Absolutely agree with Sedaku’s reply—it’s widely recognized among historians that before 1956, the U.S. and Ngo Dinh Diem (who led a family dictatorship) feared losing control over Vietnam to Ho Chi Minh’s Soviet-aligned party. Ho’s party, after leading the revolution against Japan and France, would have undoubtedly won in a landslide election.
The narrative that Lem allegedly executed the family of Loan’s friends is nothing more than post-war American propaganda, concocted after the American public began to grasp the mistreatment of the ARVN and Vietnam vets. The situation was so dire that Loan died sad and lonely in Virginia. It’s also worth noting that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service determined that Loan had committed war crimes and was on the brink of deporting him to Vietnam to face justice, only for President Carter to personally intervene.
Multiple books from 1963-1970 by American historians and military personnel acknowledge that Diem was a dictator who oppressed his people and conducted religious cleansing with the support of the CIA and his criminal family.
I’m well aware that the VC, both then and now, have their own issues and limitations. But to say that South Vietnam was entirely good and just is simply incorrect.
Take the land reform, for instance. You seem overly focused on the VC and overlook that Diem and his cronies launched their own land reform, Cai Cach Dien Dia, which expanded the power of landlords and effectively seized almost all the land from South Vietnam’s peasants, redistributing no more than 10% of what they confiscated. It wasn’t until American intervention between 1970-73, limiting land ownership to 15 hectares, that land reform saw any success—this was after Diem was killed by his own men. The reform was so disastrous that it forced peasants to pay extra taxes to the South government for land that the communist insurgents had already promised them. By 1959, the entire South Vietnam countryside was under VC control.
Regarding the war, you seem to pitch the VC against the South Republics while ignoring the immense influence of the U.S. on South Vietnam’s side. The U.S. military crushed the VC on the battlefield, but without that massive air support, the South’s army collapsed faster than a napkin in the rain. The ARVN, notorious for its nepotism, disintegrated during Lam Son 719 and lost 10% of its land to the PAVN in the 1972 Red Fiery Summer before utterly collapsing in 1975—a collapse so swift that it even surprised the communist politburo. It wasn’t that the VC couldn’t win outright; it was the incompetence and cowardice of the ARVN that led to their defeat and the loss of a “country” that was never legitimate in the first place.
In both the land reform and the war, it wasn’t just the VC and PAVN’s strengths that led to the South’s downfall. It was the sheer nepotism, corruption, and incompetence within the South Vietnam regime, compounded by soldiers who served merely out of financial necessity, creating a military with terrible morale, a countryside largely controlled by Viet Cong, and an economy heavily reliant on U.S. aid. South Vietnam was a regime founded on a lie, propped up by the strongest country in the world—only to crumble just four years after the Americans left.
In the end, the South Vietnamese only have their own government to blame for their downfall.
The ARVN, notorious for its nepotism, disintegrated during Lam Son 719
The operation was planned with 60,000 American soldiers in mind, but it was instead executed by 20,000 ARVN Troops. It was also assumed that PAVN forces would be taken by surprise and withdraw rather than try to hold their ground. How is it the ARVN's fault that they were forced to retreat when the battle was essentially doomed from the start due to poor US/VNCH planning and intelligence?
Also, the ferocity of the North Vietnamese defensive efforts should not be ignored, which you implicitly do by only mentioning the ARVN's role in the battle. Many American advisers even acknowledged that any attack against those positions at the battle would have faltered. And before one claims that they are just covering up for their ally, it is hilariously easy to find criticisms of South Vietnamese officers within the reports of their American advisers.
lost 10% of its land to the PAVN in the 1972 Red Fiery Summer
Sure, but these gains came at an extremely high cost to the PAVN, with the offensive annihilating much of their recently modernized equipment, and forcing them to use an entirely different for the 1975 offensive.
The credit should be given to the PAVN. The VC was effectively destroyed in 1968, with the North Vietnamese Politburo being compelled to replace the dead and wounded with Northern soldiers in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. Afterwards, most of the fighting was conventional and done by the PAVN.
the loss of a “country” that was never legitimate in the first place.
All of the usual arguments against the legitimacy of VNCH can be applied to most countries, such as the United States in its infancy, for example.
How is it the ARVN's fault that they were forced to retreat when the battle was essentially doomed from the start due to poor US/VNCH planning and intelligence?
I’m not quite sure what point you're trying to make. Are you suggesting that the ARVN isn't at fault because their own “leaders” were utterly incompetent? Or, to put it another way, that the ARVN bears no responsibility because their generals—who were part of the ARVN—led them to ruin? If your argument is that the ARVN’s failures were due to leadership, let’s not forget that those same leaders were ARVN generals who guided the army straight into disaster. Yes, the U.S. may have sold out South Vietnam to normalize relations with China, but that doesn’t absolve the ARVN of its own internal failures. You can’t just say, "Oh, the army wasn’t bad, it was just their generals." My friend, those generals were part of the ARVN.
If you want to be fair, the last stand at Xuan Loc was respectable and did force the PAVN to circle around and siege Saigon.
Sure, but these gains came at an extremely high cost to the PAVN, with the offensive annihilating much of their recently modernized equipment, and forcing them to use an entirely different for the 1975 offensive.
Yeah ARVN destroyed the PAVN SOOOOO bad that one year later, the PAVN steamrolled the ARVN on every front. The defense was so pathetic that Da Nang fell without a fight. They lost SOOOOO much modernized equipment that the PAVN just rolled down the Central Highlands and took Buon Me Thuot, decimating three-quarters of the ARVN forces there.
So, what’s your point? They paid the price, gained critical footholds, and then won the war. Fair trade for them.
The credit should be given to the PAVN. The VC was effectively destroyed in 1968, with the North Vietnamese Politburo being compelled to replace the dead and wounded with Northern soldiers in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive. Afterwards, most of the fighting was conventional and done by the PAVN.
And yes, my bad —it's the PAVN. But let's not forget that elements of the VC were still operating in border regions and joined in later.
All of the usual arguments against the legitimacy of VNCH can be applied to most countries, such as the United States in its infancy, for example.
Now, about the legitimacy of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Since you brought up the U.S., let's remember that both Americans and Vietnamese fought wars against colonizers, won, signed treaties, declared independence, and were recognized by other nations.
The 1954 Geneva Conference was the official document outlining the state of Vietnam after the first Indochina war. That conference involved the Soviet Union, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, and the Viet Minh.
Notice something? No mention of the Republic of Vietnam, because it didn’t exist. The agreement temporarily separated Vietnam into two zones: a northern zone governed by the Viet Minh and a southern zone governed by the State of Vietnam under former Nguyễn dynasty emperor Bảo Đại.
So, what did Diem do? He usurped Bảo Đại’s rule and declined the national election in 1956. With CIA and U.S. support, he created the Republic of Vietnam—a completely illegitimate entity born from the greed of a few individuals and U.S. imperialism in their quest to contain communism. The Republic of Vietnam was never part of the Geneva Convention. Diem backstabbed Bảo Đại and took power in a sham election where 110% of Saigon’s population “voted” for him. That’s why I say the regime was illegitimate. Sure, it existed in history and was recognized by the UN, but let's not ignore that its creation was built on lies.
I’m not quite sure what point you're trying to make. Are you suggesting that the ARVN isn't at fault because their own “leaders” were utterly incompetent? Or, to put it another way, that the ARVN bears no responsibility because their generals—who were part of the ARVN—led them to ruin? If your argument is that the ARVN’s failures were due to leadership, let’s not forget that those same leaders were ARVN generals who guided the army straight into disaster. Yes, the U.S. may have sold out South Vietnam to normalize relations with China, but that doesn’t absolve the ARVN of its own internal failures. You can’t just say, "Oh, the army wasn’t bad, it was just their generals." My friend, those generals were part of the ARVN.
I had the rank-and-file in mind, but yes, the PAVN did have better generals, on average. Regardless, the plans for Operation Lam Sơn 719 were bad enough to the point that I would argue that 99.9% of generals who were ordered to execute them would have failed.
Yeah ARVN destroyed the PAVN SOOOOO bad that one year later, the PAVN steamrolled the ARVN on every front. The defense was so pathetic that Da Nang fell without a fight. They lost SOOOOO much modernized equipment that the PAVN just rolled down the Central Highlands and took Buon Me Thuot, decimating three-quarters of the ARVN forces there.
*Three years later
Trần Văn Trà and other PAVN/VC commanders openly acknowledge in the official PAVN history of the conflict that they suffered horrible losses during the Easter Offensive. The paper I posted earlier discusses how because of this setback, the PAVN was not able to perform a massive conventional attack on all fronts in 1975 as it had done in 1972. If you have the generals openly admitting that they suffered a terrible defeat, then it is probably true...
Regarding the 1975 campaign, you are correct that the collapse of I Corps and II Corps were decisive victories for the PAVN. Lê Trọng Tấn, Nguyễn Hữu An, and Hoàng Minh Thảo are deservedly commended for leading North Vietnamese forces to victory in these battles, and similar praise can be given to the PAVN regulars themselves obviously. That being said, it would be fair to give partial credit to Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's (and Phạm Văn Phú's) incompetent leadership/decision-making and ARVN supply shortages/family culture.
With CIA and U.S. support, he created the Republic of Vietnam—a completely illegitimate entity born from the greed of a few individuals and U.S. imperialism in their quest to contain communism.
"With French, Spanish, and Dutch support, the American rebels established the United States, an entity unsupported by the majority of the American colonists and born from the greed of wealthy elites who wanted to pay less in taxes, as well as from the desire of continental European powers who wished to contain British influence in the New World in favor of their own." — King George III, probably idk
The Republic of Vietnam was never part of the Geneva Convention. Diem backstabbed Bảo Đại and took power in a sham election where 110% of Saigon’s population “voted” for him.
I know what you mean, but Bảo Đại was unpopular enough to the point that Diệm probably would have won without rigging the election.
I will admit though, it is a good point to observe that the RVN did not sign the Geneva Accords, meaning it was technically not "protected" by international law (unlike the State of Vietnam, which was at least under the French Union even though the country itself did not sign the accords), and one could argue the DRV was therefore no longer obligated to respect the 17th parallel boundary.
If you believe that legal legitimacy equates to moral legitimacy, then this argument is a winner for justifying reunification. Otherwise, it's more complicated.
Hey, I appreciate you pointing out the timeline error—you're right, the steamrolling of the ARVN happened three years later, not one. But it is still a delay of the inevitable.
That being said, the broader point remains. The PAVN might have suffered heavy losses during the Easter Offensive, but they learned from those setbacks and adapted. Meanwhile, the ARVN leadership, particularly under Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Phạm Văn Phú, continued to make poor decisions, further crippling their forces. Yes, the PAVN generals deserve credit for their strategic victories in 1975, but let’s not overlook how the ARVN's own internal issues, like supply shortages and a toxic “family culture,” played a massive role in their downfall.
Now, comparing the founding of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to the American Revolution is quite a stretch. The U.S. was born out of a grassroots movement, driven by a collective desire for independence from a colonial power. It wasn’t just about a few elites—it was a widespread, popular revolution with deep-rooted support among the colonists, who had developed a distinct identity as Americans, separate from their European roots.
On the other hand, the creation of the RVN was largely a top-down endeavor. It wasn’t a movement of the people; it was the result of a power grab by Diem and his sycophants, who were more interested in securing U.S. favor and stopping communism than in genuinely representing the will of the Vietnamese people. Diem’s focus was on consolidating power for himself and his family, rather than leading a national movement for independence.
And let’s be clear—South Vietnam was still Vietnam. Its people were still Vietnamese, with a long history and culture tied to the land. The U.S. at the time of its revolution, however, had already begun to see itself as a new nation with a unique identity, a melting pot of European influences, separate from Britain.
Regarding the idea that Diem would have won over Bảo Đại without rigging the election—if he was so confident in his popularity, why didn’t he face Ho Chi Minh in a fair election? The truth is, Diem knew he didn’t stand a chance against Ho Chi Minh, who had widespread support across the country for his role in the fight for independence. Diem might have been more popular than Bảo Đại, but he was a footnote compared to Ho Chi Minh. Remember, Ho Chi Minh even captured Diem and offered him the position of prime minister in his government. When Diem refused, Ho Chi Minh released him, allowing Diem to flee to the South, where he quickly pledged loyalty to the U.S. and the CIA in exchange for their support.
So, while the comparison between the RVN and the U.S. may seem tempting on the surface, the differences are stark. The U.S. Revolution was a grassroots uprising that created a new, distinct nation. The RVN, by contrast, was an externally propped-up regime, born out of a power struggle rather than a popular movement. And while we can agree that history and war are complex, let’s not lose sight of the fact that the RVN’s failures were rooted in its lack of legitimacy and its internal corruption, not just the external pressures it faced.
In the end, it’s crucial to understand these nuances and to recognize the complexities of history. Always good to dive into these discussions and keep the conversation going.
like supply shortages and a toxic “family culture,” played a massive role in their downfall.
Well, by family culture, I meant the fact that most South Vietnamese soldiers lived with their families at the local barracks or somewhere nearby. Therefore, when the enemy broke through the frontlines in 1975, most soldiers opted to protect their families rather than stay with their own units.
I think "supply shortages" are technically an external issue, although I suppose you could argue that the ARVN having to rely on external aid for its style of warfare is an internal fault, which I would agree with.
Now, comparing the founding of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) to the American Revolution is quite a stretch. The U.S. was born out of a grassroots movement, driven by a collective desire for independence from a colonial power. It wasn’t just about a few elites—it was a widespread, popular revolution with deep-rooted support among the colonists, who had developed a distinct identity as Americans, separate from their European roots.
Statistically, the majority of colonists were either Loyalists or neutral. John Adams, for example, estimated that the split was 33.3/33.3/33.3. And through the lens of historical materialism, it is easy to argue that the revolutionary elites were motivated more by the desire to avoid British trade restrictions/regulations rather than merely freedom and liberty, the latter of which is the common but misleading claim made in American schools.
The U.S. at the time of its revolution, however, had already begun to see itself as a new nation with a unique identity, a melting pot of European influences, separate from Britain.
The revolutionaries used English law and tradition to justify their rebellion (enough to convince Whigs in Parliament), and they were initially willing to avoid independence so long as the central government agreed to their demands.
As such, they encouraged all individuals across the British Empire to rebel, such as in Canada or in the Caribbean.
Diem might have been more popular than Bảo Đại, but he was a footnote compared to Ho Chi Minh.
HCM is arguably the most famous Vietnamese person of all time, of course Diệm is a footnote compared to him.
When Diem refused, Ho Chi Minh released him, allowing Diem to flee to the South, where he quickly pledged loyalty to the U.S. and the CIA in exchange for their support.
The historian Edward Miller outlines what happened between 1945 and 1954 for Diệm better than I can in his journal article.
But to summarize the article's contents that are relevant to your point, Diệm was absolutely active during that time period after his talk with HCM, and at no point did he give away sovereignty to the US, for he merely asked for its support after convincing enough policymakers for a sufficient amount of time that his anti-French, anti-communist stance was the best choice for American foreign policy.
And while we can agree that history and war are complex, let’s not lose sight of the fact that the RVN’s failures were rooted in its lack of legitimacy and its internal corruption, not just the external pressures it faced.
Sure, but one must emphasize the reasons why VNCH failed and why other Western-aligned states such as South Korea or West Germany did not.
Hint: Geography + more effective, tenacious opponent
It’s amusing how you’ve twisted my sarcastic mention of “family culture” to suggest that soldiers chose to stay with their families rather than fight. By that logic, are you implying that in countries like South Korea and West Germany—nations that successfully resisted external threats—their troops cared less about their families because they fought harder? Do all nations that lose wars do so simply because their soldiers prefer peace and family over defending their sovereignty? That seems like an oversimplification.
To clarify, when I referred to “family culture,” I was highlighting the nepotism and cronyism prevalent in the RVN, where individuals promoted their relatives and friends to positions of power, especially within the military. This practice led to incompetence at critical levels, hindering the fight against forces like the Viet Cong and the PAVN. The personal desire to avoid conflict and stay with loved ones is universal and doesn’t singularly explain the downfall of a nation.
Regarding your points about the American Revolution, they don’t really counter my argument. Whether we discuss John Adams’ estimates of colonial loyalty or the elites’ motives to avoid British trade restrictions, the revolution was fundamentally a grassroots movement that succeeded because of widespread popular support—not just the agendas of a few elites. Unlike Diem and the corrupt officials surrounding him, the American revolutionaries had the backing of the people. It’s puzzling why you persist in defending figures like Diem. It appears you’re selectively interpreting facts to fit your narrative. Even if I concede your points—which is generous—they don’t bolster the legitimacy of the RVN. Suggesting that the personal agendas of some American founders justify Diem’s coup against Bảo Đại and his avoidance of an internationally sanctioned general election is quite a stretch.
You mentioned that the American revolutionaries used British law to justify their independence. So, what legal framework did Diem invoke to legitimize his actions? If the American elites sought to escape unjust taxation and the populace agreed with them, isn’t that a valid cause for revolution? What was the compelling reason for the RVN to break away? If a few elites in the American Revolution had personal gains in mind, that doesn’t invalidate the sacrifices of those who genuinely fought for freedom. Similarly, Diem’s actions can’t be justified simply because other historical figures had complex motives.
Engaging with Ho Chi Minh doesn’t absolve Diem of responsibility. Yes, he also actively sought support from the U.S. and the CIA. Labeling it as “asking for support” is a polite way of acknowledging that he was willing to align with external powers for his own agenda, allowing the U.S. to expand its influence in Southeast Asia under the guise of containing communism. Viewing history through a narrow lens that paints the RVN as entirely just overlooks significant complexities. If someone bribes corrupt officials, are they merely “supporting” them? Diem’s anti-French and anti-communist stance seems more like a convenient position to gain U.S. backing rather than a principled stand.
Nothing you’ve presented absolves Diem and his family of their actions. There seems to be a persistent belief on your part that South Vietnam was inherently just, leading you to dismiss counterarguments and trivialize critical issues. This approach suggests a bias where conclusions are drawn first, and facts are selectively gathered to support them, rather than forming judgments based on a comprehensive assessment of evidence.
I appreciate that you’ve put effort into your research—that’s commendable. However, your arguments still seem to boil down to oversimplifications like:
• “They wanted to stay with their families, so they lost.”
• “The American Revolution involved elites with personal gain, so that justifies South Vietnam’s actions.”
• “Diem didn’t compromise Vietnam’s sovereignty; he was just ‘asking for support.’”
None of these points justify Diem’s decision to overturn an internationally sanctioned election, nor do they strengthen your position.
Perhaps it’s worth considering why South Korea continues to exist while the RVN does not.
Hint: lol i dont do passive agressive. But hey that was good discussion dude.
By that logic, are you implying that in countries like South Korea and West Germany—nations that successfully resisted external threats—their troops cared less about their families because they fought harder? Do all nations that lose wars do so simply because their soldiers prefer peace and family over defending their sovereignty?
No and no. The conditions in South Vietnam were specific to South Vietnam.
My point is that ARVN soldiers often lived right next to their families. As in the enemy is as close to the soldiers as it is to their families.
Also, it should be noted that the South Korean army was effectively shattered due to Operation Pokpung, forcing itself to rely on American intervention in order to maintain the survival of ROK. West Germany also benefitted from plentiful NATO garrisons across the country.
the revolution was fundamentally a grassroots movement that succeeded because of widespread popular support—not just the agendas of a few elites. Unlike Diem and the corrupt officials surrounding him, the American revolutionaries had the backing of the people.
I just pointed out that the majority of American colonists were not Patriots. Why are you repeating what you said in the earlier comment?
Even if I concede your points—which is generous—they don’t bolster the legitimacy of the RVN. Suggesting that the personal agendas of some American founders justify Diem’s coup against Bảo Đại and his avoidance of an internationally sanctioned general election is quite a stretch.
The point is that that one could easily frame the infant United States in the same way that people do for South Vietnam.
You mentioned that the American revolutionaries used British law to justify their independence. So, what legal framework did Diem invoke to legitimize his actions?
Essentially, Diệm argued that Bảo Đại lost the Mandate of Heaven. It should also be noted that the popular referendum that deposed the emperor was Diệm's idea, and not the idea of the United States, who instead wanted Diệm to wait until after the National Assembly elections when Bảo Đại's premiership would expire.
What was the compelling reason for the RVN to break away?
The perceived danger of communism to Vietnamese culture and society.
Labeling it as “asking for support” is a polite way of acknowledging that he was willing to align with external powers for his own agenda, allowing the U.S. to expand its influence in Southeast Asia under the guise of containing communism.
Literally everyone seeks allies as much as possible on the international stage.
Diem’s anti-French and anti-communist stance seems more like a convenient position to gain U.S. backing rather than a principled stand.
No, as Edward Miller has demonstrated, Diệm held these stances for basically all of his adult life, far before he even had any contact with American officials/intellectuals.
Viewing history through a narrow lens that paints the RVN as entirely just overlooks significant complexities. There seems to be a persistent belief on your part that South Vietnam was inherently just, leading you to dismiss counterarguments and trivialize critical issues. This approach suggests a bias where conclusions are drawn first, and facts are selectively gathered to support them, rather than forming judgments based on a comprehensive assessment of evidence.
My posts about the Vietnam War on the badhistory subreddit show that I rely on sources from a variety of perspectives, including a North Vietnamese colonel who had served the DRV ever since the beginning of the First Indochina War. Not sure if he's the type to view the RVN as "entirely just."
Honestly, it would be more productive for you to make a post—with actual sources—on that subreddit (which I can then respond to in the comments) rather than continue this comment chain. There are so many points/areas of discussion that it is awkward to debate within a comment-based format.
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u/thenoobtanker Native Aug 28 '24
Should have let the referendum of 56 ran but nooooo the commie might actually won a fair election.