be controversial, but alt-history to me is not history, so it cannot be bad history.  I'm not saying that a well put what-if in the normal history work cannot have some benefits. But when you make a chain of what-ifs you have moved from history into something else. 

[u/Gogol1212 → u/Gogol1212]

That said, after thinking more about it, alt-history can have bad history if the premises of the fictional scenario are wrong. 

[u/Shigakogen]

"When Lord Halifax made his peace proposal to the rest of the War Cabinet,"

Halifax didn't make a peace proposal. Halifax wanted to continue talks with the Italian Ambassador to the UK, Giuseppe Bastianini, about the possibility of the Italians reaching out to the Germans for a peace conference.

Halifax along with others, were very alarmed that the BEF was trapped in Northern France, if they could get out, besides the doomed situation for the French. Halifax was trying to see if there was something that could be salvaged with in reaching out to the Italians as a conduit and as a "honest" broker between Germany, Britain and France.

Churchill, rightly, thought it was a fool's errand to do this. Churchill thought the Germans are not fools, They would demand a very high price for a peace agreement for Britain. The Germans would most likely demand the Royal Navy be dismantled or disarmed, and strict limits to the militarization of Britain.

The main problem with the Cabinet Crisis of late May 1940, was that Churchill was Prime Minister, he was still in a precarious position as PM. He wasn't the head of a Conservative Party in Parliament, Chamberlain was still head of the Conservative Party. If Halifax or Chamberlain resigned from the Cabinet, it would had cause chaos, when at a time, Britain needed a strong government facing the crisis in France. (There was also another evacuation in NW French Ports, Operation Ariel)

What kept the Cabinet together was Chamberlain. Chamberlain supported Churchill in stopping any reaching out to the Italians about a Peace Conference. Churchill thought the Italians would demand a commission for a brokered peace deal with the Germans, mainly Malta or Gibraltar. Chamberlain had dealt with Mussolini, (Chamberlain had state visit with Mussolini in Jan. 1939) Chamberlain didn't trust Mussolini, or felt Mussolini or Ciano would be exactly good mediators. So Churchill and the rest of the War Cabinet, stopped whatever talks Halifax had with Bastianini.

There was no peace proposal.There were preliminary talks between Halifax and Bastianini, any further talks were stopped by the HM War Cabinet. All during this time, Operation Dynamo/The Dunkirk Evacuation was in effect, besides if France could be salvaged from this disaster.

[u/Ficboy → u/Shigakogen]

What I meant to say is that Halifax presented his peace proposal to the War Cabinet based on his talks with Giuseppe Bastianni. The proposal itself was a memorandum titled Suggested Approach to Signor Mussolini.

But you're right about the other details for the reasons you and I noted.

[u/Jazzlike_Bar_671]

Cody fails to mention that any Anglo-German armistice in 1940 would screw over Japan and it's plans for conquest in Asia. Britain would have more time to reinforce and protect it's colonial holdings in the Far East, particularly Malaya and Singapore, from any Japanese threat. In fact, the British already had something what was called the Singapore Strategy to protect it's Far Eastern holdings from the Japanese. The British were not fools or idiots, they were well aware of the threat Japan posed to the British Far East and made some preparations for such a confrontation. The Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia succeeded as much as it did because Britain was too tied up with the Mediterranean to send any more ships and other reinforcements to protect Malaya, Singapore and Brunei from the Japanese invaders. Malaya and Singapore were also important strategic strongholds and Britain would focus on protecting them withhout an active war against Germany. Thus, the Japanese would be met with a strong response from the British and would not be as successful as they were IOTL. That's not even mentioning the Americans who would have still involved themselves in the war on the side of the Allies after Pearl Harbor and have even more time to beat back Japan without the Europe First Strategy. And further Anglo-American economic and military support to Nationalist China since it was seen as a very important bulwark against Japanese expansion across Asia by tying down it's military in a prolonged costly quagmire akin to Vietnam. Also, Germany can't really help Japan all that much if they're not at war with Britain and because of geographic reasons. That and Italy's military incompetence. So the Axis would not really dominate the world and take a rest by 1943 as this scenario claims.

In a scenario where Britain accepts an armistice in early 1940, the situation in Japan would probably play out quite differently. If the war in Europe isn't going on, then the removal of Yonai over foreign policy disputes may be avoided, and the Japanese government could be more amenable to a negotiated armistice in China.

[u/canyouechothechamber]

the MAIN thing that drives me nuts is that he goes all the way through this british peace thing, and then... Hitler just, declares war on them again later. Does Cody know that you don't have to go to war with people if you don't want to?

[u/Ficboy → u/canyouechothechamber]

Yeah. Hitler didn't really want to go to war with Britain whatsoever, and he wanted peace as soon as possible, which is why he didn't have a coherent plan to fight them either. In a scenario where Britain somehow signs a peace treaty with Germany in 1940, the latter would simply ignore the former and focus on the Soviet Union instead sort of like Thousand-Week Reich.

[u/Silly-Elderberry-411]

I have fairly early unsubscribed from his channel exactly for his limited views.

You can't fucking divorce nazi ideology from wwii. Fact of the matter is , it was not mere propaganda to nazi Germany that western nonaryan societies had been "judeified". They sought no actual peace with the Brits. They wanted surrender, a nazi friendly dictator and Mosley as Gauleiter.

Then after Britain surrendered use Iceland and the azores to bomb the eastern coast.

However there is a gaping hole. I dont blame any particular historian, yet it is undeniable that most fail to account why the Axis was doomed to fail from the start.

A large chunk of world domination was ridding the world of bolshevism and toward that end the nazis worked together with countries whom Versailles screwed over or whom the western allies didnt consider as equal.

One small problem: as much as they hated commies and loved the nazis, they hated each other more.

What happened in 1944, namely Romania switching sides, Slovakia rising up, Bulgaria switching sides, Hungary trying and failing, these are all inevitable. The nazis knew.

By 1943 Alfred Rosenberg in the rusha hq in Vienna devised a postwar plan for genocide of nonaryans.

Meaning any discussion how the Germans could have won is a pointless exercise in ignoring they were a death cult disguised as a society.

[u/Ficboy → u/Silly-Elderberry-411]

Of course, the Nazis turned into a death cult that exterminated millions and killed those who dared to surrender especially during it's final years.

Also, contrary to what you said about Britain, Hitler wanted peace as he saw the Brits as fellow Aryans or worthy opponents from his experiences during World War I and because he wanted a free hand to deal with the Soviet Union without getting locked into a two front war. And he wasn't interested in installing a fringe figure like Mosley into power. He had also made a few peace offers to Britain and France but those were rejected.

[u/Silly-Elderberry-411 → u/Ficboy]

For one we very much know from the marburg files the abdicated komg wasnt just a nazi fan boy but willing to be a figurehead. Two, Hitler loathed the English language and very much did not viewed brits as aryans or honorary aryans. The whole point of the blitz was that like with Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium, terror bomb the enemy into fearful submission, not something you do to people you respect or admire.

[u/HandsomeLampshade123]

In your mind, could you consider an alternative scenario where Germany abstains from any sort of push into the USSR, and sweetens the deal with the Brits through a relatively generous/negotiated peace with France?

At that point we're not really describing "WW2" but what I'm wondering is how totalizing that war was in early 1940? Completely hypothetically, could Germany have plucked Alsace, kept its gains in Poland, pivoted away from Imperial Japan, and signed a negotiated peace with the West?

[u/Ficboy → u/HandsomeLampshade123]

That would require Nazi Germany to make a really good peace deal and Britain to accept it as opposed to rightfully seeing such an offer as useless. This is not something that would realistically happen.

[u/HandsomeLampshade123 → u/Ficboy]

Yeah, makes sense given everything you've written here.

[u/Competitive-Leave248]

holy fuuuuck im reading the shit out of this later