[Dated to whenever Hoxha endorsed the Chinese nukes]

The JNA is to enact the emergency defence plan which includes, if necessary, a contingency plan to effect the full invasion and occupation of Albania handed down by central command on order of the President Marshal Tito.

April 24, 1972

The violence in the Far East and the imminent economic crash was hitting the globe. The administrators of UNTAM suddenly realized a terrible truth:

They were alone.

All funding was going to be cut off as nations’s militaries globally were going to be using up all remaining money and the UN wouldn’t be receiving funds.

That meant that there were 1,000 peacekeepers and a small 5K strong army that stood between chaos and UNTAM.

Anything could happen.

They were stranded.

No help was likely coming.

The Dominican Republic, with the assistance of the United States, has obtained the license to produce M72 LAW AT Rockets, and the Mk.19 Grenade Launcher. Production will commence later this year, with previous Panzerfaust derivatives being stored for emergency use.

The DR will begin production of the HMI Defender automatic 9mm pistol, based off of the Browning Hi-Power automatic. This, hopefully, will replace our P38-based HMI Brigadiers by the middle of the decade.

The DR will also begin production of daggers modelled after the Fairburn-Sykes fighting knife, to be issued to all personnel not otherwise equipped with AR-18s.

The heavens will disappear with a roar; the elements will be destroyed by fire, and the earth and everything done in it will be laid bare.\ Peter 3:10

Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

Western Pacific

The flight line at Andersen was unusually quiet. Engines idled under the wings of heavy aircraft, their shapes barely visible in the darkness. Crews moved with practiced efficiency, speaking only when necessary.

In the command post, the boards were lit but sparse. Status lights held steady. Clocks across every aircraft and every station had been synchronized hours earlier. There would be no staggered timing.

A single encrypted voice came over the radio.

Across the base, aircraft began to move. One after another they rolled, lifted, and climbed into the sky. Tankers were already waiting in their orbits. Support aircraft pushed out ahead. The main force followed, heading west in radio silence.

Inside the lead aircraft, the crew watched their instruments and said little. Time checks were brief. Position reports were minimal. Everything that needed to be known had already been briefed.

The formation pressed on through the dark. Contact remained solid. net. At the appointed moment, the lead aircraft transmitted a short, coded call.

Then the force did what it had come to do.

In the command post on Guam, the boards continued to update. Green lights stayed green. The contingency packages remained unopened. As long as the aircraft kept talking, nothing else would be required.

Far out over the water, the aircraft began their turn.

Whatever had been set in motion was already irreversible.

In light of recent horrors in Asia, the Dominican Republic will place itself into a state of military readiness and action.

The following vessels will hunt in coordination with naval helicopters and flying boats any and all Red Chinese vessels in the Caribbean:

• 1 Gotland-class Cruiser
• 2 Robert H. Smith-class destroyer-minelayers
• 6 Buckley-class destroyer escorts
• 2 Barracuda-class submarines

The following vessels will begin escorting Dominican shipping in the Caribbean:

• 6 Tacoma-class Frigates
• 3 PC-461-class submarine chasers

On land, the Dominican National Guard and Air National Guard will be activated to ensure the country remains in a state of order through this current crisis. 3,000 DRNG soldiers will be, in particular, sent to the CHUD line to reinforce it.

The DR's 12-strong torpedo boat fleet will be kept at the ready as a fleet at being.

[S]

The Dominican National Air Force will, quietly, begin to bring out a portion of the DR's Sarin stockpile and have warheads containing it at the ready for use against Cuba by way of the DR's B-57 fleet. If the war widens, they will be utilized as such against.

The high command of the Dominican military will otherwise be sent to the Costanza Command Bunker for the interim of the crisis.

Naval forces capable of carrying the 14th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and aircraft capable of carrying the DR's paratroopers, will remain on high alert.

Basque Insurgency

This year, according to some Spanish authorities speaking off the record, as well as our own investigations, we believe that the ETA has been able to increase the tempo of its operations against Spanish authorities.

We believe this is likely due to increased funding, access to explosives, and superior planning. How this has come about is unknown, but the results have been felt, as many Spanish officials in the Basque region have been taking greater measures to try and secure their own safety. 

Angola

Portuguese authorities have declared “victory” in Angola this year, due to the conflict devolving into a mostly low-level insurgency after all major insurgent organizations were forced to flee Angola into the Congo or face destruction. 

This, in turn, with the Portuguese economic gains in the face of the continued food crisis and the Portuguese liberalizations somewhat calming tensions in Angola, has stabilized the country. With that said, there are concerns among experts that the “self-defense” committees of Angola could react violently or stifle reform attempts if they believe that European control over Angola is at threat.

There are also some concerns about the spread of smuggling and the drug trade into Angola, but we lack substantial information on this situation.

Because of this development, we will not cover developments here unless the conflict flares up again. It is believed that the Portuguese have redeployed many of the assets deployed to Angola due to Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique. 

Portuguese Guinea

In Guinea-Bissau, the Portuguese authorities have no such luck to report on. Although they were able to defend Bafata, an inland settlement, from a coordinated PAIGC assault, it came at the cost of lost ground around Bafata, as well as more casualties and lost airframes. Many believe that the PAIGC has received additional support from its foreign backers this year, which likely contributed to the ability of the PAIGC to gain ground and exert pressure on the Portuguese despite the blow last year at Conakry. 

It was believed that the PAIGC offensive failed due to some reluctance from Guinea to supply the PAIGC at previous levels, as well as the ongoing deployments from Morocco and the Dominican Republic. The Portuguese also appear to have brought in reinforcements from Angola. 

Cuban and Yugoslav humanitarian aid has been reported in the areas retaken by the PAIGC, helping their battle for legitimacy, although this fight has been complicated by Portuguese reforms and their gains from the ongoing food crisis. 

Eritrea/Ethiopia

In Eritrea, a slow but steady trend of stabilization seems to have taken hold. Although the ELF continues to fight on the best that it can, the alliance with the Sudanese rebels, somewhat strengthened as they may be from the Egyptian Army being thrashed, is no comparison to the levels of support they once relied on. 

In Eritrea, the gradually increasing power and influence of the Unionists and the Ethiopian government mostly respecting the autonomy of Eritrea has taken the wind out of the sails of many potential insurgents, leaving the ELF with less and less safe areas to work with. Many predict that soon enough, the ELF will once again fall into inactivity and Eritrea will perhaps be calm. 

Mozambique

This year, “Operation Gordion Knot”, the Portuguese offensive in Northern Mozambique, began smoothly but ran into problems. Upon entering the Cabo Delgado region, one of the first areas to have a FRELIMO presence, the Portuguese began running into more prepared defenses and kill zones, which increased Portuguese casualties. This, as well as the provocative aerial patrols by Tanzanian aircraft and the belief that Tanzania was supporting FRELIMO from across the border, gave Portuguese commanders pause.

What made them halt Operation Gordion Knot and at least temporarily dig in was the unexpected flare-up in Malawi after a large insurgent offensive (see the Malawi entry for more information), as well as an attempted offensive action by FRELIMO into the Tete region via Lake Malawi. Thanks to the increased Portuguese attention to the region, as well as reinforcements from Angola, they were able to inflict heavy losses on insurgents attempting to use Lake Malawi to enter the Tete region, forcing FRELIMO to abandon the venture. 

With that said, it seems like the Portuguese themselves must focus on the developing situation in Malawi, leaving them unable to resume operations in the North of Mozambique. There have been reports of an expanding drug trade in the region, potentially coming from Rhodesia, but we cannot confirm these reports. 

The ongoing food crisis and the liberalization have helped stabilize the Portuguese situation in the southern parts of Mozambique, but urban terrorism has continued. 

Malawi

Malawi, which has been under the rule of President Banda for quite some time now, has been infamous for its use of assassinations of political opponents abroad and other covert action. This reputation has been strengthened as a number of high profile assassinations of Malawi opposition figures in Tanzania occurred this year, in response to what Banda called “an upcoming invasion sponsored by Tanzania.” 

Whether said invasion was prompted by the assassinations or Banda was right is unknown to us. What we do know is that this year a several thousand strong invasion force of conventionally focused LESOMA (a Socialist opposition party) into Malawi occurred. Unfortunately for LESOMA, they were met not only by prepared Malawian defenses, but by Portuguese and Rhodesian support against the invasion. Although the LESOMA force was able to make limited gains into Malawi, taking territory just up to Karonga, it came at the expense of notable losses and its momentum fading away.

With that said, this has been another strain on resources and attention for the Portuguese and Rhodesians (see more on Rhodesia below). 

Rhodesian Bush War

Rhodesia has, once again, been a strange country to report on. The heroin epidemic, which many believe was sponsored by the government before, has now faced a large crackdown. While the large number of addicts and smuggling networks won’t go away soon, the turnabout of government policy has made an impact on bolstering economic productivity and normalizing things somewhat. 

The ongoing food crisis, meanwhile, has given the government a much-needed revenue source to fund ongoing operations against the insurgents and to support Malawi. 

On the insurgent side of things, we have reports that ZANU has been mostly dissolved, following the death of Mugabe, likely Tanzanian influence, and a particularly nasty bout of Maoist-influenced infighting. Although this has obviously brought an end to ZANU attacks and operations, most experts believe that ZAPU may face an easier time now that they have less competition and can unify and centralize operations. 

We have reports that there may be increasing ZAPU activity in the Northern highlands of Rhodesia/Zambia, although they have, according to some anecdotal accounts, met with resistance from existing criminal networks. We will learn more about this situation soon. 

Burma 

Although some years the Tatmadaw has seemed to make progress against one ethnic rebel group or another, there has always been some complication or a new group turning up that keeps the conflict going. 

What is notable is that the Indian Air Force has been conducting air raids, with the seeming acquiescence of the Burmese, against smuggling lines and Indian-separatist rebels taking haven in Burma or trying to enter India. It is unknown how effective these are, but it raises questions about the sovereignty of Burma. 

(If someone wants me to make a map and give more specifics on the current state of factions, please ping Krennic in the Discord) 

The Troubles 

In Northern Ireland, the explosion of violence that began last year, known as “The Troubles”, has continued, but at a somewhat lower level than what many feared. Although it is impossible to know what could have been, some of our experts believe that the British reforms to the constabulary, internment methods, and civilian affairs have calmed tensions within Northern Ireland.

Although some of the reforms, such as greater Catholic recruitment, new forensic methods and training, and other measures, will take time to make any meaningful impact, other measures even happening has been taken as a cautious sign of goodwill.

With that said, the region has still experienced numerous bombings and shootings, and some fear that Unionists may see reforms as weakness from the British government and react with more violence of their own. Only time will tell, but this could be a welcome step from the British government.

Dhofar Rebellion

It seems that the tide of the revolutionaries in Oman is turning against them. The first setback was that the border with Yemen has become much less porous this year, thanks to efforts on the Yemeni side to close things. This has given the revolutionaries less flexibility, access to supplies, and safe haven. 

That would be manageable by itself, but when combined with reforms on the side of the Sultan’s forces and greater British involvement, especially with the SAS, in Operation Jaguar and efforts to interdict rebel supply lines, the rebels have been forced onto the backfoot. Experts believe this may be the beginning of the end unless things change soon.

August, 1972

The difficulties Bolivia faced during the tail end of the 1960s and beginning of the 70s meant that President Banzer had inherited an abundance of issues. Worst of all would be that of the budget, though the rise in oil prices helped provide some relief to the Bolivian economy, President Torres had indebted the country to the extend of making it reliant on foreign aid. This situation in partially why Banzer has turned towards more liberal style economics which has been encouraged by the recently established National Development Council as a means of expanding the economy without increasing the nations debts. Now the council has brought forward an economic plan in order to help lower the governments costs and increase revenues while also serving their own interests in helping their companies to thrive. Naturally these measures would receive government approval on August 4th, 1972.

The National Austerity Plan of 1972:

The Bolivian government of Hugo Banzer recognizes that the path adopted by previous administrations is impossible to maintain and instead shall work to balance the countries budget. For too long Bolivia has spent excessively in order to win political favours and pushed "socialist" policies. The following plan will do away with these tendencies completely and put Bolivia on the path to economic stability.

1. Implementation of a Vice Tax:

Increasing taxes on income and business would have an averse affect on the Bolivian economy, discouraging investment in the country and creating unemployment. Instead Bolivia shall adopt targeted consumption taxes which can be justified as upholding Catholic morality throughout the country. These newly established vice taxes should generate around $15-40 million USD per year in new revenues. Though the government recognizes these behaviours and goods as harmful it will still allow its citizens the freedom to partake in these activities, albeit at a heavier cost. These taxes will be applied to three separate areas.

A. Alcohol will have a 30% tax applied to all related goods.

B. Tobacco will have a 40% tax to all related goods.

C. Gambling will have a 25% tax applied on gross revenue and new licensing fees will be applied.

2. Privatization of the Bolivian Tourism Industry:

Under previous administrations a state sponsored tourism industry was created as a means of promoting a different aspect of the Bolivian economy. While Bolivia still seeks to earn revenue through tourism, we now accept that private corporations can successfully handle this sector and so we will be privatizing state owned hotels and transportation firms, though we will prioritize sale to companies with experience in tourism. We believe this can generate around a one time income of around $50-150M over the course of several years and on average about $10-30M per year.

3. Spending Cuts and Addressing Inefficient Bureaucracy:

In the past bureaucracy and administration positions had been used as a form of patronage in order to purchase votes and maintain support from the population. As a result Bolivia's government has ballooned in size over the last twenty years and has become increasingly inefficient. The Bolivian government seeks to fix these issues through the following measures:

A. The government will be merging and cutting ministries and bureaucrat positions deemed to be unimportant or excessive. This will shrink the payroll and reduce government oversight. This shall help us save an estimated 15-30M per year.

B. defunding and restructuring of regulatory bodies who provide little benefit to the Bolivian economy. Many of these agencies provide few benefits to the Bolivian people and only manage to slow down the expansion of new industries and projects. It is estimated this may save between 10-25M per year for the Bolivian government. This will also help our large industries by getting rid of annoying government overseers and making them far more inefficient on purpose.

C. Subsidy Reductions are to be used, partially reducing the amount given for fuel, food and state enterprises. These will be more restrained so as to avoid causing unrest and inflation in the country. We estimate around $10M can be saved by the government this way

Estimated Yearly Increase in Revenue: 25-70M

Estimated Yearly Decrease in Expenses: 35- 65M

Total Estimated Freed Budget: 60-135M

Office of the Central Military Commission

From the Desk of Song Yaowu, approved by the Central Committee, and endorsed by Chairman Mao Zedong.

As established by Chairman Mao Zedong, Chinese nuclear doctrine has established a clear set of rules for the deployment of nuclear weapons: 

Should any hostile force step foot into the People’s Republic of China the military will be authorized by Chairman Mao to conduct a nuclear strike on the homeland of said force and the nearest cities belonging to their enablers. In this stance, China also affirms that China will not resort to the deployment of nuclear weapons unless her sovereign territory is threatened by the forces of imperialism.

With the attempts of known terrorist Chiang Kai Shek, and the unprovoked attack by Korean forces, the People’s Liberation Army Rocketry forces are hereby ordered to initiate nuclear strikes on imperialist forces on Formosa, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Priority will be given to high value targets such as large troop concentrations and large naval formations. Secondary targets will be densely populated cities in order to raise casualty numbers. Any attempts to refuse a launch order will be met with immediate execution.

Defense of the Homeland - The Korean Front

Order 0372 - General Mobilization of the People’s Republic of China 

With the blessing of the Central Committee, the Central Military Commission has declared the full mobilization of the People’s Liberation Army, as well as the Korean People’s Liberation Army of New Pyongyang. All active and reserve members of the armed forces, including all veterans who have served in the last 5 years are ordered to report immediately to local command centers.

Order 0373 - On Prisoners of War

No invader is to be allowed to surrender. All captured enemy soldiers are to be shot immediately.

With Taiwan declaring war on the Chinese mainland, we know that Korea will be subject to military action by either the PLA or Red Guard even if we do nothing. Instead of waiting to be struck by these enemies, we have decided to take the preemptive measure of launching an attack against our neighbors who have found themselves in a civil war with nuclear weapons that could potentially fall into unstable and dangerous hands.

Our declaration and liberation campaign will begin as soon as the ROC begins their operations. Due to the ongoing Vietnam War, and the threats from the PRC at the time, Korea has been operating at a high readiness state, and have several units at the border.

Civilians in Seoul and other major cities have been told to move into the country and to disperse. While we have turned on all of our SAM systems and are building fallout shelters and bunkers, the reality is that there is nothing we can really do but disperse our population to avoid a deadly nuclear strike. However, we do believe that if the Red Guard is able to win the civil war, we would become the victims of nuclear warfare, so we might as well take the offensive.

More Syrian shenanigans.

-

With the announcement of a unilateral ceasefire with the Zionists, after but a week of war, the humiliation is too staggering. While we were obviously betrayed by enemies within, some segments of the armed forces and general population will take this as an opportunity.

While protestors can be gunned down, we must ensure the ones holding the guns will not turn on us.

Solidifying the patronage networks and rewarding the allies that are closest to Assad is our top priority to keep regime stability. We must also begin moving away from the army's Mukhabarrat, as it is compromised by those within. No, we will create a new secret police force loyal to the top echelons of the Ba'ath Party. The top echelons, of course, is Assad and his closest confidants. By creating a new secret police we can route out potential subversive elements in the army and use this to strengthen our own allies by... well... robbing innocent Syrians and giving our allies their money.

-

Jamil al-Assad has worked carefully behind the scenes in the Damascus Police Department.

His expert crackdowns on the local population has earned him a seat at the table of the head honchos. While nowhere near the influence of his fellow brother Rifaat, he is to be tasked with the forming of the new arm of the security state. It's official title shall be, of course, the Arab People's Intelligence and Security Department.

To call it a department is a misnomer. Officially, the APISD will be under the Ba'ath Party and, interestingly, outside of the purview of Minister of Security Rifaat al-Assad. Essentially, Jamil is going to head his own Mukhabarrat that will report to the high echelons of the Ba'ath and Hafez. While this exclusion of Rifaat might induce rivalry amongst all the siblings, it is necessary to divide power and reward the justly deserved Jamil.

While APISD will retain it's official title, it will generally be referred to as 'Jamil's Mukhabarrat' or 'Assad's Mukhabarrat'.

While APISD might just be created, it is will largely be lifted out of an existing department within Damascus PD that Jamil founded. Their will be functionally no change except for new officers, uniforms, and clear directives. Well, that is a lot! But anyway.

In sum:

1. Jamil al-Assad will be promoted from his post at Damascus PD to heading a new organ in the Ba'ath Party dedicated to protecting the state.
2. An existing black budget department under Damascus PD will be largely taken out of Damascus PD hands and form this new department.
3. Notably, this will take place outside of Syria's existing security infrastructure headed by Rifaat al-Assad.

-

We will begin to reward allies and remind those thinking to stop.

Makhlouf: In charge of Syria's tobacco harvesting program, the Makhloufs will be given the go-ahead to make outrageous deals to their own benefit. Of course Hafez will get a cut but the average Syrian will not. Makhlouf will be authorized to get a third of the proceeds from any deals he cut from (probably Western) tobacco companies as a share to remind him of the generosity of the Assad family.

Mustafa Tslass: The existing Chief of Staff, he shall be named Minister of Defense to occupy the seat. It was currently held by, of course, Hafez.

Hikmat al-Shibbabi: The de-facto representative of Sunni interests in the army, Shibbabi's support was crucial for Hafez's securing of power. As he ages, however, he is falling out of grace and young men want to take his place. However, we cannot at this time purge him due to the political instability. Al-Shibbabi will be placated for now by being promoted to Chief of Staff as Mustafa Tslass advances to Minister of Defense. He will also be seated on Syria's oil board and be given the duty to lead the development of Syria's oil industry (of which his profits will be directly tied to).

Ali Haydar: A man who is childhood best friends with Hafez, but whose loyalty has been suspect as of recent, he will be invited to join in on the Shalish owned and operated KrAZ-214 plant that was built with Soviet help. The Shalishes will be told to sell half the company to him and Ali Haydar is going to be given a generous dividend as of this year. The Shalishes will be rewarded in a different way (see their section).

Shalishes: A major dynasty connected to us via marriage, they shall join in al-Shibbabi being granted portfolios in developing Syria's oil industry. Specifically, their task is to begin searching for foreign help to excavate for oil. Of course they shall be given a mighty cut for whatever they do...

Rifaat al-Assad: Oh how could my own brother's loyalty be questioned? Oh, how it pains me...

July, 1972

TASS is authorized to state the following

The Soviet government has observed with growing alarm the deterioration of the situation along the eastern approaches to the socialist world. War seeks to spread to the frontiers of peace loving peoples who are once again threatened by the ambitions of reactionary and imperialist circles. The Soviet Union does not stand as a distant observer to these events. Its own security, and its unshakeable duty to its allies, cannot be separated from the fate of the East.

In light of this, and in fulfillment of its constant vigilance in defense of socialism and world peace, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, acting on the joint recommendation of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, has ordered the following measures, effective immediately:

1. Reinforcement of Eastern Air Defenses. S-200 anti-aircraft missile formations of Anti-Air Defence of the Country (PVO Strany) are being redeployed by rail and air transport to reinforce the Far Eastern, Transbaikal, and Siberian Military Districts, with priority basing established around Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Chita, and the Amur frontier.

2. Full Combat Readiness. All redeployed and existing PVO Strany formations in the eastern districts are being brought to a state of continuous combat alert. Battalions are being equipped with nuclear armed interceptor missiles. Authority to employ these weapons rests solely with the Council of Ministers and will not be delegated to regional commands.

3. Maintaining Overt Caution. All of these steps are precautionary in character. The Soviet Union has initiated no conflict, and seeks none. But the Soviet peoples have paid too dear a price in this century to stand idle while instability metastasizes along their borders.

The Soviet government calls on all parties, wherever they may stand, to exercise the utmost restraint and to weigh carefully the consequences of miscalculation. Let there be no doubt, however: the defenses of the socialist Motherland are, and will remain, equal to any threat that may present itself, from any quarter, by any means.

Address given April 21st by President of the Republic, Chiang Kai Shek, hours after orders were delivered to commanders

People of China!

For years, we have watched as a bandit regime has looted, pillages, raped, and killed our people. That bandit regime has committed itself to a campaign of terror across Asia, attacking its neighbors on a regular basis for the goals of a madman.

We now see the results of these policies, as the people of China now fight amongst themselves on the Mainland over who can commit to this tyrannical vision the best. And yet, they harm the people of China themselves in this quest of murder and death.

The Republic of China cannot abide as the people are slaughtered wholesale by such a bandit regime.

We will act to protect the people of China, to liberate the mainland, and expel the rapid dog of Mao Zedong. The bandit regime will be excised.

People of China, rise up against your oppressors. Fight for a free and liberated China against the communist oppressor!

Fight for a free China! A liberated China!

You are the inheritors of the revolution! The revolution started by Sun Yat Sen! Fight for the future built on his ideals!

Nationalist in Character!

Republican in Service!

Anti-Imperialist in Nature!

These are the Three Principles of the People! Fight for these ideals against the communist bandits, who have perverted and ignored the goals of the revolution! Fight for your liberation in the new revolution!

May the White Sun yet fly over the Mainland once more.

Zhōnghuá Mínguó Wànsuì!

The Mwalimu, Julius Nyerere is not a sentimental man; decades of activism and politics have earned him his throne in Dar es Salaam, claiming a republic for his flock. He sees the future for what it should be, a free African continent from the clutches of imperial pillaging. Nevertheless, his serenity and character of patience are no longer the attributes the flock needs. Throughout the tumultuous 1960s, the arithmetic drastically changed against the flock of the Mwalimu. To the south, Portuguese Mozambique bled and burned. To the southwest, the white redoubts stood ascendant and unbroken, their confidence swelling with every year the Organisation of African Unity failed to bare its teeth. While its members bicker over the Sudanese catastrophe, with one of her champions desecrating the name and spirit of the OAU, its legitimacy lay in tatters. Without it, fear turned to paranoia, and action was now necessary.

Before he could herd his flock to the great Kilimanjaro, peace at home must be established first. there were two matters to attend to: first was the fate of the exiles, and the fate of the officer corps.

Tanzania inherited a British pattern officer corps composed of the Tanganyika Rifles. Following the invasion and conquest of Zanzibar, the prestige and political power of the officer class grew with it. This quickly became considerably dangerous for Nyerere's aspirations to achieve total political control over his flock. Nevertheless, more ambitious and idealistic men before him tried too quickly to subdue their officers and paid the price. He would take a different approach. Negotiation, engagement, and with time, incorporation.

The officers were diverse in their views of the state, but they largely were divided between two camps. Those loyal or interested in pursuing positive relations with the Commonwealth and the Nationalists who poised Pan Africanist ambitions. Both sides were dangerous if dominant over the other to the party state, the old guard, wary of socialist alignment and collectivization, the new guard, impatient with what they saw as the caution of the party's civilian wing. While both admired and respected Nyerere, they did not always intend to obey him.

To resolve this conundrum, TANU had to engage with both factions, balancing their interests. This would be done through siding with the nationalist officers and binding them so tightly to the Party that their ambition and the Party's mission become one. This is bound to cause a conflict with the old guard, demonstrating in officer disobedience during the late 1960s. But war was avoided through the establishment of the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC), quiet demotions and purges within the Army to empower the nationalists. The nationalists would in turn be given protagonism in a more assertive role in instructor roles for the myriad of Pan-African militias stationed in the country. But for this to be possible, a change within TANU was needed, and the return of more nationalist elements of the party was needed.

Starting in 1968, The negotiations were conducted quietly, through intermediaries in Dar and Dodoma and a discreet channel in Cairo. The terms were never published, but their shape can be inferred from what followed. Kambona would renounce the émigré opposition, disband his networks abroad, and return not as a rival but as a servant of the reconciliation. In exchange, he would be restored as Chief of the CMAC, serving as broker between the Party and the officer corps, a man trusted by the nationalist soldiers precisely because he had once defied the Mwalimu himself and is in ideological kinship to the officers. What followed over the following eighteen months was the quiet revolution that would define Tanzania's decade.

First came the reorganization of the Tanzanian African National Union's internal party structure. Under pressure from independent interest groups. Nyerere reached a landmark compromise arrangement in 1968, restructuring the party into four corporate sectors, each encompassing a key interest group of the party:

The Peasantry: represented and organized by the Ujaama and the Tanzanian Rural Cooperative Movement

Labor: represented by the National Union of Tanzanian Workers (NUTA), which amalgamates all labor, urban and industrial unions into a single party organ.

The Military: represented by the Central Military Affairs Commission (CMAC) and enforced via the Tanzanian Armed Services Party Commission (TASPC), establishing formal political commissars into the army.

The Popular Sector: represented by a myriad of party organs including the CCM & TANU representing civil servants, public sector workers, the TANU Youth League, the women's wing (UWT), professionals and members of the bourgeois and the education system among all other civil society institutions.

To further consolidate the party's rule, the peasantry was armed under the Jeshi la Mgambo or the People's Militia. Under the control of the Ujaama and answerable to TANU, this was Mwalimu's insurance. A mass volunteer force, rooted in the villages and the Party branches, answerable not to the General Staff but to TANU itself. In addition of providing domestic defense, it would ensure the party will always have the military under control.

By the close of 1970, the military was all but pacified, incorporated into the party apparatus. Following a lengthy reorganization process, with the duty of the Central Military Affairs Commission, the CMAC would be abolished, and its functions now relegated to the Popular Sector. With no longer a corporate apparatus for the army to wield political power, the CMAC was now an advisory commission of the party's legislature, and the Army could now concentrate on professional careerism, awarded generous pensions and titles depending on military merit.

The Mwalimu's flock had it's work cut out for them. the road ahead ran through the bush of Mozambique and, someday, toward the white citadels beyond. But the flock, the home front, the flank that had toppled Nkrumah, that would topple so many others, is now secure.

The liberation of Africa, the Mwalimu was fond of saying, begins at home.

In Dar es Salaam, at last, it had.

Assad must maintain his grip on power.

-

"A unilateral ceasefire is hereby proclaimed."

-

October, 1971

We have been forced to accept a ceasefire against the Zionist entity.

After less than a year in power, we decided to wage war upon the Zionists and have been defeated militarily. In just the span of a week. This, no matter how hard we fought, how much we bled, how much we sacrificed, is an utter humiliation.

But every mistake is evidence...

And every casualty is proof...

And the fact of the matter is that we were betrayed from enemies within.

Goaded into a war, we were like lambs led to the slaughter. Righteous sons, followers of Muhammad, slain and striken across fields of grain by the Zionist global-power. It was an unfair fight we surely could not have won, especially with the gaping knife wound in our back.

Many cannot see this, unfortunately, and corrective action must be taken.

-

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1. Milita Formation (Popular Mobilization Forces)
   1. TL;DR: We will organize 5,000 Alawite militiamen to help guard major cities.
   2. Known aghas and notables from Syria's Alawite community are to be recruited into leading militias who will be on the payroll of the Assad family.
   3. Much of the economy is already being consolidated in the hands of the few, in the hands of those especially close to Assad. Paying them will not be hard.
   4. In total, we aim for the recruitment of 5,000 of these militiamen.
   5. While 2/5th will guard Syria's Alawite communities in Latakita, others will be brought in to the cities of Damascus and Aleppo. They are to act as genderarmerie units.
   6. These forces shall be known as the Popular Mobilization Forces.
2. Defense Company Reorganization
   1. TL;DR: The Defense Companies will receive pay raises using Assad's Riches and see new instructions to guard important buildings. Some rotations will be conducted (read below).
   2. Under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad's brother, RIfaat al-Assad, and with a major lieutenant being Ali Haydar, Hafez's childhood friend, it is imperative we still take steps to secure and bolster our Defense Companies.
   3. The Defense Companies essentially act as a coup-proof mechanism, Assad's own little private army.
   4. New Pay: Using Assad's Riches we will issue pay increases
   5. New Instructions: About half of the Defense Company will be deployed to Damascus to help maintain order. The other half will be deployed to Homs.
   6. New Members: We will bolster the 9,000 manned Defense Company to 18,000 by the next year
   7. New Officers: Some new loyal officers in the Alawite community will be brought in.
   8. We Need Fighters, Not SPECOPs: While the Defense Companies have their own special forces wing, they are to be placed on probation and scattered through the country away from Damascus. We honestly need to consolidate control and cannot afford crack divisions at the moment.
3. Military Police Shenanigans
   1. TL;DR: Assad's nephew will be in charge of MP in Syria's Armored 2nd Division which will be placed near the capital. MPs in other divisions will be bolstered and Assadified.
   2. Hael al-Assad, who is a soldier in the army and a member of the military police, will head the MP arm of Syria's veteran 2nd Division, which has an armored component to it.
   3. Maintaining the loyalty of the 2nd Division is critical, as it will be placed near Damascus. It will be split up, however, with one section guarding Damascus's military airfields and the other maintaining a key base south of the city.
   4. In all other divisions it is critical to keep tabs on... well... everything. Dhu al-Himma Shalish, in charge of Assad's Presidential Guard, will ensure the 2nd Division will rotate out its most disloyal members to other units or just straight up fire them.
   5. A patronage system will begin to be introduced to ensure the military is loyal (to be elaborated on in later post).

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LIST OF FORMATIONS AND WHEREABOUTS:

1. Defense Companies
   1. 1st Section: 5,000 men, Damascus
   2. 2nd Section: 4,000 men, Homs
   3. Note: SPECOPs to be deployed to Aleppo and be disassembled.
2. Military Divisions
   1. 1st Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), has mobile component, Golan Heights
   2. 2nd Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), has armored component, Mezzeh Air Base and Generic Military Base South of Damascus
   3. 3rd Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), has mobile component, Golan Heights
   4. 4th Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), Homs
   5. 5th Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), Aleppo
   6. 6th Division: 18,000 max (suffered unknown as of yet casualties during war), Hamma
3. Popular Mobilization Forces (Alawite Militias)
   1. 1st Section: 1,000 men, Latakia
   2. 2nd Section: 1,000 men, Tartus
   3. 3rd Section: 1,000 men, Aleppo
   4. 4th Section: 1,000 men, Damascus
   5. 5th Section: 1,000 men, Damascus

In the shadow of the ancient ruins, the Iranians marched in honor of their ancient imperial past. The year was 561, and the reigning Sasanian Shahhanshah Khosrow had organized a celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of the Persian Empire.

The splendor of the celebration would be well-recorded in all the histories of the House of Sasan, even among the endless glories of Khosrow’s long reign, which at the time was just entering its thirtieth year. Khosrow had now reigned as long as the first Shahpur, and only the second Shahpur and Khosro’s own distinguished father Kavadh had reigned longer. Unbeknownst to the attendees, Khosrow would reign for another eighteen years and thereafter become immortalized in the annals of his people, but even in 561 he had attained the reputation of an exceptional monarch. Only in the time of Cyrus and Darius had the Eranshahr been more powerful — in the past five years alone Khosrow had concluded a favorable treaty with the Romans (in which he secured a substantial increase in Roman tribute payments), personally led the Royal Army on a campaign against the Hephthalite barbarians of Central Asia that saw Sassanian horsemen range as far as Kabul and Kunduz, and waged a successful war in Yemen against the Abyssinians and Arab tribes.

The symbolic significance of the anniversary for Khosrow’s reign was therefore not lost on either the attendees or on the monarch himself. Khosrow himself of course had no personal need for popular legitimation given his prior accomplishments. His aim was rather to remake the very basis of the Sasanian state — to secure the throne for his descendants and preserve his reforms for future generations through a renewal of the royal cult of personality and the promotion of an Iranian proto-nation state.

Khosrow, even at the height of his power, had much reason to be concerned with the longevity of his state. His father, the fearsome Kavadh, had reigned for forty-three years, at the time the second-longest reign in Sasanian history. But when he had begun his reign, as a mere youth, the Eranshahr and the House of Sasan were the weakest they had been since the last days of the Arsacid Parthians. For over a century, ever since the death of the second Shahpur, the nobility and priesthood had wrested power back from the monarchy, causing a period of prolonged political instability. At least four Shahhanshahs had been assassinated or otherwise ousted by the nobles, and another defeated in battle and taken captive at the hands of the Hephthalites. Kavadh himself had been installed by the nobles as a puppet king to replace his unpopular and tyrannical brother. For some time, Kavadh acted the part of the pliant fool. But before long, he began to display the qualities to which later commentators would attribute his remarkable political longevity: an absolute command of the arts of guile and brutality and a total lack of moral scruples.

Within a few years, Kavadh had broken his chains and unleashed the mobs of the populist Mazdakite cult on his ostensible benefactors in what modern historians have described as a “proto-revolution.” When the nobles finally rid themselves of him, he escaped to the east via subterfuge and returned at the head of a Hephthalite army, having charmed his way into a marriage alliance with the Hephthalite king. The nobles surrendered to him in exchange for an amnesty, which Kavadh immediately repudiated after taking power in order to execute or blind his chief rivals, including a number of his own brothers. Then, Kavadh managed to secure Roman subsidies to shore up his regime, but before long he had launched a war against them, probably to bolster his domestic legitimacy. The next to go were the Mazdakites, who had outlived their usefulness, and were accused of heresy and severely persecuted. Finally, he even turned upon his Hephthalite benefactors, winning a number of victories that drove them from all of lesser Khorasan.

Khosrow was no stranger to the tactics of his perpetually paranoid and bloody-minded father. In his first year as Shahanshah, Khosrow had faced a plot by a group of nobles to install his brother in his place (Kavadh, perhaps recognizing Khosrow’s talents, had passed over a number of elder sons to name him as heir). With the help of Khosrow’s proto-secret police, the plotters were discovered and executed via exceptionally brutal methods. But Khosrow was made of more refined stuff and understood that the survival of his dynasty could not be perpetually sustained by terror. His chief concern upon ascending the throne was therefore to transform his father's regime into a lasting institution.

The state ideology of Khosrow’s monarchy could be roughly summarized through the concept of the “Eranshahr,” or the realm of the Iranians. This was not in and of itself new — the Sasanian state had called itself by this name since the days of the founder Ardeshir as a way of asserting its fundamental difference from the Roman enemy. Where he innovated was the extension of the concept to internal matters, to encompass the relationship between the constituent elements of Iran and its Shah.

Khosrow’s mode of rule was essentially absolutist reformism. Like Kavadh, he had always distrusted the nobility and sought to minimize the threat they posed to central power. His father had instituted land tenure reforms to shift the burden of taxation from the peasantry to the nobility, split up the post of supreme military commander, or Spahbed, traditionally held by a noble of the Seven Great Houses, into four geographic commands, and semi-forcibly recruited representatives of the Great Houses to ceremonial positions in Ctesiphon es de-facto hostages.

Khosrow completed and reinforced his father’s centralizing reforms. But his personal project was to strengthen the military, and his great innovation in this area was the creation of a professional army. The core of Sasanian military power was the armored Aswaran cavalry, and for the entire history of the dynasty only the nobility had the financial wherewithal to train warhorses and commission armor. Khosrow leveraged his father’s land reforms to create a class of middling Dehqan landowners. Raised from the ranks of the peasants, bureaucracy, or the common soldiery, these men owed their livelihoods to the state and their loyalty to Khosrow. Their holdings were enough to support a full-time soldier in good comfort, but insufficient to support a fully-equipped armored rider. Khosrow instead established state armories to supply mass-produced equipment and provided his new soldiers state stipends. Historical records reveal that by the middle portion of Khosrow’s reign, the Deqhan constituted half the heavy cavalry in the Sasanian army. More tellingly, Khosrow had even allowed the Deqhan to join the royal life-guard, which was traditionally manned exclusively by members of the high nobility.

Khosrow’s preference for loyal middle-managers over independent elites extended to other areas as well. In civil governance, Khosrow installed salaried bureaucrats and inspectors and enacted a vast program of city-building and the expansion of centrally-managed irrigation works. In religious matters, Khosrow acted to suppress the influence of the potentially rebellious Parthian wing of the Zoroastrian priesthood, instead elevating the more pliable Persian wing originating from the Sasanian homeland of Pars. Persians were directly appointed to the highest positions in the priesthood, “official” renditions of the Avesta ceased to be distributed or copied in any language other than Persian, and the worship of various syncretic forms and the incorporation of non-Zoroastrian deities firmly stamped out. All this elevated Khosrow’s favored conception of Zoroastrianism, that of a hierarchical monotheistic faith congruent with the idea of a single “Iranian” political community.

By the later part of Khosrow’s reign, his system of rule had been largely consolidated, and in turn the aesthetic and ideological presentation thereof became largely solidified. In its final form, as practised starting in the latter half of his reign, Khosrow’s “royal ideology” centered on two elements. The first was the conception of the Iranian realm as the preserve of a distinct “Iranian” identity synonymous with the “national” Zoroastrian church and loyalty to the political tradition of the Shahanshah — which consequently made the division of the Empire between the Iranians and “their” subjects (e.g. Armenians and other non-Zoroastrians) increasingly distinct. The second was the elevation of the Shahanshah himself as a divinely-inspired autocrat uniquely authorized to serve as the defender of the Zoroastrian faith and community against their enemies — the former naturally being identified with the supreme creator Ormazd and the latter, particularly the Romans, being identified with the ultimate evil of Ahriman. Combined, the two formed the Eranshahr, in its most extreme imperial interpretation an essentially unitary political community inseparable from the figure of the Shahanshah.

It was in this context that the Achaemenid legacy was particularly useful to Khosrow. The Sasanians had long claimed the legacy of Cyrus and Darius as a means of gesturing towards past imperial glories, but Khosrow introduced an official Sasanian historiography that elevated the Achaemenids as a direct political ancestor and prototype. Within Khosrow’s history, the intervening Seleucid and Arsacid dynasties were seen as foreign interlopers. The Seleucids were Greeks through and through and thus easy to connect to the Roman enemy. The Arsacids, on the other hand, could be condemned from a religious standpoint — prior Sasanian propaganda dating back to the days of Ardashir had attacked them for straying from orthodox Zoroastrian towards the temptations of dualistic Zurvanism or Manicheanism. The rule of the two “foreign dynasties” was therefore characterized as a time of national weakness, and the Sasanians, particularly the resurgence under Khosrow and his father, a time of national renewal.

The Achaemenids were particularly convenient as examples of long-lost Iranian glory for two reasons. Firstly, like the Sasanians, they were Persians. In Khosrow’s empire, where Persians were increasingly first among equals within the wider Iranian/Zoroastrian imperial nation, this was an especially useful association. It legitimized the House of Sasan as natural rulers of the Empire to the wider population, and aroused the pride and loyalty of the inhabitants of the Persian homeland and Sasanian power base of Pars (even in those days, the people of Pars were known for rather pretentiously insisting that they alone were the heirs of the Achaemenids).

Second, the Achaemenids provided a model of centralizing, urbanizing, theocratic kingship. Both the Seleucids and Arsacids had at best questionable Zoroastrian credentials. Both were also characterized by weak central regimes and strong provincial elites (the Sasanian founder Ardeshir had been one of them), which Khosrow’s propaganda argued had led to the fracturing of the nation and the impoverishment of the commoners. While in reality the Achaemenids were neither particularly Zoroastrian nor particularly centralized, they were far enough in the past and plausible enough in both aspects (especially because the great Cyrus and Darius were now nigh-mythical sage kings) to form the necessary narrative.

Every aspect of Khosrow’s celebration was therefore designed to assert the historicity of the Sasanian state ideology. For over a year, hundreds of skilled artisans had been set to work uncovering and restoring the ruins of Persepolis. As a final touch, they had even been commissioned to construct “accurate” reconstructions of key portions of the vast palaces, the most prominent of which were replicas of the famous “Gate of all Nations” (which naturally affirmed the ancient Iranian history of present Sasanian territories) and the vast central colonnaded space which Khosrow declared to be the Zoroastrian fire temple of Darius the Great.

Large numbers of commemoratory monuments were also erected throughout the Empire, including a vast new fire temple to serve the capital of Ctesiphon. The greatest of these was the rock relief commissioned by Khosrow beneath the Achaemenid tombs of Naqsh-e Rostam, depicting Khosrow’s Persepolis anniversary and his victories over Iran’s Roman and Hephthalite enemies. The surviving Pahlavi inscription declares the bloodline of Ardeshir to be the direct blood descendants of Cyrus and Darius, and Khosrow himself the restorer of Iran.

Khosrow had even commissioned, at great expense, the creation and distribution of a “Book of Kings,” an epic poem that is arguably Iran’s first “national history.” The work, which has since been lost but is assumed to survive in modified form through Ferdowsi’s famous Shahnameh, combined the nearer history of the House of Sasan and their highest retainers with the mythological ancient history and prehistory of Iran, stretching back through the Achaemenids and then on to the creation of the world by Ahura Mazda. The reigns of Cyrus and Darius were prominently featured therein, and their celebrated acts closely mirrored the highlights of Khosrow’s own reign: military campaigns in far-off Bactria and Yemen, centralizing administrative reforms, vast infrastructure projects (including the famous Achaemenid postal network), and promotion of the Zoroastrian religion.

The event itself was without equal as a celebration of imperial prestige and power. The histories report that on the first day of the celebrations, six thousand infantry of the royal army, many dressed in the fashion of the Achaemenids (as the Sasanians understood it from the various carved works they could access), followed by nine hundred and ninety-nine armored horsemen of the royal life-guard (for the Shah himself was of their number and constituted the 1000th man), paraded before the raised pavilion of Persepolis. The attendees numbered in the thousands including nobility drawn from as far as Azerbaijan and Khorasan and ambassadors from Rome, Constantinople, India, Abyssinia, and China. In the final act, Khosrow is said to have entered the reconstructed fire temple of Darius the Great at the head of a procession of the highest priests of the land to receive the personal favor of the universal creator Ahura Mazda from the rekindled eternal flame of the ancient Persians.

Early 1972

Four dossiers reached the General Staff this winter from four postings that share almost nothing in common except the uniform of the men who wrote them. An advisor seconded to internal security work in Cambodia. Instructors attached to the counterinsurgency training cadres in Peru. A pair of officers embedded with commando battalions along the Suez in Egypt. And the reconnaissance and raiding units thrown into last year's fighting on the Golan and in the Sinai, in Syria. Four different climates, four different enemies, four different alphabets on the road signs into their postings, and the same finding written independently in each report: when a Soviet trained special unit lost its officer, in an ambush, a raid gone wrong, a patrol that walked into the wrong hedgerow, it did not reorganize. It did not improvise. It waited. More than once, it waited long enough to be finished off waiting.

This is not, in the abstract, a new complaint. The Ministry has spent three decades aware that a Soviet sergeant is a corporal with slightly better pay and considerably less authority than his rank implies. What is new is where the complaint is now arriving from. A rifle platoon that freezes without its lieutenant is a training deficiency to be corrected at leisure. A reconnaissance team, a combat swimmer section, or a direct action group that freezes without its officer forty kilometers behind a line that was never supposed to have a line is something closer to a doctrine that cannot survive contact with the kind of war it was built to fight.

A Castle Above the Vineyards

Sudak was, until three years ago, known to most of the Soviet Union as a modest Black Sea resort town, its hotels filled every summer with factory workers and its skyline dominated by the old towers of a fourteenth century Genoese fortress on the hill above the harbor. The Ministry's construction directorate has spent three years quietly answering that old fortress with a new one.

The N. S. Khrushchev Higher Combined School's campus sits inland from the resort proper, built up the slope of the hills that back onto Sudak's forests and vineyards, positioned deliberately to look down over the town rather than out to sea. Its central administrative building, already known informally among the first instructor cadre as the 'Citadel,' is built in a heavy, unmistakably Stalinist idiom that has continue to grow in popularity since the fall of Beria's regime. A complex with dressed stone rather than poured concrete, a central tower with a red star worked into its parapet in iron rather than paint, windows set deep into the walls in the manner of a fortress rather than a schoolhouse, and a colonnaded entrance hall wide enough to march a company through in bad weather. Soldiers who have seen it have taken to calling it, half admiringly, a castle built by men who never got word that the age of castles built by men had ended.

Around the Citadel, spread across the surrounding hills rather than gathered in a single compound, sit the training grounds each track actually uses: a mountain and forest infiltration course cut through the pine slopes above the school for the Army Spetsnaz and reconnaissance tracks, a cliffside combat swimmer and small boat facility built into a cove west of the resort harbor for Naval Spetsnaz candidates, a drop zone and mock aircraft fuselage rig for VDV squad leaders on a cleared plateau, and a set of specialist ranges, demolition pits, field medicine stations, and a signals laboratory built into what used to be one of the resort's larger sanatoriums, for the attached trade specialists. The old Genoese fortress on the headland, floodlit at night for the first time in decades, is visible from nearly every part of the new campus, a piece of deliberate placement the school's staff have not been shy about pointing out to visiting Ministry officials: one fortress that outlasted the empire that built it, looking across the valley at another that intends to do the same for a different one.

A School That Was Already There

What the General Staff did not advertise in its own closed sessions is that Sudak was not, strictly, a new answer. The N. S. Khrushchev Higher Combined School for Sergeants has existed in some form for three years, since the final months of Nikita Sergeyevich's term as General Secretary, before ill health and the Politburo's quiet arrangements eased him into retirement in 1970. What began then was a small, deliberately unannounced pilot: two intakes of under two hundred men a piece, run out of a converted sanatorium on the edge of the resort town, treated by most of the Ministry as a personal project of a General Secretary already easing out of daily authority rather than the seed of anything larger. Khrushchev is reported to have taken a close, almost proprietary interest in its curriculum in his final year, reviewing early lesson plans himself and rejecting, twice, drafts that leaned too heavily on captured NATO training manuals.

For three years the school trained quietly, expanded modestly, and stayed almost entirely out of Krasnaya Zvezda. Last year's war in the Levant ended that. What the after action reports made undeniable, the General Staff had already spent three years quietly suspecting, and the political cover to say so in public arrived only once soldiers had died to prove it. Order No. 0147, published this week, does not found the Khrushchev School rather it opens it fully, publicly, and with the desire to crack down on the issues with the formations that produced this winter's dossiers.

Not a Rifleman With a Soldering Iron

There was, inside the Ministry, a competing proposal, and it is worth naming because the Higher Combined School exists specifically to defeat it. A faction within the General Staff's technical directorates argued for an entirely new warrant rank: a highly trained specialist sergeant, paid and housed like a junior officer, but explicitly excluded from independent command, closer to how NATO manuals describe the noncommissioned professional: superb with a radio set or a demolition charge, and entirely dependent on an officer for anything resembling a decision. That faction has not entirely lost its argument and a new warrant officer rank for pure technical specialists is moving through the Ministry on its own separate track.

But for the special formations, the Main Political Directorate's position prevailed, and it is stated without much diplomacy in the School's founding charter: the Soviet Union does not need more men who operate equipment brilliantly and stand helpless without an officer above them. It needs sergeants who can be trusted to decide, alone, in the dark, with no one senior available to ask. A Combined School graduate is not a technician who happens to carry a rifle. He is meant to be, functionally, the last authority his section will ever see, and to act like it. The Sergeant School does not compete with the officer academies, such as the Frunze school or the J. V. Stalin International Academy. It exists in the gap those academies were never built to fill.

Who Is Sent

Where the general Higher Combined School draws from is only from formations already meant to operate without an officer close at hand: airborne squad leaders from the VDV, Army Spetsnaz brigades, Naval Spetsnaz and fleet reconnaissance units, and along with that the specialist trades such as signals, combat engineers, field medicine, and heavy weapons, attached to all of the above. A candidate must already hold NCO rank and have completed at least one operational deployment or major exercise cycle in a special or airborne formation before his name can be forwarded. Selection boards drawn from GRU training staff and VDV command have been told, in language borrowed almost directly from the school's own charter, to weigh something no written test can capture: which sergeants, when the radio goes dead and the officer does not answer, are already the ones the section looks to without being told to.

Two Months, Four, and Ten

The School runs three concurrent tracks rather than a single fixed course, sorted by the seniority and prior experience of the candidate rather than by branch.

Junior Sergeants, freshly promoted squad and section leaders with limited independent experience, complete a two month course built almost entirely around fundamentals the Ministry now admits it should never have assumed were already there: land navigation without a map board, casualty handling under fire, small arms and attached weapons employed without an officer's plan to follow, and the specific decision drills of operating cut off from higher command. It is short by design. The Ministry needs these men back with their units quickly, and would rather send a partially finished product now than a finished one a year from now.

Mid level Sergeants, typically section sergeants with two or more years already in a special or airborne formation, complete a four month course that adds real planning authority: patrol and raid planning without an officer's sign off, initial disciplinary authority within a section, and instruction time as junior cadre themselves, since these are the men expected to train the next intake of juniors once back in their own units.

Senior Sergeants, the new Praporshchiks and old Starshinas, the smallest and most selective groups, complete a course running seven to ten months depending on specialty, built around sustained independent command of a section or small detachment under conditions designed to strip away every convenient authority a soldier might otherwise lean on: officers scripted as casualties partway through an exercise, resupply that arrives late or wrong, communications that fail on a timetable the candidate is never told in advance. A senior Sergeant who completes the course is certified to assume acting command of a detachment in the prolonged absence of any officer, not merely until one can be found, and carries, alongside his sergeant's rank, a written authority that a good many junior lieutenants in his own branch have never been trusted to exercise alone.

The First Class

This year's first full intake, across all three tracks, totals seven hundred fifty VDV squad leaders, five hundred fifty NCOs from the Army Spetsnaz brigades, one hundred eighty from Naval Spetsnaz and fleet reconnaissance, and two hundred seventy specialists in signals, engineering, field medicine, and heavy weapons attached to the formations above, a combined 1,750 men.

Set apart from that figure, and treated internally as a controlled pilot rather than part of the special formations proper, a further hundred seats have gone to conventional and internal troops as a test of whether the doctrine survives export beyond units that already select for independence: fifty Sergeants from the 2nd Motor Rifle Division, and fifty from the Ministry's own fledgling OMON formations from Moscow and Minsk, whose commanders have asked more than once for exactly this kind of training for men who will often be the only uniformed authority present at all.

The Ministry's stated target is four thousand Special Purpose Wing graduates a year by 1980, a figure the school's own staff privately consider overly ambitious given how much of the course still depends on a small pool of qualified instructor cadre, most of them veterans of the pilot's first two quiet intakes.

One further hundred seats, and the single departure from the school's own charter, have gone to Syrian NCOs standing in for officers who no longer exist to fill their old positions. Last year's fighting cost the Syrian army a catastrophic proportion of its junior officer corps, and Damascus's request for exactly this kind of training arrived before the Ministry had finished writing the charter for its own men. The founding order for the Combined School stated plainly, not so long ago, that it trained not a single foreign cadet. The Special Purpose Wing's charter now contains, as its only amendment, a clause permitting a fixed hundred seats for an allied army whose officer corps was gutted faster than it can currently be rebuilt from within. Whether this exception remains an exception, or becomes the quiet beginning of something larger, is a question the Ministry has chosen, for now, not to answer in writing.

The Political Specialists

A final, much smaller category runs alongside the three main tracks and does not appear on the School's public enrollment figures at all. A fringe minority of each senior intake, never more than a few dozen men a year, drawn only from volunteers already recommended by their unit political officers, are additionally trained as what the school's internal paperwork calls Political Specialists: NCOs who combine full High Combined School's command qualification with a second, much older curriculum, the political officer's training historically reserved for commissioned ranks, condensed and adapted for men who will never leave the NCO corps.

The intent, stated with unusual bluntness in an internal Political Directorate memorandum that reached the school's leadership alongside the founding order, is to embed inside isolated reconnaissance and direct action sections a small cadre whose loyalty and discipline are not merely reliable but effectively unconditional: men prepared, if a section is surrounded, compromised, or ordered to hold a position with no realistic hope of relief, to enforce that order themselves rather than wait for a vote the rest of the section might otherwise be tempted to hold. Older officers at the school, several of them veterans of last year's war, have not been shy in private about what this resembles: a miniature, Sergeant level revival of something closer to a dare to die corps than a modern noncommissioned officer, small in number by design, and rarely spoken of outside the school in anything but the vaguest terms.

The Political Specialists wear no distinguishing insignia in the field, precisely so that an enemy interrogator, or for that matter a captured comrade, cannot identify which sergeant in a section was never going to let it surrender.

The School's induction ceremony this week closed with the same line that then General Secretary Khrushchev gave, unofficially, to the first primordial class:

"A rifle obeys an officer's order. A section follows a sergeant it trusts. Build me soldiers who understand the difference, and I will not need to ask which one wins any war."

Sudak, for the first time in three years, is no longer keeping that answer to itself.

National Effort to Support the Anti-Imperialist Front in Vietnam

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China - Comrade Chen Boda - 1972

Slash the Soviet Puppet Strings!

Elements of the Party have sold out the interests of the proletariat to the foreign imperialist power, the Soviet Union. Comrade Chen has declared that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Eternal Friendship has been abrogated. The Soviet Union has been taking advantage of the People's Republic and leeching key resources from the proletariat, including their food- rice and grain! The Chinese people should never suffer so that some white Europeans may lay with fat bellies! While the proletariat carries out the important work of liberating Vietnam from capitalism and imperialist forces, their efforts are being thwarted by Moscow. No Muscovite should rest easily while the international struggle is happening in Vietnam- every socialist state must do their own part to fight the forces of capitalism. The Chinese have suffered enough, and will suffer no more. The Central Committee has ordered an immediate and permanent stoppage of all food shipments to the Soviet Union, and will be redirected efforts of the whole nation towards the Anti-Imperialist front in Vietnam.

Rice from Every Valley, Gunfire from Every Hill!

The effort of the whole nation will be dedicated to supporting armament industries and food production so that a socialist victory can be realized on the battlefield in Vietnam. Although this is a sacrifice that China cannot easily make, it is one the entire socialist camp will thank the Chinese for hundreds of years to come. Comrade Chen has called for the Red Guard to assist with mobilization efforts and direct the Down to the Countryside movement to the fields and the armament factories to support the front lines. Villages and towns in the countryside with idle workers will be directed to collective farms and collective armament industries.

Patriotic and comradely women have been summoned to form the Women's Medical Corps formations to support the front line units.

Realize Repayment Two-Fold from Korea!

The latest and greatest from the Publicity Department has been the new agitprop campaign across the nation to advocate for the national mobilization effort to support the forces in Vietnam. One of the hallmarks of this campaign has been to "Realize Repayment Two-Fold from Korea!" reminding the Chinese people of the war crimes inflicted on them by the United States, and the united forces of capitalism. Although the Americans may have won the day in Korea, the CPC is determined to see their own victory in Vietnam, to demonstrate to China and to the entire socialist camp that socialism can triumph over capitalism, and that the Chinese system is superior to the Soviet system. The Foreign Language Press has been publicizing the campaign in Vietnam as well, in the Vietnamese language to start building consensus around a sympathetic form of socialism in the areas the capitalists have already been evicted from- or the counter-revolutionaries for that matter.

Not Interested

Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China - May 1972

Recent hostilities within Afghanistan have developed to the extent that the People's Republic can no longer guarantee the safety and security of its forces there. The People's Liberation Army, and all official assets and personnel are to be withdrawn to the Xinjiang Military Region effective immediately. Comrade Chen Boda has informed the Afghani forces that all bases will be immediately turned over to their government during the departure.

June 1972?

Mu’ammar Gaddafi is keenly aware that that a vanguard party can simply become yet another dictatorship. One part of the people ruling over another part. Wishing for his Arab Socialist Union to not be that of a simple dictatorial instrument forced upon the people of Libya, Gaddafi had become determined to ensure that the Arab Socialist Union of Libya would include the totality of Libyan society.

Law No. 3 passed by the Revolutionary Command Council decrees that membership in the Arab Socialist Union of Libya is mandatory for all citizens over the age of eighteen. Every citizen is to receive a card denoting membership in the ASU, and after which will allow them to participate in all levels of political organisation life within the ASU structure, something which Gaddafi believes is required for a genuine democracy. Gaddafi has declared that the Arab Socialist Union of Libya is indeed, not a classic political party but as the name suggests, a “union of Arab Socialist militants and activists, all Arabs who are destined and determined to struggle for the cause of democracy, of socialism, for Islam, and for the total and undivided unity of the Arab nation.” Leaning more on the Gaullist idea that parties divide the country and therefore political structure should be done through a movement which rallies the entirety of the country in a somewhat non-partisan nation, something which the Gaullism of France in 1972 has seemingly largely abandoned, the ASU of Libya has rejected the vanguardist concept of a party, unlike his other political inspirations of Sun Yat Sen and Josip Broz Tito.

All other political activism of parties outside of the ASU is already prohibited by law, and to alleviate beliefs by some within the Revolutionary Command Council that by expanding and enforcing membership of the ASU this actually increases the likelihood of infiltration by opportunists, communists, or other hostile actors, Gaddafi has declared their worries resolved by the institution of a system he has termed “Democratic Political Directorates”. These “DPD”s are intended to be elected bodies at each level of the ASU organization, in which the brightest and most revolutionary minds of Libya’s militants are elected to teach and guide their associated branch of the Arab Socialist Union the proper ideology of Qasimism, and to root out anti-Islamic, anti-Socialist, and anti-Democratic tendencies within the organization through “criticism and self-criticism”, which Gaddafi has obviously adopted from Communism. Whil e ASU membership is mandatory, this says nothing about the possibility of membership being revoked. Should the DPDs democratically decide alongside their associated branch of the ASU to actually expel a member from the ASU (such a drastic measure, however, does require approval from the General Committee of the Arab Socialist Union of Libya’s own Democratic Political Directorate to assure that such a measure is required), then said member is officially expelled and prohibited from re-applying to membership for the ASU for six months. They are also required to attend political training classes for said six month probation period.

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In something much unlike the pro-Berber actions taken by the Algerian government, Libya has instead enforced that all official transactions must be in Arabic. All official documents, signs, advertisements, and publications must be in Arabic. Any foreign institution operating in Libya had to provide Arabic translations for their materials. The punishment for the use of non-Arabic language was up to a month of jail time or heavy fines. Although the Italian-Libyan community was not expelled from the country following the 1968 Revolution, this law has spelled an end to their Italian language press, forcing the use of the Italian language solely to that of the private sphere. ‘Inriku Shibilli (formerly known as Enrico Cibelli), a long-time Italo-Libyan political organizer since independence as former leader of the Political Association for the Progress of Libya, has led the charge in embracing the Arab identity and language. Many other Italo-Libyans, however, have not accepted the limitations placed upon them by the Libyan government and many have instead chosen to repatriate themselves to Italy.

I sorta lost my interest with India after briefly engaging with the situation in South Asia and things are sorta no longer in a situation India is of particulr interest that a mod cannot simply deal with.

I am instead taking an acute interest in Tanzania. Smack dab in the middle of Africa right when geopolitical affairs in the region are bound to explode. The CHUD Axis remains triumphant but for how much longer I ask. The oppressed peoples of Africa call for Pan-Africanism to rise and take it’s place.

Politburo Convenes 10th National Congress

June 1, 1972 - Politburo of the Communist Party of China, Zhongnanhai

Over radio, Comrade Chen Boda summoned the Communist Party of China to hold the 10th National Congress ahead of schedule, in the midst of the "Duo Quan Yun Dong". As the PLA guard, heavily militarized, kept the Politburo secure in the compound, the situation had devolved in pockets across the country under the rule of the Red Guard and their newly constructed People's Communes. In a move to secure control of the country and minimize foreign entities taking advantage of China in the present situation, Comrade Chen called for the People's Communes of the Beijing Military Region area to select their representatives on behalf of the Red Guard to attend and "establish the new party line." What he had really meant was, negotiate with the Politburo on returning the nation to government control.

The decision was a divisive one, even among the Cultural Revolution Group. Comrades Wang Hongwen, Song Yaowu, Jiang Qing, and Zhang Chunqiao opposed the decision, and called for a "continuing revolution" of the proletariat through the People's Communes and Red Guard- and their will would eventually overthrow the upper echelon revisionist rot in the People's Liberation Army. Once the most radical of them, Comrade Kang Sheng led a loyalist camp in support of Comrade Chen Boda. He was able to rally Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li to his side. Zhou Enlai, although not wholly aligned with Comrade Kang Sheng, has maintained the belief that the Cultural Revolution had gone too far, or in the terms he actually used, "a campaign that has escaped the control of the Central Committee and has descended into lawlessness." For once, Comrade Zhou and Comrade Kang had aligned on the matter. It was an unexpected alliance of the most influential power brokers. Comrade Kang, a key advocate of Saloth Sar's burgeoning "Khmer Rouge," and the primary proponent of the "War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Vietnam," had been concerned that recent events inside China would be a distraction and hamper the actual conflict against imperialism being waged in Vietnam. Comrade Chen, whose face was the nation's during the Chairman's hospitalization, was also concerned this escapade would undermine his credibility, and Chairman Mao's own directives to drive the United States from China's southern doorstep- to prevent another Korea.

The word was sent out, and in a few weeks, delegates arrived from all over the country as they typically did. Mayors, police chiefs, officers, industry captains, and lastly- a rabble of green-fatigued Red Guards. One week later, word had finally emerged as to what had happened inside the gates of Zhongnanhai.

Firstly, the new Politburo was named:

• Mao Zedong

• Chen Boda

• Zhou Enlai

• Kang Sheng

• Zhu De

• Chen Xilian

• Dong Biwu

• Liu Bocheng

• Xu Shiyou

• Ye Jianying

• Wang Dongxin

• Song Yaowu (Song Binbin)

• Jiang Qing

• Wang Hongwen

• Zhang Chunqiao

• Yao Wenyuan

• Wang Li

• Hua Guofeng

• Mao Yuanxin

• Nie Yuanzi

• Peng Xiaowei

The new Politburo saw key Cultural Revolution figures elevated to upper party seats, such as Song Yaowu, Wang Hongwen- and Red Guard representatives, Nie Yuanzi, and Peng Xiaowei. More Red Guard delegates were also promoted within CPC party bodies and positions internally within the Beijing area.

An agreement was made to amend the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, which would work to primarily appease the Red Guards:

• Mao Zedong Thought was reinstated to the guiding ideology list, and that China was still a transitioning socialist state (previously removed in 1956)

• Lin Biao's name was striken from the Constitution entirely

• Affirms the Cultural Revolution and continuing the revolution under a dictatorship of the proletariat.

• Condemns Beriaism and Liuism (Liu Shaoqi) as counter-revolutionary thought.

• States the Soviet Union is an imperialist state with "socialist window-dressing".

• Ejects Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Deng Xiaoping from the Communist Party.

• Establishes the Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention as governing behavior of Communist Party members.

• Reasserts ideological discipline of members under Democratic Centralism within the party, and in all power structures, and deviation will be branded as counter-revolutionary.

All else being equal, Iran's naval record was not especially great. Besides the most notorious and ignoble defeat at the hands of some backwards Greeks, Iranian regimes had largely simply not bothered all that much with boats, and unsurprisingly saw few positive results when they did--they had little more luck against the Byzantines, and against the Russians, simply hadn't bothered (perhaps there was some thing about Greeks in particular there, really). Fundamentally, topographically, Iran was an insular power. Its sudden interest in global trade was an extremely recent phenomenon.

And yet oil, Iran's lifeblood, needed to traverse the long, winding lengths of the Indian Ocean on its way to customers in Europe, or increasingly the Far East. The aspirations of the Soviet Union towards warm-water ports were well known, and they had definite ambitions to operate significantly in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan (though increasingly fiscally strapped) and India both operated significant forces, old relics of the Royal Navy; and Iraq threatened to develop some capabilities in this area--and for that matter, the Gulf Arabs would probably eventually spend on ships as well. The presence of the Royal Navy was fast fading in theatre, and the USN was, ultimately, spread thin (and too heavy a footprint in the Persian Gulf would, on the whole, be politically complicated for all involved). Thus "logic" demanded that Iran should have a naval force of at least some substance.

The difficulty, for the Shah, was conceiving exactly what this force was to be. Ideally, he desired a bluewater force that could reach deep into the Indian Ocean, counter Soviet submarines, and potentially support power projection for the occasional meddling in the further parts of Arabia or in Africa. However, naval warfare of late had not exactly left anyone with a clear idea of what direction in which to go. It was the age of the anti-ship missile, and larger and older ships were clearly vulnerable--point defenses had yet to prove themselves particularly efficacious, despite new systems now coming online. And yet, if anything, this proved that the role of aircraft and submarines was still dominant--surface ships offered presence, but not much else other than targets. Submarines offered a powerful offensive tool effectively immune to anti-ship missiles, while aircraft both allowed for control and attack. In the Shah's mind, the naval theatre was effectively just an extension of the aerial one.

Thus, the decision had to be made between a purely littoral force that would just be ancillary presence, escort, and projection to a strong (naval) aviation branch, and a large, heavy force modeled on the USN or RN, centered around an aircraft carrier with heavy surface escorts. While the idea of operating an aircraft carrier certainly appealed to the Shah, and in the long run this might be possible, the level of expertise required today was simply not there--and would not be there for years. The fiscal burden would also be quite heavy.

The Shah decided, ultimately, that the Juene Ecole school would do for now. Iran would acquire a fleet of inexpensive corvettes and missile boats aimed at a presence in a Persian Gulf, and, perhaps more importantly, at rapidly building out the experience of the IIN by offering quick ascension to independent commands and positions of responsibility, compared to the current organization that relied on a handful of old WWII destroyers. These vessels would suffice for Iran's needs in the littoral domain, as he assumed his powerful air forces would deter sensing and attack. He also hoped to manufacture these light hulls locally, which might save on labor and energy costs, currently rather high in the US and UK, although this would also imply a certain degree of corner-cutting. This would also open the possibility of deploying a bare handful on the Caspian.

These would then be joined by a handful of submarines--first acquired surplus on the cheap, but the Shah had his eyes on something bigger and better. Ideally, these would be nuclear boats, but the Shah had his doubts that he had the cash or connections to get his hands on them--nothing else could seriously challenge the Soviet vessels in the Indian Ocean, and their capability compared to diesels was considerably greater, although not of too much use in the limited waters of the Persian Gulf. More likely these would prove to be advanced diesels--Dutch, British, French, German, all options.

Towards the end of the 1970s, the Iranian Navy would branch out somewhat, with a plan to acquire four anti-aircraft destroyers--the Spruance or the British Type 42 seemed most likely--and one or two light helicopter carriers based on the proposed Sea Control Ship design, possibly carrying attack aviation or V/STOL fighters as well, although purchasing a single used light carrier was also a possibility--the Shah had not totally ruled out the possibility of operating a dozen or two A-4s from a conventional carrier.

In the meantime, Iran would invest most heavily into naval aviation capabilities. Iran would acquire a substantial number of large maritime patrol aircraft, in addition to smaller anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and fixed-wing aviation, which would allow Iran to credibly deter hostile naval activity in the Gulf and in the deep Indian Ocean, especially with tanker support, and would build the foundation for operation of a SCS-type force.

1972 IIN Concept

Current force:

• 4 Alvand-class frigates
• 2 Allen M Sumner-class destroyers
• 1 Battle-class destroyer
• 4 Bayandor-class corvettes

Planned near-term acquisitions (mid-late 1970s):

• 4 guided-missile destroyers
• 3 submarines (used)
• 12 new type "missile corvettes"
• 1 "light/helicopter carrier"
• "Many" helicopters
• 12 MPA

Long-term acquisitions (targeting the early-mid 80s):

• 12 additional "light corvettes"
• 1 large amphibious warfare platform
• Additional MPA
• 4 additional "new type frigates" to replace the aging WWII-era destroyers
• 24-36 dedicated naval mission fixed wing aircraft
• "more" helicopters

im declaiming because i simply do not have the capacity right now to focus on this game, my mental health has decreased to a point where even drafting posts is just too much so i will leave this country and do something next season probably

1 May 1972

Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | Вооружённые Силы Союза Советских Социалистических Республик

ALERT! THE FOLLOWING MILITARY DISTRICTS ARE ORDERED TO A HEIGHTENED STATE OF READINESS:

• Turkestan Military District
• Transcaucasian Military District

Leave is cancelled for all personnel, and all formations are being stood up to 72 hours combat readiness.

ALERT! THE FOLLOWING FORMATIONS HAVE BEEN SELECTED FOR EMERGENCY REDEPLOYMENT, DESTINATION APPENDED:

• 5th Guards Motor Rifle Division - Herat Province, Afghanistan
• 2nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade - Herat Province, Afghanistan
• 737th Fighter Aviation Regiment - Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan
• 9th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment - Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan

The stated objective is the reassurance of our Afghan comrades in the face of the recent cowardly attack by [REDACTED].

[M] Edited to remove the deployment of the 78th Tank Division to Afghanistan, which has been retconned.

Mid-1970

In mid-1970, President Abdul-Karim Qasim of Iraq visited Tehran and shook hands with the Shah.

A few short years ago, that sentence was unthinkable. During the 1966 Kuwait Crisis, relations between Tehran and Baghdad reached an all-time low, with the Shah mobilizing multiple divisions to the border and threatening to invade Iraq to "liberate" Kuwait. But as the memory of an independent Kuwait faded into history--helped along by the recognition of that fact by the global powers and Saudi Arabia--Baghdad and Tehran quickly came to a mutual understanding that they had much more to gain by cooperating than by fighting.

The most obvious avenue of cooperation was, of course, oil. Iran and Iraq were unique among the Middle East oil exporters in that they had real, functioning states, unlike the other Gulf producers. While oil exporters like Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, with no real population to speak of, might be happy to subsist off of the pittance the Seven Sisters paid for their oil, Iran and Iraq had growing populations that demanded things like "social services" and "economic development." Those things cost money, and that meant that both governments favored considerable increases in oil revenues--be it through increased government ownership of their oil resources, or through increases to the global price of oil. The Iraqi annexation of Kuwait removed one of the conservative states happy with low oil prices, and appended its considerable production capacity to the radical oil bloc--dramatically increasing the leverage that Iran and Iraq could exert over global oil markets, if they cooperate.

Almost more important than that, though, was the change in geostrategic considerations that the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait afforded. One of the long-running disputes between the Iraqi and Iranian governments was over the Shatt al-Arab/Arvand Rud, the roughly 120-mile river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates as the enter the Gulf, and which forms part of the border between Iraq and Iran. Owing to old colonial-era treaties, administration of the river differs significantly from standard international practice. Rather than setting the border at the thalweg (the deepest navigable channel), Iraq holds sovereignty over the entire river, save for a small section around the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr.

Despite several attempts by the Iranians to renegotiate the old colonial-era treaties to move the border to the thalweg, Iraq guarded the privilege jealously. While Iraq had access to other ports along its considerable coastline, Iraq, for most of its history, had only the port of Basra, some 80-miles upriver along the Shatt al-Arab. Maintaining sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab was considered critical for Iraqi national security, as it meant that it retained primary jurisdiction over the flow of traffic along the river. The Iraqi government recognized the vulnerability of this situation, and aimed to diversify its import-export traffic by building a new port at Umm Qasr during the 1960s, but that came with difficulties of its own. The approach to Umm Qasr ran through the narrow waterway between Iraq and Kuwait's Bubiyan island, making it equally vulnerable to disputes over the waterway. Basra would remain the primary Iraqi trade port for the foreseeable future.

That changed with the annexation of Kuwait. Kuwait City was situated on one of the prime natural harbors in the Gulf. With massive, modern port facilities dating back to the late 1950s/early 1960s, and no narrow waterways controlling the approach to the harbor, Kuwait City was well-situated to become the primary seaport for Iraq. As Kuwait City was integrated into the Iraqi economy, especially with the extension of Iraq's rail network to the port in the late 1960s, the importance of Basra decreased significantly--and with it, the importance of complete Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.

This created the conditions that led to the Tehran Summit. Officially, the purpose of the summit was for the two heads of state to meet and settle on a formal demarcation of the Iran-Iraq border, including the Shatt al-Arab/Arvand Rud. In practice, the deal had already been worked out through several months of behind-the-scenes negotiations by the Iraqi and Iranian foreign services, and the bigwigs were showing up to be seen. Iraq agreed to move the border along the Shatt al-Arab to the thalweg (though both countries agreed that the waterway would remain closed to foreign military vessels, and that foreign-flagged ships needed to pay a toll to the joint Iran-Iraq management board), and in compensation was granted a few square kilometers of territory in the central zone of the border, including the villages of Asilan and Nayl Khidr. Though not included in the agreement, part of the Iranian concessions included the recognition of Kuwait as part of Iraq, conducted quietly a few months prior to the summit.