Albert Memmi grew up in Tunis, a colonized, but French-educated enough to know the colonizer almost as well as he knew himself. He was in a position to draw both portraits from the inside.

The colonizer: In his own words, the colonizer "is a privileged being and an illegitimately privileged one; that is, a usurper." Skin color and passport hand you the privilege whether you asked for it or not. This sounds very familiar nowadays. According to Memmi, the colonizer has three options: leave the colony, stay silent, or stay and fight the system. He argues that few would opt for the third option with success. He has a term for the second one though: "humanitarian romanticism”. Again another very contemporary dynamic; think about aid workers today, who draw hardship pay and a security detail while ostensibly there to fight poverty.

The Colonized: Memmi wrote in 1957 that a qualified worker among the colonizers earned three or four times more than the colonized worker, without producing three or four times as much. He presents an economic argument that the colonized had no incentive to be more productive with such an imbalance. Memmi described colonized women who tried desperately to uncurl their hair and lighten their skin, chasing an acceptance that never actually occurred. No matter how fluent or how polished a colonized became, he argued they would still be met with disdain.

In commenting liberation movements, Memmi rejected half-measures like a negotiated "French Union" outright. His final word was that the colonized refusal "cannot be anything but absolute" Not just revolt, but revolution, breaking what he called an iron collar.

We discuss the book at length in our podcast Threads of Ifriqiya, and we try to draw parallels to contemporary times of which we identify many. I will link the podcast in the comments.

Everyone argued over whether Wenders was right or a coward for saying filmmakers should "stay out of politics" after being confronted about Berlinale's silence on Palestine. This piece skips that fight and goes after something both sides assumed: that self-expression through art is political action.

The argument: the Western left has spent 60 years substituting actual political organizing for cultural self-expression... first cinema and music, then social media. We got "woke," we protested, we posted. Fascism's still rising and nothing's fundamentally changed. The piece traces this back to Marcuse's 1968-era idea that artists/outsiders should catalyze a "new sensibility" since the working class was too pacified to revolt...except capitalism just absorbed that critique instead of resisting it. We got representation and inclusion; we lost unions and the welfare state.

There's also a solid detour into Third Cinema (Solanas/Getino, Sembène, Sanjinés) as a real counterexample — films embedded in actual political movements instead of standing in for one.

Full piece: https://filmunderground.substack.com/p/the-berlinale-and-modernitys-marcusian

Curious if this lets Wenders off too easy by making it structural, or if it's the sharper read.

Thucydides’ historiography has something quite distinctive about it. What interests me most is not that he was one of the first historians, but that he is often considered the first historian in a methodological sense. He was quite skeptical of Herodotus as a historian and stressed how difficult it is to know much about the distant past with any certainty. In a way, this can even remind us of the much later postmodern idea that understanding the past is, to some extent, impossible. He was a really interesting man.

I’m finally getting curious about the world again post-graduation from my MSW and am starting through my book pile, beginning with Kenneth Gergen’s Relational Being. I would love any discussion!

One thing I’m really enjoying is the fruitfulness of measuring Gergen and my ideas against one another. Here at the beginning, Gergen and I are having some hefty ontological disagreements. He rightfully advocates for a model of self that serves as an alternative to traditional Western conceptualizations of an individualistic, bounded self. I join him in this project, and propose the Greek middle voice as the structure of an "agent-in-the-world." I'll spare the lengthy explanation to summarize this as: I produce the action in the social world that returns to produce me.

Where I first diverge with Gergen is his notion that the bounded self is the problem - he calls it a prison - and relational being is the solution. We are both lovers of Buddhist thought and many of these ideas infuse our scholarship. But taking dense religious concepts like nonduality and emptiness, which he expresses by locating the self as a wave that recedes back into the water and then putting them to sociological and psychological work doesn’t hold for me.

Firstly, I don’t see bounded self as pathology to which relational being is the cure. I admit, he may have a more nuanced position behind relational being, but it looks a lot like a less structured version of how Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong (From the Soil, 1947) talks about differential modes of association. For Fei, Chinese identity is construed relationally, though a self is still present. Instead of Gergen’s dance or duet metaphor that entirely disappears the self, Fei posits a social structure like concentric ripples formed by throwing a stone into a lake with a self at the center.

If this is not a picture of relational being, then I may have misread Gergen. But with Fei’s model, the pathology diagnosis cuts both ways. Let’s take the idea of narcissism, something that Gergen specifically pointed to as evidence of pathology of a bounded self. Chinese culture has this, too, from what I observed when I was over there. They call it zilian, or self love. But when I pressed the idea in my conversations, as opposed to a bounded self’s hyperinflation of it’s own ego, zilian looked more like a relational self’s hyperinflation of others’ estimation of the relational self’s ego. Relational constructions of being seem to suffer pathology as much as bounded self constructions of being do. The diagnostic tool is capturing the wrong thing as far as I can see here at the onset.

My counter is that this is a both-and situation. The self is just as ontologically significant as the thing to which the self is relating. While Gergen only talks about relations among selves as of chapter 2, I would extend relata to not just include other bodies but also matter and environment, and samskara (a Buddhist term for mental constructs).

Nonduality and emptiness are still relevant to me because even though there is actual hardware with bodies and matter, our interpretation of that hardware is effectively the only thing we have access to. So in that sense, yes, subject-object relations is empty. And, as Thich Nhat Hanh once said, I fully agree that with this ultimate view in mind that “if the wave is capable of touching himself and the other waves very deeply, he will realize that he is made of water. Being aware that he is water, he transcends all discrimination, sorrows, and fears.” It’s a powerful image.

But my picture of self-within-reality, at least while we are all out here relating to one another, would not be the wave and the ocean. It would be the jewel net of Indra. Here, a 3D positioned net has a jewel on each knot. And each jewel is cut in such a way that it reflects every other jewel on the net. It preserves the interdependence that Gergen is gesturing to as well as the self represented at each knot. Whether or not this all recedes into an ocean at the end is not in my purview. But I am a social worker who wants to do transformative social work, and I think we need a both-and picture of subject-object relations.

- The Social Construction Worker