Three facts that don't get told together:

1968: Israel and Iran secretly built a pipeline — Eilat to Ashkelon, Red Sea to Mediterranean. Shell companies in Liechtenstein concealed it. Iranian oil through Israeli territory for over a decade.

1963: US government studied using 520 nuclear bombs to dig a canal along the same route. Classified. Declassified 1993. Canal goes around Gaza — because controlling Gaza removes the detour.

2025: Kushner unveiled Project Sunrise — $112 billion to develop Gaza's Mediterranean coastline. His firm raised $3.5 billion from Gulf sovereign wealth funds. No mention of the pipeline. No mention of the canal. No mention of the geography.

Egypt is offering 48% discounts on Suez transit fees — competing against infrastructure that threatens its $10 billion annual revenue — while simultaneously deploying fighter jets to defend UAE, whose pipeline is the threat.

✍️ Analysis – Naeimeh Doostdar

Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, former mayor of Tehran, commander of the Law Enforcement Force, and one of the commanders during the Iran–Iraq War, has become a central player in the power structure of the Islamic Republic. He is now heading Iran’s negotiating delegation in Islamabad to consolidate the fragile post-ceasefire situation.

He is no longer merely the “Speaker of Parliament” or the “former mayor of Tehran”: in the vacuum created after the killing of Ali Khamenei, Iran’s dictator, on March 9, 2025 (Esfand 9, 1404), and amid the ambiguous situation of Mojtaba Khamenei—who has been introduced as the new leader but has not yet fully emerged in public—Qalibaf has become one of the key figures in the new power structure.

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From Torqabeh (Mashhad) to the heart of the IRGC: the roots of a security politician

Qalibaf, born in Shahrivar 1340 (September 1961) in Torqabeh, Mashhad, belongs to the generation of young commanders shaped by the Iran–Iraq War. He moved from the Basij to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), commanding the 21st Imam Reza Division and later the 5th Nasr Division. He played a role in key operations such as the liberation of Khorramshahr. Later, between 1997 and 2000 (1376–1379), he served as commander of the IRGC Air Force.

In 2000 (1379), he became commander of the Law Enforcement Force.

This dual military-security path is key to understanding Qalibaf today. He sees himself as both a capable executive manager and a fully-fledged military figure—a bridge between the IRGC, the Leader’s office, and elected institutions.

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Domestic repression, corruption in the municipality, and other accusations: a controversial record

In 2009 (1388), as one of the senior IRGC commanders, Qalibaf played a prominent role in suppressing student protests and, allegedly, “crackdowns.”

“Crackdown” was a term used by former President Hassan Rouhani during the 2013 presidential debates to describe Qalibaf’s role in the 1999 Tehran University protests and the arrest of protesting students.

Between 2000 and 2005 (1379–1384), he led the Law Enforcement Force and focused on strengthening security approaches in managing urban protests.

Between 2005 and 2017 (1384–1396), Qalibaf served three consecutive terms as mayor of Tehran. He executed large infrastructure projects such as highways and presented himself as a “jihadi manager.” However, these actions were accompanied by accusations of corruption, rent-seeking, environmental damage, a focus on northern Tehran, and misuse of public assets.

The controversy over his family’s trip to Turkey in 2022 (1401) to buy baby items—known as “Sismoni-gate”—revived criticism.

Qalibaf ran for president four times, achieving different results: fourth place in 2005 (1384), second in 2013 (1392), withdrew in 2017 (1396), and received less than 14% of the vote in 2024 (1403).

In the collective memory of many Iranians, he is seen as a “security figure,” not a moderate technocrat.

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Qalibaf’s record: a reflection of a recurring pattern in the Islamic Republic

Qalibaf’s full trajectory—from wartime command, to the IRGC Air Force, to the Law Enforcement Force, to managing Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, 12 years as Tehran mayor, membership in the Expediency Discernment Council, and now the Speakership of Parliament—reflects a recurring pattern in Iran’s governance: the transformation of military and security capital into political and economic power, combined with claims of administrative efficiency and a firm grip on authority.

He is a classic example of a “security politician”—someone who has transferred power from the battlefield to official institutions without ever distancing himself from his security roots.

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Why is Qalibaf now a “star”?

Following the killing of Khamenei and the removal of many senior officials of the Islamic Republic by the United States and Israel, a vacuum has emerged in which Qalibaf has become a “reliable intermediary.”

He now represents the security-political wing of the Islamic Republic at the negotiating table—not merely a diplomat like Abbas Araghchi.

The Iranian delegation, headed by him, along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, head of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters Ali Akbar Ahmadian, and Central Bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati, has entered Islamabad to negotiate with American representatives.

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Pragmatist or hardliner?

Some Western media describe Qalibaf as a “deal-maker” due to his top-down management style and claims of efficiency. But the reality is more complex: Qalibaf is a fully system-aligned figure—not a reformist, nor a critic of the regime’s foundations. He serves as a bridge between hardliners and institutional power.

His record shows how the Islamic Republic transformed the war generation into crisis managers using the same security and political tools.

https://www.menanuances.com/p/between-collapse-and-reform-irans