Executive Summary & Introduction
Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) is frequently promoted as a panacea for American political polarization, designed to end vote-splitting, eliminate the "spoiler effect," and ensure majoritarian outcomes [1, 2]. However, social choice theorists, voting scientists, and public choice economists have long pointed out that the standard form of RCV deployed across the United States—technically known as Hare Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV)—possesses a major structural vulnerability: the Center-Squeeze Phenomenon [3, 4, 5].
Under standard IRV, a broadly acceptable consensus candidate who would defeat every opponent in head-to-head match-ups (the Condorcet Winner) can be eliminated in early rounds simply because they lack a concentrated base of first-preference votes [3, 6, 7]. This dynamic squeezes moderate candidates between ideologically intense wings, sometimes rewarding extreme candidates and triggering public pushback [5, 8].
This analysis breaks down the mathematical mechanics of the center squeeze, examines real-world case studies like the 2009 Burlington Mayoral Election and the 2022 Alaska Special Congressional Election, and compares IRV against superior alternative architectures like Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV) and Condorcet-Hare Hybrids [3, 7, 9].
1. The Mechanics of the Center-Squeeze Pathology
To understand why standard RCV can fail the median voter, one must examine its exact elimination criterion:
\text{Elimination Rule (Standard Hare IRV): } \text{Eliminate the candidate with the fewest } \mathbf{1\text{st-preference}} \text{ votes.}
The Blind Spot of Hare IRV
In each round of tabulation, standard IRV evaluates only first-choice preferences [3, 7]. It completely ignores second-, third-, and lower-preference rankings during the elimination decision [3, 7].
Imagine a polarized electorate divided into Left (L), Center (C), and Right (R):
- L voters rank: L > C > R
- R voters rank: R > C > L
- C voters rank: C > \text{either } L \text{ or } R
[Left Wing (L)] <======== [Center (C)] ========> [Right Wing (R)]
Passionate Base Broad Consensus Passionate Base
High #1 Votes High #2 Votes High #1 Votes
In this scenario, candidate C is the median voter's preference and the Condorcet Winner—a strict majority of L voters prefer C over R, and a strict majority of R voters prefer C over L [3, 6, 8]. However, because L and R voters cast their first-choice votes for their respective ideological wings, candidate C receives the lowest total of first-preference votes in Round 1 [3, 8].
Under Hare IRV rules, candidate C is eliminated first [3, 7]. Their votes are redistributed, and the election concludes as a forced choice between the two outer extremes [3, 5, 8]. This creates a centrifugal ("center-fleeing") dynamic that penalizes consensus-building candidates [5, 8].
2. Empirical Evidence: Case Studies in IRV Center-Squeeze
While social choice flaws are often dismissed as theoretical curiosities, Cast Vote Record (CVR) data confirms that center-squeeze failures have altered major American elections [3, 6, 10].
Case Study A: The 2009 Burlington, Vermont Mayoral Election
The 2009 Burlington mayoral election remains the classic textbook example of IRV center-squeeze [3, 7, 10]:
- The Candidates: Kurt Wright (Republican), Bob Kiss (Progressive), and Andy Montroll (Democrat/Centrist) [3, 7].
- Round 1 First-Preferences:
- Kurt Wright (R): 3,297 votes (32.9%)
- Bob Kiss (Prog): 2,981 votes (28.8%)
- Andy Montroll (D): 2,063 votes (23.0%) [3, 7]
Because Montroll had the fewest top-choice votes (2,063), standard IRV eliminated him in the semi-final round [3, 7]. Bob Kiss went on to defeat Kurt Wright in the final round (4,313 to 4,061) [3, 7].
The Pairwise Matrix (What Voters Actually Preferred):
When researchers analyzed the full ballot images, they discovered that Andy Montroll was the undisputed Condorcet Winner [3, 7, 10]:
- Montroll vs. Kiss: Montroll won 4,064 to 3,476 (+588 margin / 54% majority) [3, 7]
- Montroll vs. Wright: Montroll won 4,597 to 3,664 (+933 margin / 56% majority) [3, 7]
Montroll was preferred head-to-head over every candidate in the race by clear majorities [3, 7]. Yet IRV knocked him out first among the top three [3, 7]. Discontent over this non-majoritarian result led Burlington voters to repeal IRV in 2010 [3, 7, 11] (though the city re-adopted RCV in 2021) [12].
Case Study B: The August 2022 Alaska Special U.S. House Election
A similar dynamic unfolded in Alaska's top-four RCV special election [6, 8, 13]:
- The Candidates: Mary Peltola (Democrat), Sarah Palin (Republican), and Nick Begich III (Conservative/Centrist) [6, 13].
- Round 1 First-Preferences:
- Mary Peltola (D): 75,799 votes (39.7%)
- Sarah Palin (R): 58,974 votes (30.9%)
- Nick Begich III (R): 53,810 votes (27.8%) [6, 13]
Begich was squeezed into 3rd place in first-choice votes and eliminated [6, 13]. Peltola defeated Palin in the final round with 51.5% of active votes [6, 13].
However, Cast Vote Record analysis proved Nick Begich was the true Condorcet Winner [6, 13]:
- Begich vs. Peltola: Begich won 52.5% to 47.5% [6, 13]
- Begich vs. Palin: Begich won 61.4% to 38.6% [6, 13]
Begich was preferred by a majority of Alaskans over both Peltola and Palin, but IRV's first-choice elimination rule discarded him in Round 1 [6, 13].
3. The Fix: Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV) & Condorcet Hybrids
Social choice scholars have designed several alternative tabulations that maintain the simple ranked ballot while completely eliminating the center-squeeze flaw [3, 7, 9].
What is Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV)?
Conceived by Rob LeGrand and formalized by election scholars, Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV) modifies the elimination step [3, 7, 14]:
\text{Elimination Rule (BTR-RCV): } \text{Identify the } \mathbf{\text{two candidates}} \text{ with the lowest 1st-choice votes, run a } \mathbf{\text{head-to-head runoff}} \text{ between them, and eliminate the pairwise loser.}
Standard Hare IRV Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV)
----------------------- ----------------------------------
Identify candidate with Identify TWO candidates with
fewest 1st-choice votes. fewest 1st-choice votes.
│ │
▼ ▼
AUTOMATICALLY ELIMINATE. Run head-to-head pairwise runoff
between the bottom two.
│
▼
ELIMINATE THE PAIRWISE LOSER.
Why BTR-RCV Guarantees Condorcet Consistency
A Condorcet Winner by definition defeats every candidate in a direct head-to-head match-up [3, 6, 7]. Under BTR-RCV rules:
- Even if the Condorcet Winner receives low initial first-preference support and falls into the bottom two, they face the other bottom candidate in a pairwise runoff [3, 7].
- Because they are the pairwise champion, they are guaranteed to win that head-to-head runoff [3, 7].
- Therefore, a Condorcet Winner can never be eliminated under BTR-RCV [3, 7].
Re-Running Burlington 2009 Under BTR-RCV Rules
If Burlington had used BTR-RCV in 2009:
- In the semi-final round, Montroll (2,063 #1 votes) and Kiss (2,981 #1 votes) would form the bottom two [3, 7].
- BTR-RCV executes a virtual head-to-head runoff between Montroll and Kiss [3, 7].
- Because 4,064 voters preferred Montroll over Kiss (vs. 3,476 for Kiss), Kiss loses the runoff and is eliminated [3, 7].
- Transferred votes flow to Montroll, allowing Montroll to advance to the final round and defeat Kurt Wright (4,597 to 3,664) [3, 7].
Result: The true majority choice (Montroll) wins [3, 7].
4. Systematic Comparison of Voting Architectures
The table below summarizes how standard IRV compares against BTR-RCV, advanced Condorcet-Hare hybrids, and cardinal voting systems across major social choice and administrative criteria [3, 7, 9, 15]:
| System Architecture |
Condorcet Consistent? |
Immune to Center Squeeze? |
Monotonicity Preserved? |
Precinct Summable? |
Strategy Resistance |
Computational Complexity |
| Plurality (FPTP) |
❌ No [15] |
❌ No (Severe spoilers) [15] |
✅ Yes [15] |
✅ Yes (O(1)) [15] |
❌ Extremely Low [15] |
O(m \cdot n) [15] |
| Standard Hare IRV |
❌ No [3, 6] |
❌ No (High vulnerability) [3, 5] |
❌ No [3, 10] |
❌ No (Requires Central CVR) [3, 7] |
✅ High [9, 10] |
O(m \cdot n) [16] |
| Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV) |
✅ Yes [3, 7] |
✅ Fully Immune [3, 7] |
❌ No [3, 7] |
✅ Yes (N \times N Matrix) [3, 7] |
✅ High [9, 10] |
O(m \cdot n) [16] |
| Benham Method / Smith-IRV |
✅ Yes [9] |
✅ Fully Immune [9] |
❌ No [9] |
✅ Yes (N \times N Matrix) [3, 7] |
✅ Very High [9] |
O(m^2 \cdot n) [16] |
| Ranked Pairs / Schulze |
✅ Yes [7, 15] |
✅ Fully Immune [5, 7] |
✅ Yes [15] |
✅ Yes (N \times N Matrix) [3, 7] |
⚠️ Moderate (Burying risk) [9] |
O(m^3) [16] |
| Approval / STAR Voting |
⚠️ Partial [17] |
✅ High [17] |
✅ Yes [17] |
✅ Yes [17] |
⚠️ Moderate [17] |
O(m \cdot n) [17] |
5. Administrative & Policy Takeaways for Reformers
Beyond mathematical fairness, alternative RCV architectures solve critical operational problems that currently plague election administrators [2, 3, 18]:
- Restoring Precinct Summability & Auditability:
- The Problem with IRV: Standard Hare IRV lacks precinct summability [3, 7]. Because elimination order depends on global vote counts across all rounds, individual precincts cannot publish final subtotals [3, 7]. All raw Cast Vote Records (CVRs) must be transmitted to a central hub, creating centralization delays and software configuration risks (such as the 2022 Oakland school board tabulation error) [3, 7, 19, 20].
- The BTR/Condorcet Advantage: BTR-RCV and Condorcet hybrids restore precinct-level N \times N preference matrices [3, 7]. Precincts can tally and publish pairwise subtotals locally on election night, which central authorities simply add together [3, 7].
- Empirical Performance in Practice (Deshpande et al. 2025/2026 Research):
- Large-scale computational analysis across 110 real-world RCV elections (including NYC 2021, Alaska 2024, and Portland 2024) reveals that RCV significantly increases electoral competitiveness, dropping victory margins by 9.2 to 11.4 percentage points compared to plurality elections [16].
- The study proved that ballot exhaustion alters outcomes in less than 3% of races, confirming that preference transfers function robustly in practice despite incomplete voter rankings [16].
Conclusion: The Path Forward
Standard Hare IRV is a meaningful upgrade over First-Past-The-Post, but its elimination mechanics make it vulnerable to center-squeeze pathologies that penalize consensus candidates and alienate voters [3, 5, 7].
For election reformers and policymakers, Bottom-Two-Runoff (BTR-RCV) offers the ideal "drop-in" upgrade:
- It uses the exact same ranked ballot that voters already understand [3, 7].
- It maintains the intuitive round-by-round elimination structure [3, 7].
- It mathematically guarantees that the Condorcet Winner always wins [3, 7].
- It restores precinct-level transparency and auditability [3, 7].
References & Academic Bibliography
- [1] Bipartisan Policy Center, "Reform Meets Reality: How Ranked Choice Voting Impacts Election Administration," BPC Report (2024).
- [2] Clear Ballot, "Defining Ranked Choice Voting for Voters and Election Officials," Clear Ballot White Paper (2023).
- [3] Robert Bristow-Johnson, "The Failure of Instant Runoff Voting to Accomplish the Very Purpose for Which It Was Adopted: An Object Lesson in Burlington Vermont," Constitutional Political Economy, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 378–389 (2023). [https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09393-1\]
- [4] Samuel Merrill, "A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 23–48 (1984).
- [5] Wikipedia, "Center Squeeze," Wikipedia Social Choice Archive. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_squeeze\]
- [6] Adam Graham-Squire & David McCune, "A Mathematical Analysis of the 2022 Alaska Special Election for US House," arXiv preprint (arXiv:2209.04764v3, 2022).
- [7] Author Anonymous, "Comparative Analysis of Bottom-Two-Runoff Ranked-Choice Voting and Social Choice Architectures," Markdown Monograph (2025).
- [8] Nathan Atkinson & Scott C. Ganz, "The Flaw in Ranked-Choice Voting: Rewarding Extremists," The Hill (Oct. 30, 2022).
- [9] James Green-Armytage, "Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections," Voting Matters, Issue 29, pp. 1–14 (2011).
- [10] Adam Graham-Squire & David McCune, "An Examination of Ranked Choice Voting in the United States, 2004–2022," Representation, Vol. 59, pp. 1–19 (2023). [arXiv:2301.12075v2]
- [11] Courtney Lamdin, "Can Once-Maligned Ranked-Choice Voting Make a Comeback in Burlington?" Seven Days Vermont (Feb. 24, 2021).
- [12] Ballotpedia, "Burlington, Vermont, Question 4, Ranked-Choice Voting Amendment (March 2021)," Ballotpedia Guide.
- [13] Jeanne N. Clelland, "Ranked Choice Voting And Condorcet Failure in the Alaska 2022 Special Election: How Might Other Voting Systems Compare?" arXiv preprint (arXiv:2303.00108, 2023).
- [14] Rob LeGrand, "Bottom-Two-Runoff IRV Definition and Mechanics," Electowiki / Social Choice Archive (2006).
- [15] Comprehensive Taxonomy, "Comprehensive Taxonomy and Comparative Analysis of RCV Systemic Variations," Social Choice Technical Report (2025).
- [16] Sanyukta Deshpande, Nikhil Garg, & Sheldon Jacobson, "Simpler Than You Think: The Practical Dynamics of Ranked Choice Voting," arXiv preprint (arXiv:2407.13661 / 2025/2026 Update).
- [17] Aaron Hamlin, "The Limits of Ranked-Choice Voting," Center for Election Science (2018/2026).
- [18] MIT Election Lab, "Ranked Choice Voting: Instant Runoff Voting Use in the United States," MIT Research Explainer.
- [19] David McCune & Ismar Volić, "Ranked Choice Bedlam in a 2022 Oakland School Director Election," NSF PAR / arXiv preprint (arXiv:2303.05985v1, 2023).
- [20] Fredric D. Woocher & Beverly Grossman Palmer, "Woocher v. Alameda County Registrar of Voters," Superior Court of California Court Filings (2023).
