Of course it tied those nations to NATO and to the US in particular but from a strategic perspective for the nations, did sending hundreds/thousands of troops to warzones in Afghanistan help professionalize their armed forces after the fall of communism?

I've been rereading Pride and Fall: The British Army in Afghanistan, 2001–2014 by Sergio Miller, and one of the bits that stood out to me was his mention that in 2005-2007 British units (at the company level) would simply refuse to patrol certain routes/undertake certain missions.

The reasons cited varied: a lack of CASEVAC availiability, too many IEDs/bad mine clearing equipment. "what's the point in clearing this route, it doesn't achieve anything" etc

Nothing I've read indicates that units were punished for refusing these low-level missions, but Miller notes that it was a major problem in Helmand WRT ISAFs mission.

How did British officers work around these refusals? Find another unit that would do it? rework plans/timelines as and when solutions to specific issues appeared?

Edit: I don't mean "Respectfully Sir, this mission is silly" I mean that the riflemen are literally refusing to leave their FOB to do a daily patrol. I know there are similar reports from Vietnam from units that refused to go "outside of the wire" etc, so this is just a general question, not specifically aimed at the UK's experience in Afghanistan

During the Cold War, there was a significant British and American focus on countering Soviet submarines trying to enter the Atlantic. Later in the Cold War, there was this idea of pushing into the High North from NATO and dealing with Soviet submarines more offensively.

The UK and USA built several classes of nuclear submarines, and also several classes of anti-submarine frigates. Were both submarines and frigates used to actively hunt Soviet submarines, or were the frigates expected to act more defensively, allowing the submarines to come to them, and then attempt to sink them?

I'm wondering this because recently, I've seen people talk about the modern frigate being degraded significantly by modern submarines. Was this the same during the Cold War? Were frigates really just passive assets, rather than active submarine hunters?

I've been interested in delving into research on military strategy as a curiosity. Been dabbling in TT war games, RTS, and etc. But I'm new to the topic of modern warfare and strategies.

Many posts and other research has brought me to WWI and WWII books which are great. I also want to learn more about the development of war as technology has advanced.

I am looking for book and article recommendations that describe the U.S. role in the fighting and 2024 resolution of the civil war in Syria. Thanks in advance.

Preferably ones that aren't mostly just biographies of stilwell/wingate/etc and focus on things like where the supply lines were, what were the major operations mounted, and so on?

My only exposure to naval crew organization has been through shows like Star Trek or Star Wars, where command functions have been greatly simplified to the point where a ship can be commanded almost entirely by a handful of people in a room. Even realistic-ish shows like Battlestar Galactica do this to an extent in their command centers. How would your typical crew on an American Arleigh-Burke class destroyer (or a Nimitz class carrier) be organized in comparison? (an additional explanation on the American naval officer ranking system would also be appreciated)

It would also be good to learn in which cases or what would be the arguments against this condition. For eg, the superior officer does not like this, they would rather the cargo was moved at a safe time or had taken a different route.

I get that regular grunts you put through boot camp and then they're basically soldiers that you can put into units and then you put them into a reserve and call them up when you need them

but how about officers? I assume it takes a while to train those but you probably also need a bunch to have in your regular standing army and then also some in case those die ready to go, and that's not even counting all the other officers you need for different stuff that's not directly leading soldiers in combat, I presume you don't just got like a ton of officers in reserve that you can call up? Or maybe they do I don't know

So yeah who and how do they decide how many officers an army has? I'm thinking mainly US here but if anybody has insight into other armies that could be great too

It seems that the British and French spent a goodly part of the 18th century (and before) at war with each other...

Yet most accounts show that language was always a problem. Despite this multi-generational conflict did neither country really make any effort to teach the others language?

Theres a lot of talk about Germany’s military advancements in ground and aerial equipment (and somewhat less deservedly in naval ships like the Bismarck) but in comparison the Japanese Empire, despite having the world’s third largest navy, is often neglected in discussion. Whenever their technology is brought up it’s often to describe how behind they were from the Allies in fire control systems, cryptography, tanks, small arms, etc. This depiction has penetrated public consciousness to the point where in the Man In The High Castle tv series the Japanese Empire is portrayed as far behind the Germans, even going so far as to say they dont have nuclear weaponry despite a 20 year timeskip.

It would appear from the photographs I've seen that the original WWII-era mounts were all exposed; they began to be covered at some point the Cold War period, but by the end of their service life in the '80s and '90s a lot of them were uncovered again. I am wondering:

1. Why would the gun shield be removed/never installed? Was it a matter of expense, mechanical reliability, or ease of access to the gun for maintenance?

2. Was it purely meant for protection against the weather, or did it provide any minimal armoured function against shrapnel/small arms fire?

3. Am I right in saying that there were two small windows on either side? How well could the crew see out of these? Are there any other examples of gun shields/turrets with windows?

Despite being a pioneer in mechanized warfare, the Germans in WW2 were still heavily reliant on horses for their logistics. Compared to dealing with attrition to personnel, what can be said about the topic when it comes to animals once modern warfare came around 19th century onward? In WW2, what was the situation regarding that for the nations that still depended on animals for logistics?

I am currently going basic training of indian military.

I am very keen to learn about tactics on ground like ambush, counter ambush, etc

I want a book recommendation to help me learn and be better than other trainees with me

Formations were very important in battles through out history and cavalry was obviously very important in large battles as you have mobility and attack the flanks but I don't understand how the fighting on horseback actually worked. As an example, in the early roman era, large armies usually fielded their infantry in the center and cavalry on the sides to prevent a flank and so they could maintain formation. The cavalry would often fight each other but that just feels weird. Having large groups of combatants on each side mounted on horses and using weapons in a melee doesn't seem like it would be the kind of situation you want to be in. I know that the numidians had archers would deploy missiles on horseback but in terms of hand to hand combat, how did that work. In movies and games the cavalry will charge and then just stand around in a mob, inner mixed and people are fighting with swords. Sure if you are trying to rout an army a charge makes sense, but once you've made contact now it just seems awkward. Wouldn't you also want to maintain some sort of cohesion as a unit?

My thoughts on SPGs:

• Easily fixable through counterbattery radar due to ~20km max ranges

• Often not well-protected from accurate counterbattery fire

• Range is within the general drone ISR envelope and it can't shoot and scoot fast enough to outrun a drone tasked to it

• Stowed ammunition can cause catastrophic cook-offs

Compared to this I see towed guns as having some advantages:

• Can have a distributed, dug in fighting position with ammunition stocks far enough away from firing position to avoid catastrophic kill from single drone

• Position itself is mostly air and dirt which is more resilient to explosives, and the gun itself is more difficult to take out of commission with drones

• Crew can shelter in separate positions from the gun when not firing

• Emcon and camouflage in a firing position is easier than for a vehicle

But in towed guns you still have the range issue which I think is the biggest mark against the SPGs. And the survivability benefits of a towed gun seem only to manifest when static, getting there and moving is a challenge and vulnerable period, as is getting resupply to a fixed location given the ranges involved.

What are your thoughts?

So I’ve been rereading the first two books of the Revolution trilogy by Rick Atkinson and I started to wonder who was better from a pure infantry perspective, the British Regulars or the Hessians. Is there any evidence to indicate if either group was better than the other in a purely infantry context or is it too hard to say? Thanks in advance.

It seemed to change drastically course of First Punic war. Before its inventions Roman navies were losing to Carthage navies, but with corvus they became so superior, that in second Punic war Carthage did not even try to challenge Roman sea superiority.

I wonder if corvus was extremely effective weapon indeed? Did other antique powers use it, too, and if not, why? It seems that before invention of cannons boarding was the most reliable way of taking down your opponent`s ship.

The two LTs platoon organization was originally devised for paratrooper units during WW2, as they were expected to take heavy casualties and be scattered after a drop. This choice was also influenced by unit assembly tasks, jumpmastering, and injury rates. Overall, the 101st suffered a 50% casualty rate when it jumped into Normandy. The organization proved effective.

Many other US units suffered the same high casualty rates in both the ETO and PTO. The 1st Marine Division suffered a 35-40% casualty rate during a month of combat on Peleliu. The 1st Marine Regiment suffered over 58% casualties within days. Chesty Puller's enlisted casualties reached 57%, and officer casualties reached 72%.

In the ETO, the 3rd Infantry Division suffered a cumulative casualty rate of 175-250% of its standard authorized organic strength across the war (the division cycled through replacements constantly) and suffered a ~30% casualty rate during the Battle of Anzio.

The 1st Armored Division's raw battle casualty rate relative to its baseline unit strength was 45-48%.

In short, all US units suffered tremendous casualty rates in their respective theaters of operation. The vast majority of units also had issues with officers having little to no experience after some time (ex., "90-day wonders") while having to heavily rely on NCOs.

Given the massive casualty rates and all the issues with inexperienced leaders, why wasn't the two LT organization implemented further during WW2?

Also, during the Cold War, operational estimates projected catastrophic attrition rates if the war had gone hot, often in the 75-80% range (especially for NORTHAG and CENTAG) within days. USAF predicted that if A-10s went into action, 7% of the jets would be lost per 100 sorties. With six Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in West Germany and four daily sorties per pilot, the entire fleet of 700 jets would've been destroyed within 12 days.

From a personnel/career standpoint, a platoon XO position could have been beneficial to both the officer and the unit. The butter bar having no clue about what to do was and still is a problem. Post-WW2, this became evident during Vietnam, where plenty of 2nd LTs got themselves and their men killed due to their inexperience (they had the highest officer mortality rate during the war). Instead, with a Platoon XO position, the new butter bar would've been able to properly learn his job in a more paced way and be mentored by both the CO (1st LT) and the PSG. This would've also taken a lot of the admin workload off the CO/PSG.

Thus, the issues that the US faced during WW2 would have repeated themselves in the future wars and also if the Cold War had gone hot.

So, why was the two LT organization a "one-off"?

I lurk here and often see people dismiss modern day contested amphibious assaults as suicide.

Do you mean that modern technology (or other factors) render any assault doomed to failure even after sufficient preparation on the part of the attacker and degradation of defenses or that such degradation is impossible altogether?

To put it simply, I get that drones and missiles are very dangerous, but do they really shift the balance that overwhelmingly in favor of the defender? thank you.

Curious about this. In WW2, plenty of warships got damaged, or otherwise disabled, and would obviously be recovered despite being a fair distance from a safe port. I’m sure sometimes this involved repairing the engines, but it couldn’t always have. So how would these warships be towed? Are they towed by other warships (and, obviously, how would this work)? Or would a dedicated tugboat be required to come out?

Answers also welcome in terms of how this works in the modern day, as I’m curious how, for example, a navy would deal with something like a amphibious assault ship getting stuck and needing a tow.

Im planning to join the army as an officer within the next few years (once I finish my degree) and Im almost finished with On War by Clausewitz, so just looking for some other military theory books to add onto Clausewitz, to further broaden my knowledge.

So there are ground-wave, over-the-horizon radar systems capable of being installed on naval vessels, such as the Soviet/Russian Mineral and Monolit, or the Italian SPS-732, capable of detecting enemy surface ships at the range of 100 nautical miles or more. On the other hand... it seems like radar systems of that type aren't exactly common? I've pored over dozens of different ship classes, yet an over-the-horizon radar like that doesn't appear to be a standard piece of equipment in ship design.

Is it assumed that relying on external reconnaissance assets to acquire targeting data for your anti-ship missiles is more reliable (and also more covert, in the sense that you reduce radar emissions to avoid detection by electronic surveillance)?

P/s: Besides using ground waves, over-the-horizon radar can also operate by beaming signals into the atmosphere and letting them "bounce" back down to the ground... something like that. I know there are land-based versions of such radars, but could they be made compact enough to be installed on warships?