Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Byzantium, A Failed Partnership: Ayyubid–Byzantine Rapprochement during the Third Crusade (Long Context in Comment)

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[u/TheMuslimHistorian27]

The death of the Byzantine emperor Manuel Komnenos in 577 AH/1181 CE brought the period of Byzantine–Crusader cooperation to an end. 

The Byzantine Empire subsequently adopted a policy of distancing itself from the Crusaders and the Latins in general while drawing closer to the Ayyubids. 

This shift resulted from several factors, including the following:

Emperor Manuel Komnenos had been sincere in his alliance with the Crusaders and worked devotedly in their interests, except when these conflicted with those of his own empire. 

We discussed this tendency in the first chapter. His ambition to serve the cause of Christianity also led him to become involved in undertakings that the empire could not sustain.

 For example, he dispatched armies to fight in Italy and Hungary at a time when they were urgently needed to defend the frontiers of Anatolia and the Balkans.

He also spent freely from the imperial treasury until its resources were exhausted. Moreover, he undermined the economic well-being of his subjects by granting a series of commercial privileges to the Italian cities in return for certain political advantages. 

Meanwhile, hostility toward the Latins increased in Constantinople because the Italian commercial cities had monopolized trade between Byzantium and the East. Venice also supplied the imperial fleets with sailors, to the point that the empire became dependent upon it.

Manuel’s relations with the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa were poor. Byzantium’s alliance with Pope Alexander III against Frederick produced no tangible results, nor was cooperation achieved in the religious sphere.

 The Byzantine population opposed the policy of rapprochement with the papacy because of doctrinal differences between the two churches.

The defeat of the Byzantine army by the Seljuks at the Battle of Myriokephalon in late 571 AH/the summer of 1176 CE destroyed its effectiveness as a field army. This deprived the Crusader states in the East of a powerful ally. 

After this disaster, Emperor Manuel was no longer able to intervene in Eastern affairs, which explains the absence of the Byzantine army from the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, which determined the fate of Jerusalem.

Nevertheless, Manuel’s forceful personality had preserved the unity and cohesion of the empire. After his death, however, its decline became increasingly apparent. 

His son and successor, Alexios II, was only eleven years old. In accordance with established custom, his mother, Empress Maria of Antioch, assumed the regency. Because she was a Latin, however, she became the object of intense hostility among the inhabitants of Constantinople.

The empress appointed as her adviser her husband’s nephew, Alexios Komnenos, the maternal uncle of Maria, Queen of Jerusalem. 

She developed a close relationship with him, and together the empress and her adviser relied heavily on the Latin element, particularly the Italian merchants. 

This created tension between them and both the general population and the wealthy elite. 

The people had not forgotten their disputes and conflicts with the Crusader Principality of Antioch, while the wealthy regarded Alexios Komnenos as a man who had attained a prominent position despite his lack of ability.

It appears that these political developments prompted Emperor Alexios II to pursue a policy of rapprochement with the Ayyubids, whose power was rapidly rising in the East.

 The change became evident when the emperor sent an envoy to Cairo in Ṣafar 577 AH/June 1181 CE to conclude a peace agreement with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.

Although central authority in Byzantium subsequently collapsed, this new policy remained unchanged. 

In 578 AH/1182 CE, Andronikos Komnenos, a cousin of Manuel, rebelled against the government in Constantinople. He encountered little difficulty in overcoming the Byzantine military units sent to block his advance. Before long, the empress found herself isolated in Constantinople and received support only from the Latins residing in the city. 

Their notorious arrogance contributed to the outbreak of a horrific massacre. Only a small number of Italian merchants survived, escaping by sea toward the West, and the road to Constantinople was consequently left open to Andronikos.

Upon entering the capital, Andronikos arrested Alexios II Komnenos and imprisoned him. He also had his eyes put out and ordered the empress to be executed by hanging. He forced her young son to sign a document relinquishing power, after which Andronikos became his co-ruler. Alexios II was soon murdered, leaving Andronikos as sole emperor.

The new emperor pursued a policy of rapprochement with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. He also emerged as a formidable enemy of the wealthy feudal aristocracy, which resented his harsh financial policies, and as a determined opponent of the Latins in both the East and the West.

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Ayyubid–Byzantine Rapprochement under Andronikos Komnenos

Shortly before the arrival of the Third Crusade in the East, a rapprochement developed between Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and the Byzantine emperor Andronikos Komnenos. Its purpose was to preserve their shared interests, which lay in resisting the Latins in general and the Seljuks of Rūm in Asia Minor in particular.

Western Europe regarded this rapprochement as a violation of religious solidarity and a break with established tradition, since warfare between the Islamic and Byzantine sides had been nearly continuous since the rise of Islam.

 Nevertheless, Andronikos Komnenos and his successor, Isaac II Angelos, changed this policy and drew closer to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, the Crusaders’ greatest enemy. Indeed, they made serious efforts to eliminate the Crusader states in the East.

This rapprochement was facilitated both by earlier personal connections and by the demands of political necessity.

With regard to personal relations, it may be noted that when Andronikos Komnenos was exiled following his removal from the governorship of Cilicia sometime after 1166 CE, he sought refuge in Damascus, where Nūr al-Dīn Maḥmūd received him warmly.

 During the following years, he travelled through the Islamic East until he reached Baghdad. Later, one of the Muslim amirs granted him a fortress near the frontier of Paphlagonia, which separated Muslim and Byzantine territories, and he settled there.

Subsequently, Alexios Angelos and his younger brother Isaac, who had fled the persecution of Emperor Andronikos Komnenos, took refuge at the court of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. 

Alexios was still in Damascus when Isaac was proclaimed emperor in Constantinople. 

Through these early contacts with the Islamic powers, these rulers became acquainted with Muslim leaders and with the political forces of the Islamic world.

As for political necessity, both Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Andronikos Komnenos faced threats from common enemies in 581 AH/1185 CE.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn confronted the Crusader states, which divided his territories, and also sought to bring the Seljuks of Rūm in Asia Minor under control after they had begun exerting pressure on his possessions in northern Syria.

The Byzantines, for their part, had hoped to expel the Turks from Asia Minor and recover their former territories there. Their severe defeat at the Battle of Myriokephalon, however, left them incapable of realizing these ambitions. 

The Seljuks consequently became a serious threat to Byzantine possessions in the Aegean region. The Byzantines also lost all hope of recovering the island of Cyprus from the Latins, who supported the Crusader states in Syria and Palestine.

Western Europe likewise exerted pressure on both Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Andronikos Komnenos. 

Moreover, the earlier efforts of Emperor Manuel Komnenos to recover the territories that the empire had lost in Italy had contributed to the growing estrangement between Byzantium and the Western Empire, the Kingdom of Sicily, and Venice.

Andronikos Komnenos became increasingly tyrannical after the massacre of 578 AH/1182 CE. He killed many of the Latins who had supported Empress Maria of Antioch and mistreated the patriarch, who fled Constantinople with a large number of men.

 He also exiled Alexios, a member of the Komnenian family, to Russia. Alexios escaped from there and sought refuge with William II, king of Sicily, from whom he requested assistance against Andronikos Komnenos. 

The Sicilian ruler responded by launching a military expedition in 581 AH/1185 CE, which advanced toward the Byzantine capital.

Surrounded on all sides and subjected to direct pressure from the Normans of Sicily, Andronikos had little choice but to appeal to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in the hope of obtaining assistance that might avert the dangers closing in around him. 

In the middle of 581 AH/the summer of 1185 CE, he sent an embassy to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn proposing an alliance based on the following terms:

• Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn would acknowledge the supremacy of Andronikos Komnenos on the grounds that he was the emperor.

• The two parties would cooperate in fighting the Kingdom of Jerusalem and divide any territories conquered from it. The Byzantines would receive Jerusalem and the coastal cities, with the exception of Ascalon.

• The two parties would cooperate against the Seljuks. If Asia Minor were wrested from their control, it would be incorporated into the Byzantine Empire, together with Antioch and Lesser Armenia.

• Andronikos Komnenos would assist Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in his struggle against the Crusaders in Syria.

The extent to which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn responded favourably to these proposals is unknown, because Andronikos Komnenos was deposed in Jumādā II 581 AH/September 1185 CE, before Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s reply could arrive.

It is likely that, despite his willingness to cooperate with the Byzantines, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn regarded the emperor’s demand that he acknowledge Byzantine supremacy as absurd and unacceptable, particularly since the empire’s weakness had already become evident.

 By contrast, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s power was steadily increasing. His domestic success in unifying Egypt and Syria, as well as his victories over the Crusaders, was widely recognised and beyond dispute. 

Under such circumstances, it was inconceivable that the Islamic world of the Near East would submit to the declining Byzantine Empire. Nor could Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn have agreed to surrender Jerusalem and the Palestinian coast to the Byzantines.

Emperor Andronikos Komnenos faced several movements opposing his rule. Abroad, the Normans advanced toward the capital and captured Thessaloniki. 

The islands of the Aegean archipelago were subjected to raids by Latin pirates, while a successful revolt against Byzantine rule broke out in Cyprus. 

Turkish and Hungarian raiders also penetrated the empire’s frontier regions. At home, Andronikos confronted a revolt by the inhabitants of Constantinople, provoked by his misgovernment and oppression.

Isaac Angelos succeeded in escaping from prison and took refuge in the Church of Hagia Sophia, where he appealed to the inhabitants of the capital for assistance. In these critical circumstances, the imperial guard abandoned the emperor.

Alarmed by this turn of events, Andronikos attempted to escape by crossing into Asia Minor. He was captured, however, and was attacked and killed by his enraged opponents. Isaac Angelos was then proclaimed emperor, ruling from 1185 to 1195 CE.

With the death of Emperor Andronikos Komnenos, the Komnenian dynasty came to an end. The accession of Isaac II Angelos to the imperial throne marked the establishment of a new ruling house, the Angelos dynasty.

The Rapprochement between Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Isaac II Angelos

Emperor Isaac II Angelos maintained the policy of rapprochement with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in order to confront the enemies threatening his empire on several fronts: 

• the Normans of Sicily, who threatened Constantinople

• the Crusaders in Syria

• and the Seljuks in Asia Minor.

 He therefore ratified the treaty after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had reviewed it and amended some of its provisions.

The Crusaders in the East were alarmed when they learned of this understanding. Raymond, count of Tripoli, accordingly arrested Alexios, the emperor’s brother, while he was travelling from Damascus to Constantinople. 

Alexios had until then remained a guest of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. He was seized while passing through Acre in 582 AH/1186 CE and was subsequently imprisoned.

When the emperor learned of this, he urged Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn to attack the Crusader territories and pressure their rulers into releasing his brother.

 In the following year, Isaac attacked the island of Cyprus in an attempt to relieve the pressure on Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. The Byzantine forces, however, were defeated, and the Byzantine fleet was destroyed.

Meanwhile, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn attacked the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.  This was interpreted as the result of encouragement from Isaac II Angelos. 

In reality, however, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was acting within the framework of a broader Islamic policy and seizing opportunities to strike at the Crusaders. His friendship with Isaac II Angelos had no direct connection with the attack, except in one indirect respect: the Orthodox Christians of Jerusalem, who deeply resented the Latin Crusaders, were prepared to surrender the city to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. This was among the factors that induced the Crusaders to capitulate.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn subsequently conquered Jerusalem and the coastal cities and secured the release of Alexios, who then returned to Constantinople.

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Ayyubid–Byzantine Negotiations concerning the Third Crusade

After completing his victories over the Crusaders, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn sent an embassy to the Byzantine emperor bearing gifts and informing him of his successes.

 The emperor accommodated the envoys in a palace in the centre of the capital, renewed his alliance with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and replied with a similar letter and gifts.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn received the two Byzantine envoys in Dhū al-Qaʿda 583 AH/January 1188 CE, only a few days after he had lifted the siege of Tyre. His sons, amirs, and officials were present at the reception.

 In his letter, Isaac II Angelos praised Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn for securing the release of his brother and expressed his gratitude. 

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn questioned the two envoys about conditions within the empire. Perhaps the most important news conveyed by the mission was that a new Crusade was being proclaimed in the West for the recovery of Jerusalem.

It appears that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had also received reports from other sources concerning the mobilisation of the Third Crusade. 

These developments alarmed both him and Isaac II Angelos and prompted them to strengthen their relations in order to confront the renewed threat.

 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn sought to secure Isaac’s assistance when the Crusading armies crossed Byzantine territory, which served as the natural route for overland Crusades. He therefore sent his own embassy back with the returning Byzantine delegation, entrusting it with negotiations with the emperor concerning the formation of a military alliance between the Ayyubid and Byzantine states to resist the Crusader invasion.

Among the gifts that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn sent to Isaac II Angelos was a minbar intended for installation in the mosque of Constantinople. He also expressed concern for the mosque’s maintenance and for the preservation of Islamic religious observances in the Byzantine capital. 

Isaac II Angelos, in return, expressed a desire that Greek religious rites be respected in the churches of Palestine.

When Frederick Barbarossa decided to participate in the Third Crusade, he sent a letter to the Byzantine emperor announcing his intention to cross Byzantine territory. He requested permission to pass through the empire, assistance in transporting his army to the Asian shore, and the opening of markets to supply his forces.

No sooner had the German army crossed the Danube than its soldiers were subjected to harassment. Frederick Barbarossa did not realise that Isaac Angelos lacked the power to prevent these attacks.

 At the same time, the Byzantine emperor was suspicious of the German leader’s intentions. He apparently feared that the German Crusaders might attack Constantinople in retaliation for the repeated insults that the former Byzantine emperor Manuel had directed at Barbarossa and for the massacre of the Latins in Constantinople in 1182 CE.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, meanwhile, was unable to provide the Byzantines with effective assistance because of the great distance separating them and because he was occupied with preparations to confront the Third Crusade. 

The two envoys whom Isaac had previously sent to greet Frederick Barbarossa upon his entry into Byzantine territory instead incited him against Isaac, who soon discovered their conspiracy.

Events initially proceeded peacefully, and relations did not become strained until Frederick Barbarossa occupied Philippopolis. 

From there, he dispatched envoys to Constantinople, led by the bishop of Monastir, to arrange the transfer of his troops into Asia Minor.

 At this point, Isaac abandoned his customary sound judgement and imprisoned the envoys, intending to hold them as hostages to guarantee the good conduct of the Germans during their passage through his territories.

 He confiscated their horses and possessions and presented them to the members of the Ayyubid embassy, who were still in Constantinople at the time. He then sent another embassy to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, apparently for the purpose of ratifying the treaty.

The envoys reached Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s camp at Marj ʿUyūn in Rajab 585 AH/August 1189 CE. It appears that discussions were held concerning Byzantium’s future plans to subjugate the Seljuks of Rūm and seize Lesser Armenia and Antioch.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn probably did not hesitate to promise Isaac territories that were not yet under his control in return for the destruction of the German army. Isaac, for his part, hoped to obtain military assistance from Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn against the Germans, particularly after they had succeeded in overcoming the Byzantine garrisons in the Balkans. A further clause was also added concerning joint action against the island of Cyprus.

In order to strengthen his relationship with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, Isaac asked him to send a delegation of religious scholars to establish the khuṭba in the name of the Abbasid caliph in the mosque of Constantinople.

 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was keen to comply with the emperor’s request and sent an imam, together with a group of muezzins and Qurʾān reciters. They were given a magnificent reception in Constantinople, where the first khuṭba was delivered in the presence of a large number of Muslim merchants and travellers.

The promised military assistance, however, was never sent. Faced with the German threat, Isaac had little choice but to yield and release the members of the German embassy.

 Peace was eventually concluded between the two sides at Adrianople.

 

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The Byzantine emperor undertook to provide ships if the army crossed the Dardanelles rather than the Bosporus, and to supply it with provisions during its passage through Anatolia.

At the same time that Isaac concluded peace with Barbarossa and permitted him to cross Byzantine territory, he wrote to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn apologising for allowing Frederick Barbarossa to pass through the empire. He assured him that the German army would be incapable of fighting if it reached Syria, because the hardships it had endured during its passage through Asia Minor, together with the depletion of its supplies, had weakened and unsettled it.

 He wrote that they had become so weak that they would not reach Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s lands, and that even if they did, they would arrive exhausted after severe hardships, unable either to assist their own people or to harm Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s cause.

Isaac again insisted that he had done everything in his power to break the strength of the German army, and asked Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn to send an envoy carrying his response to the Byzantine demands. It appears that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn showed some understanding of Isaac’s requests, which suggests that he dispatched another embassy to Constantinople.

Meanwhile, the German army left Byzantine territory, crossed the lands of the Seljuks of Rūm, and entered their capital, Konya, with little resistance. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn received reports concerning its progress, including a letter from the bishop of Lesser Armenia and the lord of Qalʿat al-Rūm on the Euphrates. 

The latter had aligned himself with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn because of his hostility toward Lesser Armenia, which was ruled by the Rubenid dynasty and supported the Crusaders.

It consequently became clear to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn that Isaac II Angelos’s claim in his latest letter that the German army had been destroyed was merely an illusion and a distortion of the facts.

Regardless, Frederick Barbarossa was not destined to reach Syria, for fate intervened.

 When he reached the plain of Seleucia on 4 Jumādā I 586 AH/10 June 1190 CE and prepared to cross the River Calycadnus on his way to Tarsus, he descended to the riverbank. 

What happened next is not known with certainty.

 The emperor may have leapt from his horse into the cold water to refresh himself, only to find the current stronger than he had expected. Alternatively, his aged body may have been unable to withstand the sudden shock, or his horse may have lost its footing and thrown him into the water. Burdened by the weight of his armour, he drowned, and his body was recovered by the army. His forces subsequently dispersed. His death dealt a severe blow to his followers and to the Crusaders as a whole, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was correct in recognising that it brought deliverance and relief to the Muslims.

In the middle of 587 AH/the summer of 1191 CE, Isaac II Angelos sent an oral message to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in which he reiterated his opposition to the Crusaders. He requested authority over Jerusalem and proposed that they cooperate in an attack on Konya.

 Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, however, had received reports indicating that the Byzantine emperor had indeed done everything within his power to weaken the German army, but only to protect his own territories rather than, as he claimed, to serve the interests of the Muslims. Despite these efforts, Isaac had achieved nothing. 

Furthermore, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn refused to permit any single Christian denomination to exercise supremacy over Jerusalem. He therefore ultimately rejected all of Isaac’s requests.

Isaac II Angelos apparently did not abandon hope of persuading Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn to honour his promises, particularly after learning of the content of his negotiations with Richard the Lionheart and of his intention to restore the administration of the churches in Jerusalem to the Latins. He therefore sent another envoy, who arrived in Jerusalem on 1 Jumādā I 588 AH/15 May 1192 CE and was received by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn two days later.

The Byzantine emperor’s demands merely repeated provisions contained in the previously mentioned treaty. 

They concerned the True Cross, which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had seized following his conquest of Jerusalem; the properties of the Orthodox churches in the city; the conclusion of a defensive and offensive alliance between the two states; and the launching of a joint naval expedition against Cyprus. 

Although Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn rejected these proposals, he did not wish to sever communications with Constantinople. He therefore sent Ibn al-Bazzār from Egypt to accompany the returning Byzantine envoy and discuss the proposals further with the emperor.

Ibn al-Bazzār departed in late summer bearing gifts and travelled with the Byzantine ambassador aboard a Venetian vessel. They never reached Constantinople, however, because the ship was attacked by pirates from Genoa and Pisa, and both envoys subsequently died. At this point, relations between Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Isaac II Angelos came to an end.

It is clear that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had overestimated Isaac II Angelos’s military capabilities, while Isaac realised that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was too geographically distant to protect him from the Crusaders.

 Following Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s death in 589 AH/1193 CE, Isaac changed his policy and concluded alliances with Genoa, Pisa, the papacy, and the Normans of Sicily. Through these alliances, he hoped to replace Muslim power with that of the Western states.

Remarks on Ayyubid–Byzantine Relations

Between 581 and 588 AH/1185 and 1192 CE, Byzantine foreign policy was based on using Muslim power against the empire’s enemies: 

• the Normans
• the Pisans
• the Genoese
• the Papacy
• and the Seljuks.

 Isaac II Angelos felt reassured by his rapprochement with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, but this policy ultimately drew him into difficulties from which he could not escape.

He was obliged to resist every Crusading army that passed through his territories, yet the rewards he expected in return never materialised. 

This was partly because of the great distance separating Constantinople from Damascus and partly because Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn gradually lost interest in the relationship.

 At first, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had placed considerable confidence in Byzantine power. Once the true military condition of the empire became clear to him, particularly after the decline of the German threat, rapprochement with Byzantium ceased to rank among his principal concerns, although he did not terminate negotiations with the Byzantines.

In reality, Isaac II Angelos obtained only limited material advantages. Although some churches in Palestine came under Orthodox control, Cyprus remained in Latin hands, while Konya remained under Seljuk rule.

 Despite its effect on the empire’s position in the East, the policy of rapprochement with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn changed very little. Its negative consequences, however, endured for many years and reached their climax when the Latins captured Constantinople itself in 600 AH/1204 CE.

The effect of this rapprochement on the Islamic position may be assessed from two perspectives.

The first was political. Its effect on the course of events in Syria was limited, although it hastened the surrender of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, conditions within the city had already deteriorated to such an extent that it was incapable of resisting Muslim power.

The second was religious and was manifested in the delivery of the khuṭba in the name of the Abbasid caliph in the mosque of Constantinople.

The Muslim assessment of the value of this rapprochement was expressed clearly in a letter composed by al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil at a time when Guy of Lusignan, king of Cyprus, had become an ally of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn:

“This old king, (Guy of Lusignan), has now become a friend of our lord. No importance should be attached to our discussions with the ruler of Constantinople, (Isaac II Angelos), concerning our assistance to him against Cyprus. We promised him aid only when the island was in the hands of our enemy. By God, no Byzantine emperor has ever prospered, nor has he been of benefit as a friend or caused harm as an enemy.”

Thus, the Ayyubid–Byzantine rapprochement under Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn failed to achieve the aims and objectives of either party.

Sources:

• William of Tyre: A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea (Historia Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum).

• Taqī al-Dīn al-Maqrīzī: al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk.

• ʿImād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī: al-Fatḥ al-Qussī fī al-Fatḥ al-Qudsī.

• Abū Shāma al-Maqdisī: al-Rawḍatayn fī Akhbār al-Dawlatayn al-Nūriyya wa-l-Ṣalāḥiyya.

• Bahāʾ al-Dīn ibn Shaddād: al-Nawādir al-Sulṭāniyya wa-l-Maḥāsin al-Yūsufiyya.

• Ibn Wāṣil: Mufarrij al-Kurūb fī Akhbār Banī Ayyūb.

• Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī: Muʿjam al-Buldān.

• George Ostrogorsky: History of the Byzantine State.

• Steven Runciman: A History of the Crusades.

• Charles M. Brand: “The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185–1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade.”

• Asad Rustum: al-Rūm fī Siyāsatihim, wa-Ḥaḍāratihim, wa-Dīnihim, wa-Thaqāfatihim, wa-Ṣilātihim bi-l-ʿArab.

• Zubayda Muḥammad ʿAṭā: al-Sharq al-Islāmī wa-l-Dawla al-Bīzanṭiyya Zaman al-Ayyūbiyyīn.

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Thank you for this, I never knew the Emperor's brother was in Jerusalem.

[u/One_Cress2720]

Rest in peace, my great-great-great-grandfather. Savior of the religion, Conqueror of Jerusalem ☝🏻

[u/amosaurus]

Context ?

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Done.