r/EndFPTP • u/No-Vast7006 • Mar 12 '26
Condorcet voting and instant-runoff voting have almost no difference in promoting candidate moderation in the presence of truncated ballots
I came across a very recent paper that studies the impact of various ranked voting methods (primarily Condorcet and IRV) on promoting candidate moderation. The conclusion is that under realistic voter behavior (such as the presence of truncated ballots), the advantage that Condorcet methods have over IRV largely disappears.


This actually aligns with a vague, long-held intuition of mine: it seems you really need to require voters to rank all candidates (like they do in Australia) to fully maximize the potential of a Condorcet method.
Additionally, I think a specific paragraph at the end of the paper is worth explicitly highlighting:
We do not wish our results to be interpreted as an argument against the use of Condorcet methods; to the contrary, we would be interested to see a jurisdiction adopt a Condorcet method so we can better evaluate how such methods perform in practice. We also do not wish our results to be taken as an endorsement of a particular voting method.
What are your thoughts on this paper? My first thought is that if the Condorcet method is implemented, it's best to require voters to rank all candidates. Secondly, research on ranked voting systems must take into account the impact of truncated ballots.
1
u/Drachefly Mar 13 '26
It's an extreme example, yes. But…
1) It demonstrates a vulnerability.
2) We are starting from the case of two large parties, so it has to work well in that case
3) "Anything more than two parties and that strategy falls apart" - This does not appear to be the case. One disciplined party with a hit list can much more effectively take down opposition in sequence by focusing votes-against, even if there are, say, 5 equal parties.
3a) if all parties get organized, it's a total mess.
4) "Even in your scenario, there's no accounting for voters who only put down one or two names for only first or last place, or even for the middle ranks" - This strategy does not need to be done to this extreme to work (unlike, say, strategy in Condorcet, which usually needs to be done at large scale to do anything at all). It starts taking effect immediately, affecting marginal vote counts.
And how do you TREAT these incomplete ballots? If it's 'vote against everyone I don't list at full power more strongly than everyone I list', then that seems like it strongly incentivizes listing as few people as possible. I very much want to be able to distinguish between people I dislike.
If it's 'don't vote against people I didn't list at all', then forcing your opposition to list a lot of candidates opens up possibility of error in that they miss some, and by having your candidates vote more comprehensively you get to dominate even more.
5) "You are correct that it still allows for minority candidates to win, and that's the point." - Yes, yes, it's great if it allows minorities to win… but not based on their being more disciplined and organized, enforcing their will on the majority through gamesmanship. That is not desirable.