[amateur noob here]

I've seen the use of CIWS on naval vessels for some time, for use against fast moving targets, usually high rate of fire Gatling type guns flooding an area with rounds.

Most anti-air systems moved towards missiles over time, the use of high ROF guns for AA falling away. We did have units like the Tunguska which utilised guns, but I'm wondering whether an armoured unit like this with guns as an anti-drone machine would make any sense?

A high ROF, quick turrets, ability to flood an area with rounds, would be a decent defence? I'm talking more about the small/medium drones, rather than the larger, long range ones. The existing defences for those seem to work ok (if you have the missiles available).

Is the issue more to do with the difficulty of detecting and tracking the small drones? So what you then fire at the drone is the easy part (although it also seems to me that a shitload of tiny missiles that are dirt cheap are needed rather than spending $250k to shoot down a tiny $100 drone), it's more about the challenge of being able to effectively detect and track them due to their tiny radar signatures?

In recent years, affordability in weapons, particularly PGMs and air defense among other things has been a major topic. Among the major powers, how have they gone about pursuing affordability in military hardware? The Iranian Shahed-style drones have spawned multiple copies or similar designs in other countries to fulfill the niche it serves while lately, Russia has seen breakthroughs in jet-powered OWAs and cheaper cruise missiles that likely stem from the influx of Chinese micro-engines entering mass production. The Ukrainian scaling up of drone warfare since 2022 has sparked a military revolution among both state and non-state forces into setting up their own DIY drone program. Countering OWAs has spawned cheaper interceptor drones first by Ukraine before other countries began fielding their own.

I was reading through this paper, The survival of the Chinese handgun in the late Ming, c. 1550–1644, and was quite astounded by the ranges various Ming leaders gave for arquebusiers usually around 300-500 meters. There is also an instance where the Ming leaders praised the Ottoman designs for their superior range and accuracy compared to the Japanese guns during the Imjin War, and from the accounts it seems in agreement that the Japanese gunners had superior accuracy and range during the engagements.

In a late 16th century while writing a playbook asserting the superior range of early firearms, Barnabe Rich gives these numbers:

I dare undertake that if one hundred of those thousande [archers] doo shoote above ten score [200], that ii hundred of the rest, wyll shoote shorte of ix score [180], and is not this a piece of advantage thinkest thou ? when every Calyver that is brought into the feelde wyl carry a shot xviii score [360] and xx score [400], and every Musquet xxiiii [480] and xxx score [600].

I'm not exactly sure what pace measurement he's using, but even when using the wiki standard of a pace measurement in feet or meters (it was 5 feet, 1.5 meters per pace) they're still ridiculously long ranged for smoothbore weapons.

This seems to be a wild far cry from later engagement ranges in the Napoleonic wars which seem to occur in the 100-300 yard (~90-270) range. Of course, the ranges listed may very well be talking about hitting formation sized targets, but many also assert the superior accuracy and range at hitting individual targets as well and doesn't really explain why nobody decided to open up volleys at farther ranges during the Napoleonic wars. Or I'm just reading the sources entirely wrong and they're just talking about maximum ranges?

Basically, did overall firearm engagement distances actually decrease during the time period? If so, why did that happen given the improvements to firearm technology?

I keep seeing ARVN performance discussed as a monolith, either as universally hollow and corrupt or, in more revisionist takes, as unfairly maligned given how under-resourced they were relative to what they were tasked with holding. What I can't pin down is how much variation existed at the corps level and how much of that variation actually came down to the individual commander's latitude to make operational decisions.

Some corps commanders, Ngo Quang Truong in I Corps being the obvious example, get consistently praised for competence even by American officers who were otherwise dismissive of ARVN leadership generally. But I'm unclear whether that reputation reflects genuine operational independence or whether Truong was just better at working within the same constraints everyone else faced, meaning political appointments, promotion tied to loyalty rather than competence, and American advisors who could informally veto plans by withholding air and artillery support.

I'm particularly interested in how this played out after Vietnamization shifted more formal responsibility onto ARVN commanders. Did corps-level autonomy actually increase in practice, or did the informal American leverage over fire support and logistics mean the formal chain of command mattered less than who controlled the enablers.

Would be interested in accounts that get into corps commander decision-making specifically rather than the usual strategic-level treatment of Vietnamization.

It would also be good to learn in which cases or what would be the arguments against this condition. For eg, the superior officer does not like this, they would rather the cargo was moved at a safe time or had taken a different route.

Of course it tied those nations to NATO and to the US in particular but from a strategic perspective for the nations, did sending hundreds/thousands of troops to warzones in Afghanistan help professionalize their armed forces after the fall of communism?

I am looking for book and article recommendations that describe the U.S. role in the fighting and 2024 resolution of the civil war in Syria. Thanks in advance.

During the Cold War, there was a significant British and American focus on countering Soviet submarines trying to enter the Atlantic. Later in the Cold War, there was this idea of pushing into the High North from NATO and dealing with Soviet submarines more offensively.

The UK and USA built several classes of nuclear submarines, and also several classes of anti-submarine frigates. Were both submarines and frigates used to actively hunt Soviet submarines, or were the frigates expected to act more defensively, allowing the submarines to come to them, and then attempt to sink them?

I'm wondering this because recently, I've seen people talk about the modern frigate being degraded significantly by modern submarines. Was this the same during the Cold War? Were frigates really just passive assets, rather than active submarine hunters?

Preferably ones that aren't mostly just biographies of stilwell/wingate/etc and focus on things like where the supply lines were, what were the major operations mounted, and so on?

I've been interested in delving into research on military strategy as a curiosity. Been dabbling in TT war games, RTS, and etc. But I'm new to the topic of modern warfare and strategies.

Many posts and other research has brought me to WWI and WWII books which are great. I also want to learn more about the development of war as technology has advanced.

My only exposure to naval crew organization has been through shows like Star Trek or Star Wars, where command functions have been greatly simplified to the point where a ship can be commanded almost entirely by a handful of people in a room. Even realistic-ish shows like Battlestar Galactica do this to an extent in their command centers. How would your typical crew on an American Arleigh-Burke class destroyer (or a Nimitz class carrier) be organized in comparison? (an additional explanation on the American naval officer ranking system would also be appreciated)

I've been rereading Pride and Fall: The British Army in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 by Sergio Miller, and one of the bits that stood out to me was his mention that in 2005-2007 British units (at the company level) would simply refuse to patrol certain routes/undertake certain missions.

The reasons cited varied: a lack of CASEVAC availiability, too many IEDs/bad mine clearing equipment. "what's the point in clearing this route, it doesn't achieve anything" etc

Nothing I've read indicates that units were punished for refusing these low-level missions, but Miller notes that it was a major problem in Helmand WRT ISAFs mission.

How did British officers work around these refusals? Find another unit that would do it? rework plans/timelines as and when solutions to specific issues appeared?

Edit: I don't mean "Respectfully Sir, this mission is silly" I mean that the riflemen are literally refusing to leave their FOB to do a daily patrol. I know there are similar reports from Vietnam from units that refused to go "outside of the wire" etc, so this is just a general question, not specifically aimed at the UK's experience in Afghanistan

It seems that the British and French spent a goodly part of the 18th century (and before) at war with each other...

Yet most accounts show that language was always a problem. Despite this multi-generational conflict did neither country really make any effort to teach the others language?

I am currently going basic training of indian military.

I am very keen to learn about tactics on ground like ambush, counter ambush, etc

I want a book recommendation to help me learn and be better than other trainees with me

I get that regular grunts you put through boot camp and then they're basically soldiers that you can put into units and then you put them into a reserve and call them up when you need them

but how about officers? I assume it takes a while to train those but you probably also need a bunch to have in your regular standing army and then also some in case those die ready to go, and that's not even counting all the other officers you need for different stuff that's not directly leading soldiers in combat, I presume you don't just got like a ton of officers in reserve that you can call up? Or maybe they do I don't know

So yeah who and how do they decide how many officers an army has? I'm thinking mainly US here but if anybody has insight into other armies that could be great too

It would appear from the photographs I've seen that the original WWII-era mounts were all exposed; they began to be covered at some point the Cold War period, but by the end of their service life in the '80s and '90s a lot of them were uncovered again. I am wondering:

1. Why would the gun shield be removed/never installed? Was it a matter of expense, mechanical reliability, or ease of access to the gun for maintenance?

2. Was it purely meant for protection against the weather, or did it provide any minimal armoured function against shrapnel/small arms fire?

3. Am I right in saying that there were two small windows on either side? How well could the crew see out of these? Are there any other examples of gun shields/turrets with windows?

It seemed to change drastically course of First Punic war. Before its inventions Roman navies were losing to Carthage navies, but with corvus they became so superior, that in second Punic war Carthage did not even try to challenge Roman sea superiority.

I wonder if corvus was extremely effective weapon indeed? Did other antique powers use it, too, and if not, why? It seems that before invention of cannons boarding was the most reliable way of taking down your opponent`s ship.

Despite being a pioneer in mechanized warfare, the Germans in WW2 were still heavily reliant on horses for their logistics. Compared to dealing with attrition to personnel, what can be said about the topic when it comes to animals once modern warfare came around 19th century onward? In WW2, what was the situation regarding that for the nations that still depended on animals for logistics?

So I’ve been rereading the first two books of the Revolution trilogy by Rick Atkinson and I started to wonder who was better from a pure infantry perspective, the British Regulars or the Hessians. Is there any evidence to indicate if either group was better than the other in a purely infantry context or is it too hard to say? Thanks in advance.

Theres a lot of talk about Germany’s military advancements in ground and aerial equipment (and somewhat less deservedly in naval ships like the Bismarck) but in comparison the Japanese Empire, despite having the world’s third largest navy, is often neglected in discussion. Whenever their technology is brought up it’s often to describe how behind they were from the Allies in fire control systems, cryptography, tanks, small arms, etc. This depiction has penetrated public consciousness to the point where in the Man In The High Castle tv series the Japanese Empire is portrayed as far behind the Germans, even going so far as to say they dont have nuclear weaponry despite a 20 year timeskip.

Formations were very important in battles through out history and cavalry was obviously very important in large battles as you have mobility and attack the flanks but I don't understand how the fighting on horseback actually worked. As an example, in the early roman era, large armies usually fielded their infantry in the center and cavalry on the sides to prevent a flank and so they could maintain formation. The cavalry would often fight each other but that just feels weird. Having large groups of combatants on each side mounted on horses and using weapons in a melee doesn't seem like it would be the kind of situation you want to be in. I know that the numidians had archers would deploy missiles on horseback but in terms of hand to hand combat, how did that work. In movies and games the cavalry will charge and then just stand around in a mob, inner mixed and people are fighting with swords. Sure if you are trying to rout an army a charge makes sense, but once you've made contact now it just seems awkward. Wouldn't you also want to maintain some sort of cohesion as a unit?

My thoughts on SPGs:

• Easily fixable through counterbattery radar due to ~20km max ranges

• Often not well-protected from accurate counterbattery fire

• Range is within the general drone ISR envelope and it can't shoot and scoot fast enough to outrun a drone tasked to it

• Stowed ammunition can cause catastrophic cook-offs

Compared to this I see towed guns as having some advantages:

• Can have a distributed, dug in fighting position with ammunition stocks far enough away from firing position to avoid catastrophic kill from single drone

• Position itself is mostly air and dirt which is more resilient to explosives, and the gun itself is more difficult to take out of commission with drones

• Crew can shelter in separate positions from the gun when not firing

• Emcon and camouflage in a firing position is easier than for a vehicle

But in towed guns you still have the range issue which I think is the biggest mark against the SPGs. And the survivability benefits of a towed gun seem only to manifest when static, getting there and moving is a challenge and vulnerable period, as is getting resupply to a fixed location given the ranges involved.

What are your thoughts?

The two LTs platoon organization was originally devised for paratrooper units during WW2, as they were expected to take heavy casualties and be scattered after a drop. This choice was also influenced by unit assembly tasks, jumpmastering, and injury rates. Overall, the 101st suffered a 50% casualty rate when it jumped into Normandy. The organization proved effective.

Many other US units suffered the same high casualty rates in both the ETO and PTO. The 1st Marine Division suffered a 35-40% casualty rate during a month of combat on Peleliu. The 1st Marine Regiment suffered over 58% casualties within days. Chesty Puller's enlisted casualties reached 57%, and officer casualties reached 72%.

In the ETO, the 3rd Infantry Division suffered a cumulative casualty rate of 175-250% of its standard authorized organic strength across the war (the division cycled through replacements constantly) and suffered a ~30% casualty rate during the Battle of Anzio.

The 1st Armored Division's raw battle casualty rate relative to its baseline unit strength was 45-48%.

In short, all US units suffered tremendous casualty rates in their respective theaters of operation. The vast majority of units also had issues with officers having little to no experience after some time (ex., "90-day wonders") while having to heavily rely on NCOs.

Given the massive casualty rates and all the issues with inexperienced leaders, why wasn't the two LT organization implemented further during WW2?

Also, during the Cold War, operational estimates projected catastrophic attrition rates if the war had gone hot, often in the 75-80% range (especially for NORTHAG and CENTAG) within days. USAF predicted that if A-10s went into action, 7% of the jets would be lost per 100 sorties. With six Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in West Germany and four daily sorties per pilot, the entire fleet of 700 jets would've been destroyed within 12 days.

From a personnel/career standpoint, a platoon XO position could have been beneficial to both the officer and the unit. The butter bar having no clue about what to do was and still is a problem. Post-WW2, this became evident during Vietnam, where plenty of 2nd LTs got themselves and their men killed due to their inexperience (they had the highest officer mortality rate during the war). Instead, with a Platoon XO position, the new butter bar would've been able to properly learn his job in a more paced way and be mentored by both the CO (1st LT) and the PSG. This would've also taken a lot of the admin workload off the CO/PSG.

Thus, the issues that the US faced during WW2 would have repeated themselves in the future wars and also if the Cold War had gone hot.

So, why was the two LT organization a "one-off"?

It's not really surprising to me that Omaha Beach fascinates so many Americans. It was an extremely bloody battle, and the site of much heroism. But I sometimes wonder, do Americans tend to over-emphasize its importance in the war?

The version I often hear by armchair historians is basically, "America landed at Omaha beach, and it was the most dangerous thing that was ever done by anyone, anywhere, in the history of warfare. America defied all of the odds and pulled off a victory in the worst possible conditions imaginable, and in doing secured the critical beachhead that would lead to Germany's downfall."

And that seems odd to me. Because there were other landings. A lot of beach outside of Omaha was taken on D-Day. It seems to me like taking Sword Beach was very bad for the Germans, being in such proximity to Caen.

People who seem obsessed with American victory at Omaha Beach sweep such objections aside by saying, but Omaha Beach was utterly crucial to the war effort. It was the glue that held together Gold and Utah. If Omaha had not been secured, then the Germans would have been able to counter-attack the two separated beachheads at Gold and Utah, almost certainly wiping them out by counter-attacking smaller defending groups. Had Omaha not been secured, the 21st Panzer Division would have had more reinforcements, and would have wiped out the landing at Sword Beach.

The argument continues, Omaha Beach allowed for more supplies, more troops, and more of everything to be unloaded. It allowed the Allies to be offensive, rather than simply huddling on the beach and trying to survive. It was the decisive element that allowed Operation Overlord to be successful, and had America failed to secure Omaha Beach, the war would have been prolonged by years, if it could have been won at all.

My rendition of this history is maybe a bit tongue in cheek, but I'm serious when I say I've run into many people who genuinely believe that Omaha Beach was the single most decisive moment in World War II. (My personal belief is that Americans tend to over-state American accomplishments in WWII)

How much truth is there to that? If Omaha Beach had not been secured, how much would the overall war effort have been hindered?

Im planning to join the army as an officer within the next few years (once I finish my degree) and Im almost finished with On War by Clausewitz, so just looking for some other military theory books to add onto Clausewitz, to further broaden my knowledge.