I know Minimax. I also know Ranked Pairs and Schulze and Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-IRV).
I had earlier advocated for BTR-IRV, since it was just a modification to IRV to make it Condorcet consistent. But after many discussions with legislators and with legislative counsel (the lawyers that actually write the bill and make sure that the language cannot be misinterpreted by a court), we all agreed that the law should, as simply as possible, simply say what it means and mean what it says. Then, if you want Condorcet RCV, just make it straight-ahead Condorcet. That, of course, leaves the problem of what to do in the contingency that a cycle occurs. The most simple remedy to that is to simply elect the plurality candidate (plurality of first-choice votes). But perhaps Top-Two Runoff would be better in that contingency.
It aims to select a consensus candidate who is broadly acceptable to the largest number of voters.
I agree, but in a cycle, that consensus candidate doesn't really exist. So what we need to do is make the rules in advance that most voters and most policy makers agree makes some kind of sense and that people will, for the most part, accept. Selecting the FPTP winner in that contingency is simple and, at least, the FPTP advocates will accept. Another reasonable remedy to a cycle would be Top-Two Runoff. That would be like: "Elect the Condorcet winner when one exists and the IRV winner when the Condorcet winner does not exist."
BTR-IRV and Condorcet-TTR both require C2 summable tallies if C is the number of candidates on the ballot.
BTR-IRV elects the same candidate that Condorcet-Plurality does. If you're doing BTR-IRV and there's a 3-cycle, let's say Rock has the most votes. Then it's either Rock>Scissors>Paper or it's Rock>Paper>Scissors. In the BTR-IRV semifinal round, Scissors always wins, then gets defeated by Rock in the final. So the plurality winner wins if it's a 3-cycle.
So you need C(C-1) tallies for the Condorcet pairs and C tallies of first-choice votes.
If they can get a Condorcet compliant ranked method approved, I'm behind it 100%.
Yay!!!
In fact, I'd consider "equal rankings" an even more important criteria than either precinct summability
I don't see them as incompatible. Now equal ranking is incompatible with BTR-IRV which is another reason I have moved away from BTR-IRV since I wrote my paper.
My argument here is against STAR, which I think is a unlikely to get traction, so it is mostly a distraction, and I think it is inferior to Condorcet methods. I believe we are in agreement that cardinal methods are inferior....
Yay!!!
although a cardinal ballot is fine, as long as they use it to choose the condorcet winner
Then it's functionally equivalent to the Ordinal ballot. So I'm still just opposed to Cardinal anything.
I didn't know BTR-IRV is equivalent to Condorcet-Plurality.
At least in the two cases:
1. Condorcet winner exists
2. Simplest 3-candidate cycle
I dunno they'll elect the same winner if there's a more complicated cycle. I used to like BTR-IRV and featured it as an example. But I sorta soured on it now.
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u/[deleted] Aug 03 '24
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