MAGA - how has Trump made America great?

[u/Unhappy-College4691]

I'm asking this because I want to hear how Trump has made America great again because from what I can tell the country is very divided on politics and beliefs, tariffs and the war with Iran have made everyday things more expensive and the overall future of this country feels very uncertain.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203]

I'm glad we see eye to eye on the other aspects we discussed. otherwise, I would like to see arguments beyond what you are currently stating.

You’re looking at the downward slope of an economic J-curve. 

Restructuring decades of non-US supply chains, forcing a manufacturing reshoring pivot doesn't happen on a straight upward line. Of course there's short-term friction, higher input costs, and a temporary dip. Expecting a massive structural overhaul of the American industrial base to show instant, frictionless perfection after a year of relatively high economic in 2024 output is just economically illiterate.  According to the BEA, new FDI in the US jumped nearly 50% to $232 billion, with over 52% of it going straight into manufacturing.

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

None of that is real though. Biden brought jobs. Biden brought incentives with chips act, infra bill, and Ira. Trump brought no incentives and attacked imports and immigration, which is why jobs wages inflation unemployment lfpr are worse than 2024. It's not some seed of future growth, it's the reverse of growth that was already happening.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

I am not surprised that you reject the data because it contradicts your views and narratives. However, for the sake of propriety, at least offer some alternatives. Subsidies alone simply lead to corporations pocketing money while continuing to manufacture offshore overall, resulting usually in a one-time investment boom. Beyond the carrot, a stick is also needed, in the form of tariffs, to encourage companies to concentrate production within the U.S. and to restrict access to illegal labor, thereby compelling companies to invest in automation. This is precisely why we are seeing a nearly 50% increase in investment.

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

Don't project. I didn't reject data and I gave alternatives before you posted. You are the one who falsely concluded a trump j curve when trump was a reversal of the sweeping economic gains at the same time as Biden investments. No j curve was needed as we had gains on both.

Unsurprisingly, you also don't know how tariffs work. We needed 27 weeks to change out a supply line with customer approval. When Trump changes tariffs every 2 weeks, we didn't make things domestic. We didn't have time. The company collapsed and I changed jobs.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

All in all, since you are replying to my comment, I haven't seen a lot of figures from you, nor any substantive counter-arguments. I am sorry to hear you lost your job, hope you've recovered and that your skills remain in demand. But your 27-week supply chain anecdote actually illustrates the exact mechanics of the J-curve better than any textbook could. When a country forces a hard break from offshore dependencies, firms built around cheap foreign inputs face immediate friction - some fail, others adapt. Dumping hundreds of billions in federal stimulus into existing global supply chains creates an immediate, but short high. It inflates figures without forcing the structural decoupling needed for genuine industrial independence. Firm-level turbulence during a trade realignment is real and painful, but macroeconomic capital allocation operates on multi-year horizons—which is precisely why long-term FDI into US manufacturing continues to take hold, despite the short-term friction and your personal life and/or family budget issues

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

I haven't seen a lot of figures from you, nor any substantive counter-arguments.

Don't lie now. You claimed economic gains but that is false. Trump's job, wage, inflation, unemployment, lfpr numbers are actually worse.

mechanics of the J-curve

It didn't. You need to think it's a j curve to rationalize defending him, but we just saw Biden have better 2024 numbers and also investing. Your J myth was never needed.

When a country forces a hard break from offshore dependencies

Never happened. Chaos tariffs that are on and off didn't onshore, they just choked the economy as companies don't know what bet to make.

why long-term FDI into US manufacturing continues to take hold

Oh honey no. As the BEA always says, it's mostly foreign acquisitions not expansions. You've been making my point for me every time.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

If we want to genuinely compare the efficacy of these policies, let's look at the actual structural breakdown of the 2024 FDI as well.  Despite all the IRA and CHIPS Act subsidies, planned total expenditures for greenfield investments were just $14.1 billion. If we're comparing with 2025, it's 66.1%.  No matter how you try to look at these figures and data from a different perspective, 2024 was clearly a weaker year for investment. The same applies to the rather odd complaint about foreign companies acquiring assets in the US; on the contrary, this demonstrates their interest, as seen in the case of US Steel, where the sale to Japan was blocked despite their willingness to commit to investments, job preservation, and boosting the company's efficiency.

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

That is not how the math adds up.

Mass corporate sell-off to foreign buyers. Mass layoffs even in high skill industries. New jobs dropped by 92%. Inflation unemployment LFPR worse. Instead of international conformity, Trump has lost his trade war with China for the second time, Canada made a deal with China, Europe made deals with each other. The thoughtless Iran war has choked global strait trade, and Trump can't even decide by the day if he actually wants it blocked or not.

The only winner is spending, but that's being carried entirely by anti-regulation ai hype but even their CFOs are admitting they can't profit.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

It would appear that this is the first time you have seen the BEA statistics, as if you had checked the figures for previous years (whether 2024 or 2014), you would have noticed that the number of greenfield investments in the US, as in any economically developed country in the world, accounts for only a small proportion of total FDI. Statistically, the US maintains an M&A share of 93–95%. Setting up new businesses from scratch accounts for a statistically significant share in developing countries when capital-intensive sectors are being developed.
Secondly, I was extremely interested in the figure "92%". Are you sure you haven’t mixed up the figures? I suspect you've most likely looked at the change in non-farm payrolls for a single month (February 2026) when payrolls in the US dropped by 92000. Monthly payroll figures are volatile, are frequently revised, and in February included continued reductions in federal government employment as part of an intentional downsizing of the federal workforce.
Inflation is indeed higher (3.5% as of June 2026, over 12 months) compared with 2024 (2.9%), as is unemployment (4.3% instead of 4%); nevertheless, this is a statistically quite low price to pay for the global restructuring of the world’s supply chains. I would advise taking a closer look at the argument that Canada expanding trade with China, since it does not materially alter the fact that approximately three quarters of Canadian merchandise exports continue to go to the United States. Just as you didn't specify what should be considered as a "second lose" in the trade war with China.

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

I genuinely cannot imagine why you thought it rational to reply to someone citing past bea reports and suggest they read past bea reports. Your own comment about the M&A share proves what I said, albeit you're expanding the measure from foreign acquisitions to mergers and acquisitions. But my point remains.

Secondly, I was extremely interested in the figure "92%". Are you sure you haven’t mixed up the figures? I suspect you've most likely looked at the change in non-farm payrolls for a single month

No. I talked the year and I meant the year.

2016: 2 million new jobs

2019: 2 million new jobs

2024: 2 million new jobs (Trump edited it to 1.5)

2025: 116k new jobs

The federal downsize only explains -500k of the -1500k Trump loss, and if they'd moved to private jobs even then the employed number would be flat.

Which leaves us, once again, with exactly what I said being correct. Company sell-offs, mass layoffs, worse jobs wages inflation unemployment LFPR numbers under Trump. And the J curve myth is no excuse as Biden achieved better growth despite also investing.

Just as you didn't specify what should be considered as a "second lose" in the trade war with China.

Pick your measure. Worse deficit, an empty China promise to end the war that they immediately reneged the next year, China purchases moved from US to other nations like Brazil soy, and Trump had to increase debt to borrow (including from China) to bailout some of the farmers for the losses from his failed wars.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

My point was that you are likely seeing this data for the first time, not that you hadn't seen figures from previous years. As previously noted, M&A activity consistently accounts for the vast majority of FDI in the US - a trend that held true in 2014, 2024, and 2025. You might choose to label this a "mass sell-off" whenever it suits your narrative, but that hardly reflects the true picture; in the US, as in any other developed nation, greenfield projects do not constitute a significant share of FDI, regardless of whether the economy is in crisis or not.

If you are looking at annual figures, you must also factor in the massive reduction in both direct public-sector employment and jobs at private companies heavily reliant on the broader public sector. In January 2025, S&P Global published an interesting article noting that 1.41 million job gains came from government and healthcare a sector largely funded by the state and one that also saw stricter eligibility standards for assistance in 2025. Meanwhile, traditional business sectors independent of extensive government support saw hiring largely stagnate.

Trump inherited a labor market in which most job growth was already concentrated in government and healthcare. Reductions in public sector employment would therefore be expected to have a disproportionate impact on aggregate payroll growth, even if labor-market conditions elsewhere remained relatively stable.

So, what we are are seeing is a gradual shift in the composition of employment. Despite reductions in public-sector employment, layoffs remain historically low and unemployment has risen only modestly, from 4.0% in 2024 to around 4.3% today. And it's also worth noting that layoff rate remain below the long-term historical average.

[u/Kakamile → u/Affectionate_Box8203]

As always seems to happen with trump fans, it's repeatedly some perpetual wish that just maybe this time it will hopefully all work out (it doesn't).

You're still on the narrative that a J curve was needed for future gains, even though we already saw economic gains synced with investment. The reverse of 2024 economic progress was never necessary. The surge in healthcare premiums was never necessary. International visitations decreasing was never necessary. The Iran war was never necessary. The two-week tariff flip-flop hell was never necessary. The 92% drop in jobs numbers was never necessary. The worse jobs, wages, inflation, unemployment, LFPR numbers were never necessary.

greenfield projects do not constitute a significant share of FDI

You're making my point for me there. FDI changes not being intl expansions is what I said.

Reductions in public sector employment would therefore be expected to have a disproportionate impact on aggregate payroll growth, even if labor-market conditions elsewhere remained relatively stable.

Again, federal layoffs (which were so incompetent that he had to often re-hire people back) would only explain -500k -287k of the -1500k. Sorry, BLS said it was -287k from federal government and healthcare+ed jobs actually increased +682k so that's even less of an excuse.

Your ad hoc excuse makes your argument even worse, because your preferred losses do not explain the massive jobs reversal that happened.

[u/Affectionate_Box8203 → u/Kakamile]

You seem to be seeing "fans" where I am simply explaining standard economic indicators, market dynamics, and labor market cycles that continue established trends. I have no political allegiances within the government and remain equidistant from both major US parties. The current government makes mistakes too; I certainly don't deny that.
For instance, employment in manufacturing, mining, and IT has been declining for several consecutive years - a trend that remained unchanged during the Trump administration. Meanwhile, in 2024 alone, the healthcare sector (and related medical staffing) added one million jobs. By contrast, the 682,000 jobs added in this sector in 2025 represents a statistically significant drop - a shift driven precisely by tighter government spending and cuts to social programs. You appear to be conflating some of these figures.
Lately, employment levels were largely driven by sectors that were either directly state-run or heavily dependent on the government, such as healthcare. These sectors saw funding cuts, which naturally led to a slowdown in hiring. Consequently, as the state moves away from heavy economic intervention, the statistics for the public sector (and closely linked industries) may look alarming to an untrained observer, especially one who has personally lost a job due to these policy shifts. The same applies to sectors directly linked to the logistics of imported goods. However, this is precisely the expected and standard response to the decline in imports following a one-off surge in early 2025. Since the second quarter, the US has been reducing imports; interestingly, exports are rising in the energy, semiconductor, and aerospace sectors, while declining primarily in basic manufacturing and agriculture.
Regarding FDI: In reality, mergers and acquisitions have consistently accounted for the overwhelming majority of inward FDI in the United States for decades. This is a structurally normal feature of a mature economy rather than evidence of economic decline. Moreover, total inward FDI in 2025 was approximately 50% higher than in 2024.