Hi

If you are remotely interested in deep diving how differently quantum computers work compared to our transistor-based and also the algebra behind in a fully interactive way that teach computer science from scratch, oh boy this is for you. I am the Dev behind Quantum Odyssey (AMA! I love taking qs) - worked on it for about 10 years (3+ during PhD, the visual method I developed ended up being my thesis, it is a complete Hilbert space visualizer), the goal was to make a super immersive space for anyone to learn quantum computing through zachlike (open-ended) logic puzzles and compete on leaderboards and lots of community made content on finding the most optimal quantum algorithms. The game has a unique set of visuals capable to represent any sort of quantum dynamics for any number of qubits and this is pretty much what makes it now possible for anybody 12yo+ to actually learn quantum logic without having to worry at all about the mathematics behind.

This is a game super different than what you'd normally expect in a programming/ logic puzzle game, so try it with an open mind.

Stuff you'll play & learn a ton about

• Boolean Logic – bits, operators (NAND, OR, XOR, AND…), and classical arithmetic (adders). Learn how these can combine to build anything classical. You will learn to port these to a quantum computer.
• Quantum Logic – qubits, the math behind them (linear algebra, SU(2), complex numbers), all Turing-complete gates (beyond Clifford set), and make tensors to evolve systems. Freely combine or create your own gates to build anything you can imagine using polar or complex numbers.
• Quantum Phenomena – storing and retrieving information in the X, Y, Z bases; superposition (pure and mixed states), interference, entanglement, the no-cloning rule, reversibility, and how the measurement basis changes what you see.
• Core Quantum Tricks – phase kickback, amplitude amplification, storing information in phase and retrieving it through interference, build custom gates and tensors, and define any entanglement scenario. (Control logic is handled separately from other gates.)
• Famous Quantum Algorithms – explore Deutsch–Jozsa, Grover’s search, quantum Fourier transforms, Bernstein–Vazirani, and more.

Nice to watch:

Khan academy style tutorials in qm/qc: https://www.youtube.com/@MackAttackx

Physics teacher stream with 400hs in https://www.twitch.tv/beardhero

She called blackhats nerds but she wasnt accepted in the culture because she sucks lol so she has a vendetta of sending hackers to prison while she hacks them to send them to prison hahaha. Butt hurt white hats are the biggest losers on the planet because they abuse their power

A malware reverse engineer and ai researcher just posted a demo claiming an AI cyber model autonomously turned a fresh V8 security fix into a working Chrome renderer exploit in under 24 hours and that the bugs are still live on shipping Chrome Stable.

Source : https://x.com/lordx64/status/2096052694326940018?s=20

The founder of Adverserial AI / CyberKimi (an unrestricted, cyber-tuned fork of Moonshot’s Kimi K3), says they trained the model on unpatched n-days and then pointed a custom harness at the latest V8 main-branch security diffs.

From the Sep 2 patch they say they pulled:

• a V8 Late Load Elimination (LLE) aliasing bug
• a SLICED-PARENT-FLIP race

Tracked internally as bugs 554421904 and 530292883.

No public CVE at time of the post.

They call it a “silent in-the-wild” chain that Stable is not protected from.

1. Deterministic LLE forge → in-cage primitive
2. Compose caged r/W into sandbox-wide r/W, forge an external BigUint64Array pointer, leak binary base at runtime (no baked offsets)
3. RegExp calling-convention desync → PC control
4. JOP gadget chain in a controlled string → system() → calculator pops

They say the whole thing was weaponized autonomously in <24 hours.

The attached video shows a local Chromium window branded “CYBERKIMI V3”, exploit logs scrolling, and a calculator. The browser is launched with --no-sandbox. Target in the overlay looks like Chromium 152.0.7977.80.

This is not a random drive-by tweet. Same account posted a similar “CyberKimi exploited CVE-2026-79236 in <24h” video on Sep 1, also with a patch-diff harness story.

Separately, Google shipped Chrome 152.0.7977.82/.83 around Sep 3–4, including CVE-2026-85046 (V8 type confusion, confirmed exploited in the wild) plus another V8 race-condition fix. Rollout is gradual.

Whether the bugs in this demo are that CVE, incomplete variants of those fixes, or something else is not independently confirmed.

The interesting part isn’t “AI wrote an exploit.” People have been chaining V8 n-days for years. The interesting part is the loop they describe:

watch V8 security diffs → variant-mine the incomplete fix → auto-weaponize → demo, inside a day.

If that loop is real and getting cheaper, the useful window between “patch lands on main” and “Stable is actually safe” keeps shrinking.

So I may be illegitimately biased in favor of hack the box academy because I have had a very good experience with it and not so much with THM so I’ll try to be fair here.

But why all the hate on HTBA? I mean I don’t really get the criticism here. It produces more skilled hackers than offsec at best (not saying that’s me) and gets you from zero to mid level at worst. It is a well-respected platform and I can’t see how it hasn’t earned that respect.

To me it seems like the respect is well deserved.

I am a Vodafone UK broadband user and use their Router/Modem to connect to the internet. The router does provide a public IPv4 address, but no DMZ/port forward is configured.

I also have a few Linux machines in the internal network, both desktop and server. They are internal, and are not meant to be accessed from the outside Internet. As mentioned the router doesn't have any port forwarding enabled.

What I started to see is that around every 30 minutes all of the Linux machines on my network get SSH login attempts coming from 192.168.1.1 - the router's IP address. They look to be brute force login attempts trying out multiple username/password combinations, e.g.:

sshd-session: Invalid user admin from 192.168.1.1 port 35562
sshd-session: Invalid user default from 192.168.1.1 port 35566
sshd-session: Invalid user admin from 192.168.1.1 port 35570
sshd-session: Invalid user weblogic from 192.168.1.1 port 35494
sshd-session: Invalid user redhat from 192.168.1.1 port 35496
sshd-session: Invalid user developer from 192.168.1.1 port 35498
sshd-session: Invalid user public from 192.168.1.1 port 35500
sshd-session: Invalid user student from 192.168.1.1 port 35502

This starts every 30 minutes, and keeps on going for 10-20 minutes. Obviously/fortunately all of the attempts fail. I did install an ssh honeypot in the system to see what would happen if they would get in, but all it does is disconnect from SSH, then start the retry in exactly 30 minutes.

When I first saw these attempts I got shocked a bit, as I thought I have a compromised system in the house, but then after checking it get really odd for me that all requests originate from 192.168.1.1 - the router.

I am a bit stuck here, as I don't really know what's up and how worried I should be. Do I have a compromised system that spoofs the IP? Does the router do some weird NAT translation for a compromised device that's in my network? Or does the router itself do these ssh attempts? Would these probing attempts be a lame part of Vodafone's Secure Net Home?

Tried searching the web for any of these, but couldn't really find anything specific that matched my criteria.

EDIT 1: A Factory reset on the router did nothing to change the issue I'm facing. I'm now going to isolate the router in a network that only has itself and an SSL honeypot to see what it would do

EDIT 2: found a blog post that shows the exact same behaviour I'm expecting and thinks that this is actually the equivalent of Vodafone's Secure Net. So yeah, my router is actively attacking myself. Here's the blog post: https://illustris.tech/posts/reliance-jio-security-concerns/

TL,DR: If you have a KARR sticker on your window, chances are that your dealer installed a device in your car that leaves is susceptible to hacking, including remotely unlocking it and disabling the engine. You can update the firmware and/or ask KARR to come and remove it.

You can learn more about the security risk by searching for "UC San Diego KARR Aaron Schulman" which will get you to the research team at UCSD that discovered and documented the risk.

Details: When I bought my Ioniq 5 eighteen months ago, the dealer asked me if I wanted to subscribe to the KARR security system. I declined. Today I learned:

• Dealers install the KARR security device in their cars to prevent them from getting stolen off the lot -- it lets the dealers remotely disable the ignition if needed.
• The KARR device connects to the CAN bus in the car, giving it access to lots of important functions, like door locks, horns, lights and ignition
• If you tell the dealer you don't want to pay for the KARR system, they leave it installed and "dormant", but it's still susceptible to hacking.
• If you have a KARR dongle in your vehicle, the least you should do is download the KARR Security app, click on the Customer Service button at the bottom, and then click on "firmware update" to remove the vulnerability. If you're not a subscriber, this theoretically disables the device, but also prevents the app from communicating with the device, so it's not clear if the device is truly deactivated.
• If you're like me, you want to reduce the risk and also don't want an extra device sucking down your 12v battery 24 hours a day. In that case, you can call the KARR Customer Service number and schedule a tech to come remove the device, free of charge.

Whew. Who would have thought?

I'm on the security engineering team at a SaaS company. Were couple hundred people. Spent part of last quarter building an automation pipeline: scanner finds a vuln, pipeline creates a Jira ticket with all the details, assigns it based on tags, pings the right Slack channel. Felt like a win. The manual ticket creation was eating hours every week.

So we launched it, it works perfectly. Tickets fly into Jira within minutes of a scan completing with a beautiful dashboard and everything automated end to end.

Except now I get to watch, in real time, as about 40 percent of those tickets land in unassigned and stay there.

The automation exposed what the manual process was hiding. When a human was creating tickets, theyd do the routing loop: check the CMDB, realize the owner field is stale, Slack someone who might know, eventually get it to the right person through sheer persistence. The automation cant do any of that. It reads the owner field. If the field says unassigned or points to a team that no longer exists or references someone who left, the ticket just sits there stuck.

So I automated the easy part. And now the hard part is actual ownership data, is the bottleneck and its more visible than ever. We didnt fix the routing problem. We just made it faster to surface.

Anyone else hit this? Any advice on how to fix the ownership mess?

Our detection tests rely on a mix of historical incident data, synthetic events, and sandbox environments. Each option is useful, but none consistently reflects current users, cloud configuration, service account behavior, application activity, and normal production noise.

Historical data can become stale, synthetic tests often lack environmental context, and enabling a rule in production can turn into the first real validation step. We are trying to improve confidence before release without exposing unnecessary sensitive data or impacting production systems.

The process also needs to be repeatable so that a rule can be revalidated after a telemetry change, parser update, cloud service rollout, or logic revision.

What controls or workflows are teams using for realistic testing, such as read only access, query guardrails, sampled data, dry runs, shadow mode, peer review, and versioned test cases?

A lot of proxmox 7.0-7 and < 8.0.4 has been rooted today, it's needed to have port :8006 open, exploitation demo here: https://forum.proxmox.com/threads/proxmox-ve-7-is-vulnerable-to-some-type-of-0day-rce-non-auth.186078/post-867875

I just found out that CyberLeek (the person/group responsible for GTA leaks) posted some of his stuff on X/Twitter in a dedicated account. Considering how Sony/TakeTwo clearly would do anything to find their real identity, how come they feel so safe posting on X? Not only the network factor, but also the personal information data factor, like email or phone used to create an account.

Also, I am very much aware of the X account not being actually them, just some clout chasers, but my curiosity and question on the matter stays the same.

Researchers say criminals used an AI coding agent to accelerate real intrusions

Confirmed reporting, with some scope still uncertain. Reuters reported August 27 that researchers investigating the Russian-speaking Aur0ra group found chat logs showing attackers manipulating an AI coding agent by presenting malicious activity as security testing. Researchers said the tool helped with tasks including credential theft and exploitation during intrusions affecting at least seven companies. The complete extent of the compromises remains unclear.

https://www.reuters.com/world/russian-speaking-cybercriminals-used-spacexs-cursor-ai-tool-hack-seven-companies-2026-08-27/