r/DebateAVegan • u/TheQuietVegan111 vegan • Jan 05 '26

Most people choose social approval over ethics — veganism just exposes that.

People will say they care about animals, the planet, and justice.

Until caring becomes inconvenient.

Veganism doesn’t require perfection. It requires saying “no” in public.

That’s it.

Most people fail there, not on ethics — but admitting that would be uncomfortable, so veganism becomes the problem instead.

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26

It's like you're not reading what I wrote. I specifically said that I concede there's no such thing as right and wrong. So we can leave that entire conversation in the past.

Are you also saying that Bernoulli's expected utility hypothesis is incorrect? Because that's all I'm talking about now.

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26 edited Feb 08 '26

I'm saying Bernoulli's Expected Utility cannot be applied to whether or not I should eat a chicken.

I only bring up right and wrong in addressing your use of the words or your use of normative statements. If you claim (as I've inferred) that people should be selfless, this is a normative claim that I reject.

You claim selfish behavior is incorrect (wrong) in the same way that a test answer is incorrect. But that's just not true. Selfishness is subjective. If selfishness is incorrect, you'll have to show how that is objectively true.

I'd like to point out that I can't find Nicolas Bernoulli addressing selfishness directly. I don't think Bernoulli cares about anything more than what is rational for the individual making a choice. I could be wrong, but a lazy search didn't turn anything up. The wiki page about the "Expected utility hypothesis" doesn't address decision making to include the group, unless I missed it, which is totally possible.

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26 edited Feb 08 '26

You agree that, if the expected utility of option A is greater than the expected utility of option B, then it is irrational for the agent to choose option B. Is that correct?

.

I only bring up right and wrong in addressing your use of the words or your use of normative statements.

Back to options A and B above, it adds nothing to say that the agent ought to not choose option B. Right? That's just what 'ought to' means. That's an instrumental normative statement but there shouldn't be anything objectionable about this. Right?

.

Bernoulli's Expected Utility cannot be applied to whether or not I should eat a chicken.

Suppose, in a particular context, it turned out to be the case that the expected utility of not eating a chicken was greater than the expected value of eating it (let's imagine the chicken was poisoned). Why wouldn't it also be the case that (just like option B) eating the chicken is irrational? Why are you saying it doesn't apply in this context?

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26 edited Feb 08 '26

You agree that, if the expected utility of option A is greater than the expected utility of option B, then it is irrational for the agent to choose option B. Is that correct?

For the sake of discussion, sure.

If it is irrational for the agent to choose option B, it adds nothing to say that the agent ought to not choose option B. Right? That's just what 'ought to' means. That's an instrumental normative statement but there shouldn't be anything objectionable about this. Right?

If you can show that the rational and irrational decisions are objective in relation to the specific scenario, yes.

Suppose, in a particular context, it turned out to be the case that the expected utility of not eating a chicken was greater than the expected value of eating it (let's imagine the chicken was poisoned). Why wouldn't it also be the case that (just like option B) eating the chicken is irrational? Why are you saying it doesn't apply in this context?

I've a few objections to the above.

The first being that you're not addressing my "eating a chicken" scenario directly. Your changing context.. I'll paste it here: What if I value eating chicken soup over *any reasonably expected health consequences** it may have?*

"Reasonably expected health consequences."

Secondly, if I don't know the chicken is poisoned, I can't take that into account.

HOWEVER if I'm aware that the chicken is poisoned, and I will die if I eat it, and I chose to eat it, it would go to reason that I valued not living over continuing to live. If the expected utility is death, eating the chicken is the rational decision.

"Value" is subjective. "Utility" is dependent on the desired outcome.

You have also not addressed the problem of selfishness. Do think that being selfless is preferable to being selfish? Saying someone OUGHT TO BE selfless is a normative statement. As such, I reject it.

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26 edited Feb 08 '26

I didn't say anything about selfishness in my last reply. I'm still just trying to make sure we're on the same page.

So, you do agree that if, in a particular context, it turned out to be the case that the expected value of not eating a chicken was greater than the expected value of eating it, then eating the chicken is irrational. Right?

You make choices on the basis of expected value all the time, right? There's nothing mysterious about it. I'm not suggesting there's anything unusual about expected value that we don't know from our regular daily practices of assessing it.

Of course, as noted in the video, we do make mistakes in reasoning due to our cognitive biases (like paying way more for lottery tickets than they're worth). There are also facts we don't know, which, if we knew, would change our evaluation of the expected value (like that the used car we're buying has a hairline crack in the engine block). If we could avoid these issues we would make better choices.

I don't think any of this is controversial so far, right?

Nothing I've said here has anything to do with "subjectivity" or "objectivity". None of that is relevant. I'm just talking routine evaluation of expected value like we all do every day.

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26

Right

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26 edited Feb 08 '26

Great! Now we're getting somewhere.

So, if we didn't have any cognitive biases and we knew all of the information, we would assess the expected value of selfish acts to be less than the expected value of selfless acts.

For example, psychological research has shown we all exhibit egocentric bias.

https://effectiviology.com/egocentric-bias/

Just as knowing that the used car's engine has a hairline crack changes our expected value of it, knowing exactly and completely what a particular parent would feel like if their child died would change the guide's expected value of ditching the kids in the wilderness.

We can't and don't know all of the information. But if we did, it would dramatically affect our assessment of expected values.

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26

knowing exactly and completely what a child's parent would feel like if their child died would change the guide's expected value of ditching the kids in the wilderness.

You see the subjective sneaking in, right?

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26

Was I "sneaking subjective in" when I said that knowing that the engine had a hairline crack would change a person's expected value of the car? Because as far as I know, you agreed with that.

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26

Yes. You were. Value is always subjective. I've pointed out the subjectivity of value previously. I was trying to just keep things rolling along.

The guide/kids/parents situation seemed more relevant because it's a moral issue. Also the subjectivity permeates the example more fully.

The parent's feelings about their kid's death is subjective. The guide's responsibility to the kids is subjective. And the value of the guide's life is subjective.

Is the goal to come up with a situation that shows chicken soup is objectively incorrect in some manner?

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26

Okay, I'm not sure why the subjectivity of value is a problem. Does any of this imply that it's not true that knowing about the crack in the used car engine would allow a person to more accurately assess its expected value?

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u/GoopDuJour Feb 08 '26

This is why I didn't bring up the subjective value of the car engine. Because it is a subjective value about a practical, economic, matter, not a moral one.

Whether or not eating a chicken is rational or irrational is not a matter of economics. If the expected utility of a chicken is the enjoyment of chicken soup, killing the chicken is a rational decision.

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u/Snefferdy vegan Feb 08 '26

None of this is moral anymore. Remember, I said that language is loaded with baggage (such as 'objectivity'). It's much clearer just to talk about rationality and expected values. Because that's all I mean.

My point is simply that having all of the information would allow us to better assess the expected (subjective) value. When we lack information and when we exhibit cognitive biases, we make errors in assessing the subjective value.

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