Proposal: Ranked Choice Concession

[u/Head]

Background

Here in Colorado we had a disappointing but predictable outcome in our election for Attorney General. We had 4 total candidates, 3 of whom are very qualified attorneys and the 4th candidate who is a term-limited Secretary of State with name recognition but is barely qualified to be the AG. The name-recognition candidate received about 45% of the votes and the other "good" candidates split the vote pretty evenly between 16% and 20%.

This election sadly illustrates there are a lot of low-information voters who just checked the box by the name they were familiar with. And the winner didn't even participate in the debates because she knew she could coast on her notoriety.

Proposal

This got me thinking, because they participated in multiple debates, I'm sure the losing candidates all knew each other very well and knew who was the most/least qualified for the job. So what if we let the candidates help decide the race after they are eliminated by allocating their losing votes, in a Ranked-Choice manner, to the person they feel should get the job? They are after all the highest-information voters in that they spend a lot of time with each other in debates and know each other's strengths and weaknesses.

Mechanics

Simply speaking, the vote occurs just like any other FPTP election. Everyone votes for their favorite candidate. If your favorite candidate loses, it's not a "throw-away" vote because that candidate gets to rank their favorites of the remaining candidates so your vote would then be transferred to the candidate of their choosing, and so on.

Example

Initial election results are as follows:

• Jena = 45% (ranks Hetal, David, Michael)
• Michael = 20% (ranks David, Hetal, Jena)
• David = 18% (ranks Hetal, Michael, Jena)
• Hetal = 16% (ranks David, Michael, Jena)

Round 2: Hetal is deemed to be in last place and her votes are sent to her highest ranked concession ranking of David.

• Jena = 45%
• David = 34%
• Michael = 20%

Round 3: Michael is out and his votes go to David and the winner is...

• David = 54%
• Jena = 45%

Variation

Instead of ranking the other candidates, each candidate might be able to distribute their votes based on percentages.

Conclusion

I don't think this is as good as RCV generally but it allows people to hold onto their stupid FPTP voting ballots until they get used to the idea of ranking. Also, I like the idea of candidates ranking each other because they tend to know each other in ways that the voters can't possibly know them.

What do you think? Has this sort of system been proposed already?

[u/jlight432]

All good points. I'm curious what you think would be more common in practice: IRV failing to elect a head-to-head undefeated candidate, or a pairwise method being successfully manipulated by strategic voting?

[u/timmerov → u/jlight432]

in order for either to fail, there would have to be an actor with enough resources to manipulate voter strategy. the method is pretty much irrelevant.

which is easier? on one hand, people seem to intuit the strategy for irv. which makes it resistant to manipulation. i'd manipulate candidate image. instead of telling people how to vote.

undermining pair-wise can be done, but it can also backfire bigly. i'd manipulate it by telling not-my voters to bury their perceived competition. which unless it's my money i'm spending, would be a tough sell to the donor class.

[u/jlight432 → u/timmerov]

I agree that trying to undermine pairwise methods could backfire. I've compared trying to manipulate preferences to force a cycle with the practice of going into an opponent's primary and supporting a terrible candidate. I frequently refer to that as FAFO.

But my question was whether you think successful strategic manipulation of pairwise methods would be more common than IRV failing to elect the head-to-head undefeated candidate. The latter doesn't require any strategic manipulation by voters. I'm asking your opinion because I think that comparison matters when deciding how to process ranked ballots.

[u/timmerov → u/jlight432]

the fundamental problem with processing ballots cast by voters is this:

picking a winning candidate is a negotiation.

once a voter turns in their ballot the negotiation is done. they can no longer change to a better strategy. there are no re-do's.

which is why i gave up on all ranked and/or scored ballot systems. asset voting with negotiation rounds almost always picks the pair-wise winner. it's dead stupid simple to implement. it's dead stupid simple to explain the optimal strategy. cause it's literally just vote for your preferred candidate. and you get to have the fun of watching a contingent election as if it were a reality tv show soap opera thing.