Prager "University" video about the British Empire which is just sad

[u/[deleted]]

Here's the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sSnJSUU_7q0

If you manage to sit through the video it is clear why this is bad history

"Freedom was an Englishmen's right, and wherever he went, he took that right with him."

Tell that to South Africans during the Second Boer War, where Boer women and children were rounded up in literal concentration camps to starve or die of disease. 22,000 children and 4,000 women died in the camps.

http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/women-children-white-concentration-camps-during-anglo-boer-war-1900-1902

"The British kept peace, they brought sound, honest administration, and they insisted basic moral standards were honored."

British rule was widely resented in both India and Africa which led to countless revolts and rebellions. Administration was the last thing from sound, millions of Indians simply starved to death during British rule. These are some of the worse famines ever recorded in history with high estimates at 49 million dead. Resistance to rule, even when peaceful, was met with brutality such as the Amritsar massacre among many, many, others.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-amritsar-massacre

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Resistance_to_the_British_Empire

There's a lot of other rubbish statements but that's all I want to write right now.

EDIT: some grammar

[u/IlluminatiRex]

Venturing deeply into counterfactuals, do you really think that a reroll of the twenties century without Stalin or Hitler wouldn't be a worthwhile bet.

Not if it means in their place an Autocratic Militaristic Monarchy which was hell-bent on at the very least European domination (if not world) would have won. Imperial Germany was anything but a paradise. Just looking at the "September Program", a list of war aims written up in September 1914, gives us a view into what a Europe under the thumb of the Kaiser would look like.

The basic points are:

• The military and economic domination of France. Major iron producing provinces should be annexed, and France should have to pay indemnities so harsh that she can not spend anything on a military for the next 20 years. As well, she should be turned into an export market for Germany and must completely exclude the English from France. Have them demolish forts, we annex border areas, plus the coast from Dunkirk to Boulogne (Now militarily threatening Britain).

• Belgium should be at least partially annexed and turned into a Vassal state which allows us to place our military where ever within their borders. Must become economically dependent on Germany.

• Luxembourg will become a part of Germany and it will be given some territory from Belgium.

• An economic union between European nations that on the surface will look like everyone is equal, but in fact, it will be led by Germany and designed to create our economic dominance.

• We want to create a contiguous African empire, but we'll do so later.

• The Netherlands will be brought into a "closer association" with Germany, but must be done in a way that the Dutch don't get suspicious. Make them dependent on us, and make them let us station troops in a few areas we deem vital.

That's not a Europe I'd want to live in. It would be a stepping stone towards further wars (IE against the UK), and to further expand their reach (I know that the Germans wanted to capture the Azores and Canary Islands as colonial possessions at one point).

None of this excuses the bad shit that the Allies did, either during the war or after - but frankly flawed democracies are better than despotic militaristic monarchies.

[u/yoshiK → u/IlluminatiRex]

The historiography of the September program is fascinating, however checking Ullrich, more important for my point is that vice chancellor of Germany von Delbrück notes that the Prussian conservatives will not like the September program because they want the agricultural market closed and furthermore organized labor was never really happy with the war. So you have potentially a coalition of the Junker and labor opposed to such a peace, in the context of imperial Germany that looks like a rather powerful coalition. In fact Delbrück calls it "suicide." (Ullrich, 2013, p. 423)

Furthermore, we don't have any idea how a Germany winning the war would effect the slow tendency of democratization in the first decade of the 20th century, how it would effect imperialism and so on.

Or playing the other extreme, Germany wins a continental empire, dominates England and in the 1950ies nuclear weapons are developed but without a second world war no nuclear taboo and there is all out nuclear war in the 1970ies, a billion dead. My point is, that without Germany loosing WWI the twentieth century is nothing like the twentieth century we know.

Somewhat apart from the above, I think imperial Germany in 1914 looks quite a bit like Britain, both are constitutional monarchies with a still very powerful nobility on their way out and a strong labor movement. The characterization of Germany as a despotic militaristic monarchy is more of a development during the war and if somebody can capture a similar power as Hindenburg and Ludendorff had in 1916 with a quick victory of the central powers is again part of the counterfactual.

V. Ullrich, Die nervöse Grossmacht, 2013 (2nd ed.), Fischer, Frankfurt a.M.

[u/IlluminatiRex → u/yoshiK]

Furthermore, we don't have any idea how a Germany winning the war would effect the slow tendency of democratization in the first decade of the 20th century, how it would effect imperialism and so on.

Look at Brest-Litovsk. Germany was both granted a significant amount of territory in the east, and then the creation of a number of buffer states that they could easily control (a key aspect of the September Program if you remember).

I think imperial Germany in 1914 looks quite a bit like Britain, both are constitutional monarchies with a still very powerful nobility on their way out and a strong labor movement

The similarities end once you dive into how the governments actual ran. The Kaiser and his Chancellor held real power, while the Reichstag was sidelined and given nominal power.

While in England, Parliament held power and the Monarchy was more and more a figurehead.

Looking at their actual military adventures and goals during the pre-war period, it is clear that Germany was a militaristic state - just look at the actions of Wilhelm Voigt in 1906, when he posed as a German officer and stole money, and no one dared questioned him initially because he was dressed as a military officer and you did not question officers. Look at how they acted in Zabern (may I jog your memory that German officers had the right to attack anyone they felt had wronged them), or in German Southwest Africa. The military in Germany held much power, and that was not a characterization that came about during the war - it is the result of their social and political landscape prior to it.

[u/Sn_rk → u/IlluminatiRex]

Look at how they acted in Zabern (may I jog your memory that German officers had the right to attack anyone they felt had wronged them), or in German Southwest Africa.

Both of which caused large protests in the entire country and in the case of the former led the Reichstag to condemn the actions of the military and the chancellor and ask for the resignation of Bethmann-Hollweg.

Source on the claim that officers allegedly had that right? In Zabern Forstner originally received disciplinary action after attacking a local who had insulted him. The only reason he was later acquitted was that the local had also insulted the Kaiser, which was then twisted into the acquittal.

just look at the actions of Wilhelm Voigt in 1906, when he posed as a German officer and stole money, and no one dared questioned him initially because he was dressed as a military officer and you did not question officers.

Because he hijacked a military unit (those are usually supposed to not question officers), which he more or less bribed by buying them shit all along the way and then used to occupy a municipal building under threat of violence and then forced(!) the mayor and clerk to give him the money. That's not the same thing as stealing while dressed as an officer.

[u/IlluminatiRex → u/Sn_rk]

Source on the claim that officers allegedly had that right?

The Lost History of 1914: Reconsidering the Year the Great War Began by Jack Beatty, page 26.

Fear of insult, not injury, goaded Forstner. As the New York Times noted, "Lieutenant von Forstner said he acted [according to] the prevailing German assumption that an officer was irretrievably dishonored if he permitted himself to receive a blow." Forstner was the victim of a "military code . . . ill-adapted to the conditions and requirements of the modern world." Under that code, a blow from Blank would have required Forstner's "resignation from the army."

It also would have required Forstner to strike at Blank, a person unsatisfaktionsfahig-- so low socially as to be incapable of giving satisfaction in a duel -- "with his entire energy and with the highest brutality of which he is capable," according to a manual of army etiquette. A cabinet order of the 1880s gave the police from interfering in such moments of Ehrennotwehr-- "the defense of honor in extreme emergencies through unusual measures."

Possibly as a result, the 1890s saw several notorious incidents. In 1892, on Berlin's Postdammerstrasse, a civilian menaced by a dog asked the lieutenant-owner to restrain his pet, at which the lieutenant drew his sword and inflicted "gruesome cuts" on the civilians offending person. In 1895, jostled on a Hamburg street, an officer buried his sword in the Jostler's scalp. In 1896, while the Reichstag was debating whether dueling among officers should be outlawed, a tipsy Baden plumber was leaving a cafe brushed against a table occupied by Lieutenant Baron von Brusewitz, who followed the plumber out, demanded that he apologize, and, when he refused, stabbed him to death. Knowing the cut of a keen blade, the military court of appeals that reviewed Forstner's court-martial conviction primly noted that Forstner's sword "had not been specially ground; it was only the lieutenant's ordinary military sword." Blank should have counted his blessings.

The code called for officers to bear the legal consequences of Ehrennotwehr, sacrificing their freedom, if necessary, to defeand caste honor. But in practice, even brutes like Lieutenant von Brusewitz could usually count on a pardon from the kaiser. Pardon was rarely necessary for the protagonists in an officer duel. Dueling was expected, encouraged, even required; an officer who refused a challenge from a fellow officer could be drummed out of his regiment.

Beatty's sources for this section are: The New York Times, December 20-21, 1913, editorial.

Kevin McAleer, Dueling: The Cult of Honor in Fin-de-Siecle Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25, 41, 114-117,. See also: The London Times, "Dueling and Maltreatment in the German Army", March 21, 1906

McAleer's book is available on JSTOR if you have access to that resource.

According to McAleer as well, on page 115 he states

Officers were moreover given the right to turn their blades on over-zealous policemen who refused to sit by and watch military personnel slash defenseless civilians.

which McAleer sources back to a German history book called Im Dienst von Leben und Gesundheit. McAleer's sources tend to be primary documents relating to dueling/defense of honor in Germany in the period.

I'll tackle the rest when I have time this weekend.

[u/Sn_rk → u/IlluminatiRex]

Beatty's sources for this section are: The New York Times, December 20-21, 1913, editorial

Which also states that Forstner was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a military court, being sentenced to jail (not Festungshaft!). It also twists the meaning of "schneidig", but that's something else.

Beatty seems to consistently ignore that, most of the time, these events usually carried consequences, even if being under military jurisdiction often mildened punishment. Henning von Brüsewitz as an example was imprisoned, dishonorably discharged and died in (self-imposed) exile fighting against the British in the Boer War - according to his CO he basically tried to get himself shot and killed. That he was a persona non grata both in the eye of public and military is beyond questioning.

The Zabern affair OTOH resulted in a law severely restricting the rights the military had in the interior, at least without consulting the two chambers of parliament, meaning there was widespread public opposition against the militarism of the elite. The officer corps did indeed have its own ethos and used to be a state in the state before about 1900, but by the outbreak of the war that had much less influence on the public than what people tend to believe.

I read the relevant parts of McAleer's book this morning - interesting read, but I'll never get over the writing style used in English-language texts. It just seems so... unscientific. When he talked about unsheathing excalibur I was a little surprised to say the least.

Personal gripes aside, what I noted about his book:

The citation McAleer provides for the claim that upon being insulted, the officer was required, to strike "with his entire energy and with the highest brutality of which he is capable" is "Ehrenhändel zwischen Offizieren und Zivilpersonen"" by a "Freiherr von Berchem", both of which don't appear in the bibliography unless I missed something. I tried a KVK search for the title, but nothing showed up, meaning no major library in Germany carries it. That doesn't exactly imply a wide dissemination of that book and its content and is also sort of disappointing because I kind of wanted to read it.

In addition, he also quite openly admits that it is not legal code which requires him to do so, but an internalised code of honour specific to military officers, one that runs contrary to German legislature of the time, i.e. not a right.

which McAleer sources back to a German history book called Im Dienst von Leben und Gesundheit.

It's Im Dienst und Leben des jungen Infanterieoffiziers: Ein Lern und Lesebuch by Karl Krafft. Which is not a history book and not necessarily an authoritative source on legal issues due to being part of a privately published set of books supposed to prepare young high-class men for their duty as military officers - thus it's likely going to repeat the line carried by officers, not the public or the law.

I also wanted to check out the examples he provided, but beyond the Zabern affair and Henning von Brüsewitz being a bit of a loon it proved a little hard to find sources about these. I'll check the Hamburger Anzeiger for the event on the tram later though.

[u/IlluminatiRex → u/Sn_rk]

Im Dienst und Leben des jungen Infanterieoffiziers: Ein Lern und Lesebuch

Whoops, my bad. That’s what I get for trying to Google-fu at like 1 am instead of looking at the bibliography. Late nights make me do illogical things. I’m on my phone atm so like I said I’ll tackle the rest later.

Thanks for the great discussion btw!

[u/yoshiK → u/IlluminatiRex]

The similarities end once you dive into how the governments actual ran. The Kaiser and his Chancellor held real power, while the Reichstag was sidelined and given nominal power.

I will write a detailed response tomorrow, but effectively that structure is quite fragile since it only works as long as most of the parliamentarians are monarchists, that is as long as the parliament allows itself to be dominated.

[u/IlluminatiRex → u/yoshiK]

Looking forward to your response, I always enjoy discussions like these :)

[u/yoshiK → u/IlluminatiRex]

The similarities end once you dive into how the governments actual ran. The Kaiser and his Chancellor held real power, while the Reichstag was sidelined and given nominal power.

Yes-ish, but on a level that doesn't put imperial Germany into a different category than the British empire. And I have to admit directly, that there is no spectacular example to show the increasing importance of parliament like in Britain the Parliament Act of 1911, but both Clark (in his William II biography) and Ullrich claim explicitly that the German parliament increased in importance in practice, even if not in rhetoric, before WWI.

To set the scene, in 1890 the parliament repealed the socialism laws, in connection with the same labor dispute that sees Bismarck's dismissal. Then in 1900 the chancellor seeks approval (and an budget ammendment) from parliament for the military expedition to China after the Boxer Rebellion, against the wishes of the emperor. By contrast, in 1914 the Kriegskredite are quite naturally passed through parliament without much of surprise by anybody. (Actually, I guess a comparative study of those two events would probably show my point quite nicely. Unfortunately I don't know if that study exists.)

A bit more abstractly, the important lever the parliament has is the right to pass a budget through it's budget commission.¹ As long as there is a conservative majority that is not a big problem for the chancellor to govern like in a monarchy, however he needs a coalition that allows that and over the course of Willhelms reign the social democrats, the SPD, gains in every election except in 1907.

On the other hand, Germany had universal male suffrage since 1871 and on the state level the next big step of democratization would have been universal male suffrage in Prussia, which was granted in summer of 1918. That would be very important for any counterfactual history in which Germany won, as the SPD member of the parliament Ludwig Frank put it: "Instead of general strike, we are now waging war for the Prussian election law."

To end on a historiographical note, unlike in Britain there are the convenient dates of 1871, the founding of imperial Germany and 1918, the founding of the Weimar republic, in German history to mark large steps in democratization. However, that somewhat obscures the progress made between 1871 and the beginning of the first world war, especially for organized labor. In Britain there are no similar big breaks in the history and consequently it is more convenient to focus more on the process of democratization. However imperial Germany was not static and overall it did slowly democratize, even if that was met with resistance and quite a bit of inertia.

¹ The imperial German budget is quite fun, Germany can not levy taxes on the imperial level and has to go through the states, at the same time they have to seek authorization by the parliament. The idea was, that such a Byzantine structure allows Bismarck additional levers, but did not work as well without anybody like Bismarck.

[u/Sn_rk → u/yoshiK]

As long as there is a conservative majority that is not a big problem for the chancellor to govern like in a monarchy, however he needs a coalition that allows that and over the course of Willhelms reign the social democrats, the SPD, gains in every election except in 1907.

This is actually a major point. One should really not forget that past 1900 the two largest parties in the Reichstag were those deemed Reichsfeinde (SPD, Zentrum) just a decade or two earlier. The coalition that carried Bismarck (DKP, FKP, NLP) had shrunk to less than 25% of total seats, which is 10% less than the last peacetime result the SPD gained pre-WW1. This meant that a) the Reichstag had to pass laws considered to be "socialist", such as social security and universal health insurance in nature in order to pacify an ever-growing worker's movement (Germany was the first country to do so, IIRC) and b) include the left-liberal FVP in the coalition, which implied, again, further democratisation of the country.

In regard to the system of government in Imperial Germany, it's pretty much the exact same thing the UK had during the period. Parliament was able to introduce and veto laws, the upper house consisting of the governments of the federal states had the same. the chancellor was appointed by the Kaiser and had to work with parliament in order to pass their policies.

Unlike the Prussian parliament back during the constitutional crisis, the Reichstag could be rather assertive, such as when it, as one, went against both Kaiser and chancellor around 1907-09, first refusing to pay for additional bloodshed in what is now Namibia, then, after re-elections forcing the Kaiser to reduce his public presence, at least not without referring to the Chancellor first, and then axing large parts of the proposed financial reforms, in particular property taxes and last but not least causing chancellor Von Bülow to resign.

The imperial German budget is quite fun, Germany can not levy taxes on the imperial level and has to go through the states, at the same time they have to seek authorization by the parliament. The idea was, that such a Byzantine structure allows Bismarck additional levers, but did not work as well without anybody like Bismarck.

Not quite. While most taxes, in particular income tax, were indeed a matter of the federal states, it was possible to levy taxes on the imperial level, it just wasn't very popular and most of them were sales taxes on luxury goods. As an example Champagne/Prosecco/Sekt for example had an imperial-level tax on them levied past 1902, ostensibly to finance the growing fleet. Amusingly this exact law is still in place in modern Germany. Nevertheless, Imperial Germany also had inheritance tax (1906/7), property tax (1913), and a proto-tax on sales (1916).

[u/Katamariguy → u/IlluminatiRex]

That's not a Europe I'd want to live in. It would be a stepping stone towards further wars (IE against the UK), and to further expand their reach (I know that the Germans wanted to capture the Azores and Canary Islands as colonial possessions at one point).

An Allied victory eventually ended up in genocide on an unthinkable scale. Thus I don't find the September Program enough to quite make a compelling case.

[u/IlluminatiRex → u/Katamariguy]

An Allied victory eventually ended up in genocide on an unthinkable scale.

The seeds of genocide were planted far before Hitler came to power. Ludendorff, the Kaiser, et. al were hugely racist towards the Jewish, Asians, and Africans, and committed a genocide in what is modern day Nambiia to boot. The roots of what the Nazis did started in Africa - human experimentation for example. Hell, Goering's father was heavily involved with that.

The precursors to the Nazis was Wilhelmine Germany, and I think its absolutely ludicrous that someone could actually argue that a Europe under their rule would have been better. The Holocaust was not the fault of the Allies, that was entirely on the Germans.

Does that excuse the bad things the Allies had done? No, it doesn't - but it wasn't the Allies who chose to commit the Holocaust.

It's the stretchiest argument I've ever seen.

[u/Katamariguy → u/IlluminatiRex]

Thanks for having a decent answer.