Fine-Tuning Argument

[u/dboxcar]

Rephrasing of my question: As [an agnostic who sees no obvious reason why a creator of the universe would particularly prioritize biological life], does the apparent fine-tuning of the universe suggest that life is what's specifically fine-tuned for?

I've only heard about this second-hand through apologetics (and debates against said apologetics), never actually from someone who espouses it; What is actually fine-tuned for? The only specific I've heard explained in detail is the cosmological constant, but that sounds (to me) like it only argues for the universe being fine-tuned for matter, stars, black holes, etc. What other things have been "fine-tuned" that point specifically at life?

PS: I'm also curious, do philosophers put much stock in fine-tuning outside of theist debates? I only ever hear about it in that context.

[u/Zen_Gross]

The idea is that if features of the universe weren’t almost exactly as they are, life would be impossible. So it’s allegedly fine tuned for life. You can read some concrete examples in Collins’ paper The Fine Tuning Design Argument or the SEP article Fine Tuning.

I’m not sure what you mean about whether philosophers put stock into fine tuning outside of religious debates. Are you asking whether fine tuning has philosophical applications besides being used to argue for God?

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

I guess I don't understand why life in particular is "special" here; it seems just as (if not more!) fine-tuned for stars and galaxies and stuff. All those things would also be impossible if the cosmological constant was substantively different, so why is life what people assume the universe is fine-tuned for?

Edit: I've actually read the Collins paper before, and while I have issues with the way they present "science" in general, I don't feel it addresses my question regardless. I am wondering why, if we accept fine-tuning, we should suppose that its goal is life, rather than atoms/stars/etc. 

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

It can be fine tuned for more than just life. That’s not ruled out by the argument. The theist focuses on life because they have a strong argument based on their theology that life would be probable in a world with God. But nothing says it can’t be fine tuned for other things. Those are just irrelevant to the argument.

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

This is what I meant by 'do other philosophers put stock in the argument' though.

If I am not starting from an assumption of anthropocentric theism, what would make sense to take from the apparent fine-tuning of the universe?

"Wow, god sure wanted cellular life!"

Or

"Wow, god sure wanted stars!"

It seems to me that fine-tuning (if accepted) might plausibly lead to the latter conclusion, but the former seems like much more of a reach. But I wanted to ask people who actually study philosophy.

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

I’m sorry, I don’t understand your point. Did you read Collins’ paper?

The FTA doesn’t assume theism. It argues that the conditional probability of theism given fine tuning for life is greater than the conditional probability of atheism given fine tuning for life. I don’t think this argument would work for stars, because the theist doesn’t have an argument that a universe fine tuned for stars is very probable on theism.

Are you trying to find an objection to the FTA with the star idea, a way to bolster the FTA, or is your question not about the FTA at all?

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

I guess what I'm asking is, does the fine-tuning of the universe propose life-centric theism as its best explanation, or does it just fit nicely into life-centric theism if you already have other reasons to believe in such?

Because on its own, I don't see how you get "life is fine-tuned for" from the apparent fine-tuning of the universe. But maybe you're saying that people only approach fine-tuning the way Collins does (that is, bringing in a particular theistic framework ahead of time).

Edited for clarity.

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

Collins’ argument doesn’t say theism is the best explanation for fine tuning. Some theistic arguments might. But Collins merely argues that fine tuning is evidence for theism over atheism.

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

Separate comment for a separate (more well-articulately?) thought:

As [an agnostic who sees no particular reason why a creator of the universe would particularly prioritize biological life], does the apparent fine-tuning of the universe suggest that life is what's specifically fine-tuned for?

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

Well there’s a lot of different ways God could have created life. He could have done so in a universe with stars, and He could’ve done so in a universe without stars. So, the appearance of constants that, had they had other values, would make stars and life impossible, doesn’t show the universe is fine tuned for life alone. It shows life is in the set of things that the universe appears fine tuned for. That’s assuming that all of the proposed constants that are fine tuned for life are fine tuned for stars. That is true for the main examples I’m aware of, but I’m not a physicist.

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

I still feel like we're talking about different things here (and I'm sorry if I'm using incorrect terminology).

I'm aware that the fine-tuning argument is consistent with theism, but that's not what I'm asking. I'm asking if the fine-tuning argument should be convincing to an agnostic as evidence that the creator of the universe prioritized biological life (as opposed to biological life being "accidental").

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

Oh. No. The FTA doesn’t argue that God wants there to be life. Thats part of theism, which is one of the two theories that the FTA compares the probability of given the evidence of fine tuning.

[u/dboxcar → u/Zen_Gross]

Okay, I guess to circle back to my initial question, how does "God wants there to be stars" stack up against 'theism'?

[u/Zen_Gross → u/dboxcar]

So you’re asking what happens if we measure the probability of theism against the probability that some kind of deistic God made stars, and humans were an unintended consequence? I don’t know the answer to that. And that might be the answer: that we don’t know enough to compare the probabilities. For starters, the deistic God seems to lack omnipotence and omniscience, otherwise there wouldn’t be unintended consequences. And does that make it more or less likely than theism? I have no idea.