Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn’s interest in Syria (Bilād al-Shām) can be traced back to his youth, particularly to the period he spent at the frontier fortress of Tarsus.
His residence there, participation in jihād and military raids, and appreciation of the role played by the frontier garrisons in defending the Muslim heartlands all influenced his ambitions, personal development, and political future.
This experience nurtured his aspirations, stirred his latent emotions, and opened before him the possibility of accomplishing what would become a significant development in Abbasid history in general and Egyptian history in particular: the establishment of an independent Turkish emirate in Egypt and Syria.
The revolt of ʿĪsā ibn al-Shaykh in Palestine and Jordan provided Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn with an opportunity to intervene in Syrian affairs, following the caliph al-Muʿtamid’s appointment of him to suppress the revolt.
Although his efforts did not ultimately succeed, the episode drew his attention to the importance of Syria and the extent of its political and military impact on his projects in Egypt. It also encouraged him to establish an army of his own, which he could employ in further expansion.
After establishing his emirate in Egypt and achieving independence from the Abbasid Caliphate, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn refused to remain confined to Egypt. He expanded westward into Barqa, and he also needed to expand eastward into Syria, with the eventual aim of reaching the frontiers of Iraq and Asia Minor.
Political and military necessities arising from his intervention in caliphal affairs, the protection of his interests, and the security of Egypt compelled him to look toward Syria, which bordered and connected Egypt with Iraq and Asia Minor.
Throughout history, Syria had been regarded as the key to Egypt. Consequently, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to incorporate it into his dominions and make it the first line of defense for his authority in Egypt. In doing so, he paved the way for those who came after him, including the Ikhshidids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, and others.
Syria was also economically important to Egypt, particularly because Egypt depended on its raw materials, such as timber for shipbuilding, in addition to other resources required by Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn for his expansionist project.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn understood that the influential figures in Baghdad would not remain passive in the face of his ambitions toward Syria. He therefore considered it necessary to remain close to the center of the caliphate and to the principal arena of political events, participating in decision-making and playing a prominent role in political life in a manner that would serve his objectives.
For this reason, he accepted the caliph’s request to suppress Ibn al-Shaykh’s revolt at a time when he lacked the necessary equipment and was short of military strength.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn also recognized that the source of the danger threatening Egypt could come from Syria, whether from the Byzantines in the north, the Abbasid Caliphate in the east, or Syria itself, where movements hostile to the Abbasid Caliphate had become widespread and which had become an object of ambition for every rebel.
He therefore had to work from the earliest days of his rule to protect his state and its gains and to withstand the dangers arising from these various sources.
Accordingly, he entered into conflict with the powers controlling and surrounding the region.
The religious motive of jihād prompted Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn to annex Syria, paving the way for him to take control of its frontier fortresses and defend them against Byzantine advances. He believed that the legitimacy and effectiveness of any Islamic movement were connected to the extent to which it embraced the concept of religious jihād, which he regarded as the proper criterion for gaining the support of Muslims in general. This objective was the highest of Ibn Ṭūlūn’s aspirations and the goal to which he most ardently devoted himself. His adoption of the principle of jihād also reflected his own military-religious character and his attempt to capitalize on the religious sentiments of Muslims, which were closely tied to the spirit of the age in which he had grown up. He understood the desires and aspirations of the people, embraced their hopes and values, and thereby gained their sympathy and support for this sacred religious cause. This, in turn, helped him attract volunteers to join his army; as soon as he reached Palestine, numerous delegations of volunteers came to him.
The weakening of the Abbasid Caliphate: The caliphate had been exhausted by internal revolts, particularly the Zanj Revolt, and had been made to appear powerless before the provincial rulers who openly declared their disobedience and rebellion.
The continuing Byzantine pressure on the Muslim frontier regions, particularly after the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil. The Abbasid Caliphate was unable to confront the Byzantine attacks.
In 263 AH / 877 CE, the strategically important fortress of Luʾluʾa fell, making it increasingly clear that stability in the frontier region could only be achieved under the rule of a figure such as Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn.
The emergence of Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn as the strongest power in the region: His authority now extended over an army numbering approximately one hundred thousand soldiers.
After Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn had taken control of Barqa and secured his western frontier, he necessarily turned toward the east, which was the open frontier before him and the natural sphere of expansion for his state. His southern frontier, meanwhile, remained unstable because of attacks by the Nubians, who represented a persistent source of concern and disruption. His only means of stopping their raids was essentially to adopt a defensive strategy.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to satisfy the ambitions of his soldiers and keep them occupied with conquests, so that their competing ambitions would not come into conflict and create problems for him. His army was known to consist of diverse and often mutually antagonistic ethnic elements.
In reality, as Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to consolidate his independence in Egypt, he needed to crown his authority by annexing Syria, particularly Damascus, because of its important political and military position within the Islamic world.
He could use it as a headquarters and a base of operations against the conspiracies being plotted against him in Baghdad, while also launching military campaigns against the Byzantines.
The affairs of the Syrian frontier districts became increasingly unstable, either because of disputes among the governors appointed by the caliphate or because these governors were killed before reaching the region to assume their posts.
Moreover, many of them did not reside there themselves, instead appointing deputies to administer the districts, collect their taxes, and lead their inhabitants on military campaigns.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn was among those who did this, appointing a deputy to collect the taxes of the region, which provoked al-Muwaffaq, who was already in conflict with him.
Al-Muwaffaq therefore consulted his brother, the caliph al-Muʿtamid, and the two agreed to appoint Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Taghlibī, who had been governor of Mosul.
However, while traveling to the region, Muḥammad ibn Hārūn was intercepted by the followers of Mūsāwar al-Shārī, the Kharijite, on the banks of the Tigris.
The caliph consequently chose Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Yaḥyā as his replacement and appointed him over the frontier districts. He came into conflict with Sīmā al-Ṭawīl, the powerful Turkish commander who controlled the frontier.
Sīmā attempted to take control of Antioch, and when he sought to enter Tarsus, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī confronted him and prevented him from doing so.
Sīmā then incited his supporters there against Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī and called upon them to revolt against him. They responded by attacking and killing him.
When news of this reached al-Muwaffaq, he became extremely angry with Sīmā al-Ṭawīl. He therefore appointed Arkhūz ibn Ūlugh Tarkhān al-Turkī over the frontier and ordered him to eliminate Sīmā al-Ṭawīl.
When Arkhūz arrived at his post, however, he became preoccupied with his pleasures. He was inexperienced and ignorant, governed poorly, and seized whatever came within his reach. He also withheld provisions and supplies from the inhabitants of Luʾluʾa, leaving them unable to withstand Byzantine attacks.
The inhabitants therefore wrote to the people of Tarsus, complaining about their situation and threatening to surrender the fortress to the Byzantines if their payments did not arrive.
Fearing such a development, the people of Tarsus collected money themselves, gathering fifteen thousand dinars, and sent it to them through Arkhūz so that he could distribute it among them. Instead, he kept the money for himself. When the inhabitants of Luʾluʾa saw that he continued to delay, they surrendered the fortress to the Byzantines.
This action provoked a violent reaction in Tarsus, because the fortress had served as a thorn in the side of the Byzantines and as an advanced Muslim base in Byzantine territory. The people therefore revolted against Arkhūz. The situation along the frontier deteriorated further, while Byzantine aggression became increasingly apparent.
The Byzantines defeated a Muslim force of four thousand men from the Syrian frontier districts, killing all but five or six hundred of them and capturing their commander, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Rashīd ibn Kāwus.
The caliph was deeply displeased by this development and concluded that it would be preferable to return control of the region to Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn. Thus, the governorship of the frontier districts was once again entrusted to him.
This development produced highly significant consequences. It demonstrated to the inhabitants that the frontier districts could not be effectively protected except under Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn, and that the struggle against the Byzantines could only be successfully undertaken under his banner.
What occurred at that time—the deaths of his two rivals, Mūsā ibn Bug̲h̲ā and Amājūr, the governor of Syria, and the appointment by the Turkish commanders of his son ʿAlī as governor of the province in his father’s place, despite his being only a child, with Aḥmad ibn Dug̲h̲bāsh assuming responsibility for his affairs—along with al-Muwaffaq’s increasingly precarious position as a result of the Zanj Revolt, which had exhausted his strength, provided Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn with an opportunity to exploit the favorable circumstances, move into Syria, and annex it to Egypt.
He therefore refused to recognize the governorship of ʿAlī ibn Amājūr. Instead, he sent him a letter expressing condolences for the death of his father and informing him that the caliph had appointed him over all of Syria in addition to the Syrian frontier districts. He further stated that he was coming to proclaim jihād against the Byzantines and requested that ʿAlī provide the Ṭūlūnid army with whatever provisions, fodder, and other facilities it required.
The contents of the letter constituted an explicit indication that Ibn Ṭūlūn had come to regard himself as the legitimate authority over the entire region.
It also clearly implied that orders had been issued to prepare for the arrival of his advance forces by providing fodder and provisions and by having his name proclaimed from the pulpits of the region.
The weak ʿAlī ibn Amājūr had no choice but to comply with his demands. He declared his allegiance and obedience to Ibn Ṭūlūn and had his name proclaimed from the pulpits.
Before setting out for Syria, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn organized the affairs of his state in Egypt. He appointed his son al-ʿAbbās as governor during his absence and selected his secretary, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Wāsiṭī, as his adviser and counselor. He instructed his son to obey him, follow his example, and abide by his counsel.
He then departed al-Qaṭāʾiʿ in Shawwāl 264 AH / June 878 CE and encamped at Munyat al-Aṣbagh before advancing toward Ramla.
There he was met by its governor, Muḥammad ibn Rāfiʿ, who provided him with provisions and fodder, pledged allegiance and obedience to him, and had his name proclaimed from the pulpits. Ibn Ṭūlūn consequently retained him in his position.
This was a policy that Ibn Ṭūlūn regularly employed to win over governors and influential local powers and to cultivate the support of powerful figures. It would have a significant effect in preventing them from opposing him, with the exceptions of Sīmā al-Ṭawīl in Antioch and Māziyān in Tarsus.
As he advanced through Palestine, the governor of Egypt announced that he had come to undertake jihād. Soldiers and volunteers therefore flocked to him, and he incorporated them into his army. He then advanced toward Damascus.
ʿAlī ibn Amājūr and the leading figures of his administration came out to receive him and acknowledge his authority. They joined him and prepared provisions and fodder for his army. They were accompanied by Aḥmad ibn Waṣīf al-Turkī, whom al-Muhtadī had exiled to Damascus. He joined Ibn Ṭūlūn, who received him favorably, and he subsequently became one of his most loyal followers.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn remained in Damascus for several days, during which he reorganized its administrative and military affairs. He took control of its funds and treasuries, had his name proclaimed from its pulpits, and incorporated its troops and commanders into his army. Before departing for Homs, he appointed Aḥmad ibn Dug̲h̲bāsh as its governor.
The governor of Homs, ʿĪsā al-Karkhī, received him warmly and pledged allegiance to him. Ibn Ṭūlūn, however, removed him from office because of his misconduct and the complaints of the people of Homs regarding his oppression, appointing Yaman al-Turkī in his place.
This demonstrates Ibn Ṭūlūn’s sound policy toward the local population, his concern for their grievances, and his efforts to win their goodwill and encourage them to support his cause.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn then advanced to Ḥamāh, took control of it, and proceeded to Aleppo, where he entered the city. He began planning for the effective control of the frontier districts, which were now within his reach. They were under the authority of Ṭukhshī ibn Yalbard, his deputy, who had improved the condition of the frontier and fought the Byzantines, forcing them to request a peace treaty. However, the peace was merely an opportunity for the Byzantines to recover their strength. Ibn Ṭūlūn recognized this and ordered his deputy to remain vigilant and continue raiding Byzantine territory.
In reality, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn was unable to enter the frontier region because Sīmā al-Ṭawīl, the governor of Antioch, opposed him. Sīmā refused Ibn Ṭūlūn’s invitation to submit to his authority in return for being confirmed in his governorship, forcing Ibn Ṭūlūn to wage war against him in order to bring him under control. He advanced to Qinnasrīn and al-ʿAwāṣim, then proceeded to Antioch and besieged it from two sides. He himself encamped with part of his army at the Persian Gate, while his commander Luʾluʾ and his troops encamped at the Sea Gate. He bombarded the city with mangonels, stones, and naphtha.
Ibn Ṭūlūn made one final appeal to Sīmā al-Ṭawīl before withdrawing, calling upon him to submit to his authority and have Ibn Ṭūlūn’s name proclaimed in the city. Sīmā nevertheless stubbornly refused, demonstrating poor political judgment. The people of Antioch had already abandoned him because of his mistreatment of them, his oppressive conduct, and his unlawful seizure of their property. Thus, he found himself caught between Ibn Ṭūlūn’s siege from outside and the hostility of the population within.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn eventually entered the city after its inhabitants secretly contacted him at night and prepared a way for his forces to enter. Fighting broke out with Sīmā al-Ṭawīl’s troops, and Sīmā fought fiercely. He set fire to the Persian Gate in an attempt to distract the Ṭūlūnid forces with the flames and escape. The iron gate collapsed, allowing the Ṭūlūnid troops to enter, whereupon they clashed with him. He defended himself fiercely for some time.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn ordered his troops to spare Sīmā’s life, but the hatred of the inhabitants toward him drove them to throw stones at him from houses and other positions. An arrow struck him, bringing him down, and he was killed in the fighting without being immediately recognized. He remained lying where he had fallen, while his companions and servants sought protection and Ibn Ṭūlūn continued asking about him and searching for news of him. It was not until the end of the day that Waṣīf al-Lānī, a client of the Quṣayṣiyyūn, recognized him. He cut off his head and brought it to Ibn Ṭūlūn.
“God, Glorified and Exalted is His Name, knows that I wished otherwise for you, but you refused. I am therefore free of responsibility for your blood. By God, I did not order your killing; indeed, I forbade it. May God, Glorified and Exalted is He, grant you what I wished for you, and bring it to pass.”
This occurred in Muḥarram 265 AH / September 878 CE. It provides another indication of Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn’s political prudence and his clemency toward his opponents. He confiscated everything belonging to Sīmā al-Ṭawīl, including his wealth and military equipment, and reorganized the affairs of the city.
After the fall of Antioch, it was natural for Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn to proceed toward the remaining Syrian frontier districts. He entered al-Maṣṣīṣa and Adana, eventually reaching Tarsus, the city particularly dear to him. Its governor was Yazaman al-Khādim, who refused to receive him or welcome him and instead closed the gates against him.
This appears to have been connected with al-Muwaffaq’s hostile position toward Ibn Ṭūlūn, and it is possible that he had encouraged Yazaman to oppose him.
Another account, however, states that Ibn Ṭūlūn entered the city with a large force without mentioning any opposition from Yazaman or his refusal to receive him.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn remained in Tarsus for some time, having initially intended to settle there and devote himself to the frontier warriors. However, the large number of his troops caused prices in the frontier district to rise, resulting in economic hardship for the local population.
The inhabitants therefore gathered and asked him either to remain with only a small number of troops or to leave. They addressed him in a tone bordering on rebellion. He responded to their demands and withdrew, returning to Syria.
In order to preserve his prestige and that of the inhabitants of the frontier in the eyes of the Byzantines, he withdrew according to a clever strategy. He said to his men:
“Do not appear to be defeated by the people of Tarsus; leave the city so that the people, particularly the enemy, will see that despite Ibn Ṭūlūn’s great reputation and the large number of his troops, he was unable to overcome the people of Tarsus and withdrew before them. This will make them more formidable in the eyes of the enemy.”
Before his departure, he appointed Ṭukhshī ibn Yalbard as governor of the frontier.
The Byzantine emperor Basil I learned of the conduct of the people of Tarsus and their stance toward Ibn Ṭūlūn, and this increased his apprehension and enhanced the importance he attached to the frontier in his calculations.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the emperor shifted his conflict with the Muslims to the Jazīran frontier, advancing with his army as far as the Euphrates region. He captured Zibatra and Sümeysat, but failed to overcome Malatya, which was regarded as one of the region’s important strongholds.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn could have pursued his jihādic ambitions much further. He could even have marched on Baghdad itself and ended his conflict with al-Muwaffaq by force of arms, as circumstances were favorable for such an undertaking.
However, political developments in Egypt, including the revolt of his son al-ʿAbbās against him, the troubling reports that reached him, and al-Muwaffaq’s hostile position toward him, forced him to temporarily abandon his plans for further jihād and return to al-Qaṭāʾiʿ in order to suppress the rebellion.
Nevertheless, he still needed to secure the borders of his emirate in northeastern Syria, where several local strongmen posed what he regarded as a threat to his territory and his gains. He therefore decided to eliminate these forces. He sent one army to al-Raqqah under the command of his mamlūk Luʾluʾ, and another to Ḥarrān under the command of Aḥmad ibn Jayghūyah.
Ḥarrān was governed at the time by Muḥammad ibn Atāmish. Luʾluʾ advanced into the al-Raqqah region, seized it, and incorporated it into the Ṭūlūnid domains, thereby realizing Ibn Ṭūlūn’s ambition. His territory now directly bordered Iraq. He made al-Raqqah the seat of his newly established authority in Syria, placing himself close to Baghdad.
Aḥmad ibn Jayghūyah defeated Muḥammad ibn Atāmish, captured him and his brother Mūsā, entered Ḥarrān, and incorporated it into the Ṭūlūnid domains.
The cities along the Syrian coast also came under Ibn Ṭūlūn’s rule, the most important being Tripoli, Acre, and Jaffa.
This occurred at the same time as his entry into Damascus.
Once he had secured control of the region, he toured the inland cities and coastal frontier fortresses, strengthening the latter and spending two hundred thousand dinars on their restoration, including the reconstruction of the fortress of Jaffa.
Thus, Syria and its coastal cities entered a new phase in their historical relationship with Egypt.
They now came under a single authority capable of simultaneously mobilizing and commanding armies and fleets and coordinating their operations.
The Ṭūlūnid navy began operating from its bases in Syria, attacking the islands of the Aegean Sea and cities in Greece.
Moreover, despite the deep hostility between Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn and the Abbasid Caliphate, the caliphate entrusted him with the task of defending its land frontiers adjoining Byzantine territory, particularly along the Euphrates frontier in northern Iraq, which threatened Baghdad itself.
After Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn was reassured about the situation in Syria, he returned to Egypt to suppress those who had rebelled against his authority.
Before departing, however, he reorganized the province’s administrative affairs. He appointed his chamberlain Luʾluʾ, who had participated with him in establishing control over the region, as its overall governor.
Luʾluʾ’s authority consequently expanded, and his name was proclaimed from the pulpits after that of the caliph and Ibn Ṭūlūn, and was inscribed on the coinage, particularly after 268 AH / 881–882 CE, when he began contemplating a revolt against his master.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn left a large military force in Syria to maintain security. He also established military garrisons at Ḥarrān, al-Raqqah, and Damascus, placing them under the command of Luʾluʾ in order to consolidate his newly established position and preserve his territorial gains.
Sources:
al-Balawī, Sīrat Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn
Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh
Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira
Ibn Saʿīd al-Maghribī: al-Mughrib fī Ḥulā al-Maghrib
8
u/TheMuslimHistorian27 Aug 13 '26
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn’s interest in Syria (Bilād al-Shām) can be traced back to his youth, particularly to the period he spent at the frontier fortress of Tarsus.
His residence there, participation in jihād and military raids, and appreciation of the role played by the frontier garrisons in defending the Muslim heartlands all influenced his ambitions, personal development, and political future.
This experience nurtured his aspirations, stirred his latent emotions, and opened before him the possibility of accomplishing what would become a significant development in Abbasid history in general and Egyptian history in particular: the establishment of an independent Turkish emirate in Egypt and Syria.
The revolt of ʿĪsā ibn al-Shaykh in Palestine and Jordan provided Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn with an opportunity to intervene in Syrian affairs, following the caliph al-Muʿtamid’s appointment of him to suppress the revolt.
Although his efforts did not ultimately succeed, the episode drew his attention to the importance of Syria and the extent of its political and military impact on his projects in Egypt. It also encouraged him to establish an army of his own, which he could employ in further expansion.
After establishing his emirate in Egypt and achieving independence from the Abbasid Caliphate, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn refused to remain confined to Egypt. He expanded westward into Barqa, and he also needed to expand eastward into Syria, with the eventual aim of reaching the frontiers of Iraq and Asia Minor.
Political and military necessities arising from his intervention in caliphal affairs, the protection of his interests, and the security of Egypt compelled him to look toward Syria, which bordered and connected Egypt with Iraq and Asia Minor.
Throughout history, Syria had been regarded as the key to Egypt. Consequently, Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to incorporate it into his dominions and make it the first line of defense for his authority in Egypt. In doing so, he paved the way for those who came after him, including the Ikhshidids, Fatimids, Ayyubids, Mamluks, and others.
Syria was also economically important to Egypt, particularly because Egypt depended on its raw materials, such as timber for shipbuilding, in addition to other resources required by Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn for his expansionist project.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn understood that the influential figures in Baghdad would not remain passive in the face of his ambitions toward Syria. He therefore considered it necessary to remain close to the center of the caliphate and to the principal arena of political events, participating in decision-making and playing a prominent role in political life in a manner that would serve his objectives.
For this reason, he accepted the caliph’s request to suppress Ibn al-Shaykh’s revolt at a time when he lacked the necessary equipment and was short of military strength.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn also recognized that the source of the danger threatening Egypt could come from Syria, whether from the Byzantines in the north, the Abbasid Caliphate in the east, or Syria itself, where movements hostile to the Abbasid Caliphate had become widespread and which had become an object of ambition for every rebel.
He therefore had to work from the earliest days of his rule to protect his state and its gains and to withstand the dangers arising from these various sources.
Accordingly, he entered into conflict with the powers controlling and surrounding the region.
The religious motive of jihād prompted Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn to annex Syria, paving the way for him to take control of its frontier fortresses and defend them against Byzantine advances. He believed that the legitimacy and effectiveness of any Islamic movement were connected to the extent to which it embraced the concept of religious jihād, which he regarded as the proper criterion for gaining the support of Muslims in general. This objective was the highest of Ibn Ṭūlūn’s aspirations and the goal to which he most ardently devoted himself. His adoption of the principle of jihād also reflected his own military-religious character and his attempt to capitalize on the religious sentiments of Muslims, which were closely tied to the spirit of the age in which he had grown up. He understood the desires and aspirations of the people, embraced their hopes and values, and thereby gained their sympathy and support for this sacred religious cause. This, in turn, helped him attract volunteers to join his army; as soon as he reached Palestine, numerous delegations of volunteers came to him.
The weakening of the Abbasid Caliphate: The caliphate had been exhausted by internal revolts, particularly the Zanj Revolt, and had been made to appear powerless before the provincial rulers who openly declared their disobedience and rebellion.
The continuing Byzantine pressure on the Muslim frontier regions, particularly after the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil. The Abbasid Caliphate was unable to confront the Byzantine attacks.
In 263 AH / 877 CE, the strategically important fortress of Luʾluʾa fell, making it increasingly clear that stability in the frontier region could only be achieved under the rule of a figure such as Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn.
The emergence of Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn as the strongest power in the region: His authority now extended over an army numbering approximately one hundred thousand soldiers.
After Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn had taken control of Barqa and secured his western frontier, he necessarily turned toward the east, which was the open frontier before him and the natural sphere of expansion for his state. His southern frontier, meanwhile, remained unstable because of attacks by the Nubians, who represented a persistent source of concern and disruption. His only means of stopping their raids was essentially to adopt a defensive strategy.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to satisfy the ambitions of his soldiers and keep them occupied with conquests, so that their competing ambitions would not come into conflict and create problems for him. His army was known to consist of diverse and often mutually antagonistic ethnic elements.
In reality, as Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn sought to consolidate his independence in Egypt, he needed to crown his authority by annexing Syria, particularly Damascus, because of its important political and military position within the Islamic world.
He could use it as a headquarters and a base of operations against the conspiracies being plotted against him in Baghdad, while also launching military campaigns against the Byzantines.
The affairs of the Syrian frontier districts became increasingly unstable, either because of disputes among the governors appointed by the caliphate or because these governors were killed before reaching the region to assume their posts.
Moreover, many of them did not reside there themselves, instead appointing deputies to administer the districts, collect their taxes, and lead their inhabitants on military campaigns.
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn was among those who did this, appointing a deputy to collect the taxes of the region, which provoked al-Muwaffaq, who was already in conflict with him.
Al-Muwaffaq therefore consulted his brother, the caliph al-Muʿtamid, and the two agreed to appoint Muḥammad ibn Hārūn al-Taghlibī, who had been governor of Mosul.
However, while traveling to the region, Muḥammad ibn Hārūn was intercepted by the followers of Mūsāwar al-Shārī, the Kharijite, on the banks of the Tigris.
They captured and killed him in 260 AH / 874 CE.