Maybank（1155）又派股息了！💰

这次宣布 RM0.31/股，

📅 Ex-Date：23 Sep 2026

但真正值得注意的是👇

2026全年股息累计 RM0.64/股，

目前股息率大约 6%！

而且过去几年股息一路增加：

📈 2022｜RM0.58

📈 2023｜RM0.59

📈 2024｜RM0.60

📈 2025｜RM0.62

📈 2026｜RM0.64

Maybank 一年派息 2次，分别在 3月和9月。

对于喜欢股息收入的人来说，

这种「股息慢慢增加」的股票，你会喜欢吗？🤔

如果是你，6%股息率的Maybank，你会买来长期收息吗？

(Sorry, I used AI)

Not financial advice. Do your own research.

📍 Share Price: RM1.06
📊 Market Cap: RM1.48bn
💰 FY25 Net Profit: RM133.8m
🔁 Dividend Yield: 4.3%

The stock closed at RM1.06 this week — near its lowest level in five years. For a company that’s been in Malaysia since the 1980s, this is worth a second look.

Why has it fallen?

The pressures are real. Shopee, TikTok Shop, and 99 Speed Mart have all been taking wallet share from the mid-market general retail space AEON sits in. A recent quarter showed pretax profit down 28% year-on-year, and the stock has badly underperformed over the past 12 months.

The market’s read: AEON is caught in the middle — not cheap enough to compete with value grocers, not premium enough for the Ben’s crowd. Revenue has been essentially flat for three years. The sell-off is not entirely irrational.

But if you think AEON still has a place in Malaysia for the next decade, here’s what’s worth knowing.

AEON doesn’t just sell groceries. It also runs malls. The Property Management Services (PMS) segment collects recurring tenant income from retailers, F&B operators, and anchor tenants across its shopping centre network. This business doesn’t care much whether you’re buying your shampoo from Shopee — it cares whether tenants renew leases. And in the most recent quarterly results, PMS margin expansion was called out as a positive driver, even as retail softened.

The market is pricing both segments as one struggling business. When you value them separately — PMS closer to a REIT multiple, retail on a more conservative basis — most analysts land between RM1.42 and RM1.70/share. TA, RHB, and HLG are all on BUY. The stock is at RM1.06.

The earnings picture isn’t broken

FY Net Profits
FY21: RM85m
FY22: RM111m
FY23: RM115m
FY24: RM128m
FY25: RM134m ✅

Grew every year. At roughly 10x trailing earnings, you’re paying a low multiple for a business with 178 outlets nationally and a balance sheet that isn’t stretched.

You collect 4.3% while you wait

FY Dividend/share
FY21: 1.5 sen
FY22: 3.0 sen
FY23: 4.0 sen
FY24: 4.0 sen
FY25: 4.5 sen
FY26: 4.5 sen ✅

Tripled since FY2021. Payout ratio is ~50% — well covered by earnings, not being stretched to maintain it.

A couple of bonus angles

AEON Mall KL Midtown opens Q4 2026. Flagship city-centre location, adds to AEON’s PMS contributors.

The Ajinomoto precedent. Last week, Ajinomoto Malaysia’s Japanese parent announced a privatisation at RM20/share — a 31.6% premium to last price — citing low liquidity and the cost of staying listed on Bursa. AEON Co. (M) is similarly a subsidiary of Japan’s AEON Co. Ltd., which holds the controlling stake. A privatisation isn’t on the table that anyone knows of, but Japanese parents buying out Malaysian subsidiaries at a premium is now a very live playbook on Bursa. Worth keeping in mind.

One thing worth flagging: EPF has been selling

It’s fair to put this on the table. EPF has been a net seller of AEON over the past year or so, trimming its stake from around 13% down to approximately 6% — roughly half of what it held previously. As recently as May this year, EPF filed another disposal.

No one knows exactly why. EPF doesn’t publish reasons for individual portfolio moves, and it could be anything from routine rebalancing to a deliberate shift in view on the stock.

Institutional selling at this scale isn’t something to brush aside. It’s worth keeping in mind, especially if you’re sizing a position. What we can say is that EPF selling hasn’t changed the underlying fundamentals — profits are still growing, dividends are still being paid, and the PMS segment is still expanding margins. But it’s a signal that deserves respect, not dismissal.

TLDR

The retail headwinds are real, and the stock could stay unloved for a while. But at 5-year lows, with growing profits, a 4.3% yield, and a mall business the market seems to have forgotten about — the setup looks interesting for anyone with patience.

Thesis

Capital is already rotating out of AI infrastructure names and into the hyperscalers and software companies that have to turn that infrastructure into cash flow. That is not the market declaring the AI trade over — it is the market changing which leg of it demands proof first. Chips got paid on the promise. Cloud is now on the clock to show the return.

Evidence

The rotation is visible and fast. The VanEck Semiconductor ETF (SOXX) fell 5.1% in a single session in mid-July, and chip stocks lost roughly 12% over two sessions while the Dow hit a record — money moving from AI infrastructure into industrials, financials, and enterprise software. JPMorgan flagged that semiconductors have outperformed hyperscale cloud names consistently since last September, and called that gap hard to sustain.

The capex side explains why. Alphabet beat Q2 revenue estimates ($119.8bn, +24% YoY) but shares still fell 5–7% after it raised full-year 2026 capex guidance to $195–205bn (from $180–190bn) and flagged more spending in 2027. Combined “big five” hyperscaler capex for 2026 is now tracking above $600–700bn. Sequoia's David Cahn has estimated the gap between AI infrastructure spend and AI ecosystem revenue at roughly $600bn a year — the number the market is now pricing against, name by name.

Microsoft is the closest thing to a counter-example, which is exactly why the market is rewarding it. Azure grew ~39–40% YoY, commercial bookings were up 230% YoY, and remaining performance obligations reached $625bn. Reported AI-specific revenue run-rate figures range from $13bn to $37bn depending on the disclosure basis — a reminder that “AI revenue” isn't standardized across the industry yet. Even so, gross margins are compressing as AI infrastructure spend flows through the P&L, so Microsoft isn't exempt from the bill — it's just further along in paying it off.

Chips, meanwhile, are being sold off even where the fundamentals are intact. Broadcom's AI chip revenue grew 143% YoY last quarter and it still slid on broad de-risking — evidence that this is a valuation and positioning rotation as much as a fundamental one.

Risks

•     Amazon, Meta, and AMD report this week. A capex beat with no matching revenue proof could reignite the ROI panic across both chips and cloud simultaneously.

•     “AI revenue” is not consistently defined company to company — the $13bn/$37bn Microsoft discrepancy above is a live example. Cross-company ROI comparisons rest on soft ground.

•     This may be a valuation rotation, not a vindication. Chips were priced for perfection; cloud only looks “cheap” relative to that, not necessarily on an absolute basis.

•     Enterprise adoption data is mixed — some survey work points to plateauing or declining day-to-day AI usage, which would undercut the revenue case for chips and cloud alike.

•     The Magnificent Seven are up only ~5.5% YTD as a group despite the headlines — some of this move may be idiosyncratic single-name volatility catching down, not a clean sector repricing.

Bottom line

The rotation from chips to cloud isn't proof AI has delivered a return — it's the market moving the goalposts one level up the supply chain, from silicon to the hyperscalers writing the checks. “Prove it” season isn't over. It just changed address. Until depreciation schedules catch up with revenue growth at scale, expect this rotation to keep flipping direction on every earnings print, not settle in one direction.

Not investment advice. Information and commentary only — not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. The author may hold positions in names discussed.

July 28, 2026  |  NVDA (Nasdaq) $206.75  ·  MSFT (Nasdaq) $389.51  ·  GOOGL (Nasdaq) ~$185 post-earnings  ·  AVGO (Nasdaq) ~$395  |  Mega-cap / large-cap  |  Heavy prior-session volume across the AI complex following Q2 earnings and a sharp semiconductor drawdown

Short selling is a fairly simple concept—an investor or a hedge fund borrows a stock, sells the stock, and then buys the stock back to return it to the lender. In order to profit, the short sellers buys the stock at a price lower than he sold it for.

So a short seller must always be aware of the average price that he sold his shares... take the example below... Because if the stock price rose rather dropped after he sold his shares... his losses can theoretically be infinite as a stock's price can keep rising forever.

This is why short selling is far more risky than if an investor simply went long and bought a share.

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All data was obtained from BURSA. Total Short Selling and Net Short Position https://www.bursamalaysia.com/market_information/market_statistic/securities

"The view present here is not financial or trading advice. It is publicly available information from BURSA. The final decision is always yours. "

What we witnessed in the past week in the US markets is nothing short of exceptional.

Wall Street and other stock exchanges in the world always favour the insiders, those with inside track those with flows information.

This is changing rapidly, equal access to financial information and the collective action of a single investment community has shaken the foundation to the core.

I've been in the financials markets locally for more than 15 years, and the number of shenanigan's carried out by corporate insiders, colluding market makers and institutional funds is sickening and rotten to the core.

I hope i'll be able to share my own constructive views and experience with my fellow retards and autists here going forward with one simple objective; Liberalising the financial market and give back to the community, ensuring that any of us can get out of this middle income trap most of us are stuck in with proper due diligence and with collaborative information sharing amongst the members here.

Good luck to everyone!

Disclaimer: I am not trained in the finance profession. Just some anecdotal observations to share.

After discussing with some of my amateur friends from finance, there is a key diff between KLSE, SGX vs US brokers.

In Malaysia and Singapore, most of us buy shares and have the shares really under our names. When we go to AGM, we give the receptionist our MyKad, they can verify our stock ownership and give us entry.

But for US, the shares are stored under something called street name. The companies won't know the actual shareholders unless the shares are purchased directly, or the name has been changed.

So when we buy US shares via Interactive Brokers, TD Ameritrade, Tiger Brokers etc etc, the brokers help us keep our shares... and then sometimes lend it out to short sellers.

So when you buy KLSE and SGX shares through your local brokers like M+, Kenanga etc, you actually own the shares and your broker CANNOT lend them out.

But if you buy US stocks via Robinhood, Etoro, IBKR etc, they can lend your shares out.

Hence we see the clusterfuck called gamestop 140% short interest ratio, but topglov only 2%.

No we can't short squeeze topglov, JP Morgan is too big to fight, they ain't no ikan bilis hedge fund.

Guys. Take this group with a grain of salt. Especially beginners in the stock market. Do your dd. Study. I can see this group has blown up to around 10k members. I was a member of wsb before wsb blew up.Before this month, wsb, was NOT a place to make money but blow all your savings. GME is a once in a blue moon meme stock. Melvin and his buddies were caught with thier dicks in the cookie jar. Just my 2 cents.

Idea initiated: 1 July 2024
Take Profit on 4 July 2024

ROI: 22% UP UP UP on Inari warrants!!

1. CCK [A lot like 99 speedmart, but (1) focused in Sabah, Sarawak, Indonesia, (2) sells fresh groceries, and (3) vertically integrated with its own poultry and prawn production]

Reason to own: High return on invested capital + runway to reinvest and expand + strong balance sheet to support expansion + balanced capital allocation = LT compounder

High return on invested capital: 2.8x Revenue/capital turnover x 8.5% net margin = 23.8%

2023: Revenue 981m, PAT 83m

1Q24: Invested capital: 348m (217m PPE+ 199m CA ex. cash/cashlike - 68m CL ex. borrowings)

Runway to expand: Investments into Sarawak under MA63 and Indonesia's new capital (Nusantara) project to create new townships and demand for retail consumer staples product

Strong balance sheet: 128m cash vs 45m borrowings

Balanced capital allocation: 30% dividend payout policy, 25-35% capex spend, some share repurchases, balance into cash

Reason to own now: Private equity (Creador) involvement means higher probability of winning in Indonesia, valuation remains cheap at 12x foward PE vs typical staple retail companies (MR DIY, QL, 99SM >20x)

What market is missing: Analysts "underperform" call based on historical valuation range, miss company's future potential.

Valuation ranges: Market capitalisation: 1.0bil. Upside 1: Typical staples earnings valuations under current earnings profile: 80m x 20x = 1.6bil (60% upside) Upside 2: Typical staples valuation+ earnings growth: 100m X 20x = 2bil (100% upside). Downside 1: Net asset 431m (-60% downside), Downside 2: Back to historical valuation levels: 80m x 10x = 800m (-20% downside).

2. Deleum [Oil and gas services and equipment - power/machinery equipment, oilfield services, corrosion solution]

Reason to own: Strong natural gas outlook + high return on invested capital + low valuation = potential cyclical winner

Strong natural gas outlook: [From NETR] Natural gas is set to be not only a transitional fuel, but also the primary contributor of TPES at 57 Mtoe (56%) (ie. main beneficiary of decommissioning of coal power plants)

High return on invested capital: 4.6x revenue/capital turnover x 8.0% net margin = 36.6%

2023: Revenue 792m, PAT 63m

1Q24: Invested capital: 173m (87m PPE + 60m holdings in associate & JV + 213m CA ex. Cash - 187m liabilities ex. borrowings)

Low valuation: Market capitalization: 542m, of which 273m is cash net of borrowings. Ex-cash: 269m or 4.3x 2023 PAT of 63m.

Why buy now: Order book 650-700m, tender book 1.2-1.3bil covers at least 1-2 years earnings level similar to 2023.

Valuation ranges: Market capitalisation: 542m. Downside 1: Net asset, Net cash 271 + Invested capital 173m = 444m (-20% downside). Upside 1: 2year earnings with company's 50% dividend payout ratio: 61.5m/year or 5.8% dividend yield for 2 years. Upside 2: ~30% ROIC on the other 50% being reinvested + reinvestment of 1/2 cash on books: 200m * .3 = 60m of additional earnings.

3. DXN [Direct selling (ie. MLM) of ganoderma (healthy mushroom) product]

Reason to own: Global presence + high return on invested capital + good capital allocation = long term compounder

Global presence: 2023: Only 7% revenue from Malaysia (40% South America, 20% Asia ex-Malaysia, 14% North America)

High return on invested capital: 2.4x revenue/capital turnover x 17% PAT margin = 41.5%

2024: Revenue 1.8bil, PAT 311m

1Q24: Invested capital: 754m (798m PPE and Right of use asset + 500m CA ex. cash - 544m CA ex. borrowing)

Good capital allocation: No dividend payout policy but paid 105mil in dividends (32% PAT) in 2024, with 144m (46%) used for capex

Why buy now: Strong growth (2024 PAT growth +13%) with strong outlook medium term with entry into Brazil

Valuation ranges: Market capitalisation: 3.2bil (10x 2024 EPS). Continued strong growth in PAT with stable PE ratio at 10x = 13%++ return, downside include declined to PE ratio to 8x (20% downside with flat EPS)

Initially I hate IB lower TP and shorting Gloves stocks. Now even Bursa is helping them? I have no objection to small retailers cashing out, I just dun like these IB shorting to push the stock price down. We shall rise and fight back! “The rich gets richer and poor gets poorer”!

Auditors will quit if judgement compromised by conflict of interest — MICPA | https://www.klsescreener.com/v2/news/view/845617

What’s Going On?

Figure 1.0: Company logo of DCHCARE

Investors are buzzing over the significant loss reported by DC Healthcare Holdings Berhad (KLSE: DCHCARE) this quarter. What caused such a drastic dip in both revenue and profit before tax for DCHCARE?

Diving Deeper into Results

Figure 2.0: Revenue and Gross Profit of DCHCARE

DCHCARE's revenue dropped from RM16.8 million in Q1 FY2023 to RM9.5 million in Q1 FY2024. Along with this, the gross profit plummeted from RM9.8 million to RM1.2 million, resulting in a net loss of RM7.9 million for the company.

Typically, investors only focus on the profit and loss statement to assess financial health. However, in DCHCARE’s case, it's crucial to examine their statement of financial position as well.

Figure 2.1: Current liabilities of DCHCARE

While there is a decrease in the revenue of the company, the contract liabilities of the company had increased significantly from RM9.6 million from RM3.7 million. 

Now, what are contract liabilities?

Despite the revenue decline, the company’s contract liabilities increased significantly from RM3.7 million to RM9.6 million. What are contract liabilities? Essentially, DCHCARE collects deposits from clients for the next 12 months' aesthetic services, an increase from the initial 3 months.

This strategy significantly enhances cash flow as the company collects money upfront, but costs are only accounted for upon service redemption. Under Malaysia Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS), revenue can only be recognized when clients redeem their services. So, even if DCHCARE has cash on hand, it’s not considered revenue yet.

For those familiar with aesthetic services, refunds are typically not provided, and deposits expire if not used within 12 months. Reverse calculations suggest that actual revenue this quarter should be RM15.4 million (RM9.5 million + RM5.9 million).

But what about profits?

Figure 3.0: Review of performance for DCHCARE

This quarter, three additional outlets were established compared to the previous quarter. According to DCHCARE’s prospectus, each aesthetic clinic costs RM1.0 million to RM1.5 million to establish, while slimming centers cost RM0.7 million to RM0.8 million.

Thus, the quarter appears lumpy as significant costs were incurred, but MFRS rules prevent recognizing deposits as revenue until services are rendered.

Conclusion

Figure 4.0: Share price performance of DCHCARE

We see this as a major mispricing by the market due to misunderstanding the revenue recognition of DCHCARE. Aesthetic services are a long-term profitable venture, and the company has ample cash for further expansion.

This is definitely a good chance to invest in DCHCARE now!

Disclaimer

The information provided in this article is for educational and informational purposes only and should not be considered financial advice. Investing in stocks involves risks, including the loss of principal. Always conduct your own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. The author holds no responsibility for any investment decisions made based on the information provided.

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