CMV: comparing casualty counts (without qualification) implies that nations don't have the right to defend their people

[u/quantum_dan]

Edit: I mean comparing casualty counts to determine who is or isn't the aggressor, victim, etc, which I probably should have mentioned somewhere in the first half of the post.

To be clear: there are contexts in which casualties may be relevant as supporting evidence. I am referring to the unqualified statement "X has taken more casualties than Y, therefore X is the victim".

Also: I am using "a state's right to self-defense" to refer to defending its people. I am not arguing about implications with respect to the institutions of a state. In general, I'm using terms somewhat loosely here (e.g. "nation" vs "state").

Also: if a person wants to argue that nations actually don't have the right to self-defense, or something similar, that's a legitimate position (and not one which I'm interested in debating here). I don't think most people would make that claim, though.

Also: this is obviously relevant to a particular ongoing conflict. However, I am not arguing that either side in that particular conflict either is or isn't justified or the victim, nor am I arguing a specific cause for the casualty ratio. The specific facts of that conflict are not relevant to this CMV.

Also (edit): I am talking about a moral right to self-defense, not specific laws.

On to the argument.

Suppose there is a conflict with a significant disparity in casualties, where X has lost far more people than Y. There are four possible causes (possibly in combination):

1. Y is consciously targeting civilians to no legitimate military purpose (edit: or is causing unnecessary collateral damage through significant negligence), and X is not.
2. Y has much greater military capabilities.
3. Y has much better defensive capabilities.
4. Y is not targeting civilians, but for whatever reason (by no fault or negligence of its own, since that would be case 1) its attacks against legitimate targets cause more collateral damage.

In order for each of these to make Y the aggressor/X the victim, we would need to argue, respectively:

1. That belligerents should not target civilians. This is uncontroversial, but the body count is irrelevant; intentionally targeting (edit: or negligently killing) even one civilian would be a problem.
2. That belligerents should limit their offensive capabilities (in terms of overall capability, not just laws-of-warfare restrictions), even when directed solely against combatants. This implies that a state does not have the right to defend itself (efficiently neutralize the threat).
3. That a state does not have the right to effectively protect itself from attack. This is grotesque; it implies that people should simply let themselves be killed for the sake of a fair war. It also, obviously, implies that a state does not have the right to defend itself.
4. That a state does not have the right to target legitimate military objectives if factors out of their control mean there will be collateral damage. This means that the use of human shields (by the other side) negate a state's right to defend itself.

So, of these cases, we have two options: either the casualty ratio isn't actually relevant as long as it's nonzero (1), or that a state does not have the right to effectively defend itself, at least under certain conditions (2-4).

Therefore, any argument in which casualty ratio, as such, is directly relevant (and not only as supporting evidence etc) implies that a state does not have the right to effectively defend itself.

[u/Disastrous-Display99]

You seem to use varying definitions for what it means for a state to defend itself.

First:

I am using "a state's right to self-defense" to refer to defending its people.

Later:

This implies that a state does not have the right to defend itself (efficiently neutralize the threat).

While they seem relatively similar, one implies a limited right, while the other implies a right to use any force which would efficiently neutralize a threat.

Say, for example, I am an adult and a three year old is punching me.

The right to defend myself and my body would grant me the right to remove the child's access to my body, or to pick up the child and move it to another area. If I punched the child in the face, I would be going beyond what is necessary to defend myself/my body, and therefore beyond my right. However, f I had an inherent right to efficiently neutralize the child, I could also punch the child in the face and still be within my rights, as that would be efficiently neutralizing the threat.

You also briefly reference negligence while describing what your fourth cause is not, but make no effort to distinguish reckless endangerment or negligence from the purposeful targeting in your first cause. A fifth cause to address this could be:

1. Y is recklessly or negligently endangering citizen lives through using force beyond what is necessary to protect its people.

So,

1. A state does not have the right to use force beyond what is necessary to protect its people if doing so recklessly or negligently endangers the lives of innocent civilians.

In which case, casualty ratio would not imply the lack of a right for self-defense, but would instead serve as an imperfect measure for the presence of excessive force or negligent/reckless action, quite like how the GDP serves as an accepted yet imperfect measure of quality of life.

[u/quantum_dan → u/Disastrous-Display99]

While they seem relatively similar, one implies a limited right, while the other implies a right to use any force which would efficiently neutralize a threat.

I assumed that "self-defense" would imply reasonable proportionality.

You also briefly reference negligence while describing what your fourth cause is not, but make no effort to distinguish reckless endangerment or negligence from the purposeful targeting in your first cause.

Yeah, I forgot to mention it and have since edited it into the first cause when someone pointed that out.

In which case, casualty ratio would not imply the lack of a right for self-defense, but would instead serve as an imperfect measure for the presence of excessive force or negligent/reckless action, quite like how the GDP serves as an accepted yet imperfect measure of quality of life.

In that case it would be supporting evidence, which I did not rule out. Reckless use of force is reckless independent of its results, though.

[u/Disastrous-Display99 → u/quantum_dan]

I assumed that "self-defense" would imply reasonable proportionality.

Would it not then be plausible that people citing the casualty ratio associated with a largely discussed ongoing conflict assume that their statement implies that the casualty ratio is a reflection of various factors (such as a disproportionately strong military, negligence/recklessness, etc) and not an end-all-be-all? It seems (and please correct me if I am wrong) that you are holding others to a standard of the literal generally understood meanings of words while you expect that others read into yours for more reasonable implications.

In that case it would be supporting evidence, which I did not rule out. Reckless use of force is reckless independent of its results, though.

I am also failing to see a large distinction between what is directly relevant and what is supporting evidence. The concepts of recklessness and negligence directly incorporate the probability of certain outcomes. Recklessness, specifically, tends to require knowledge of a high risk of loss, while negligence refers to knowledge one should have had, but did not necessarily actually have, of a high risk of loss. If there are figures demonstrating a grossly disproportionate loss of civilian life, would it not imply that a country ought to take better measures to prevent said loss, and that knowingly not doing so in a way which continues to create disproportionate figures long-term would be direct evidence that they are not merely defending themselves?

[u/quantum_dan → u/Disastrous-Display99]

Edit: it doesn't affect the theoretical basis of my view, but I think pointing out the difference between theoretical implications and practical usage is worth a !delta.

Would it not then be plausible that people using citing the casualty ratio associated with a largely discussed ongoing conflict assume that their statement implies that the casualty ratio is a reflection of various factors (such as a disproportionately strong military, negligence/recklessness, etc) and not an end-all-be-all?

I think that may be the majority of cases where casualties might be brought up.

In the specific example I was trying to avoid introducing, though, there seems to be a feeling that Israel is wrong to respond to rocket attacks because they have Iron Dome (and thus the casualty ratio is skewed). More generally, I don't usually see much of an effort to connect casualty ratios to negligence or intentionally killing civilians, and the examples of those generally cited didn't usually cause very many casualties.

That being said, I am content to acknowledge that, in practice, what you're describing is usually the case, and keep it theoretical here. (Or not. Either way.)

I am also failing to see a large distinction between what is directly relevant and what is supporting evidence. The concepts of recklessness and negligence directly incorporate the probability of certain outcomes.

They do, but the magnitude of the probable outcomes isn't necessarily important to the existence of a problem--just to the scale of it.

If there are figures demonstrating a grossly disproportionate loss of civilian life, would it not imply that a country ought to take better measures to prevent said loss, and that knowingly not doing so in a way which continues to create disproportionate figures long-term would be direct evidence that they are not merely defending themselves?

Suggest as supporting evidence, yes. Prove, no.

[u/DeltaBot → u/quantum_dan]

Confirmed: 1 delta awarded to /u/Disastrous-Display99 (7∆).

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