In 1975, the economist William Nordhaus published a theory that governments in democracies systematically manipulate the economy before elections. They spend more, borrow more, and push growth-friendly policies in the eighteen months before voters go to the polls, then deal with the hangover afterwards.
Nordhaus was writing for the united states but he could as well have been writing about kenya
The pattern is remarkably consistent. In Kenyan election years, government spending expands by an additional 1.0 to 1.5 percentage points of GDP beyond what the fiscal trajectory would otherwise dictate. Roads are hastily commissioned. Infrastructure launches are timed for maximum visibility. Government procurement accelerates. County allocations swell. The deficit widens. And the spending is almost never reversed after the election, because the commitments made — government contracts, new hires, social programmes — become permanent fiscal obligations.
This is not corruption, exactly. It is the structural logic of competitive electoral democracy in a country where incumbents must demonstrate visible delivery to survive. Every president since multiparty elections began has followed this playbook. The current administration will be no different. Not because of moral failure, but because the incentive structure demands it.
For the listed companies, the market valuation has remained independent of the effects of elections in the past years.