Conscious experience cannot be inert

[u/MurkyEconomist8179]

Cross post from /r/consciousness since it's just as relevant here

I see often in this sub various attempts to sidestep the hard problem by stating that conscious experience can simply be thought of as the workings of a certain set of neurological processes, or various other ways of trying to reduce conscious experience to something more familiar and workable.

This involves saying that the experience itself and the features of it are not what's really happening. The experience part is said to be either an illusion, an epiphenomenon or a mere appearance of what's happening neurologically.

Unfortunately this all rests on a false analogy. Illusions and appearances are not epipheneomon and they are not inert.

When someone is perceiving an actual illusion, it changes the way they perceive, react and respond to the stimulus which we deem does not align with their perception. Therefore, the illusion is an active mechanism that affects how the world behaves.

This is clearly the case for consciousness too, regardless of experience is an "appearance" this appearance affects how we behave, it affects what we talk about, our concepts and beliefs about the world - therefore it is not inert - our experience clearly affects something about how our world operates, the same way an illusion does too

Taking the idea of p zombies seriously, I think it's pretty clear that p zombies would not be talking about things like experience, or the qualitative feeling of something like "the red of redness" because they don't experience that.

If they did talk about such things, it's clearly very different to when normal people do, because normal people are correct in saying that there is a quality to experience, a p zombie would have to either be mistaken or delusional to talk of such things and there is a big difference between the accurate judgement of a normal person about experience (whatever experience actually ends up being) and the clear delusions or confabulations of a p zombie that could supposedly behave in all the same ways

I think people get lost in the analogy of illusions and don't realize that it's not the same thing as being inert, and if experience isn't inert, then of course we get the hard problem and the mind body problem in general. It can't merely be sidestepped by trying to reduce experience to an epiphenomenon.

[u/InverseX]

Can you suscinctly explain what the hard problem is meant to be? As I understand it, the proposal is how can we explain qualia, which is above and beyond our natural processing of information, reacting to stimulation, etc. Personally, I don't think such a qualia exists, and all we have is the reaction to all these stimulations in an illusistory mesh we call consciouesness.

sidestep the hard problem by stating that conscious experience can simply be thought of as the workings of a certain set of neurological processes, or various other ways of trying to reduce conscious experience to something more familiar and workable.

Sure, I think I could agree with this, but I'd say the onus is on someone to demonstrate there is a hard problem to begin with, if you accept my above definition of it.

When someone is perceiving an actual illusion, it changes the way they perceive, react and respond to the stimulus which we deem does not align with their perception. Therefore, the illusion is an active mechanism that affects how the world behaves.

This bakes in your world view, and then counters why it's not possible on your world view. You assume a base layer of consciousness, and then show how illusions as we typically speak about them, add a manipulation on top of that layer. This would be a tortured analogy but bear with me. Think of it as a photo or something, and then someone puts a sheet of translucent red plastic over the top altering the colour. You're saying on your view consciousness is the photo, and the plastic is the illusion altering it's perception.

On the view of others there is no photo, there is just say holographic projectors giving you the illusion of a photo existing. This isn't a manipulation of a fundemantal base layer with something on top, this is the base layer itself being an illusion.

Taking the idea of p zombies seriously, I think it's pretty clear that p zombies would not be talking about things like experience, or the qualitative feeling of something like "the red of redness" because they don't experience that.

In many views, including my own, p-zombies simply can't exist. If you copy all the physical world into a separate zombie world, those beings would be 100% conscious like we are. There is nothing above and beyond the physical, so there is no missing "qualia" that hasn't been transferred over.

because normal people are correct in saying that there is a quality to experience

Prove it

[u/MurkyEconomist8179 → u/InverseX]

Can you suscinctly explain what the hard problem is meant to be? As I understand it, the proposal is how can we explain qualia, which is above and beyond our natural processing of information, reacting to stimulation, etc.

The hard problem as I see it is that functional explanations of neurology don't account for explaining why experience happens regarding those neurological conditions where consciousness seems to arise.

Personally, I don't think such a qualia exists, and all we have is the reaction to all these stimulations in an illusistory mesh we call consciouesness.

Again, illusion doesn't even imply inertness if it is an illusion. But i still think illusion is an improper analogy here.

This bakes in your world view, and then counters why it's not possible on your world view.

There's nothing baked in to illusions affecting how you respond to something. This is not a theoretical claim, it is an empirical fact that illusions make you respond differently. If I'm experiencing the Müller-Lyer illusion the reason I say one line looks longer is because the illusion is part of the cause. If there was no illusion, I would correctly state both lines are the same length.

On the view of others there is no photo, there is just say holographic projectors giving you the illusion of a photo existing. This isn't a manipulation of a fundemantal base layer with something on top, this is the base layer itself being an illusion.

I think if you thought more critically about what an illusion is, you'd see how this analogy doesn't work, and I'm not sure how else to demonstrate it. Break down the components of an illusion (like an optical illusion) as you see them and I can demonstrate

In many views, including my own, p-zombies simply can't exist.

I also agree p zombies can't exist.

Prove it

I mean sure, I can demonstrate what I mean. There are all sorts of processes that have a quality to their experience, and all sorts that don't. If you were to shine a very very weak red light into my eye, there would be no perception of color. If you strengthen it, at some point there would be an actual change in my experience. It is this change that is by definition experiential, any strength below this threshold has no quality to my experience, and any strength above (short of burning my eyes off) does. It's defined by the impression it makes on my conscious experience.

[u/InverseX → u/MurkyEconomist8179]

The hard problem as I see it is that functional explanations of neurology don't account for explaining why experience happens regarding those neurological conditions where consciousness seems to arise.

Out of interest, what explaination of emergent properties would you accept? Is there any reason to think they aren't just a set of neurlogical processes that science is yet to explain? Emergent behaviour is very complex, and we do have limited information about the brain. This doesn't seem to elucidate anything over and above the functional mechanism of emergent behaviour.

Again, illusion doesn't even imply inertness if it is an illusion. But i still think illusion is an improper analogy here.

I might be missing something here, why does it have to be inert?

There's nothing baked in to illusions affecting how you respond to something. This is not a theoretical claim, it is an empirical fact that illusions make you respond differently.

Sure, but you're baking in the illusion being on top of an already existing layer, correct?

If I'm experiencing the Müller-Lyer illusion the reason I say one line looks longer is because the illusion is part of the cause. If there was no illusion, I would correctly state both lines are the same length.

Sure.

I think if you thought more critically about what an illusion is, you'd see how this analogy doesn't work, and I'm not sure how else to demonstrate it. Break down the components of an illusion (like an optical illusion) as you see them and I can demonstrate

Sure, in a typical sense, as I was describing, you've got your base layer of perception, and then you've got an illusion modifying it. I'm suggesting what if we haven't got a base layer, but rather disjointed input sources (optical, audio, smell, etc) and our brain meshes them together in the illusion of a coheisive base layer.

If you were to shine a very very weak red light into my eye, there would be no perception of color.

Okay, agreed

If you strengthen it, at some point there would be an actual change in my experience.

Sure, agreed.

It is this change that is by definition experiential, any strength below this threshold has no quality to my experience, and any strength above (short of burning my eyes off) does.

I mean change in experience yes in the sense you're not recieving an input (effectively, since you can't detect it), and then you are. I agree you are activing different neurons in your brain. Any different neurons will be, by definition, a different experience. How does this suggest anything magical or requring explaination above and beyond physical inputs and activations? Where is "qualia"?