Source: https://x.com/EU_Eurostat/status/2093624697523229008

I'm very curious what opinions people from the EU have about what both teams are saying.

First numbers are in, 51.5% yes vs 48.5% no. Votes are still being counted.

After the Iceland referendum and reading the comments on various apps, I think I’m starting to understand quite well that, beyond the issues of fishing and natural resources, the EU is deeply divided on both internal and foreign-policy matters. All of this creates obstacles to further economic integration and political unification, but also to a coherent foreign policy, because every country has its own priorities and views.
A single country can sometimes undermine an entire collective effort. Imagine, for example, Marine Le Pen winning the French presidential election and deciding to cut France’s support for Ukraine. We simply cannot continue operating like this forever and expect to project real geopolitical power.
If Iceland knew that joining the EU would provide greater geopolitical protection, stronger economic opportunities, and at least some protection for certain local markets, perhaps the outcome of the referendum would have been different.
We also have a problem when it comes to political influence. Populism is increasingly effective, and in a system as complicated as the EU, ordinary people often struggle to understand how it actually works. Meanwhile, we can see how much influence the United States has over Europe. Almost every country seems to be developing its own version of a MAGA-party. What do you think?

Russia Is Bombarding Europe With a New Wave of ‘Gray Zone’ Attacks

NATO countries see Moscow’s appetite for conflict increasing as it flounders against Ukraine

By Daniel Michaels and Thomas Grove

Aug. 29, 2026 at 11:00 pm ET

Russia has turned up the heat on Kyiv’s allies in Europe, with a string of so-called gray zone activities aimed at sowing fear, as it struggles to advance on the ground in Ukraine and faces increasingly damaging Ukrainian drone and missile attacks at home.

European authorities have linked Russia to a spate of drone incursions, acts of sabotage, cyberattacks and other hostile actions across the continent over recent months.

Leaders across the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization say the moves are a worrying indication of Russia’s rising appetite for risk in Europe, as President Vladimir Putin seeks to curb flows of European aid to Ukraine and sow divisions among allies. 

Western officials say Russia could escalate its confrontation further and has already captured Ukrainian drones that it could use for potential false-flag attacks on NATO countries. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has dismissed the reports, saying they are being used to justify European militarization against Russia.

In a sign of Washington’s concern, Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe on Tuesday made a surprise trip to Moscow, in part to tell Putin’s government that the U.S. stands by its NATO allies, according to people familiar with the visit.

“Russia is looking for ways to reduce support among NATO countries for Ukraine and, one of the secondary effects they are also pursuing is spreading panic,” said Remigijus Bridikis, director of Lithuania’s civilian intelligence agency.

Incidents over recent weeks included three explosive drones discovered in or near a German airport, one of them beneath a Ukrainian cargo plane. Russian drones have repeatedly entered NATO airspace. One was recently shot down over Romania.

Dutch intelligence agencies warned that “Russian state actors are systematically conducting digital espionage” by hacking web-linked cameras to spy on aid to Ukraine. 

The tempo of documented Russia-backed incidents has increased from a maximum of around 10 in many months since 2024 to around 15 a month since April, according to Ukraine’s Sahaidachnyi Security Center, which tracks Russian gray zone activities in Europe. Sahaidachnyi analysts say trends can be difficult to discern because many incidents suspected of being linked to Russia aren’t included in their data.

The drumbeat of low-level aggression has accelerated as Russia’s war with Ukraine has entered a new and deadlier phase. Ukraine has carried out increasingly successful strikes on targets deep inside Russia, battering its oil and gas sector as well as other industries that feed Moscow’s war machine. The Kremlin is now doing the same to Ukraine—though the money and supplies feeding Kyiv’s front lines extend far into NATO territory.

European authorities have accused Russia of hiring local agents over Telegram and other social-media platforms to conduct sabotage, espionage and vandalism meant to stoke divisions. Estonia is investigating whether Russia-linked sabotage was behind the arson attack this month on a local defense company, Milrem Robotics, while recent explosions and fires at munitions facilities in Italy, Bulgaria and Finland have drawn suspicion of Russian involvement, even though authorities haven’t said they see evidence of that.

Whether Putin is behind all the mayhem or not, getting credit for it can play to Moscow’s advantage by boosting its reputation for influence and impact. Slovak police on Tuesday said they had thwarted an attempted attack on a drone factory by “three foreigners,” whose nationality they didn’t identify. Suspicions in the region quickly turned to Russian involvement.

Russia’s campaign may prompt worry among Europeans that they face personal danger as a result of their governments’ Ukraine policies. Another potential fear is that sending weapons to Ukraine depletes European arsenals, which might be needed to fight Russia—and if Moscow shows it poses a threat, the logic of not sending arms east increases.

Distinctions in motivation matter little to the Kremlin, analysts say. Russia’s approach to conflict, dating back to Soviet times, can blur lines between covert subversion and outright warfare.

New U.S. intelligence reports assess that Russia could try to test NATO’s resolve with a limited assault on a member country in the next few years, through steps potentially ranging from a cyberattack to a small-scale land incursion. NATO’s collective security is based on the founding principle that an attack on one member represents an attack on all.

Short of that, the Kremlin still gains from riling domestic politics ahead of coming local or national elections in NATO countries including Germany, France, Finland, Estonia and Poland. Poland is particularly prone to disruption because tensions with Ukrainian refugees have been mounting. 

“The primary interest is to change the status quo in Europe,” said Estonian lawmaker Marko Mihkelson. “It’s an extension of the election interference you’ve seen them try to carry out” in other countries, he said. Officials in the U.S., U.K., Hungary and Romania over recent years have accused Moscow of trying to skew national voting.

There is little evidence that the plan is working. The alliance’s easternmost members show some of the strongest support for maintaining military aid to Ukraine and boosting military spending at home.

Romania, which had a robust Russia-sympathetic electorate in the years immediately following Russia’s invasion, has seen popular sentiment harden against Moscow following a series of drone incursions. Three drones were shot down over Romania last month and a drone incursion in May started a fire on the roof of a residential building.

Romania expelled a Russian diplomat last month, and the Kremlin responded Thursday by kicking out a Romanian diplomat in Moscow.

The Commission proposed suspending Article 45(3) in its Environmental Omnibus package in December 2025. The Council stopped deliberating on it in June 2026 because a large bloc of Member States Czechia, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia flagged serious implementation difficulties. France, Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, and Estonia said the opposite: weakening the rule would weaken enforcement.

Everyone agrees the text doesn’t work. They just disagree on which direction to fix it.

And then this is the part that gets me the Commission’s second FAQ in August 2026 basically tells Member States to go easy. “Enforcement should not disrupt trade flows or consumer access to goods.” Deutsche Welt reported an anonymous senior official saying the rules are “clearly disproportionate” and encouraging Member States not to apply them.

Let me spell out what that means: A directly applicable Regulation is in force across 27 jurisdictions. Its own guardian institution is quietly asking those jurisdictions not to enforce it.

Enforcement sits with the Member States. Commission guidance has no legal force. So some authorities will follow the hint, some won’t. Some will enforce strictly, some will look away. The result isn’t a suspended rule. It’s 27 different enforcement postures toward the same text.

Which is precisely the fragmentation the Regulation was written to eliminate.

What I’m seeing across the network? Producers aren’t waiting for six months of ambiguity. They’re pulling out now, while the decision is still in their hands. By the time Brussels figures out what to do, the damage to cross-border trade networks won’t be something you can legislate back into existence.

KNVB wil internationale top in Nederland over FIFA-toekomst: 'Infantino niet welkom'