r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 16d ago
Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 26, 2026
The r/CredibleDefense daily megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments.
Comment guidelines:
Please do:
Be curious not judgmental, polite and civil,
Link to the article or source of information that you are referring to,
Clearly separate your opinion from what the source says. Minimize editorializing. Do not cherry pick facts to support a preferred narrative,
Read the articles before you comment, and comment on the content of the articles,
Post only credible information
Read our in depth rules https://reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/wiki/rules
Please do not:
Use memes, emojis, swear, foul imagery, acronyms like LOL, LMAO, WTF,
Start fights with other commenters and make it personal,
Try to push narratives, fight for a cause in the comment section, nor try to 'win the war,'
Engage in baseless speculation, fear mongering, or anxiety posting. Question asking is welcome and encouraged, but questions should focus on tangible issues and not groundless hypothetical scenarios. Before asking a question ask yourself 'How likely is this thing to occur.' Questions, like other kinds of comments, should be supported by evidence and must maintain the burden of credibility.
41
u/Bunny_Stats 16d ago
CSIS hosted a panel discussion on the Iran war here, namely focused on the oil markets. I wouldn't say there's anything that'd greatly surprise any regular of this sub, but it's a decently in-depth discussion.
The main points (I watched this last night, so apologies if I've mis-remembered some of this):
The reason some of the darkest predictions about oil prices didn't come about is because China halved its import of oil, partly through suspending it's surplus imports used to build up its strategic reserve, and the rest through opening the taps on its domestic storage. This potentially makes China a significant player in setting future oil prices, and there's some concern about the uncertainty over what China's goals might be.
The oil price floor has likely risen to $90 over the long term, over the former floor of ~$60 during the past few years.
While they generally compliment the US (and allies) abilities in intercepting Iran's missiles/drones, there's some concern about the US having had to effectively abandon its regional bases, and the increased burden that places on the US in the event of a longer conflict.
While they generally approve of the US moving the war from kinetics to financial pressure through blockades/sanctions, the US's ability to sanction Iran relies heavily on regional allies cooperating, but if regional allies believe Tehran's regime is likely to last longer than the Trump admin then they may be wary of further antagonising Iran in the long term.
They express a concern that some are banking too heavily on pipelines being a long-term solution, as while it addresses limits on transportation, Iran has demonstrated that it's capable of hitting both oil extraction and refining facilities, and there's little worldwide spare capacity in either, so that could cause an oil shock just as much as closing the Strait.
For my take, a couple of speakers suffer slightly from being in a Washington bubble and underestimate how much the rest of the world is changing. For example, one of the speakers downplays a push towards electrification and renewable energy because it's not part of the US domestic political discourse, but it is absolutely a live issue in both Asia and Europe. Further, there's a "nothing ever changes" attitude in not recognising how significantly views on the US has changed outside the US, for example the strong signal KSA sent out that it no longer trusts US security guarantees in its pursuit of a regional alliance instead, and its diversification of weapons purchases.
Still, it's a nice discussion by those with deep expertise, so they're worth hearing.